

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THE LETTERS AND FRIENDSHIPS OF
SIR CECIL SPRING RICE

Works by Sir Cecil Spring Rice

THE STORY OF VALEH AND HADIJEH

SONGS FROM THE BOOK OF JAFFIR

POEMS

SIR CECIL SPRING RICE, 1914

Photo: Harris and Ewing, Washington, U.S.A.

THE LETTERS AND FRIENDSHIPS *of* SIR CECIL SPRING RICE

A RECORD

Edited by
STEPHEN GWYNN

VOLUME II

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CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
XV.	RUSSIA 1905-6	1
XVI.	THE ANGLO RUSSIAN ENTENTE	52
XVII.	PERSIA 1906-7	77
XVIII.	ENGLAND 1907-8	108
XIX.	IN ENGLAND AND IN SWEDEN 1908-1910	126
XX.	IN SWEDEN. FROM THE ACCESSION OF KING GEORGE TO 1913	152
XXI.	WASHINGTON	178
XXII.	THE FIRST STAGES OF THE WAR	213
XXIII.	FROM THE SINKING OF THE "LUSITANIA" TO THE AUTUMN OF 1915	268
XXIV.	FROM THE AUTUMN OF 1915 TO THE SPRING OF 1916	295
XXV.	FROM THE SPRING OF 1916 TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S RE-ELECTION	325
XXVI.	FROM NOVEMBER 1916 TO AMERICA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR	352
XXVII.	FROM APRIL 1917 TO JANUARY 1918	390
XXVIII.	THE END OF SERVICE	426
INDEX		439

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

VOLUME TWO

Sir Cecil Spring Rice, 1914 - - - - - *Frontispiece*

Mr. H. E. Luxmoore - - - - - - *Face p.* 48

Henry Adams - - - - - - - „ 168

Mrs. Lodge - - - - - - - - „ 294

CHAPTER XV

RUSSIA 1905–6

THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AND THE FIRST DUMA

From October 27, 1905, till May 28, 1906, except for one week in the month of January, Spring Rice was in charge of the Embassy at St. Petersburg,[1] Sir Charles Hardinge being brought home to replace Sir Thomas Sanderson at the head of the Foreign Office. The charge was peculiarly difficult and arduous during that period, owing to the acute disorder which prevailed in Russia, and which came to a head after the conclusion of peace with Japan. We have all known the strained conditions that result even in a country which emerges victorious from a great war. But Russia had met defeat, humiliating to the national pride; and long before the first surrender, the nation was torn with internal strife.

From the beginning of 1905, strikes had been declared at many places, with avowedly political object. On January 22 of that year Father Gapon, at the head of a great but unarmed body of strikers, after having given full notice of their purposes, marched to the Winter Palace to demand the constitutional reforms which had been promised by the Ministers on December 15, 1904. They found the access guarded by troops, and confusion began, and the end was a massacre. The party of reaction resumed control: Trepow, formerly Minister of Police in Moscow, was appointed Governor-General of St. Petersburg; and Boulyguin replaced the Liberal Prince Mirski as Minister of the Interior.

During these disturbances Spring Rice was in London and Washington.

In spite of repression, strikes spread even into Siberia; on Feb. 6, 1905, the Procurator of the Finnish Senate was assassinated; on February 17, the Grand Duke Serge was blown up by a bomb. Meanwhile at Baku and Tiflis, Tartars rose and massacred their Armenian neighbours.

On March 3 were issued, as has been noted above,[2] two conflicting manifestos, of which the second promised an elected assembly to take part in legislation. Weeks passed, and delegations from the Zemstvos

[1] His knowledge of Russian was considerable: he had been granted an allowance in respect of it from July 1904.

[2] I. p. 456.

pressed for fulfilment of the promise. At the end of April, clemency was in the ascendant, and a ukase abolished many religious disabilities of Old Believers, Roman Catholics and other Christians not of the Orthodox Church. But on May 1 a procession of working men in Warsaw was assailed with volleys.

So it went on, representatives of the Zemstvos meeting in Congress to renew their demands for a constitution, and reactionaries leading out mobs against students and other Liberals. After the naval defeat at Tsushima, the demand for stopping the war redoubled, and on June 19 the Tsar renewed his promise of reforms to delegates of the Zemstvos.

Discontent broke into revolution. Sixty thousand armed workmen raised barricades at Lodz in June and fought the troops, but mutiny spread to the enlisted men; the barracks were burnt at Sebastopol and on June 27, the "Potemkin," leading ship of the Black Sea Fleet, mutinied while at sea and was taken into a Roumanian harbour. There was rioting at the Baltic ports of Reval, Riga, Libau and Cronstadt—dockers and bluejackets fraternising. On July 10 the Prefect of Police in Moscow was assassinated. Again, Spring Rice was absent during the moment of acute disorder—which spread to the Baltic provinces where the Letts were assailing the landlords, most of them German.

On August 19, before peace was yet signed, an Imperial manifesto declared that a Duma should begin to sit, not later than January 15, 1906. It was to be established for preliminary study of legislation to be submitted to the supreme autocratic authority—that is, it was only to draft Bills, not pass them.

This excessive limitation of its powers provoked furious protest and the declaration of peace passed almost unnoticed by the people at large.

In September the Tartars declared a Holy War on the Armenians, and fired the oil wells at Baku. On October 12 came the death of a trusted leader of Reform, Prince Serge Troubetskoi. On October 26, the day before Spring Rice assumed charge of the Embassy, a general railway strike began—political in object. On October 30, the Tzar issued yet one more manifesto, promising the Duma at once, with freedom of conscience, speech and association to all his subjects. The chief reactionary, Pobiedonostseff, was removed from his post as Procurator of the Holy Synod, and Witte became Prime Minister.

But Witte, the Liberal who had accepted office under an autocrat, was regarded as such men are in times of revolutionary temper. Rioting went on. Certain concessions were made: Finland recovered free suffrage, and a Finnish Ministry. But at Moscow Cossacks dragooned demonstrators; there was much Jew-baiting. On November 9 mutiny broke out at Kronstadt; on the 16th there was revolt of the troops and seamen, leading to an actual battle at Sebastopol; and on December 9 martial law was proclaimed and the reactionaries again took charge. On December 21 there was a rising in Moscow. On December 26, elections for the Duma were ordered.

Naturally enough, in these months foreign residents went in dread of their lives—especially the English, who had been Japan's allies. On November 14 Spring Rice got a compliment from his official chief, who was not lavish of praise.

" I am glad," Sir Thomas Sanderson wrote, " you are able to write and telegraph with such calm logic in the middle of a very distracting situation, for I have no doubt that you are being pelted with frantic applications for information and protection."

More detailed testimony as to this coolness is given by Lord Onslow who then (as Lord Cranley) was attached to the Embassy as private secretary. He writes :

" In St. Petersburg in 1905 there was almost a panic in the British Colony, and we had a constant flow of people at the Embassy asking for protection, for ships, etc., etc. : every kind of foolish demand. There was, of course, no cause for it and our people were making themselves really ridiculous. Just at this time an English Club was formed and an inaugural dinner held at the Hotel D'Angleterre. Springy was in charge at the time and he and the rest of us went. The others were Herman Norman, Errington (now Lord Cromer), and myself. There was a good deal of panicky talk at dinner, and after dinner Springy was called on for a speech. In the nicest possible way, and the most charming manner in the world, he so soundly chaffed the panic-mongers and made them look so ridiculous that we never heard another word about it. This stoppage of a possible serious riot at St. Petersburg then was not the least of Springy's many public services. . . ."

He himself wrote to Louis Mallet on November 12, 1905 :

" British subjects have been in need of a good deal of assistance and this means a letter and a visit in each case. I have found the heads of the police authorities very good natured and helpful and have no cause of complaint. Stead is an ass. If he thought there was danger, why did not he tell me ? He knew me and knew the Consul at Helsingfors. He left here in a great fright owing to a threatening telegram which he received : ' Get out ', *non amplius*. He rushed off to Finland on the way home. There the strike caught him. I have an appealing letter which he addressed to the strike committee threatening them with the wrath of the *Times* newspaper if they insisted on detaining him. He got off finally, owing to the exertions of the Consul. He was accused here of being a sort of agent of the autocracy and I suppose was afraid for his life. I don't see any particular reason to be afraid, although most people are arming

themselves. The streets are quiet and the authorities are taking every measure of precaution. Anyhow we can do nothing and the idea of sending a cruiser is just folly.

The British Colony are behaving extremely well and are keeping their heads, though the governesses who are in Jew houses are rather anxious. The Jews have left their homes and live in hotels. I repeat I can't see that there is any cause for anxiety, unless there is another general strike resulting in an open conflict with the Government, or a revolt of the army. There are no signs that either one or the other is probable and we have all the greatest confidence in the good will and competence of the local authorities here. So I think you can set yourselves at ease. This is the temple of rumours and the correspondents have a hungry public to provide for. You might, if you see him, tell Sir Frank (Lascelles) that I have reported officially in this sense. He would not perhaps believe me if I wrote privately to him. Norman and Errington have had a very hard time lately and I hope that you will remember it to their credit. We are here all day and very often till late at night, and there is not much diversion. Reward them or put them down for a good mark. Cranley comes to-morrow, which will be a comfort."

Spring Rice continued to describe the situation to his friends in the White House.

Nov. 1, 1905.

"Dear Mrs. Roosevelt,

Your friend Witte has been going it. As you asked for details about him, here are some. The strike was intended to break out simultaneously all over the country, but like the Black Sea Mutiny it broke out sooner than was intended, and as a consequence lost some of its effect. It was not meant to be the final effort of the reform party but a sort of general rehearsal. It was not believed that the Government would yield.

However, on Oct. 21 it broke out in Moscow and a few days after spread to St. Petersburg. On the second day a council of Ministers was held at Witte's house, who decided on repressive measures, Trepow (in whose hands these measures would be) remarking that they were only a temporary measure, and that the only cure for the present evils was the impossible one of a constitution. Measures were taken accordingly and communicated to the Emperor by the Ministers. Witte, however, made a speech in which he said that, if the Government resorted to severe measures without political concessions and if blood was shed, he believed the sense of the whole civilized world would

be against the Russian Government. He accentuated his remarks by saying that it would be interesting to see what the capitalists would say who were at the present moment at St. Petersburg negotiating a loan. The next day things got very much worse. Trepow was urged by Witte, and instructed by the Emperor, not to fire unless it was absolutely necessary ; but he published a very strong warning in which he told the people that the troops had been ordered not to spare their cartridges. Everything remained quiet, as both sides were anxious that the blame of bloodshed should be on the other, but the pause was ominous and those who knew the town well were very much alarmed. The financiers definitely said (and the Finance Minister agreed with them) that in view of the present state of things the loan was for the present impossible. On Oct. 26 there was a meeting at Peterhof. The Ministers had to go down by sea as even the Imperial Railway was closed. Two days afterwards Witte went down alone and gave the Emperor a written manifesto and programme of reforms which he asked the Emperor to sign. He said if the Emperor signed he would then consent to undertake the whole responsibility of Government. He did this in the firm conviction that he was risking his life. The Emperor read the document and hesitated. He then asked if Witte himself would bind himself to serve if he, the Emperor, consented to his terms. He sat down and wrote a promise which he signed. Still the Emperor hesitated and at last said that he could not definitely say whether he would consent or refuse. Witte went back quite exhausted and said the next morning that he was free of the whole business and that now he could retire. All that day he heard nothing from the Palace. In the meantime the Emperor had consulted his inner council consisting of his family and certain old gentlemen, like Budberg and Ignatiev and Goreimeikin, men who were practically pledged to reaction. They told him that the movement would collapse of itself, that the troops were faithful and the peasants devoted to their ' little father.' Then appeared the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch. He said that he was the bearer of messages from the working men whom he had seen. Also he said that one regiment was doubtful and that the artillery could not be depended on. Also that officers and soldiers were frequent attendants at the revolutionary meetings and that the whole situation was most alarming. It is said he asked the Emperor to put the government in the hands of some of those who advised reaction. Ignatiev, the chief reactionary adviser, at once refused, and Witte remained the only possible resource. The fact that the Emperor and the whole court hated him made

no difference. He was a useful screen to put for a time between the people and the throne. He could be kicked over when his popularity was used up.

Late in the evening Witte got a telephone message from Peterhof. The Emperor had consented to the manifesto but Witte himself must sign the programme of reforms. But there was a slight change which the Emperor wished to make in the manifesto. So all night there was doubt. What was the change? The next day he heard that the change was in the preamble. The Emperor wished to give the constitution of his own free will of his abundant love for his people and so on. The reference to the disorders might be understood to mean that the Emperor was yielding to force. Witte insisted. He was summoned to Peterhof, for the Emperor would not leave his family and come to Petersburg. There Witte gained his point. He showed the telegrams which had arrived from all parts of the country and the reports from the police of the capital. He received full permission to publish the manifesto and the Emperor claimed his promise to undertake the Government. He returned to St. Petersburg that night.

In the meantime things had got worse. Trepow said he must order his men to shoot. There was no doubt the people were making bombs and he must invade the technological institute where the bombs were being made. On the other hand the mob was getting furious with delay. Every day they had been promised a constitution and they had seen nothing but Trepow's threats. They refused to wait any longer, the more so as their money was expended and the strike would have to stop anyhow. They must do something to shock civilisation before the strike ended. I believe the most urgent entreaties were addressed to both sides by the friends of peace, and that men went on their knees to officers to entreat them not to fire and tore the pistols out of the hands of the students. At last the shock came. A bomb was thrown and the soldiers fired. Witte received the news just as he returned, and it seemed that all was over. But both people and soldiers behaved extremely well and the firing suddenly ceased. The worst of it was that the manifesto was already in the hands of the printers and would not appear. There had been a strike of the electric workers and they had to be persuaded to come back to work. That caused delay and it wasn't till nearly midnight that the manifesto actually appeared. There was shouting and running about and speechifying and applause and howls: the whole lit by a searchlight from the Admiralty tower, for the electric light on the Nevski had gone out because of the strike. The next

morning the streets were decorated with flags and we thought that all was over. Quite the contrary. The processions with red flags went through the town and there were fights between bands carrying Russian flags and those carrying red flags. The police had to fire and there were some more deaths. The Liberals were communicated with, and told Witte that unless the Government could do something at once their promises were no good. No one believed in them. They demanded the instant release of all political prisoners. They asked why the Emperor in abandoning the autocracy still called himself autocrat ?

It looks as if the whole business was to begin over again. As yet, it is true the Government has promised a great deal. But its performance consists as yet merely in the dismissal of the wicked old Procurator of the Holy Synod [1] who after the death of Alexander prevented his son from granting the constitution. It is frankly stated by Liberals that what has been given will be as usual rendered of no effect by the Emperor's advisers, and that the people must not lay down their arms till they have deeds and not words. On the other side, it is freely said that if the people commit excesses, as is very probable, the Government will be relieved of its promises and also of Witte. The Liberals still refuse to work with Witte although he is the only possible man now. He has no one to help him. Troubetskoi had been offered the Ministry of Education when he died.

We hear that the President [2] is furious with the English for not having helped him to make peace and that he has expressed a very low opinion of the Government of my poor country. Also that he wished to enter the league of nations which was to have opposed the Anglo-Jap agreement. That league has fallen to the ground, as the French said outright that they would not join it under any pretext whatever, until something was done by the allies to make an agreement between the other powers a necessary measure of self defence. Then the Russians became very friendly to us and the Emperor received our Ambassador. Hardinge said that, in wishing to be on easy terms with Russia, England had no idea whatever of asking the Russians to join the English in any combination hostile to anyone. The Emperor agreed and expressed very sincerely his hope that we should be able to settle the difficulties which so often arose. So some time or other we shall set to work and try and build another room in the house of peace.

I send you our Magna Charta, if you are not now too much of a sovereign to look at it with equanimity ?

[1] Pobiedonostseff.

[2] Roosevelt. Of course, this is an ironical account of Russian opinion.

That letter crossed one from Roosevelt himself.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Nov. 1, 1905.

"DEAR CECIL,

Your letters are of the greatest pleasure and interest to us, and I do hope you will keep on writing them.

Moreover, you often give me the chance to set things right. As soon as I returned from my trip to the South, Mrs. Roosevelt read me your last letters, including the one in which you describe how Witte had told the French Ambassador that the United States sympathised with Russia in being hostile to the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In accordance with your request I saw Jusserand [1] at once and told him what Witte had said, and asked him immediately to cable to his Government that so far from this being true, I had seen the treaty in question before it was ratified, both the English and the Japanese giving me the substance thereof; and that I had told both nations in answer to their requests that I entirely approved of the treaty, was glad that it had been negotiated, and believed that it was advantageous to the peace of Asia, and therefore, to the peace of the world. By my direction, Taft reiterated this in a talk with the Japanese Prime Minister, Katsura; saying specifically, that we entirely approved of the Japanese position about Korea as set forth in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, and as acknowledged in the Treaty of Portsmouth. Jusserand told me that he entirely understood my position, and that he believed the French Government did, but that in any event he would cable just what I had said. Root also, of course, understands my position and cordially sympathises with me. I informed Takahira to-day of what I had told Jusserand and shall ask Root to let Durand know also.

Witte impressed me much while he was here, but by no means altogether pleasantly. He spoke with astonishing freedom of the hopeless character of the Russian despotism; he said among other things that if we took the writings of the Russian anarchists on the one hand and the writings of the Russian Government officers on the other, we would get at the truth by drawing a line just about midway between them. I thought this pretty frank, coming from a man in his position—it was when he was at dinner with me the last time. He also commented on the brutality of the treatment of political suspects with contempt and indignation, and said that Russia could not possibly go on in the twentieth century with methods suited

[1] The French Ambassador.

only to the sixteenth or seventeenth. In short, he impressed me with being entirely alive to the need of radical reform in Russia, and all the more fitted to do good work because he was not a doctrinaire. But he also impressed me with being very much more concerned for his own welfare than for the welfare of his nation, and as being utterly cynical, untruthful and unscrupulous. He said, with great frankness, that it was to Russia's interest to support the Turks, because if the Bulgarians replaced them they might build up a prosperous Slav Empire to the South, which would be a very disastrous thing, in his judgement, for Russia ; and added contemptuously that this might not be right from a sentimental standpoint, but that sentimentality had nothing whatever to do with practical politics.

As for what you tell me about the Czar and the Court generally now, saying that they did not want peace, and that the southern half of Saghalin was only offered in the belief that Japan would fight rather than recede about the indemnity, I regard it as a poor piece of silly bluster. The Czar was firm about the indemnity, and would undoubtedly have fought rather than have given in on it. But as a matter of fact I think that through Meyer we would have gotten a small payment, something like what was given for Alaska, to secure the return of the North half of the island to Russian rule. The Japanese behaved very well and with great moderation, and while I think they were primarily actuated by a wise self-interest in refusing to fight further to get an indemnity which they would never have gotten, and which would have cost them untold treasure and blood, yet I think that a certain high and fine sentiment may have had a part also in determining their action. Of course, it is very easy after the event to say that things should have been done a little differently ; and, indeed, I personally would have played the game a different way. I should not have made a bluff that I did not expect to make good, and I would not have gotten into the position of asking an indemnity which was sure to be refused, and therefore in the end giving the Russians the simulacrum of a diplomatic victory. But the Russians are such preposterous people (at least as regards the diplomats and the governmental authorities in general of the old régime), and lying and bluffing and breaking faith are so ingrained in them that it may well be they would not have given up the south half of Saghalin if the Japanese had not made the bluff they did about the indemnity. I was very much concerned lest my little Japanese friends, the statesmen over here, would have to kill themselves when they got back to Japan. But I think now

that the Japanese people are taking a more rational view of matters. It was most to Russia's interest, but it was also greatly to Japan's interest, to make peace.

Takahira came to me the other day and stated that his Government was anxious as to what Japanese despatches I was going to make public and would like the privilege of cutting out one portion of one at least. But I told him I did not intend to make public anything relating to the matter at all, but would let the Japanese and Russians make public whatever they chose. As far as I am concerned, the thing is done. A good many years hence it may be amusing, and perhaps profitable, to write a full account of how it was done, but now is not the time.

I do not know what to say as to the relations you set forth as existing between Germany and England. I think you are entirely right in your statement of these relations ; but I have no idea how to make them better. I have more than once been greatly exasperated with the Kaiser myself. When I first came into the Presidency I was inclined to think that the Germans had serious designs upon South America. But I think I succeeded in impressing on the Kaiser, quietly and unofficially, and with equal courtesy and emphasis, that the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by territorial aggrandisement on his part around the Caribbean meant war, not ultimately, but immediately, and without any delay. He has always been as nice as possible to me since and has helped me in every way, and my relations with him and the relations of the two countries have been, I am happy to say, growing more close and more friendly. Very possibly, these friendly relations will be completely upset by a tariff fight next spring, or shortly afterwards. But at any rate it was a good thing to have softened down the spirit of bitterness that was certainly rife in both countries four years ago. I did not like the Kaiser's attitude in the Morocco business. But upon my word, the showing that Delcassé has made of himself since—together with the fact that, as I am now pretty sure, Delcassé really wished to prevent peace between Russia and Japan, or at least its coming through American efforts—has made me very uncertain whether the Kaiser did not have just cause for apprehension from Delcassé's policy.

As to your own country, I have never wavered. I feel that England and the United States, beyond any other two powers, should be friendly with one another, and what I can legitimately do to increase the friendliness will be done. One of the best manifestations of it, by the way, was my insisting upon having the Alaskan boundary settled right and taking sufficiently

active steps to make the British Government understand the seriousness of the situation.

I am concerned at the hostility between England and Germany. I think it very unfortunate. I am obliged to say as far as my own experience goes I have heard just as wild talk, just as inflammatory and provocative talk, among Englishmen as among Germans. Whether anything can ever be done to reduce the feeling I cannot say. If I can do it I certainly will.

You speak of my being able to help to keep the peace of Europe. If at any time I see where I can thus help I shall most certainly try to help. But I do not wish to assume the position of an international 'meddlesome Matty' or to make myself ridiculous by striving to interfere where my interference is not desired or would be wholly ineffective. I need not say to you that there is no more grotesquely foolish error than to suppose that, because under certain circumstances one has achieved a given object, this same object can always be achieved, even though the circumstances be different. I have made peace once because I refused to act until the right moment, and then used every ounce of influence at my command to secure what I desired. It may be that sometime under somewhat similar conditions I shall be able to make peace again, but I am not at all sure, and I certainly do not intend to go into peace-making as a regular business. It is quite enough to keep this nation on an even keel and to prevent its being led into doing anything out of the way on the one hand, or showing weakness on the other. I have great faith in my countrymen; but I believe that all of us must normally do our duty at home before striving to do too much abroad."

The immediate answer to this may be detached from the end of the long letter to Mr. Roosevelt which follows, dated Nov. 27, 1905.

"I have received with infinite joy and satisfaction the President's letter. It has been *an immense* relief here and elsewhere to know the President was not hostile to the Anglo-Jap agreement. The French were told so by the Russians, who were told, so they said, on the highest authority. Consequently the French thought it was the President, and were much relieved to know it wasn't. You may be sure of one thing; neither France nor England will enter into a hostile combination against anyone. With a Republican Government and citizen army, as we both must have, none but a war of self-preservation and self-defence is possible. The men wouldn't fight for Asia, or for Africa."

The bulk of the letter, as will be seen, described events in Russia.

"DEAR MRS. ROOSEVELT,

Things have been most interesting as you will have guessed. I have heard a good deal because I have seen Dillon pretty often who is the literary agent of the great man,[1] and also of the new procurator of the Holy Synod who is his only official friend. What has happened I take to be something of this kind. When the manifesto was published, orders were given that the police were to abstain from interfering with the people. The consequence was that here at Petersburg and, of course, in a greater degree in other parts of the country the Liberals and Socialists had a very good time. They looked upon the manifesto as the victory of the working classes and the Liberals over the Government, and proceeded to celebrate it as such. Here there were enormous processions with red flags, shouting the Marseillaise, and 'down with the Czar,' and other patriotic manifestations, and the police either disappeared altogether or looked on without interfering. The streets were a curious sight. These processions were marching about, and everyone who met them had to take off their hats to the red flag, on which as often as not was inscribed 'Down with Autocracy.' These last two days, the university was turned into a general meeting-place where all sorts of extravagant speeches were delivered and very threatening language used. The same took place in the provinces, and often enough the policemen were fired at and had to disappear altogether. In Moscow the policemen were removed at the request of the town council. But the old régime did not intend to die so easily, and everywhere the police and the minor officials organized reprisals, which was easy enough to do, as the lower classes of the population are entirely in the hands of the police, and are besides, like the lazzaroni of Naples, all for Government and Church. The Liberals are composed of the upper strata of society with students and, of course (small blame to them), of the Jews. Thus it was easy enough to persuade the lower classes that these students and Jews were celebrating their victory over the Government which meant that the Czar was to be deposed and the Jews and students and middle classes to take his place; and that if this happened it would be a very bad thing for the poor. And when the crowds began to tear down the pictures of the Czar and to shout 'Down with autocracy,' the police could say with some show of reason that the Czar had ordered these wicked persons to be destroyed and their property handed over to the faithful 'people.' The 'people' acted accordingly, and all over the country the trium-

[1] Witte.

phal processions of the reformers were most terribly punished. In almost every town of the Empire there were savage attacks made on students and Jews. You will have seen the accounts of the inconceivable brutality of these attacks, and the accounts are not exaggerated. In Petersburg they were planned. Lists of proscription were drawn up and houses marked. The Jews fled to Finland or to the big hotels where they slept for two nights, five in a room.

From the accounts I have heard from impartial persons I think it is probably true that the Jews in some places had made elaborate preparations and had collected arms, but like the Armenians they can prepare and organize, but when the moment comes for fighting they lie down and die. In some places, however, they made a good fight and I believe in Odessa more Christians than Jews were killed. When the first news began to arrive, the diplomatists here rushed off to Trepow to remonstrate. I was among them. Trepow observed that he had sent orders but that 'These anti-Jewish riots always lasted three days.' I also went to Witte, as Lord Lansdowne wanted me to point out that the press would infallibly turn against his Government if such things went on, and Witte is particularly sensitive about the foreign press. He answered that it was impossible to doubt the good faith of the Central Government; no one willingly cut their own throats; but that as, for the last few years, the Police and the priests had been told by the authorities that their duty was to persuade the people that every Jew and every Liberal was the enemy of the Russian race, it could not be hoped that a new Government could cure that in a single day.—He was in a terrible state of mind, and said that it seemed to him inconceivable that these people would not understand that the real danger was reaction, and that if they continued to give the party in power an excuse for reaction, reaction would come and in a form more terrible than Russia had ever known.

As a matter of fact his position was very difficult. He had given the Emperor a written promise that he would undertake the Government if the Emperor would accept the manifesto. The Emperor accepted—

December 11.

Here has been a long interval. I never have had such a time and you will, I hope, forgive me. I was about to write (when interrupted) that the Emperor had accepted the programme laid before him by Witte, and that Witte had undertaken to carry on the Government on this basis. It was a

bargain, and Witte has done his best to keep it. You will see with how much success. The supposition was that the Liberals would be satisfied with the concessions granted them and that the Conservatives would bow to the will of the Emperor. As a matter of fact the Liberals were not satisfied. The reason was that the manifesto contained, like other promises which preceded it, *promises*. The promises contained in the preceding manifestos were never realised. The laws which were drawn up on the basis of these promises were very different indeed from the laws expected and promised. The Liberals therefore refused to accept the manifesto as a satisfactory solution until it was translated into legislation. And the legislation was a very long time coming. The result of the impatience of the people who demanded something real and positive was a second strike, which was ordered in consequence of the arrest of the Cronstadt mutineers and the declaration of martial law in Poland. The mutiny at Cronstadt had been carefully prepared and only broke down because the mutineers all got hopelessly drunk in the first five minutes and were easy to capture. The military were not to be depended on, and if the mutineers had been determined they could have occupied the place. They were arrested and tried for their lives. The strike was ordered in the hope that the reform party would capture the army by this show of sympathy. At the same time the Poles (who certainly were behaving very badly as I know from Britishers who are in business there) were put under martial law. Neither mutineers nor Poles are very popular in Russia and the workmen were already exhausted by the long strike which led to the manifesto. Only half the men in Petersburg went out and Moscow refused to join. The strike collapsed and resulted in a certain encouragement to the Government. On the other hand it showed clearly what we all see at present, that the real object of the revolutionary party which organized the strike was not to cause the establishment of a constitution but to bring the Government to its knees by an entire disorganization of all the conditions of life. No reforms can satisfy such a party, which demands not the reform of the Government but its destruction.

Under these circumstances the Zemstvos met in Moscow. They do not represent a party. They are composed of representatives of the people who are not bureaucrats nor proletarians, but are all interested in the maintenance of order because they are in business or are landed proprietors or engaged in professions. Their decisions were very characteristic. They refused to support the Government because they said that long experience had taught them that the Government was

not to be trusted; and they at the same time did not like to refuse their support to what is really the only hope of order. Therefore they said that they would give their support, but only on condition that the Government acted and acted according to certain principles, one of which was the convocation of a national assembly based on universal suffrage. This means that they are convinced that this is the only hope for the country. If such an assembly is once convened, then there is something round which all the political life of the country can rally. At present, there is the Emperor whom no one can get at except through the good will of courtiers. There is Witte who is a bureaucrat of bureaucrats and absolutely out of sympathy with all non-official persons. There is his Government which consists of a maze of committees, which hardly anyone understands and which no popular sentiment can influence. In fact, there is nothing which in any sense reflects the life and feelings of the nation. If the assembly once meets, this may all be changed. But if the Government has the making of this assembly and forms it to its will, it will only be another branch of the bureaucracy, and the last state of Russia will be worse than the first. So the Zemstvoists do all they can to urge the Government while it is yet time to grant what they say is the popular demand. The Government is hesitating and will probably at the last moment make some electoral law which will leave everyone dissatisfied.

In the meantime Witte is trying to keep the head of his Government above water till the Duma meets, when he hopes to be the constitutional Minister who will manage it on the Prussian system. But against him are working the only people who have made up their minds in this country—the Socialist Party—and they seem to be determined to prevent the meeting of the Duma, or indeed any fixed form of Government. They are prepared to ruin the whole country and starve the population rather than allow the Government to continue its existence. And there is a good deal of sympathy felt for them because the history of Government in this country has been such that all Government is odious. It is like the temper which prevails in Ireland to this day. Every person who thinks at all is against the Government. On the other hand the suffering caused by the war against Government is immense, and the exasperation of those who suffer by it is growing. In addition to this the loyal feelings of a large section of the population have been outraged by the language and actions of the reformers, and a large class are prepared to rob, murder and destroy all the enemies of the Emperor, especially if they are Jews and if the

loot may be kept. Then there is the army which is still, though discontented, faithful to the idea of the Emperor. They may rebel against their officers and complain of their treatment but so far they have shown no sign of a desire to obtain a new Government by force of arms. The revolutionaries wish and hope by working steadily among the soldiers to gain them over, but the time has not yet come for that, though perhaps it is getting nearer.

Under these circumstances it is natural enough that a number of people are saying to the Emperor that it is time that he should show himself and appeal to the patriotism of the troops and declare that he trusts them and will lead them against his enemies. Witte on the other hand says: 'Wait till our experiment has been given a fair trial.' The revolutionaries say they will give no constitution a fair trial; they have had enough of constitutions. The moderates take sides neither with one party nor the other. They stand aside and say: 'Better appeal to the people and see what they want: till they have declared themselves, we can give no advice.' In the general uncertainty all the forces of anarchy flourish, with the result which you see. The present situation is this. No one either trusts or likes Witte or his Government. Since the manifesto was published, the only difference is that the papers are allowed to say what they like, but otherwise no one is a bit the better. No one knows yet what sort of a chamber will meet, nor when it will meet. No one has a fixed programme except the revolutionaries who wish to destroy the Government altogether, not to reform it. The Labour Party are getting rather tired of the revolutionary parties and are determined to act on their own account, but they have a programme of their own which is as destructive as that of the revolutionaries; only it is a means to an end and not an end in itself. Practically the only organized force now left in the country is the army, and the question is how much longer its organization can be maintained. You will see before you get this what has been the result of the present conditions, for it can't last very long."

Meantime the foreseen change in British affairs had taken place, and the Unionists were out, as it proved, for the rest of Spring Rice's lifetime. But one of Lord Lansdowne's last official acts had been to secure for Spring Rice the rank of Minister,—sending him to Persia, a country with whose problems he was already familiar. Lord Lansdowne wrote on December 7:

"I hope Tehran smiles on you. I was told that you would like the appointment, and it gave me great pleasure to be able

to offer it to you. The post is one of the highest importance, and if, as I hope, we succeed in arriving at an understanding with Russia, there may be a big thing to be done in Persia before long. Meanwhile I fear you are having a bad time. I trust it is not telling upon Mrs. Spring Rice's nerves.

This letter must be the vehicle of my official farewell. My work here has been immensely interesting to me, but I am saying only what I really believe when I tell you that none of the documents which I have had to read have interested me more than your letters and despatches.

Wishing you success, which I do most confidently, I am,

Yours sincerely,

LANSDOWNE."

Sir Charles Hardinge added a piece of information even more flattering than Lord Lansdowne's compliment.

" When the King talked to me about it during this past week at Crichel, he told me to write to you and tell you that your appointment was entirely due to him, as he had insisted upon it with Lord Lansdowne, who wished to leave the appointment to Tehran to his successor, and the King told me that he had to overcome Lord L.'s opposition. . . . You are very much in the King's good books and he is very pleased with your despatches, etc. Let me add also my tribute to their excellence and to the soundness and moderation of the views contained in them."

There is not any personal criticism or appreciation of Lord Lansdowne in these letters ; and there was no personal intercourse between the Minister and the chargé d'affairs. But Spring Rice, who had little praise for Mr. Balfour's administration, always thought Lord Lansdowne a Foreign Secretary of the first order. Also, Lord Lansdowne later, at a London dinner party, told Lady Spring Rice that no other servant of the Foreign Office had helped him so much " to get under the surface of things."

There was evidently a general feeling that Spring Rice had made a lasting mark during his service at St. Petersburg. Bernard Holland, writing his congratulations on December 9, said :

" You are now approaching the heights of your profession and I expect to see you in a few years Ambassador at Tokio or Berlin."

Tokio had indeed passed through the mind of some of his official friends ; but Berlin would have been almost a comedy—though Louis Mallet wrote about this time :

" Sir Frank (Lascelles) describes you as having entirely lost all your anti-German feeling, which has caused great alarm to all your friends."

Spring Rice must have been in conversation specially considerate of his father-in-law's feelings, which were friendly to the Kaiser. One thing, however, was certain; nothing could have been more welcome to Spring Rice than to see Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office, and his satisfaction was the greater because his friends Louis Mallet and Tyrrell[1] became respectively chief private secretary and précis writer to the Minister. The Foreign Secretary himself wrote on December 12, the day after he took up office:

"DEAR SPRING RICE,

I was very glad to get your letter; do write to me from time to time. It will keep me in touch not only with affairs but with you, which is what I should like.

I haven't time to write much; to get into this office after an absence of over ten years, and to get through an election, are enough to sink anyone."

The new Minister did, however, go into some brief outline of policy which must be discussed later; but the postscript refers to an immediate issue:

"We are trying hard not to send any ship of war to any Russian port; we certainly shall not be the first to do so."

For, in spite of Spring Rice's own coolness and confidence, there was a general panic among foreigners, and since the disorder was specially serious at the ports, demands were made for British cruisers to be at hand as a refuge. Spring Rice had vehemently opposed this demand, while he and his staff were busily and successfully arranging for the departure of those who wished to leave. Great numbers of them were English governesses employed in Russian families, many of which families were themselves taking flight. And as days went on, the situation worsened.

On December 20 Spring Rice wrote to Ferguson, who had been left out when the Liberal Ministry was being formed—much to his friend's disappointment, who had hoped to see him Secretary for Scotland.

"Grey's appointment is splendid but I don't suppose he will stay if the Irish have the command of the house. . . . His appointment has had the most extraordinary effect abroad. Everyone feels confident. I mean those people who like us. Those who don't, hope for someone else. I only hope he will stay.

I don't suppose you would have been happy with C.B. but it is a great grief and disappointment to me not to see you clothing the hills with forests. But the next Government will be a sad business, I fear.

[1] Now Lord Tyrrell, Ambassador to France.

Strikes begun again. What will this end in? I am getting tired of it. So are many of us, but not the Russian people. If Ireland takes up this line, we are finished."

The elections put Liberals in by a great majority over all possible combinations against them, and there was no question of Sir Edward Grey's resigning for any political reason. But as he has himself told, a week after his re-election his wife's sudden and tragic death made him contemplate leaving public life. Spring Rice wrote to Ferguson, two months after this thought of resignation had been put aside.

St. Petersburg,
April 26, 1906.

"Grey is *extraordinarily* good. I believe he will turn up the very biggest trump card. Good judgment; cool head, courage to execute, and the moral qualities of honesty and stick-to-it. It is luck we have him. It's an awful thing to think that Lady Grey can't be there to see. I remember talking to her the first time I saw her after Chamberlain's plunge [1] and the way in which she saw the immense opportunity at once, if a courageous line were taken. I can't remember, though I have tried again and again, to remember any particular word of hers. I can only remember the general impression—the sort of woman who would have been splendid at Lucknow. . . ."

Detail of the time is given in the drafts of letters to Lord Knollys who had suggested in the previous autumn that Spring Rice should keep him informed; and, of course, the correspondence was designed to reach the King. The letter of December 20 opens with an expression of gratitude for the King's intervention which had been described by Hardinge.

St. Petersburg,
December 20, 1905.

"Dear Lord Knollys,

, Would you be so kind (if it is right and proper so to do) to express my deep gratitude for my appointment to Tehran?

There will probably be little news here for some time to come as the telegraph should be cut to-morrow according to the programme. There will be all sorts of alarming rumours which may or may not be true, but will most probably be false. There are many people who want to depreciate Russian stock and when the wire is cut the imagination of the public has free play. So I hope you will be sceptical.

The present position of affairs is this. The Government has declared that it will not yield any further and will enforce the

[1] Into Protection.

law. The opposition says that it will not have the law enforced. The Government then puts as many of the opposition in prison as it can get hold of. They might as well intimidate an ant heap by imprisoning the four biggest ants. The unions declare war on the Government and there will now be a general strike. It will cause great suffering and the strike funds are already low. Also the country is getting sick of strikes. But the revolutionaries are indifferent to the consequences and intend to persist. In any other country, one would say they can't possibly succeed. Here one doubts. It may succeed simply from the extraordinary powers of endurance possessed by the Russians. But the Government is determined now to act with energy and so are the pro-Government parties who are armed and desperate. It is almost civil war. The alternatives before us seem to be : (1) Victory of the Government and continuance in office of Witte. This would lead to bombs but otherwise we should have peace for a time ; (2) Defeat of the Government and retirement of Witte. He would give place to a Government either more or less reactionary than his own. In the latter case, a man called Gutschkow is spoken of, who is clever and ambitious with great influence at Court and who is said to be in favour of universal suffrage, with large concessions to the peasants and the army, and war to the knife against the revolution.

The Emperor is very cheerful. I hear the reason is that he receives every minute telegrams of devotion from soldiers and peasants who swear that they will live and die for him. Also the pitiable collapse of the recent mutinies must be regarded as encouraging. The evidence seems to show that the army as a general rule, though discontented, is faithful to the Emperor. The revolution hopes to change all this but has not yet succeeded. They will go on trying until they do succeed, or will get entirely destroyed.

I fear the state of things in the neighbourhood of Riga is terrible and that we may see even worse things. I am very sorry for the Germans.[1] I have one or two Berlin friends married there, one of whom all but lost her husband. He was turned out naked into the forest at night and arrived at Riga half mad. It is very awkward for the German Government, which does not wish to interfere but may be forced to do something if things grow worse.

The Grand Duke Vladimir is here all alone. His family has left him which I am told seems to make him more cheerful. He says it is no time to leave his country. The courtiers use

[1] Proprietors of German race in Russia.

every sort of language against the Emperor but very few seem to wish for a return to reactionary measures. They talk hopefully and are selling their furniture cheap. Some Paris dealers have made very good bargains. . . . There is a story told that a man was obliged by a hooligan to change coats with him. On putting on the hooligan's rags, he found a large sum in the pockets and two gold watches.

The Empress Mother is said to be determined to come here. Witte said so. I don't see that there can be much danger at Tsarskoe although the Emperor has insisted on their taking down the enormous wire fence which the police had set up round the park. The Empress is pretty often to be seen driving. A visit to Moscow seems now a very risky proceeding, although it might be the turning point. It would be risking all or nothing. No police Minister would sanction it."

A letter of the same date to Sir Edward Grey suggested that the Government would probably connive at very grim deeds if these were committed against the revolutionaries by the peasants, who were determined to prevent the stoppage of the railways. A state of civil war seemed almost inevitable. Yet: "We had a dance with acting which about three hundred of the British colony enjoyed. Some of them are nervous, but they can go home."

It was, however, thought necessary that Mrs. Spring Rice should leave, as she was on the way to her first confinement; and her father, Sir Frank Lascelles, hearing stories of what happened in Lithuania, across the German border, was extremely anxious.

The chronicle for King Edward's ear goes on:

St. Petersburg,
January 3, 1906.

"Dear Lord Knollys,

The situation is better than it was; that is, the Government has won all along the line. But, of course, if it is encouraged by its success to enter on a path of pure repression, we shall have murders and bombs to a certainty and the whole business will begin over again. I hope that the Government will not do this, but it is impossible to say anything for certain of Russian politicians; and the behaviour of the opposition is enough to make anyone inclined for repression. Anyhow there is a lull for the present. The greatest precautions are being taken with regard to the capital. The town is divided into military districts and any attempt at collecting a crowd will be prevented by force. The soldiers are sick of police duty and are longing to fire at the mob. There is no reason to distrust their loyalty as a body even in the provinces, and here they seem to be

absolutely to be depended on. A Jew told me to-day that he had ascertained after very careful enquiry that the government could depend on the troops; this is the cause of the confidence which the Germans have in the Government, which is greater than that of the French. I hear that the Emperor is very cheerful and that the evidences of the loyalty of the fighting force and the peasants, which reach him daily, make him indifferent to the news of a more disagreeable character which also reaches him. His standpoint is quite clear; namely that he has given certain promises which he intends to keep, but that he will not go beyond what he has said. The worst of this is that if the realisation is too long delayed, the debt is not regarded as paid or is demanded with accumulated interest. But he believes that the Duma when it meets will be a loyal body, and that if it isn't the troops will abolish it. At least so I gather from people who have heard him talk.

The new German Ambassador and the new German Plenipotentiary-General-Aide de Camp are just arrived. The latter will be a very important person—more important than the Ambassador. You remember Bismarck's furious complaints as to the old Emperor's military envoy here, and how he never was able to find out what passed between the Emperors through the military attachés.

The Danish Minister, who is a very pleasant man, told me that he had been to Cannes which was full of Grand Dukes and their friends, and that there was talk there of the arrival of a train full of gold sent from Russia with the proceeds of the sales of property here.

Witte wished to send Dillon on a mission to England in order to persuade the English to show some overt act of sympathy with the Russian Government. Perhaps in the form of money. He promised that if such an act of friendliness was shown, he personally would do all in his power to bring about good relations and even a general settlement with England. I said Dillon had better wait till the Ambassador's arrival. You will hear more of this. Unfortunately Witte has so far succeeded in alienating everyone. A Jew who knows him since a long time told me that he had lost a great deal of his old energy and that he did not regard him any more as a first-class statesman.

The financial position here is bad but not desperate. The export of wheat continues in the north to such an extent that business in that line has not seriously suffered. In that case Russia must receive payment in gold and the gold reserve will be kept up. The present depletion is caused by the bolt of so many rich people with all their money with them. But if the

present state of things continues there will be a commercial crash to a certainty and the Government will suffer with the public. I should think the payment of the coupon should be quite secure, and therefore the holders of the bonds will not suffer if they stick to them. This is a comfort for the French.

I am so glad to hear of Gleichen's [1] going to Washington. I am writing the strongest letter of recommendation to the President of which I am capable, because I am sure that a military attaché is the very man to get at him. Perhaps Grey might be told this, and I am writing to Mallet.

Hardinge comes back, so that my letters now cease."

He gave a more general picture of the situation to Mrs. Roosevelt.

ST. PETERSBURG,
Jan. 4, 1906.

"I *was* so much obliged for the book, and it will be the greatest blessing to have a book of poems to read in this *awful* place. 'A land without any order—day even as night.'—'Throw down her bulwarks for they are not the Lord's.' The prophets read now in Church are the only historians capable of telling what passes here.

To-day all is hope and confidence. The revolution is crushed. The people and above all the army are faithful to their Tsar. There is nothing more to be feared. The capitalists will lend money as before, the newspapers applaud, the diplomatists bow, the sovereigns congratulate and the bureaucracy plunder and persecute—just as before. The storm has blown about the candles a little, but the Government can wake up and snuff them and quietly go to sleep again.

It is a fight in the dark, in the mud, with weapons which don't reach, and which are innocuous when they do. No one seems to say an articulate word, or to be moved by an intelligible or an inspiring idea. On the one side—autocracy, a little man with a snub nose, descendant of an alien and scarcely royal race, who is at the centre of this vast machine and the god of 100 millions. On the other—nothing at all, not even a snub-nosed mannikin—but just simply destruction.

'The other shape
If shape it might be called that shape had none
Distinguishable in feature, form, or limb,
Or substance might be called, that shadow seemed,

[1] Count (now Major-General Lord Edward) Gleichen, after distinguished service in South Africa, had been Military Attaché at Berlin since 1903. He had acted as best man at Spring Rice's wedding.

For each seemed either. Black it stood as night,
Fierce as ten furies, terrible as Hell,
And shook a dreadful dart.' [1]

This is the only description I have seen, which is worthy of it.

And now the old order is singing its song of triumph, and Witte as loud as any. 'He never *advised* the manifesto, but as the Emperor has issued it, it represents the Imperial word and must be fulfilled but no more—not a jot more.' And the main thing is to keep order till the Duma meets—which will be without 'constitutional mummery' (*i.e.* the Emperor will not swear allegiance to the constitution). Then Witte will retire. He doesn't think that the atmosphere of the Duma will suit his constitution which is accustomed to the pure keen air of a monarchically-inspired bureaucracy.

The question is—What will the Duma do? It may *do* something. Everyone now believes it to be a pure farce—to meet to register the decrees of the Government, and then to vanish like the reforms of 1862 into the harmless regions of history.

I pity Meyer. There is nothing here for an active man to do. The climate is vile. His wife and daughter are unable to come here. The post is one of expectancy and observation—that of a newspaper correspondent. The Emperor is *absolutely* shut to all approach except through the German Emperor, who has a private code. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is an uneasy phantom who can hardly even gibber unless he is authorized—and he never is. Witte is open with newspaper correspondents—but shut to Ambassadors. There is no danger to make it worth staying here, nor work to make it useful. All these arguments I could advance for myself to my Government, if I weren't so accustomed to being simply an observer. What I mean is, that if you want Meyer to *do* anything here, he can't. It is quite out of the question, and if he is a good man he had better be employed elsewhere.

I shall be here till April. My wife I *drove* away. She had to go for family reasons and I insisted with great difficulty. I hope to join her in April. It is very hard when one is married to be separated.

Ct. Gleichen, who comes as military attaché, is an old friend of mine. He is absolutely *fearless*, which the President may approve of. He is also quite straight. I like him very much and I hope you will. He is a very capable officer and knows a good deal too.

[1] *Paradise Lost.*

I hope you like my friends Rennie and Lindsay. Isn't the latter good-looking? Dear me, how I wish I could get to Washington."

He wrote also to Sir Edward Grey:

"Gleichen, I hear, is going to Washington. The best person to keep touch with the President is the military attaché, and as Gleichen has been shot in the stomach and the neck, he is quite certain to meet with a favourable reception. I have written strongly to Mrs. Roosevelt. Gleichen would certainly get on there, although he is rather apt to be scandalised by the unexpected."

There is more than a suggestion that the unexpected was likely to abound in Roosevelt's neighbourhood.

The diplomatic history of this time must be reviewed later: but it is necessary to say here that the Conference on the Affairs of Morocco, demanded by the Sultan of Morocco on the suggestion of Germany, was now sitting, and that Hardinge's designated successor, Sir Arthur Nicolson, who had been Minister at Tangier, was the British delegate. Till he was free from that duty, Spring Rice must remain in charge.

St. Petersburg,
Jan. 16, 1906.

"Dear Lord Knollys,

Hardinge will have given you all the latest news, but since he left the situation has again changed slightly. Witte's unpopularity has increased to an unparallelled extent. All parties now speak of him with contempt. I don't know whether this is his fault or theirs. It is certainly a fact. The impression I gather is that Witte is against anyone and any party who might be his rival by being able to maintain order. Thus he is certainly against the Duma, and its postponement is supposed to be due to him—partly, at any rate. On the other hand there is a consensus of opinion that the Emperor himself is firmly resolved to keep his word, and not to go back on the constitution. The recent *démenti* which Witte issued of his undoubted language condemnatory of the constitution is supposed to have been ordered from Tsarskoe. The Emperor has also just given orders that the Council should draw up the rules for the relations between the two houses, *i.e.* the constitution. If this is so, as the evidence tends to prove, the Emperor may be able to steer safely through the present difficulties. It is plain that if the Duma meets and if the constitution is found to be a working institution, the worst is over. The people who are opposed to this are the reactionaries and bureaucrats and the revolutionaries, because their game will be lost if the Duma succeeds. But

the game of the monarchy will be won, or at least not lost. It is a good sign that all classes except the extremists on both sides are going to take part in the voting. What is wanted now is a Lord Melbourne to give advice of a constitutional character to the Sovereign. If, after these great victories over the disorderly element, the Emperor knows how to reconcile constitutional ideas to the intense feeling of loyalty which still exists all through the Empire, the result may be a very workable sort of government. To get a man like this is the difficulty. Here the men are either courtiers or bureaucrats or ignorant landowners or merchants, mostly Jews. No one seems to combine knowledge of public and private affairs. Therefore the best solution would seem to be a Ministry composed of men of the bureaucracy to carry on the business of government, and one or two of the Zemstvoists who know the country and the people. But here is the difficulty—to find the men.

The French are very anxious. When the Manchurian army comes back, the situation will be better, but the railway is disorganized and it will be a long time before the Russian force on the German frontier will be a formidable fighting machine. Even if it were, it will be difficult for a Russian army to fight in Poland. The French wished to advance the money required for Russia, but it was found quite impossible. The Russian Government must wait until the Morocco question is settled.[1]

Witte wanted to send Dillon over with a message to try and persuade the King to come here as a messenger of peace and in order to negotiate directly with the Emperor for a settlement of all outstanding difficulties. Witte's idea was, I imagine, to get a loan floated on the news that the King was coming here.

The French Ambassador says that Nicolson has been splendid,[2] so I hope that he will prepare the way for him here."

Meanwhile in England, where the Liberal party was in the first jubilation of its success, there was passionate interest in the Russian reform movement.

At the same time a Jewish committee was formed to raise a fund for the relief of their fellows in Russia who had suffered in the turmoil, and the good offices of the Embassy were asked for.

Spring Rice's reply illustrates the difficulty of dealing with such a matter in Russia. Mr. Oswald Simon to whom it was addressed was a Balliol contemporary, son of Sir John Simon, for many years M.P. for Dewsbury, and founder of the Anglo-Jewish Association.

[1] That is, owing to France's fear of war with Germany over the Moroccan difficulty.

[2] In the Conference at Algeciras.

St. Petersburg,
Jan. 20, 1906.

"My Dear Simon,

I was so delighted to get your letter and also to hear that Claude Montefiore[1] had not forgotten me. I hope you haven't forgotten the Balliol days either. It was a great pleasure to me to be able to be of use here although I could do very little. You know the situation here, which is complicated but at the same time easy for you to understand. The result of oppression is a perfectly natural hatred of the oppressor by the oppressed. The consequence is that the most intelligent and ablest portion of the population[2] finds itself in a permanent attitude of hostility to the existing state of things and all connected with it. This is inevitable. Another consequence is that these people, being more able and better organizers than the ordinary run of the opposition, take a front seat and in fact are the moving spirits. Therefore it cannot be wondered at if the Government, and all those who favour the Government, are inclined to look with the greatest suspicion on all connected with the movement, and on all who are the leaders of the movement by the force of circumstances.

With regard to the people and the ignorant classes, the hatred which exists here is a defensive hatred, and is based on the feeling that competition is impossible, and that the only resource is oppression and exclusion. This is backed up and encouraged by the Government and the Church, because the class in question is, for the reasons I have given, naturally at the head of all opposition against the existing order.

Now you can realise what happened, when quite unexpectedly the reform party at the end of an organized struggle suddenly found itself victor. On the one hand the victors celebrated their victory, the first achieved for centuries, with jubilation, and triumph. The older order, of course, looked on grinding its teeth. 'And loath to see his kingdom fail, swinges the scaly horror of his folded tail.' And the triumph was terribly punished. Then comes your movement for relief. The money was most generously given. The idea was to distribute it at first through British officials, as having been collected through British gentlemen. I was perfectly ready to do everything I could to assist at the distribution and to recommend good persons for that purpose. But I opposed from the first the

[1] President of the Anglo-Jewish Association, 1896-1921; a very brilliant Balliol contemporary of Spring Rice.

[2] The Jews.

employment of Consuls for that purpose, because I could not consent to their being exposed to the risk of being accused of subsidising men who were said to be the enemies of this Government. And there is no doubt whatever that the organizers of the movement which is perfectly well known to you would at once have said: 'Here are Russian citizens receiving money through foreign Consuls, which money will be devoted to the purchase of bombs and arms.' So I went at once to the authorities and told them what had happened and the suggestion made by Lord Lansdowne. I was at once referred to Gunsburg as a person well known to the Government and who was organizing a relief committee under imperial protection. He had an agent in the South who took over the money sent there, and I handed over to him at once the money so generously subscribed. It was not a vain precaution, for I found not long after that someone had been to the highest quarters with a statement that money was being raised abroad for the purpose of arming the revolutionaries under the pretext of charity. As a matter of fact, a large quantity of arms have been imported here, and the money for this purpose has been subscribed by the sworn enemies of the Government, and indeed of all Governments.

Another point to remember is that any pressure from the outside for the removal of the existing restrictions does more harm than good. If the demand were granted, the result would be that a movement would be started among the people themselves which the Government would be unable to check. This movement would not (strictly speaking) be a race or creed movement, but the natural efforts at self protection which are the necessary consequence of the sentiment that a special class of the population possesses qualities which make them the inevitable victors in the struggle for existence. The solution of the present difficulty is the education of the Russian people. As soon as they become as intelligent and hard-working as other classes of the population, they will cease to be afraid of them, and the present antagonism will die a natural death.

But we are still a long way off that and the best thing is to look facts in the face.

To resume this long story. If there exists in the midst of a nation a race having its own distinctive marks, which has certain qualities that make it inevitably more powerful than the rest of the nation if it has free play—it will never be allowed free play. If that race has supporters and friends outside the nation, it will be looked on, not only as a state within a state, but also as a foreign state supported from without by other foreign states, and it will be doubly hated. If it is hated, it will hate ;

if it is persecuted, it will try and avenge itself; and if it is cleverer and more energetic than the rest of the nation, it will be able to avenge itself effectively by devoting its superior qualities to the cause of revenge. This is a fatal sequence of cause and effect and you must bear it in mind if you want to judge the situation fairly.

My advice would be to remember that the past must have its effects, but that the present may be utilized in order gradually to redeem the errors of the past. But you must not act as if the past had never existed. Your friends here are numerous. But in trying to befriend you, they very often advocate a course which would be more fatal to you than the advice of your worst enemies. Like many Russians they believe that a new world can suddenly be created out of chaos and that the old world will die without leaving a wrack behind. That is quite wrong. As I said, until the Russian nation is educated and able to compete in the struggle for existence, it will defend itself against the competition of its superiors by disabling them from competing at all. And if they try, as is natural, to remedy the disabilities under which they suffer by calling in the sympathy and assistance of the civilized world, they will suffer for it, for they will be looked on as having once and for all given up the hope and expectation of sharing in the fortunes of the country and people among whom they live. And this would be fatal. They are here and they intend to stay here. They must help, as many of them are helping, the people of this country to find some means of attaining to that degree of culture which is at present almost the monopoly of a section of the population. They must help the Government to attain this end, and they must show that they are as much and more the real friends of this unfortunate people as those who profess their friendship so loudly. I am as you see the *advocatus diaboli*, but the view which I explain to you is, I believe, the view of some of your own people here, and a view which has some important backers.—This is a long letter and is a very ungrateful recompense to you for your kind remembrance of me. Besides, to whom am I preaching that they should be *ipsis Christianis Christianiores*? I daresay Claude M. will take my meaning.

On Feb. 16, 1906, Spring Rice reported to Sir Edward Grey:

"The internal situation has no special features except that the parties are gradually moving leftwards, and that the Conservatives are resorting to methods of open intimidation exercised through the 'black gangs.' One of these after a long

series of outrages on workmen was blown up by dynamite. They had apparently paraded the streets and robbed or maltreated anyone who did not wear the badge of the party. The Government has put most of its open enemies in prison or sent them off to Siberia or Archangel. The armies are marching about, restoring order by drastic methods. This can't last and the only question is, when the reaction will come. The general impression is that the peasants are to give the signal by sporadic risings which are expected to take place in the spring. The Duma when it meets will necessarily become the centre of the opposition to the Government, and it cannot be said that the situation is settled. There is, however, an increase of confidence among business men, and there is at least outward order. It is also out of the question that another armed rising will be attempted soon. However, as there is no leader and no fixed plan, everything is possible."

On March 1, 1906, he wrote to Lord Knollys :

"There are at present two tendencies in the Government ; one rather radical, which is resigning ; and the other extremely reactionary. This last is represented by the Minister of the Interior, Durnovo, and by Trepow who guards the Palace. Durnovo is a frank savage. He was turned out of office by the late Emperor on a report of some particularly disgraceful proceedings, but got in again under Plehve's protection. He is so useful that he cannot be dispensed with. A new and remarkable scandal has just come to light and it is said that he will have to go as soon as the elections are over. But, as there is no security against renewed outbreaks unless some experienced man is at the head of the Home Office, he will have to be kept in for some time. The effect however is, of course, to increase immensely the unpopularity of the Government, which will have an unfortunate result on the temper of the Duma. It is rather an awkward position to have to choose between a gentleman like Mirski—which would mean universal disorder—or a known savage like Durnovo, who can keep order, but only by the most violent and unscrupulous methods.

Witte's position is changed somewhat for the worse because the moderates have openly declared against him. There is no doubt that the Emperor disapproves of many of the things he does. But there is a great difference between disapproval and sending him off. The Government must be carried on and it is doubtful if any one but Witte can do it at present."

The course of affairs up to the elections and first meetings of the

Duma can now be understood. Spring Rice wrote on March 29, 1906, to Sir Edward Grey :

"The position here is rather threatening. The present situation cannot last, as repression is pushed to its furthest limits. Witte is failing in health and certainly in spirits. He has made up his mind to get out of his present position. The Emperor refuses at present to let him go, as it is hard to get anyone to take his place. But H.M. will be persuaded to try some new experiment. He is in good spirits and has no fears. On the other hand the Government, although confident that they can weather the storm and that all the necessary preparations are taken, are still convinced that a serious outbreak is at hand ; perhaps they wish it. The leaders of the revolutionaries do not wish it, but their hand may be forced as it was before.

The attitude of the Jews is quite uncompromising and they can, of course, provide the necessary means. Without financial help I don't think a strike or revolutionary movement can be a success. The Government has provided, in large measure, one of the things most needful, and that is hatred and the desire for revenge. Russia is full of people who have a blood feud with the bureaucracy. I fear that acts of violence will begin soon."

Again on April 16th to the same :

"The elections on the whole are going well for the radicals. The workmen won't vote. They attend the polls with red flags inscribed with Boycott in capital letters. The peasants are waiting to see if they get the land. They are fairly quiet. There is a pause. At the end of it, which will come when the Duma meets, we shall be able to see our way more clearly. I believe that the Government will be able to pay its way for some time longer, although a loan will be necessary before the summer is out. The French Ambassador seems to think that there will be no difficulty. It is fairly evident however, that a loan before, or without, the consent of the Duma will be looked on by the radicals as an act of hostility against them and will very likely lead to outbreaks . In any case there are rumours of intended attacks on the Minister of the Interior.

The international loan, for which the contract was signed in Paris on April 3, was in the main a French transaction, but support from international finance generally was needed. Germany refused, and it was for some time doubtful whether England would co-operate. This was still not clear when Spring Rice wrote to Hardinge of the result of the first Russian elections.—By this time, it should be explained, the Conference at Algeciras had ended peaceably, and France with

the support of England and Russia had maintained her essential demands.

April 12, 1906.

"*To* Sir Charles Hardinge,

Bompard[1] came to thank officially for the support given him by H.M.G. here, and generally for the attitude of England with regard to the Morocco Conference, which he said had been of the utmost service. Russia has to suffer for the support she has given to France, as Germany has quite unexpectedly refused to allow the loan to be floated on the German market.[2] It is now announced that she has also prevented Austria from joining. If Germany is successful in preventing England and the U.S. from joining in the loan, it will be a very severe blow to Russia and will be a great victory for Germany. If on the other hand we join in the loan, as I suppose we will, we run the risk of alienating our probable friends, the Russian radicals, who threaten us with the most serious consequences if we lend the present Government money.

The elections have proved a great surprise. It was quite a short time ago that an admirer of Witte's said that Witte had shown much prescience in not opposing the Duma because it was certain to be a bureaucratic Duma and do exactly what it was told. Now it appears that the Government will hardly have twenty supporters, unless it offers the peasants land at once, which it is unable to do. This means that the Government will have to face a determined, bitter and talented opposition which has shown its power to organize itself and which has a large newspaper force at its disposal. It is openly said by Gutschkow, who belonged to the beaten moderate party, that the real reason of the triumph of the radicals was the intense hatred for the Government and the present administrative system which prevailed everywhere throughout Russia. Witte, who a short time ago had been inspiring articles breathing scorn against the Liberals, publishes this observation of Gutschkow's in his paper, although it is clearly directed against Durnovo. Witte has seen Durnovo become powerful little by little, and he is now independent of the President of the Council. The country is practically ruled by him, and I notice that Lamsdorff[3] now says 'I will speak to M. Durnovo,' where a short time ago he would have mentioned Witte. And as a result of

[1] The French Ambassador.

[2] He wrote to Grey: "Russia was led to believe that Germany had accepted. At the last moment Mendelssohn received a formal interdiction."

[3] Minister for Foreign Affairs.

his rule there is external order, but the prisons are full, and the whole country is protesting through the electorate.

He wrote also on April 16 to his father-in-law, Sir Frank Lascelles, that the Radical victories had provided a safety valve for discontent, and that the best men among the revolutionaries had gone over to the Constitutionalists.

"All is quiet, but, of course, it is evident that the repressive measures cannot be continued indefinitely; and when they are removed, the reaction will be dangerous as it was after Plehve's death. A country can't take to constitutional habits in a day when it has been ruled for generations as this country has been ruled. Troubles there must be, and as the Liberal movement spreads to the army, the troubles will get perilously like a revolution. The Liberals are inclined to be friendly to us, although our attitude towards the loan has irritated them a good deal and they are now conducting a furious agitation in the papers. On the whole, however, the movement towards a friendly understanding with us is increasing; but as yet any definite agreement is, I think, out of the question, unless it is negotiated directly between the Emperor and the King."

ST. PETERSBURG,
April 18, 1906.

To GREY.

"The signature of the loan contract has excited public opinion here a good deal and there is some wild talk of boycotting French goods and attacking the French and English Embassies. I spoke yesterday with Miliukoff about the matter and pointed out that it would be unwise to alienate what really are the best friends of the Russian Reformers, the free peoples of the west. He agreed but was evidently very sore at the action taken by the Government. The bitterness here is extreme and everything the Government does is wrong. Of course, it is a bitter pill that the French and English, instead of waiting the few weeks necessary, have concluded this hurried bargain with Witte, thus rendering him independent of the Duma. There is thus some danger that we should lose the sympathy of that part of the Russian nation which is naturally our friend, and we must certainly do our best to explain that we do not intend to take sides with the Government against the people, and that the object of the loan is simply to discharge back debts, which must be met anyhow if the Russian nation is not to be declared bankrupt.

The Danish Minister, who is intimate at Court here, says that the Emperor and his family are perfectly happy at Tsarskoe

where the life suits them admirably. They need do nothing they don't like, and see nobody unless they wish to, and this exactly answers the Emperor's tastes. The worst of it is that it puts him outside the general life of the country. There is none round him who counts for anything except Trepow, and he is pure reaction. Friederichs, the Minister of the Court, has no ideas, Benckendorff and Dolgorouky dare not speak; the Empress is become as reactionary as Trepow, and there is none to tell him what is going on in the country. The consequence is that he thinks that since the suppression of the Moscow revolt there is no further danger, and that the Government can do exactly what it likes because the army is faithful. He has no idea that the political movement shown by the elections is of any real consequence and thinks it can be safely neglected. This is a dangerous view to take of the situation. From Moscow I hear that the reactionary party are profoundly dissatisfied with the Emperor, and, of course, the loyalty of the Radicals is a very doubtful factor. It is therefore unfortunate that to all appearance the Emperor is entering on a constitutional struggle with the Liberals without any party supporting him, and with a blind reliance on the loyalty of the army and the peasants which in the last instance must mainly depend on how far the Emperor is capable of satisfying their demand for land. The Radicals are already in *pourparler* with the peasants and there are hopes that the two will march together. At least so Miliukow told me. But things move slowly here and the army is as yet quite loyal. No armed rising has any hope of success. Nor can a party inspired by Jews and students hope for some time to win the support of the whole Russian people."

April 25, 1906.

To Mrs. Roosevelt.

"I wish I could bring my wife to see you. I really believe you would like her. But I daresay you would be bored, and then? However, I like her myself, which is an important point. She is in London now. She left—that is, I sent her away—for family reasons some time ago in order to avoid the danger of railway travelling, and she is expecting her confinement every day now. I feel rather a cur, over here, but as she observes, we are both doing our duty.

Witte's career would *still* interest you. You know he was made President of the Council with authority over the Interior. Well, the Interior Minister, Durnovo, openly puts his authority at defiance. Witte says to all his friends: 'I am so sorry, I would like to be Liberal, but Durnovo *won't*—so what is the

good?' They say, 'Are you not Prime Minister?' He says, 'No more. I have ceased to be,' Then they ask, 'Then why don't you resign?' He answers with dignity that he can't resign because he is a Russian subject and only the Emperor can tell him when his services can be dispensed with.

So he and Durnovo go on gaily together, and say, I believe, that they will face the Duma. It will be fun to see all these men who have been all their lives long consumed with hate for the whole system face to face with the other men who put them in prison, deprived them of their careers, and, as they believe, ruined the country for their own profit.

Never did two parties hate one another so as these do.

Last night a meeting took place among some of the Government supporters. They said that they were all right; they have the loan which gives them money till the end of the year, and the 'fundamental law' which they took out of their pockets at the last moment to show the Duma what the Government thought good for them. This last is a bitter pill. The Radicals fear that they will be continually met with the observation, 'This is in the fundamental law, and you must not discuss it.' Also, that if they refuse to vote the Government money, the Government will simply take it and send the Duma away."

May 2, 1906.

To Sir Edward Grey.

"The rumour current in circles connected with the Court is that the Emperor has determined to get rid of all the Ministry and to start with a fresh lot when the Duma meets. It is indeed difficult to believe that he would dare to meet the Duma with a Ministry such as the present one. How Durnovo would be greeted by a body of men, many of whom he has put into prison, and many of whom have actually lost near relations through his personal action, is not hard to imagine. As for Witte, he is little more popular. He is regarded as the Liberal label on the Conservative wares destined for foreign consumption, and as responsible for the hated loan. He would be wise to go. The question is, who will follow? The impression here which reigns among persons connected with the Court is that the Duma, being composed of violent and uneducated persons, will soon make itself ridiculous, and that the Emperor will be justified in sending the members away or indeed in putting them in prison. It is believed that the Army is still faithful and that the Government has money enough. The military preparations in case of a rising are finished. The last act of the old Government was to vote a large sum for the secret police fund and a

large sum for the country gendarmerie and the military arrangements in the interior against a peasant rising. The Government has also in its pocket a constitution which really enables it to govern for all practical purposes without the Duma, and in any case the Emperor at his own free will can put the country under martial law, which in fact is being done at present. That is, two-thirds of the Empire are now under exceptional or military law.

The prospects are not brilliant. If the Emperor holds these opinions then it is merely a question of time when the crash will come. The army may be faithful for another year or another two years, but a citizen army recruited among a revolutionary population cannot long remain loyal.

A great deal depends on the Duma itself which contains a majority of persons entirely inexperienced and also a great number of peasants. It will be as queer looking an institution as ever flourished under an autocracy. Its predominant feeling is evidently—hate ; the question is as one of them said to me, whether they will be able to bear in mind that you can not cut a man's head off with a white hot sword.

Before finishing this letter I should like to record what I really believe to represent the feelings of the F.O. here. I had a long conversation with the man who is second in the Asiatic department and an intimate of Witte's. He said that he and most of the F.O. were strongly in favour of a *rapprochement* with England, but that it was quite out of the question in view of the feeling which existed in all the subordinate consulates and among the army and navy. The only cure for this was the known desire of the Emperor himself. And he added, ' We are still nearly as far from that as ever.' "

Before the assemblage of the Duma, Count Witte definitely fell from power and there were important changes. Spring Rice wrote to Grey on May 5 :

" The new appointments are only rumoured. Almost all of them are reactionary to a greater or less extent, and two are ex-friends of Plehve. The feeling of confidence as to the army is very strong. The power of resistance of the opposition is not thought to be great. The necessary military measures are being taken. They were ordered about a fortnight ago. New guns have just been placed in St. Peter and Paul. It looks as if the Government were quite prepared for a struggle if it comes. I hope they will not provoke it. Unfortunately it would be a mistake to put too much confidence in the moderation of the opposition. At the Party Caucus last night they resolved to

press for a complete amnesty of political prisoners and for the impeachment of the ex-Ministers. Also for universal suffrage. The Duma itself as at present constituted presents a strange appearance on paper. Of 371 members, 190 are simple peasants; only 125 have received a first-class education and 176 can only just read and write. Only 66 have independent means of their own. In the elections a great importance was attached to the pound a day which they will receive while the Duma is sitting. It certainly will not be an aristocratic assembly. The prevailing cry will be for the land. This will be more important than any other question, and it is very difficult to see how the Government can satisfy the demand for land while respecting, as the Emperor says they must do, the rights of property.

The following was told me by an eyewitness. An Imperial messenger was announced at Witte's house. He was ushered in. He had two papers in his hand; one the ukase of dismissal; the other the ukase granting him the Order of Alexander Mevski. He said, 'These are from His Majesty, transparent Sir; and I am charged to say that the Order itself in diamonds will be ready at two o'clock.' He then clicked his heels, saluted and retired. *Finis coronat opus.*"

There are available despatches from Spring Rice, concerned with the beginnings of the Duma; but these do not compete in interest with a less official narrative. On May 1st he learnt that his first child—a daughter—was born; and he recounted the news of St. Petersburg to amuse his wife's convalescence.

But since this is a biography of Cecil Spring Rice as well as a collection of his letters, one must begin by showing how he felt about the news from his home. He had been a child-worshipper all his life, and now at forty-seven he had a child of his own. If this had been the case of any of his friends, how fast his pen would have run! But since it was himself, we may observe this fluent writer and talker gasping. At least, however, with unconscious art, he gives a complete picture of his own tongue-tiedness. This is the letter textually and exactly:

BRITISH EMBASSY, ST. PETERSBURG,
May 1, 1906.

"What splendid news! Here is the telegram which arrived this morning. Norman gave it to me and I retired into my room where I read it. I was so glad I didn't exactly know what to do and so did nothing. Norman hearing no news, and no sign from me, got anxious and poked his head in to see. Henderson, wishing to break silence said, 'Mrs. Springie is going to ride with us this afternoon,'—meaning Mrs. Napier. Then I

told them and they were much delighted and sent a telegram. So now you are I hope feeling quite rested and happy. I wish I could see you and it. What an extraordinary event. As I have no means of realising it at all I simply won't try. I dare say I'll realize in time.

Mrs. Napier gives me lots of comforting advice. She says it is great fun getting letters after a week and that I ought to have telegraphed to you and not to Aunt Florence. Well, I felt pretty glad, I can tell you.

I hope this writing is big enough and black enough. I rode this afternoon and it was lovely. All sorts of flowers—that is, there were spurge and anemones in great quantities. The spring is so sudden. There are bits of ice and snow still. Isn't it a good day to be born, the 1st May? Labour day—what a horrid joke; but also flower day, and spring day, and all nice sorts of things-day.

I came back to find at least three troublesome cases which make me mad, and one to make me so glad I don't care.

C."

May 8, 1906.

"How are you to-day, I wonder? It is such beautiful weather here I wish you could enjoy it. There is a cloudless sky and a warm sun. Yesterday Henderson and I took Mrs. Napier out a long ride—we went to the wood we visited the other day and then further on till we came to a little brown stream running through a meadow which was one mass of flowers—violets—anemones—globe flowers (in bud) and marsh marigolds. Also a few cowslips. Lilies of the valley in quantities but not out. We heard a cuckoo. Then we dismounted, tied the ponies up (mine at once began to roll with evident delight), undid my saddle bags and produced spirit lamp, etc., and boiled some water and eat oranges and cakes to the accompaniment of a chorus of birds. Very rustic and perfectly delightful—and all within a distance of 1½ hours from the Embassy. We stayed there an hour and came back cantering. Found the city still here and much the same. We shall try and go out again if the weather holds. Napier hates such expeditions unless there is something to kill. Henderson delights in them and so does Mrs. Napier. So naturally do I. I wish you had been there—it would have simply delighted you. I wish we had done it last spring. We have only just discovered the place. Yesterday another governor was attacked. This time he was killed. It looks very much as if a troublous time were in store and there are many disquieting symptoms. It is very

sad that there is no sign of an end. Both parties are losing their tempers, though for a moment it seemed that peace was to be re-established.

Last night Henderson and I had Mrs. Napier to dinner at Dunon's, as the Colonel was dining in the same restaurant but with his military colleagues and Mrs. Napier was not asked. She seemed to have an invigorating consciousness that the proceeding was improper and was occasionally rather embarrassed. Came back to papers and bed. This morning endless newspaper correspondents asking for cards of admission—which have not been accorded to us—to the Duma. I doubt whether (being only a chargé) I shall be asked at all, which will be sad.

Of course you will be very careful and, above all things, don't hurry to get up or to see people. Julie says she has seen the infant who is apparently a treasure. I should rather like to see for myself but I don't know when that will be. I wish the time would come. It is quite a long time yet—a month, and I am getting in rather a hurry to depart. However, we must all do our jobs."

May 10, 1906.

" Just come back from the Duma. Keep the enclosed as a curio.[1] There are few in the world. In the morning early (at 3) there was a beautiful flush of light in the sky. I was working and suddenly saw that the night was over and a most lovely sunrise begun. I went to bed and got up to the usual bustle. At a quarter to twelve started off in a hired carriage and drove through deserted streets full of soldiers to the Palace garden. Found that I was alone with the Turk ; we two representing diplomacy. A long talk between us—of a friendly character,—and then up came other dips. one after another. We were marshalled into the biggest room—the marble St. George's Hall—and stood to the left of the entrance. There was a lane down the middle of the room, and on one side were the Council in gold and orders, and on the other the Duma, many in red shirts and boots, some in uniform (very few). All rather grave. The throne was at the end. In came the guests one after the other—no ladies. Then suddenly a bang, bang, and the national hymn. The regalia were brought in strongly guarded, crown and sceptre, etc. Then came the Emperor, very *grey*, walking alone. Then he was met by all the golden priests including the Liberal Antoni, and sung at for half an hour. The peasant members bowed at the blessings, but many showed no sign whatever of respect. Then the moment came

[1] The admission card.

and the Emperor marched up to the throne and sat on it. Then a golden man presented the speech. The Emperor rose and read it. A tremor in the voice at first, but *not* later. His words were well pronounced and clearly spoken ; I heard every word though I could not understand all. You will see the speech, but as you can guess it was pretty exciting to us who had no idea what he was going to say. Everyone listened with the greatest interest. Then he stopped and sat down and there was a tremendous shout—from the gilded ' council ' on the right ; the Duma remaining silent. So we all said. Then the Emperor walked back between the shouting council and the silent Duma ; the music began again and the whole thing was over. We heard a shouting out of doors—thought that the Emperor was leaving, ran to the windows and saw it was the crowd shouting applause to all the members of the Duma as they left. Then the Emperor took ship, amid applause, and disappeared down the Neva—to rest and lunch on board his yacht.

Then I went to the Duma. Everything passed in order—except for the crowd outside which was very excited—but civil. Had to get out of carriage and walk.

The proceedings were dignified. There was no disorder and the Speaker was elected almost unanimously. But there was no doubt about the sentiment. A perfectly determined but good-humoured feeling of triumph so far. What it will turn into remains to be seen. How are you ? My head swims with the heat of excitement of the day. Poor Emperor—what is he thinking of ! Can he have any further doubts whatever ? It seems a certainty now that the Duma will accept no compromise. How is Miss Duma ? Shall we call the Duma Mary Elizabeth or Mary Elizabeth [1] the Duma ?

The Duma has a full-length picture of the Emperor behind the Speaker's chair. Rather provocative ! Love and blessings."

May 12, 1906.

" . . . Bless you ! Such a nice letter from Aunt F. Everything sounds thoroughly well. I fear I am more interested in you than Mary Elizabeth. Bless her too, however.

The Council of the Empire met yesterday and I am told that the gentlemen were so old that it took them three hours to sign their names because most of them lost their spectacles (like me). The President was too old to stand up and the

[1] Mary Elizabeth, so called after her grandmothers, Mary Lascelles and Elizabeth Spring Rice, had for godparents Ronald Munro Ferguson, Lady Hardinge and Georgiana Spring Rice.

proceedings were suddenly ended for fear of the amnesty being called for. A man spoke out of the window and said that as the boat of deputies went down the river to the Duma, the windows of the prison on the Viborg side were full of hands waving messages of greeting from the brothers in durance. Great excitement in consequence. I am, however, becoming rather conservative in my leanings here as in England—the effect of a majority.

Bless you both!"

May 15, 1906.

"I have just come from the Duma where there were a large number of dips. The lobby was full of people discussing things—many groups of peasants rather violently disputing on the land question. 'Divide the land? Why, I have been in occupation of mine for five years, why should I?' 'Not divide the land? Why, all Russia wants it, and your people as much as mine.' Stanciow[1] goes about and listens to their talk. Groups stand round and encourage the disputants. Very keen faces, full of intelligence—and rough but sharp. Numbers of newspaper correspondents going round. The committee on the answer to the address has reported—land appropriation, amnesty of political prisoners, universal suffrage, etc., etc., pretty good for one mouthful. Yet the leaders of the Duma maintain they will advance their demands in most regular and legal methods. They say they will have nothing to do with violence in any form and will discountenance it. They hope to get a unanimous vote. Went up to the gallery. There were many dips, including the Jap and the Italian. Also Madame ——, ex-ambassadress with a past; takes refuge now in politics, failing religion. Debate began coldly about the rules of the house—*clôture* and so on. Then an adjournment and we wandered about and finally went off home.... Nicolson's arrival is announced for next week. I hope so. Then after a week or so I shall depart. I am arranging papers in view of departure. Last night I finished up a good many arrears. Isvolski[2] has entered *en fonction*. I have not seen him yet. He is up to his eyes in work.

So we have finished for a time with the Turk[3]—thanks a good deal to France and Russia, who showed him that they thought he was in the wrong. I suppose the delimitation will go on for ever and lead to new troubles. I hope not. Good

[1] Bulgarian Minister at Petrograd.

[2] The new Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[3] There had been serious trouble with Turkey over her attempted encroachments on Egypt in the Sinai peninsula.

news from you. You are really splendid to keep so well. Keep it up. I wrote to your father to-day. I suppose he will soon be leaving. Will you really be presented? I shan't be there. Love to the baby."

May 16, 1906.

"Last night I went to call on Helen Pototzka—found her in and suggested taking her to the Duma. We went off together and I got her in. She found numerous friends at once. Suddenly her husband mounted the Tribune and spoke! Rather an event. Her shoulders trembled, poor thing. The debate was on the address. Such an address! All the land, all the liberties, and everything man can want, in three pages; all demanded at once. The speakers mounted the Tribune one by one and deposed their sentiments, rather in the style of respectable clergymen. Two were different; one, Rodichev of Tver, the arch-Liberal who is the best speaker—keen, earnest, with a good voice and dramatic utterance. The other, Aladin of London[1]—a man of the people who said that he spoke as a workman on behalf of the peasants who had elected him—and their voice must be obeyed. The audience clapped but didn't shout. The President kept perfect order and the house sat still and listened to every word. Got bored once and had a coughing fit; which the President put down—with the remark that 'Liberty of speech must be respected.'

The general impression given was not exciting; businesslike, determined, with a good deal of reserve force—strong words spoken decorously and listened to mostly in silence. Perhaps this will change. There is practically no opposition. The Ministers sit on their seats facing the Duma in silence and without any expression, except—as far as one can see—of boredom and contempt. Rodichev pointed his finger at them once or twice, but left them quite unmoved. At 11 the House got bored; demanded to go to bed. And went."

May 20, 1906.

"In a week Nikko[2] will be here and I shall be packing up—thank heaven. I suppose 15 days will be a decent interval to render my account. I only hope I shan't be ordered straight out. Hartwig leaves in three days and I hope he will see to the troublous state of things there with G. D.[3]

[1] He had been long in England; later, after the Bolshevist revolution, he was with British troops during the war.

[2] Sir Arthur Nicolson.

[3] Mr. (afterwards Sir Evelyn) Grant Duff, then in charge at Tehran.

Yesterday I dined with Maurice Baring who was as usual most entertaining. He discussed all manner of things but always coming back to Russia which fills all his thoughts. We are all full of Gapon. His body has been found and the story of his death (killed by workmen for trying to bribe them to betray comrades) is most detailed. But now people say they have seen him walking in the streets and that they have letters from him. Easter time! Shall we have another miracle?"

May 21, 1906.

"... Saw Dru. He says the position is very obscure and very difficult to describe, because there was no general movement directed by a thought or an idea as was the case with France. It is an instinct more than an idea which is the driving force—like animals moving towards the water. In some ways this is more serious. If successful, the effect on Europe will be immense. As I have no money I don't care one way or the other but can inspect impartially. I don't wonder at other people being anxious. The message[1] in answer to the message has not been accepted; they are told to apply in the usual way at the servants' door and to get a receipt from the butler. Why this should make much difference I can't see; as a bill is a bill whether delivered by the front or the back door—but there is the devil of a row."

May 24, 1906.

"It is believed here that there will be a great Government statement to-morrow and that one has already been issued to the provinces, courteously telling the Duma that they can't get what they want because it isn't good for them.

Serge B. and Schwanebach both told me that the Government believes the country is not really represented by the Duma and that all that the Government has to do is to treat the Duma with contempt because the country will soon get sick of it, but not to persecute or dismiss it because this would be making a martyr of it. The K. D.s[2] are determined so to act that the country may respect them and the Government have no excuse to quarrel with them. It is a difficult game to play, for all the ultras and reds are saying that 'We told you so; the Government is fooling you,' and accusing the Duma leaders of betraying the nation by talking of moderation. I send you a very interesting newspaper résumé which shows the game perfectly. It is rather a large order that the Government are now

[1] From the Duma in reply to the Czar.

[2] Kadets of the Duma.

absolutely encouraging the Socialists against the K. D.s who are now attacked on both sides. It's said that the country is far more radical than the Duma; if so, the Government is doubly sold.

Schwanebach says that Witte got up the revolution himself with Vinaver, a Jew, Ostrakow, a labourer, and Gapon. That he knew the disorders were coming, and was in communication with the leaders in order to defeat the loan, and to dethrone, or disgrace, the Emperor. Also that when he came to power he was furious because the labour party would not act with him (they distrusted him) nor accept him as leader and guide. That he knowingly allowed the country to fall into confusion and when it became necessary to resort to force to suppress it, he tried to escape from office and get the Emperor to accept Count Ignatiev as Premier—a man whose name spells reaction—in order himself to profit by Ignatiev's unpopularity. He swears that Witte all through played a double game, encouraging the radicals and encouraging the Crown—in order that a conflict between the two might become inevitable. He got Skipow to propose a suspension of cash payments, and Kuttler to propose land expropriation, and then abandoned both the Ministers when their proposals were rejected in council. The worst thing he did was to try and get the Emperor to accept the 'fundamental laws' in such a form that they would have been even more unpopular than they were; and *then* went about saying that he had from the beginning opposed the fundamental laws!

This is a strange story and I should like to hear what Dillon thinks about it. I shall ask him."

May 25, 1906.

"Last night was Bag festivity—Norman, Henderson, Ewen. Ewen[1] very amusing with his descriptions of life on a man-of-war. Little midshipman addresses him: 'What are the regulations for conduct and entertainment of a King's Messenger on board a man-of-war?' He goes and looks it out in his instructions and finds he is not to dine with the captain unless invited. He got into a scrape for standing up when the King's health was drunk. In old days the cabins were too low (or the men too drunk), and so the health is drunk sitting. After dinner went to call at Chinese Legation. Deputation of Chinamen come to study institutions of Europe. Gave a week to Russia. I was introduced to deputation and sat surrounded by Chinese faces and opposite the head commissioner, a man of

[1] A King's Messenger.

very stately demeanour. My remarks translated by an interpreter with a strong American accent. I was asked about constitutions and said, In England if we don't like our Ministers we turn them out, and in Russia they kill them. He seemed shocked. I said they wouldn't go otherwise. He asked me how many had been killed. I told him. He said that Confucius had said that when you live in a strange country you should speak with respect of the habits and laws. I said I narrated the facts. He asked me if I expected soon to be killed too? I said I was not important enough. He asked me if I could give advice about China's constitution. I said I was too young—besides England was always blamed for giving advice to other people which suited herself better than them; as if she should recommend umbrellas to the people who lived in the Desert of Gobi, because it rained in England. He said this was true, but could I not say something? So I said that a country was always well governed if there were people in it who loved their country more than themselves. It was curious how grave they all looked and how the old man nodded his head. It is quite true that the Chinese have every good quality but patriotism. I thought it wisest to scoot for fear I should have said something rude."

St. Petersburg,
May 27, 1906.

"Nikko comes to-day.

Last night I asked Consul Grove to dinner at Dunon's. He told me lots of interesting things about the Moscow garrison. Of course, as a soldier he sympathises strongly with the officers. He says that the men behaved very cleverly in their own interests. They knew they had the upper hand and insisted on having a good breakfast with plenty to eat and time to digest before they would go out fighting. The firing began at 12 regularly and not before. The real fighters in the crowd didn't amount to much over 1500—most of them very young men. The others ran away as soon as firing began, although they were quite ready to join in making barricades. The soldiers on the whole do what their officers say, if the officers are decent fellows. The officers as a rule didn't at all like firing at the mob; hence the small loss of life. If the officers stick to it, the men won't ever revolt, he believes—at least not as a mass. The majority of the guard here are said to be quite faithful, so there doesn't seem to be much chance of a real serious outbreak—which is a good thing and I hope will last.

Went to church this morning and heard the wonderful and

curious story of Christ and the woman of Samaria who said he must be a prophet because he said the man she was living with was not her husband. The whole conversation is as vivid as can be and you can see the whole scene and the woman's growing astonishment. 'Give me this water that I may never thirst again.' 'The well is deep and Thou hast nothing to draw with.' Macleod read well, but preached a sermon on the historic consequence of the historic fact of the Ascension, which he maintained was a fact which all church-goers must accept as the corner-stone of life. I should have thought life depends more on present than on past facts."

Spring Rice was not sorry to say good-bye to St. Petersburg, where he neither liked the country nor the people; also he was in haste for home, to make acquaintance with his daughter. His last letter to Valentine Chirol from Russia begins with her; the rest of it sums up the situation.

May 24, 1906.

"My Dear Chirol,

I hope you are seeing Florence now, unless you have made her jealous over the baby; but then the baby isn't the proper age for you yet. It was good of you to write, because I didn't deserve it, but I have had rather a hot time of it, especially on bag days. I should say the situation (as far as one can say anything here with certainty) is this. The Government wants to put down the Duma but dare not. They think that the Duma can be killed with neglect and this they intend to administer in the kindest and most courteous manner possible. They hope that this will be effective and that after a time the Duma will lose self-command and also the respect of the country. In the mean time they are encouraging all the enemies of the Duma to raise their heads against it. These include ultra radicals and ultra conservatives. On the other hand the leaders of the Duma, who are intelligent men, know very well the danger of the situation and are doing all they can to prevent a quarrel in the Duma or the use of rough expressions or in fact any breaches of discipline. They are so far successful and they hope to remain so. If they succeed, then the Duma will remain a force to be reckoned with to which all the nation will look for guidance. The Government are determined to prevent this and are convinced that this is what they will be able to prevent.

The Government acts on the supposition that the Duma is not really representative of the people—that it was a trick of Witte's, or some accident, that the elections went as they did, and that in the end the country is certain to go back on the Duma. But

this is not accepted as true by many here. They say that the feeling in the country is not less radical but more radical than the feeling in the Duma. In the meanwhile the Emperor's table is piled with telegrams from country districts professing fidelity to the crown and the desire to see the Emperor get the better of all his enemies. This is public opinion as the Emperor understands it. His associates and relations and his constant counsellors are men personally interested in a state of things which means a permanent source of profit to themselves. He never stirs from the park within which he lives. It is some way off that part of the capital where the Government is conducted, and the capital is of all places in Russia the spot where Russia is least known. I repeat what I hear."

St. Petersburg ends a notable stage in Spring Rice's official career. He was to be no longer a subaltern in the service. Yet indeed for six critical months he had been in command of one of its most important posts, not without recognition. On June 28 Sir Edward Grey wrote:

"It gives me great pleasure to inform you that the King has been pleased on my recommendation to confer on you the Knight Commandership of St. Michael and St. George on the occasion of the celebration of His Majesty's birthday, in recognition of the valuable services which you rendered during the trying and arduous period of your Chargéship at St. Petersburg."

Among the shoals of congratulations it is worth while to pick out this from St. Loe Strachey, editor of the *Spectator*, a Balliol contemporary and constant correspondent.

"It is easy enough for men in diplomacy and the Civil Service and the army and navy to get honours if they are clever and at the same time assiduously assent to whatever their chiefs say; but it is a very different thing for a man to win when he says what he thinks, without troubling whether it will be disagreeable or not to those above him."

Lord Curzon welcomed Spring Rice's "tardy election to the ranks of the adorned," and hoped that "promotion in future may be as rapid as it has hitherto been halting." Others said the same, though less decoratively. But, of course, the most characteristic expression came from his old tutor at Eton:

"My Dear Cecil,

You may imagine that anything which honours you gives me enormous pleasure, and when that honour reflects light on the family to which I am attached and the school which

I belong to, it is doubled and redoubled: so I thank you for winning it for us.

'So watch old armourers' eyes
their young knight's emprise
wistfully brighter.'

Yours affectionately,
H. E. LUXMOORE."

In the course of these long chapters, concerned with world changes and high politics, readers will have lost sight of the sensitively affectionate human being, with so many ties, not only at home, but in what was almost another home country across the ocean. A couple of letters bring out this side. The first is to Mrs. Lodge, and begins with baby worship; and it has a characteristic hint of apprehension. Spring Rice adored children so much that when he had children of his own they were almost as much pain as pleasure; he lived in terror about them. The letter is written from Rounton Grange, Sir Hugh Bell's house in Yorkshire.

Aug. 11, 1906.

"It was quite delightful hearing from you, and I am so glad Constance and little Constance are getting on so well. You must have had a royal time with little C. over the recovery from the measles. My daughter is a reality and although I found it very hard at first to realise her existence I have got quite accustomed to it. She is very tranquil on the whole and has regular hours for wailing which I know how to avoid. She lies on her back and occasionally deigns to smile at me. Sometimes I am left alone with her and she stares gravely or discourses. She has only once been ill. Fortunately her mother was away for the day and came back the next morning when the illness was over. She is very well now, but still one can't help a horrid feeling of anxiety because an infant is such an absurdly small thing to put such store on. I suppose all babies are much alike—like the stars—and so a description will be useless. I wish you could see her. I remember your grandbaby being deposited on a large bed and lying there as if it was an angel in a cloud. We have a great question to decide. Shall she come with us to Persia or not? My wife won't let me go without her, and can't bring herself to part from the baby for a year. So we shall probably take her. It's rather a risk, but these matters aren't my department and I don't interfere. Isn't it odd that I should be on my third side of paper all about my domestic affairs. I am staying with Florence's aunt who has always treated her like a daughter. She has many children of her own—all in-laws of mine.[1] They tolerate me kindly.

[1] One of the "in-laws" was Miss Gertrude Bell.



MR. H. E. LUXMOORE

Photo: G. C. Beresford

I go long expeditions on a bicycle. Yesterday I went up to the top of the moors and then down a long slope till I suddenly came to Rievaulx Abbey. Have you ever seen it? It is maddening to think that it might have been saved. It is most wonderfully beautiful. Then I went up to the moors again, through storm and sunshine and suddenly came out on the edge—a cliff about 800 feet above the plain which was enjoying storms and sunshine in different parts of it. The Yorkshire people are very conversational and in the course of the day I met four or five people who told me most of what they had to tell. There was a workman at work in the Abbey to whom I told what I knew of the monks, while he criticized the masonry from a professional point of view. He said it was first-class and was rather surprised to be told that the income of the Abbey was £200 a year. In a few weeks I shall have left all this and be at sea. I do love this country. Some day I shall take you over it. You have no idea what Yorkshire is and the delight of moving about in it and exploring the nooks and crannies. It is crammed with history and the old stone relics of it are many of them nearly perfect.

This isn't what I started out to write. Lady Curzon's death was quite unexpected by most people. I believe from something he said to me that he feared it. He is dreadfully despondent. He says that his life is a failure and a misery—that she made his one resource and comfort since he left India and that before then she was his only friend and trustiest adviser. As he is the best judge, we must view his character in rather a different way from what we used to. His life has been very successful and crammed with interest and excitement. At the end she was bitterly disappointed, as Curzon had failed in carrying his point and had returned to England without, for the present, a political position, or friends. All this would have passed. I don't know what he will do now. . . .

I am getting gloomy and won't proceed. It is beastly having to go off to Persia and I rather dread the journey for the child. Florence takes it all very philosophically, at least she makes no sort of fuss. It is a good job politically for me, although the task is a hopeless one and I shall get more or less discredited.

I have such a lot to say. Why aren't you here? I went the other day to a little ruined church near here. In the chancel which was roofed in, was the tomb of an old crusader with a Gothic canopy and broken and defaced armorial bearings. There he was all alone in the ruined church with his feet on his old dog. The place was thoroughly lonely and deserted and neglected and it made the old fellow all the more impressive.

This afternoon I am going to an old Carthusian monastery of which a good deal remains, including several cells ; little houses with separate gardens in which the monks lived by themselves. On the hill above was the chapel where the Abbot was allowed to live after the dissolution—looking down on his destroyed Abbey. On the walls is carved Oliver Cromwell's initials. It is supposed he stayed with the men to whose family the Abbey was granted. This is rather like a guidebook—but, I repeat, I should like to take you around it and see how you liked it.

When shall we meet ? Two years and a half will pass before I get back from Persia. This is a devil of a time ; but it is satisfactory to think that other people are coming on—all the grandbabies and my small baby. When I went to Ullswater this was a pleasant thought. Before, the place was rather too full of ghosts for comfort, but the baby is a good layer of ghosts.

Mrs. Cameron seemed extremely well and Martha is very nice. I saw them both several times ; but in London it is quite impossible to see anyone in a satisfactory way ; everyone is answering out of a whirlwind like the Creator in Job—only in a different way."

The last of these letters was written to Ferguson after staying with him at Raith :

107 Ebury Street, S.W.,
Aug. 30, 1906.

" I can't tell you how I feel about my visit and your letter. You have an important and useful job to do where you are, and you must stick to it, and make the best of it, as you are doing. It is a noble country and a splendid people and you will do well to make yourself an improver of men and things in your own domain. My job is quite a different one : and I have to show my affection for my country by leaving it, which isn't quite as illogical as it sounds. I won't tell you what it is to me to know that when or if I return I shall find Raith with you and Lady Helen, as a fixed point to return to. I take it so for granted, that like some other things, it is easier to leave unsaid.

It is an awful wrench leaving now. But I really believe that I can do some useful work ; and after a certain time I shall be justified in consulting my own wishes—if they are also Florence's —and retire as soon as I am pensionable. I saw Milner yesterday and entirely admired his determination not to begin again. He looks well, happy and contented. Grey will tell you about what is happening in Washington. I shall be in Persia about two years and a quarter and shall then take leave. It will be such a wrench starting off again that I rather doubt whether, if

asked to do it, I shouldn't prefer some other alternative—having only one life to spend and not being quite prepared to spend it all before one is incapable of settling down in England. But this is all in the future. At present it is settled that I go, and I have resolved to stay for two years. After that I shall see. So I don't intend to ask you out there. I shall come to you. Let me know what your next move is. Don't quit Parliament till you know exactly what is to take its place.

As for Haldane,[1] it looks as if he were intent on playing a part in Europe which is pleasant no doubt to himself but very embarrassing to us. It is quite wrong that such action on the part of Ministers should be allowed. Brodrick's private correspondence with the Kaiser was not at all to our advantage. I think sovereigns should be kept to their own society and we should keep to ours."

[1] Mr. Haldane, then Minister for War, visited Berlin, where he was received by the Kaiser on Sept. 5. The visit was understood to be for discussion of relative armaments.

CHAPTER XVI

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE

During the early months of 1905, while Russia's domestic affairs were so exciting, a great diplomatic movement had been silently developing.

It is worth while to glance back at the letters (for instance that to Roosevelt on Sept, 14, 1896), in which Spring Rice, then at the Berlin Embassy, described the obsequious servility of other European powers to Russia, for that brings out in strong relief the complete shifting of poise in the balance of forces. After Mukden, all the great European powers felt themselves unstable. France, before that, had leant confidently on the mass of Russia. The Czar controlled innumerable hosts, the means to equip them with modern weapons, and a staff trained in the modern school of war. Also, even more than the Kaiser's, his word was law ; no simulacrum of a parliament hampered his authority. Yet after long preparation, his hosts had been beaten, and not by superior numbers, in a battle on the modern scale, against Asiatics, to whom modern war was a new study. With defeat came disorganisation, moral and material, to the beaten country—all the more crushing because its place in the world rested on military prestige.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Europe had become an armed camp. Great Britain lay partly outside it, supreme on the sea ; but the limits of her power by land had been rudely disclosed in the South African War. Till 1904, the last word among the continental forces had rested with Russia. Germans might think themselves by superior efficiency more than a match for the colossus, but France was on their other flank. Now, after Mukden, with the colossus so shattered and shaken, Germany determined that the last word should be hers. By the still recent and untried *entente* with England, France had gained, if not a new ally at least a friend, where France had always seen an enemy. Germany's first impulse to self-assertion had been to show France how little security this new friendship could promise.

So in 1905 the Kaiser went to Tangier and claimed his right to intervene in the Mediterranean Africa, where England and France had just arranged matters (with Spain's concurrence) between themselves. Italy, the other member of the Triple Alliance, was at this time almost completely disabled. Adowa had been her Mukden, and the Abyssinian victory left her without confidence or prestige.

Austria was weak. Germany, if she claimed a decisive voice in Europe, must claim it in her own individual right; and, as against France, she could claim it. Count Bülow at Paris could tell the French in June 1905 that they were walking on the edge of a precipice; and the French threw over M. Delcassé who had brought them there. They accepted the Conference which the Kaiser demanded; but, as events moved, the precipice seemed no further away. In England, the Unionist Government was about to be replaced by a Liberal combination, and the Liberals had the name of being pacifists at all costs. As the Conference approached, it became more clear that Germany would demand a foothold in Morocco—which, apart from the threat to French aims and material interests, would mean a new and acute point of friction between France and Germany.

In England, however, temper had been roused by this arrogant intervention. The friendship with France was popular and England stood by her friend; she refused at first to enter the Algeciras Conference, and only agreed after France had found it necessary to do so. In the Conference she was France's steady backer.

Meantime, the question was what Russia would do. Traditionally opposed to England, she was France's ally; but France counted increasingly on England's friendship. Naturally, the Kaiser had his purpose, which was to assume the guidance of Russia and swing France into their orbit, detaching her from the English connection. When in July 1905 Kaiser and Czar met in secret personal discussion at the island of Björkö in the Baltic, there was no doubt which of these two personalities would assume the ascendant. But after Russia's defeat, the Czar was no longer securely an autocrat; his unlimited sovereignty was challenged by his own subjects; his realm was in need of money and international finance threw its support on the side of the Russian Liberals. Under those conditions, every Russian—except perhaps the Czar—must inevitably see that if Russia allied herself with Germany, Germany would dominate.

Another choice was possible, involving a new direction of policy. The letters which follow enable us to trace the slow and tortuous beginnings of Russia's *entente* with England, which set up a new equilibrium in Europe. Inevitably, they refer to events which have been already described in the last chapter, but in a different connection.

When Sir Edward Grey took charge of the Foreign Office his first letter to Spring Rice outlined his general purpose.

Dec. 22, 1905.

"You will see what I said to Benckendorff[1] about not disturbing the *status quo* where our interests touch, while Russia is unable to discuss anything. As a matter of fact, I don't want to do anything on the Indian frontier or in Persia, and in Turkish affairs we no longer pursue an anti-Russian policy anyhow, so it is no sacrifice on our part.

[1] Russian Ambassador to England.

But enterprising Russian officers in Asia must not take advantage of the confusion at St. Petersburg to do things on their own account. I suppose you have no idea of what the outcome of the Revolution will be: the laws of the course of revolutions are not capable of scientific analysis. The general rule is that what is on the top at the beginning is not on the top at the end. I hope the struggle won't last too long. I want to see Russia re-established in the councils of Europe, and, I hope, on better terms with us than she has yet been."

While the British Foreign Minister maintained a waiting attitude, Spring Rice had to report advances from Russia—or at least from a section in Russia.

Jan. 3, 1906.

"DEAR SIR EDWARD,

Dillon called on me on the 1st with a communication from the Prime Minister. He said that Witte had always avoided the subject of foreign politics since he had taken office but that he had suddenly made a new departure. He had told him that in his opinion the friendship and sympathy of England was now of the greatest value to him and to Russia. During the war what Russia had needed was a strong military friend on her border. This need Germany had supplied. But now what Russia needed was not the support of a military power so much as that of a great liberal and commercial power. England's sympathy if afforded in some open and evident form would be of the very greatest service to the party of order. He said that Germany could give a finger's length of help and England an arm's length. France was so deeply implicated in Russia's financial situation that her opinion was discounted. But England was entirely independent of these considerations.

He said that if England could see her way to such an open and evident sign of sympathy, he himself could undertake to arrange permanently for the settlement of all difficulties between the two countries in the form of a satisfactory treaty. Accordingly he wished Dillon to proceed at once to London and lay these considerations before you as coming from himself. I asked Dillon if he had any indication as to the form which Witte wished this open and evident sign of sympathy to take? Dillon said that he had once in the course of conversation mentioned a loan. I said that I did not see any other form in which the sympathy of England could be conclusively proved at the present moment, and that he must remember that a loan depended not on the will of our Government but on the disposition of the city. I offered, of course, if he wished to go, to

give him a letter to you ; at the same time, I said that Hardinge was on his way ;[1] that the step was a very important one and that it seemed to me better in the interest of good relations (which Hardinge has at heart) not to take such a step without consulting the person most competent to give assistance. He said in reply that that was his own idea ; that he had said so ; that Witte had replied, ' Then we shall have to do it through Lamsdorff[2] and nothing will come of it ' ; that he had a rooted objection to all dealings with diplomatists with whom he had to speak ' diplomatically ' ; that he much preferred to send a messenger straight from himself who knew his inmost thoughts and could express them as he wished them to be expressed. I pointed out to Dillon that I could neither stop nor advise his going, but that it would certainly be better, if he wished to have such a proposal carefully considered, to consult the Ambassador about it, who in any case would be asked to report fully on the whole matter. He said that personally he did not wish to go and that he thought that Witte would probably insist on his going at once or not going at all. As the Ambassador returns on Friday, the delay would not be very considerable.

I thought it best to tell the French Minister about it in general terms. He remarked that it would not in his opinion be a good thing for England and France or for either country alone to make a loan to Russia at the present juncture before the Duma met, and before it was certain whether the Government was about to renew the old order of things or seriously to inaugurate reforms.

It seems to me that the offer does not, in fact, amount to very much. We should have to promise to advance money immediately. (This is taking for granted that we could do so. As, however, Revelstoke has already signed an agreement with the French and German bankers to issue a loan as soon as the moment is opportune—which apparently it is not yet—and the Jewish bankers are resolved not to assist Russia at the present moment, I don't see what hope we should have of bringing about an advance.) Well, suppose we were able to arrange the advance. Russia in reply would then announce her willingness to begin negotiations. But these negotiations would take a long time. And all the evidence is to the effect that at the present moment Russia would not be prepared to make any serious or permanent concessions. The Persian Minister is a fairly good judge and he is strongly of the opinion

[1] Sir Charles Hardinge returned to his post at St. Petersburg from January 5 to January 13, 1906.

[2] Then Foreign Minister ; replaced soon after by M. Isvolsky.

that Russia regards Persia as her predestined prey and that nothing would induce her to renounce her aims in any permanent form. In that case we should find ourselves confronted with a long and unsatisfactory squabble over details, having already given away the one thing we had to give which Russia wanted.

I have no doubt that when the time comes, if it ever does, when the loan is issued in London and Paris, the Russian Government will be in a yielding mood and that we shall be able to get a few things through. It is a very different thing to promise financial assistance at the present moment on the assumption that Russia will give us in exchange for this very great service a permanent and satisfactory treaty.

This is already long enough. Thank you most sincerely for your letter. It is very pleasant, as I needn't say, to have you for chief. Most of us have looked forward to this as the best possible arrangement and your appointment was hailed with enthusiasm. It was especially pleasant to hear the French talk about it. I am perfectly delighted you have Mallet."

Later in the same day, after recording another visit from Dr. Dillon on the loan matter, he added some general impressions.

" The internal situation has changed for the better from the Government point of view. But the fear is that the Government may simply return to the old methods and, the candles having been blown about a little, will get up and snuff them and then go quietly to sleep again. The trustworthiness of the soldiers has come as an immense and unexpected relief and now the Government feels secure. On the other hand they have certainly gained in securing the sympathy of the commercial classes, and the Jews who don't hate anything sufficiently to lose money by it. But the Russians are a strange people ; very persistent in a dull sort of way ; willing to sacrifice everything to avenge their wrongs, loving destruction, and very amenable to the guidance of those who once get control over them. It would be a mistake to suppose that because the disturbances were over for a time the trouble was over altogether. The cause remains, and the fact that the opposition have played their game badly will rather encourage the Government to pursue its old courses in the certainty that even the bureaucracy is better than anarchy. This is certainly the view of the Germans here.

The new Ambassador[1] and the new military *fidus Achates* of the Czar have arrived together. The American Ambassador told me that as the Emperor had assured him that the two

[1] The German Ambassador was Count Schoen.

Emperors had a private telegraph code for mutual use, he didn't see that very much was gained by the new arrangement. It excites a good deal of interest here, especially as the Czar is supposed to have taken the first step by sending an officer of general's rank. The result of the disorders in Poland and the Baltic provinces is on the one hand to draw the sovereigns closer together, and on the other hand to alienate the peoples. There is, of course, a tendency both here and in Germany to regard the Russian dynasty as part of the German garrison which holds Russia down and makes her decent company. That tells both ways. The feeling which has always existed is being accentuated now. If there is a real revolution here, the whole complexion of Europe will be changed. But to bet on the revolution in our sense of the word would be a parlous proceeding. It is a movement of elemental forces and seems to have no real guidance. That is the difficulty of the situation for the Government. It is like fighting a bad smell. And the Government will, I fear, not look seriously after the drains."

Jan. 16, 1906.

To GREY.

"To continue the curious story of Witte's advances. After Dillon had been told that the best thing Witte could do, if he wished to effect an agreement with England, was to wait for the Ambassador's return to St. Petersburg, nothing further happened until Hardinge's arrival. I told Dillon when H. had come, and he called at once. In the course of a long conversation he explained his idea, namely that the King should come here at once and arrange directly with the Emperor for an agreement with England. He argued that the Emperor was the only government in Russia and that nothing else was any real good. He argued that negotiation through Lamsdorff offered no guarantee; that it would lead to long delay and that the result would very likely be that the golden opportunity would be lost. Hardinge said he would call on Witte the next day. You will see his report. I asked Dillon the next day what his impression was as to the visit. Dillon said that Witte was much disappointed and that it was plain to him that he could not manage it 'through diplomats.' He had promptly opened fire with a proposal that the King should come to St. Petersburg at once. Hardinge had talked of the danger to which the King would be thereby exposed. The conversation had drifted off to secondary topics. The attempt had failed.

In the meantime Witte had been playing another but similar game. He had promised the French to obtain a promise

from the Emperor that he would exert his personal influence with the Kaiser in order to obtain from him a formal promise that his intentions in the conference [1] were peaceful, and also a formal statement of the instructions which he was sending to his delegates. This Witte promised to obtain ; but the attempt if really made, was fruitless. The Emperor ' did not answer.' Lamsdorff, when pressed by the French Ambassador, would only say that all he knew, and all he could ask, referred to the official communications which passed through the diplomatic channel. He could not ask the Emperor what had passed between him and his friend and relation the Kaiser. He spoke also regretfully of yellow books and the freedom of a diplomatic press. This was not satisfactory to Bompard, who had already received in full measure the assurances of Russian diplomatic support at Algeciras. This, however, was not all that was wanted. If, as in former times, the diplomatic voice of Russia was supported by a vast and menacing military display, the diplomatic support of Russia would have been a powerful factor in the situation. But that was no more the case. What Russia could provide was the moral effect of a personal appeal from sovereign to sovereign. Bompard explained to me at length the difficult position in which France was placed, and as he has just returned from Paris, it is perhaps of interest to hear what he said. He told me that France had been convinced that if Delcassé went, there would be no further difficulty. He went. Then she was told that if there was a conference there would be no further difficulty. France consented to the conference. Then she was assured that all that was necessary was a preliminary agreement with Germany as to the instructions to their delegates. France consented to such a preliminary agreement. It turned out that Germany refused to communicate her instructions at all, that she insisted at first even on the surrender of what France had enjoyed for forty years, and that at the end of the preliminary conference all that had been gained was an understanding as to the subjects of discussion, but not as to the manner in which they should be discussed. Since then, Germany had played with France like a cat with a mouse. Now menace ; now flattery. Latterly, flattery had prevailed. The world was full of ' peaceful and reassuring utterances.' But these utterances had never once been accompanied with any statement as to what Germany intended to do. She said she desired peace but gave no indication of any desire to do those things which were necessary to peace. The result was that every ' peaceful assurance ' made France more nervous.

[1] At Algeciras, concerning Morocco.

There was, he said an extraordinarily strong feeling now that the honour and the existence of France were in peril, and that an end must be put in some way or other to the cruel uncertainty of the present situation. He had spoken in this sense to Lamsdorff who had been very sympathetic. But 'What can these poor people do? How can they even think?'

A bad side of the situation was the attitude of the Russians as to finance. The language held was a menace. If Russia repudiated, so much the worse for France. She would suffer more than Russia. If Russia was reluctantly obliged to suspend payments it would be unfortunate for her credit, but it would ruin France. And a war would, of course, make a loan impossible. But would this be as bad for Russia or Germany as for France? Germany would, of course, suffer, and had in fact suffered considerably already, by the withdrawal of French capital, but the loss to her would not be as great as to France. Here was one of the chief dangers of the present situation. It might be in the interest of Germany to provoke a war which would lead as its first result to the breakdown of Russian finance and to the collapse of the Paris money market. All that Germany would lose would be the 15 millions of Mendelssohn, and a small additional sum lent a year ago, but which had probably been resold in Paris. Altogether the outlook was not brilliant. He was especially anxious about Spain and America. In the former country it was quite easy to get what one wanted out of the press by paying for it. In America there was the very specious argument now urged by Germany as to 'equal treatment.' Of course, anyone who knew the situation could see that if the conference broke down on a demand from Germany that no one power should be entrusted with the police,[1] the power then would be concentrated in Fez. And in Fez the Germans could do just what they wanted and obtain from an 'independent Sultan' all they desired. In Constantinople the German Ambassador, as a friend of the Sultan, could get all his demands satisfied, on the single understanding that he would not allow other nations to 'interfere in the administration of the Empire.' If that was true in Turkey, it would be far more so in Morocco. What was wanted was a catchword, *une formule*, with which to answer the *formule* of equality. This perhaps might be found in the word 'civilization'; for there was no doubt that if the German view prevailed, the state of Morocco, bad already, would become infinitely worse. The Sultan would be encouraged to slight and

[1] The French proposal was to organise a border police in Morocco under French guidance.

insult all foreign nations by the support of Germany, and Germany would reap her reward in Morocco as in Turkey by her profits on railway concessions and trade and the sale of fire-arms. I am sorry to say that my experience of German influence in Constantinople altogether bears out this. I was there when the famous meeting took place between the Sultan and the Kaiser, and when the Kaiser made at Damascus his famous speech in which he swore that henceforth the Mussulmans throughout the world would find in the German sovereign their fastest and truest friend. That was within a year of the Armenian massacres. Since that time, Turkey has been more and more emboldened to set Europe at defiance, and the conditions of life for all Europeans except Germans has been steadily growing worse. In the summer I met Rosen, now at Morocco. He confessed to me that his experience at Bagdad, where he had been Consul, was to the same effect. He openly deplored the policy which the Germans themselves described as the policy, not of 'Barbarossa the Kaiser,' but of 'Barbarossa the pirate.' As to any effectual aid from Russia, that is out of the question. Russia has a languid interest now in all outside affairs. You can't talk geometry to a man on a tight rope.

There is the greatest uncertainty as to what Russia will do now. It is plain that the armed insurrection has failed and that the policy of a general strike will for some time at any rate also be a failure. But for how long will the army keep faithful, and for how long will the Government be able to pay its way? There is here the same feeling of confidence which we saw after the depression caused by the Japanese victories. There was a pause between each fight, and in the interval Russian public opinion became confident, even jubilant. Then came another blow and another interval of depression. It is the same now.

But one thing is certain. A nation of 100 millions can't be wiped out. It is worth while to keep on good terms with the Russian people and to build up for ourselves a treasure of gratitude in the future. We will do them more precious services for doing them in times of difficulty. And this doesn't only refer to the Czar and his Government. They will have the natural and instinctive hatred that Bismarck and all other ministers of would-be autocracies have for our manner of political life and thought. But the Russian people will sooner or later make itself felt, and a service to them or sympathy shown to them will not, I think, be thrown away. This should not take the form of advising them to take Count Witte's advice and trust him. They don't and they never will. And I also don't believe in

making a private arrangement with him, as he proposes, in order to strengthen his hands.

This is very long and you will be as little inclined to listen to my lucubrations as the Russians to the French. You have other things to think of. At any rate I do hope and believe that the result of the election will be to give you a firm tenure. It is needless to tell you how much our service, and indeed all our friends in foreign countries, desire it."

On January 26 Spring Rice reported to Sir Edward Grey a long conversation with the Russian Ambassador to Great Britain who was then at St. Petersburg. It need not be reproduced, but the comments on it to Mallet a few days later are of much interest—mixed as they are with Spring Rice's feelings about the crushing defeat of Mr. Balfour and his party at the polls.

St. Petersburg,

To Louis Mallet, Jan. 31, 1906.

"I entirely concur in your observations. If we let France be beat, our turn will come next and France will be perfectly satisfied in seeing us beat, and justified too. But if war is to begin it must be a just war, because it is a war which I hope and trust will be fought to a finish. The wars fought by England for the balance of power were not fought out by days but by years, and were finished when they were finished and not before. And we must prove that this war, if it is to come, is one for our life and not for vanity. This I suppose the French understand. They have all the world to gain if they keep their heads. If they lose their self-command as they did in '70, we are lost, for the world will not be with us till too late. And this is not a small thing as has often enough been proved.

I wrote a long private letter to your chief as to Benckendorff which ought to be private because it was entirely unofficial. But what B. said was of importance and interest; so I reported it. The Russians still think that we are dying to have an arrangement with them and would pay anything to have one. They want us to declare what we will give them, in order, as before, to count it as given. We must be most careful not to do what Balfour did about Port Arthur and say that we don't want a thing and therefore will give it. That is the worst bargaining. So about the Dardanelles.[1] We ought to say that it is impossible. The French, we are certain, will object very strongly and think it their business as much as ours.

I think Dillon will very probably convey some sort of message

[1] Russia desired to rescind the international agreement forbidding the passage of warships.

from Witte to the King at Copenhagen as to H.M.'s visit here. He wants the visit to be announced soon. This for financial reasons partly, but not solely for them. He thinks that the sympathy of England will certainly strengthen his hands. He has the idea which is partly true that if England takes the side of the existing Russian Government there is nothing to be feared. Germany, of course, they are sure of. What they want is the known champion of liberty. What I should say is: wait till Russia has declared herself, and the constitution is a working concern. Before then, don't identify yourself with any man or any party. What we want is Russia herself, and not this or that individual, even the Emperor, although he is certainly very important. . . .

What an election! I never had such odd sensations about any political event of my time. *Afflavit deus.*[1] However, we must be non-political. One party we can belong to, and that is the party of Europe, I mean those who maintain the right and the independent right of nations to exist and pursue their own policy and make their own friends without the interference of an outsider. And in the present case, all the powers I most hate are grouped on the one side, and their triumph means the entire extinction of not only European but also national liberties. I must say, I am all with the internationals here and wish them luck."

A letter to Lord Knollys of the same date dealt with rumours concerning the Conference at Algeciras. The Czar was convinced of the Emperor's pacific intentions. The French Ambassador, Bompard, was not equally reassured, but had confidence, from his certainty that war must mean a great accession to Socialist strength in Germany and Russia—and would therefore be shunned by the sovereigns.

"Bompard talked with great gratitude of the influence exerted by the King, but said that tremendous efforts were being made in France to persuade her that the Liberal Government would play them false. He attached great weight to the press, especially the Liberal press, and said that if the French thought that England was going to *lâcher* them they would probably, with Russia, definitely enter into the German sphere of influence.

The Emperor had invited all the *chefs de mission* to Tsarskoe to dine. This had been, said Count Lamsdorff, owing to his desire to talk with them about political affairs, but this is not

[1] "Afflavit Deus et dissipati sunt" (God blew and they were scattered) was the motto on Queen Elizabeth's Armada medal.

very consistent with his usual practice. The Emperor has been told, it seems, that England is meditating treason to France. This, at least, is according to Bompard. The Ambassador was delighted with the speech made by Sir F. Lascelles at Berlin which he said was exactly what was needed at the time. But he is evidently very anxious. Partly, perhaps, because the Russians are so little anxious."

These apprehensions were due to a rumour spread about at this time (as Sir Edward Grey has told in his *Twenty-five Years*) that the English delegate at Algeciras was about to support a proposal that the Moorish port of Casa Blanca should pass under German control. A contradiction was issued, and Spring Rice wrote of the result.

Feb. 16, 1906.

To GREY.

" Your message to the Russian Government as to your attitude on the question of Morocco has had a most excellent effect here. It was the more necessary, as there is every reason to believe that reports had been circulated to the effect that the policy of H.M.G. was not that of their predecessors.

The difficulty of the situation here is that the chief direction of foreign affairs is not in the F.O. but in Tsarskoe. Lamsdorff goes there once a week. On the other hand the two Emperors have their private telegraphic code and there are also always at hand the German general who is attached to the person of the Czar, and the Russian General who is attached to the person of the Kaiser. The French Ambassador here is thus arguing with a man who has not full powers when he talks to Lamsdorff, and he is never in possession of all the facts of the situation. Negotiations may be going on of which he knows nothing. He has no doubt as to Lamsdorff's loyalty, but Lamsdorff, with the best intentions, may suddenly find that a decision has been taken behind his back as to which he knows nothing. Thus we may suddenly find that an agreement has been prepared behind the backs of the real and official negotiators and may be suddenly announced as a favour from Kaiser to Emperor.

The French Ambassador has been very grateful for the support and sympathy shown throughout by your Government and speaks very warmly about it.

Benckendorff looks on the matter naturally from the Russian point of view, which demands a settlement of some kind. If, however, this settlement is one unfavourable to France, it may lead to a reaction against her *entente* with us, and also may make it very difficult for the Russian Government, in view of such an example, to come to a friendly arrangement with us, unless

this arrangement is previously submitted to Berlin, with the usual charge of so many shillings in the pound.

He thinks it very likely that the resentment of Germany for the refusal of France to join in the coalition planned by the Kaiser against the Anglo-Japanese alliance has a good deal to do with the violent conduct of the Morocco question by Germany. He understands that the attitude of England in the event of a war depends on the state of popular opinion, and has so informed the Russian Government; but he did not seem quite to have realised that your views on that matter were as definite as Lord Lansdowne's. The Liberal Government is in a better position to negotiate than the Conservative with Russia, as there is a keen remembrance of the services of Mr. Gladstone to the Balkan States. This refers more to public opinion (which is becoming a more important factor) than to the throne. The sympathy shown by the Liberals did not prevent Russia declaring herself free from her pledges as to Batoum during the short-lived Liberal Government of 1886. But though there is a certain amount of traditional sympathy with the Liberal Government, there is no doubt (judging from what I hear here) that any indication of a change of policy, because Liberals have succeeded Conservatives, would only weaken us in dealing with Russia. For it would be said that it was impossible to come to an agreement with England as a nation; it would only be possible to bind the Government in office as long as it continued in office. This is a strong argument if addressed to an Emperor who does not depend on popular election, and when he binds himself binds his nation. Thus we have been watched here with the greatest interest to see if the traditional accusations against us were or were not borne out in fact. I don't think there is any doubt felt as to our desire for peace. It is so evidently our interest. The difficulty is to explain that we desire not only peace ourselves but peace for all the world."

Sir Edward Grey replied:

Feb. 19, 1906.

"DEAR SPRING RICE,

Your letter of the 16th is very interesting. The Germans are now on the other tack, putting it about that we are too stiff in our support of France, and that but for us France would be more reasonable. They want public opinion to blame us if the Conference breaks up without result. As a matter of fact the French have been very conciliatory and very anxious to get an agreement at the Conference; but they will not and cannot agree to the internationalization of Morocco. What Germany

suggests is that we should advise France to yield to Germany, which would mean our going back on the *entente*. All the French would ask is that the organisation of the police should be entrusted by the Sultan of Morocco to France and Spain; their police would be for the ports alone and their functions would be limited to the protection of foreigners.

Our interests in Morocco are two. (1) The preservation of order, and the French-Spanish plan would secure this for foreigners at the ports, because they alone have the personnel or experience. (2) The open door, and this is guaranteed for thirty years by our *entente*. France and ourselves have by far the greatest share of the trade; not one of the other powers thinks its trade interests endangered by the French-Spanish police proposal, except Germany. It will be on her therefore that the blame must rest if the Conference breaks up. If Germany thinks the open door not sufficiently guaranteed by the clause in our *entente*, it is open to her to propose a longer term or more explicit economic guarantees. This she hasn't cared to do. I write this, because you may find that the Kaiser has persuaded the Czar that Germany has been the conciliatory power or not the unreasonable one; he tried to do this by using fine phrases, which should be answered by stating the facts.

Meanwhile I am impatient to see Russia re-established as a factor in European politics. Whether we shall get an arrangement with her about Asiatic questions remains to be seen; I will try when she desires it and is ready, and till she is ready we do not wish to change the situation in Persia or elsewhere. If Persia breaks up, we must protect lives and property of British subjects in the south, where we can; but we shall not lend money to the Persian Government to strengthen our hold on this country, an extension of responsibility which I do not desire.

To Lord Knollys Spring Rice wrote on March 1, 1906:

"Of course the main question for Russia now is, how to get money. This is impossible as long as the Morocco question remains unsettled. And there seems not much chance of a settlement. The Emperors exchange amiable letters expressing a desire for peace but there is nothing definite. We are told that the Austrian Emperor also intervened but without effect. I hear from the French Embassy that the Emperor intends, as a last resource, if all other means fail, to appeal to the Kaiser in concert, if possible, with the King. The American Ambassador is willing to be of use but he does not think that the President will intervene unless he is asked by both parties. The French,

though they would like to, won't ask him, because it would be regarded as a sign of weakness. The Germans are not likely to ask anyone to intervene.

The view of the French here is that Germany, having asked for the conference, must accept the conference and that she ought not to be helped by the other powers to avoid the arbitrament of the conference, as she would if there were any form of arbitration. The Russians seem to take the view that the Kaiser is a bad horse to go up to in the stable and that they would rather not adventure their Emperor near his heels. So we are all waiting for news from Algeciras.

I ought to say that there is an idea here that the object of the German Government is to arrive at a separate agreement with France which would not be disagreeable to Russia, or be directed against her in any way, but would probably lead to a cooling of the relations between England and France."

A letter to Sir Henry Austin Lee, then at the Embassy in Paris, is more outspoken and more general than the official or semi-official despatches to Sir Edward Grey and Lord Knollys.

St. Petersburg,
Feb. 20, 1906.

"My Dear Austin Lee,

The situation is this, that the Russian Government will have to borrow about 750,000,000 roubles before the end of the year, and if it does not will be in a very embarrassing position. In addition to other claims, there is the crying claim for the satisfaction of the ruined landlords and for the peasantry who demand land. Money will have to be raised for these purposes, and if not, the Government will certainly encounter internal difficulties of a serious kind. If the worst comes to the worst, they will, however, be able to revert to the old system of increasing the paper issue, which is always possible in Russia. The people have no objection and as for the foreign bondholder, he is secured by the excess of export over import. This will be increased by the new tariff which is even more highly protective than the old one. The resources of the country are so enormous that in the end, like America, they are certain to come out again right side up, but in the meantime the difficulties will be very great. It will be interesting to see what the Duma will do. The present state of reaction cannot possibly last indefinitely and when it comes to an end there may be a rebound in the other direction which will perhaps set things wrong again.

The Russians are curiously optimistic about Morocco and refuse to believe that there is any danger. They are also

rather thick-skinned as to the evident cause of the violence of the Germans, namely the battle of Mukden. This is only characteristic of their general laziness of thought; they never will realize any danger till it is too late to do anything. Lamsdorff, however, feels it deeply, as he is rather conscious of having the fate of Delcassé impending over him. He is regarded as responsible for the *entente* with Austria and for attempting an *entente* with us. The Emperor, however, is inclined to stick to him and Witte is very much disgruntled with the Germans. Kaiser Wilhelm in Witte's presence at Rominten[1] telegraphed to Radolin to draw it mild with Rouvier, and Witte thought he had managed a reconciliation. But it appears that this was all bluff, and was really conditional on France joining the projected alliance against England and Japan. We certainly owe a great debt to France and I hope we shall repay it. Of course, if we don't play up, we shall lose all chance of arriving at an agreement here except on ruinous terms. Our undertakings would not be worth much. I see the Liberal papers are saying that Mogador should be handed over to the Germans as their commission for agreeing to our arrangement with France. If this is the principle to be adopted in the future, what commission shall we have to pay in Germany for coming to an arrangement with Russia? Ceylon? or Singapore? The Russians are rather sick about it, as hitherto they have received nothing but flattery and caresses from Germany, and now they begin to realize how helpless they are, and in fact that despised England is a more useful backer than mighty Russia.

What is the state of feeling in France? I am rather afraid that our people don't understand that if France has to yield, then we shall have got Egypt on the promise of Morocco, and this promise will not have been fulfilled. In that case the agreement will scarcely prove popular in France and there is no doubt as to the German papers rubbing that in. Here all these considerations pass off like water from a duck's back. No one cares for much, except the internal situation, and not very much about that."

Through all this correspondence one subject constantly recurs—the desire of the Russian Government and of the Czar that King Edward should pay a state visit to Russia. Spring Rice put it to Sir Edward Grey:

"The moment is opportune if it can be managed. It is like visiting a man just declared bankrupt. I remember in Japan it

[1] Where the Kaiser entertained Witte on his way back to Russia from the negotiations in America. Radolin was the German Ambassador in Paris.

was the custom, if you knew that a man's house was in danger from fire, to call on him at the last moment before the fire took hold. Witte's idea is that a visit now or in the early summer would have a much greater effect than if it was put off till all danger had passed, or until there was no court to visit."

However, the British authorities thought the risk too great and would not hear of the King's undertaking it. Yet so strong was the tradition of personal monarchic government that all in touch with the court not only considered it impossible to arrive at a satisfactory agreement unless the Czar took a hand in it, but held that without his authority it could not be carried into effect.

St. Petersburg,
March 29, 1906.

To Hardinge.

"We seem to be on the eve of changes. Witte wants to go. Dillon told him he should never have taken office and his answer was that there were circumstances which Dillon didn't know which made it impossible for him to do otherwise than take office. The Emperor will let him go (he thinks) when he can find a successor. Lamsdorff would go with him if not before. I expect, from what I hear, after Easter. It is curious that the Emperor should give up a man whom he really likes because of the newspaper attacks on him. I fear that there is a still more powerful enemy against Lamsdorff, and that is the Kaiser, who can't forgive him for having carried out the agreement with Austria, and for meditating an agreement with England. Witte is strongly in favour of this agreement, and hopes to see the King's flag at Peterhof. He says that the only way to bind the soldiers and bankers and minor officials is to obtain the Emperor's personal orders that they must keep quiet. An agreement with the Foreign Office alone will never bind the hands of the War Office. This is the way in which the Austro-Russian agreement has been founded and kept alive,—by personal talks between the sovereigns when the details had already been settled diplomatically. Unless the King can have a personal interview with the Emperor, W. fears that the influence of the Kaiser will remain supreme, especially after the departure of Lamsdorff, whose long experience here has made him especially useful as a drag on the Emperor's sudden and erratic motions. An instance of the influence exerted here by the Kaiser is the fact which I have just heard, that Witte on his passage through Germany was told that the Kaiser would support him with the Emperor. Accordingly he did everything he could to promote the Kaiser's wishes with regard to an

alliance against England and Japan: and in return the Kaiser did his utmost to induce the Emperor to receive him well, which, as you remember, he was not at all inclined to do when Witte first came back with the peace in his pocket."

Things, however, were not going well for Germany. The Algeciras conference had separated, after reaching decisions which France was able to accept; and French gratitude for English support strengthened the *Entente*. The German Chancellor, Count Bülow, was in failing health, and Holstein, the chief permanent official, who had pretensions to regulate all policy, was on the eve of resignation. Spring Rice heard of these discontents and reported them to his Minister.

March 29, 1906.

"Perhaps the following may be of interest, which has been told me by the brother of an intimate friend of the Kaiser's. The K. was at first very much opposed to the visit to Tangier and only consented at the last moment owing to pressing messages from the Chancellor. The arguments used were mainly that Germany would be able to break up the Anglo-French agreement, after which Germany could make her own terms with France. Holstein was also an advocate of a similar policy on similar grounds. Much was expected of the new Government in England if the elections turned out favourably to the Liberals, and of a new government in France if Delcassé could be removed. However, it turned out that these expectations were unfounded. The result was that the Emperor is now very angry with the Chancellor whom he accuses of having led him into an impasse from which he cannot escape with honour. He taunts the Chancellor with having induced him to take a step against which he protested (the visit to Tangier) on grounds which turned out to be false. When Richthofen[1] died, the Chancellor wished to appoint a creature of his own, but the Emperor refused and appointed Tschirsky, his own friend and confidant, who will act independently of the Chancellor. The Chancellor on the other hand lays the blame on Holstein whose position is threatened.[2] The Emperor desires to have his cousin Hohenlöhe appointed Chancellor, but the Centre (the Catholic Party, who control 100 votes) are opposed to this because he is a Protestant member of a Catholic family, and because he was connected during his regency with a dispute in the matter of the school question in which he opposed the Catholics. On the other hand the Reichstag likes him very much, though in face of the opposition of the Catholics it was

[1] Foreign Minister. [2] In fact Holstein resigned in April, 1906.

impossible to get the vote through for the establishment of a separate Colonial Office with Hohenlöhe as Chief. My informant seemed to think that the fall of the Chancellor is a matter of time. After a decent interval some trivial occasion will be found to retire him. In any case his influence is shaken. There may be a new turn in German politics.

From America I hear that the Kaiser, having found that it was difficult, in spite of the large German and Irish votes, to get a strong anti-English and pro-German party organized there, has determined to conciliate the President (who represents the native American element which is difficult to conciliate) by the expedient of offering him an opportunity of playing again the part of peacemaker which at Portsmouth so increased his prestige at home. For this reason the Kaiser appealed to Roosevelt to settle the questions pending between France and Germany as *amicus curiæ*."[1]

Having dwelt on the threatening internal symptoms, and the insecurity of Witte's position, the letter continues:

"With regard to our negotiations with Russia. If they are to wait till things are more settled in Russia, you will see from what I have said that the present moment is not opportune. Things are not by any means settled in Russia. The immediate present is favourable, as both Witte and Lamsdorff are in favour of an agreement. But Witte wants it because he wants money and Lamsdorff is too timid (and with reason) to come to any agreement with England in which Russia does not come off very much better than England. In fact, I have never heard a suggestion that Russia should give anything except a written promise not to attack India, Beluchistan and Afghanistan. The followers of Witte and Lamsdorff may very likely be men belonging to the high conservative party who will lean on Germany and hate England. But that regime cannot last. I think it inevitable that a new and more liberal regime will come in inevitably and that this will mean better relations with England. So time should work for us, unless some untoward incident arises which could put us at daggers drawn again.

It is, of course, hopeless to bind the War Department through the Foreign Office. An agreement with the Foreign Office means nothing, and the only way to tie the hands of the pushing proconsuls and border lieutenants is through the Emperor himself. This can only be done, as far as I can see, by the personal influence of the King, and, of course, a visit here would very likely bring that influence to bear. In the meantime I

[1] Roosevelt intervened, but not publicly.

suppose we will try and avoid incidents, though the avoidance will probably be all on our side. The officers and the bankers will not care what the Foreign Office may have said.

I suppose some consideration will be given to the suggestion that we should act with Russia in the matter of a possible extension of the Bagdad railway into Persia. If we don't, we may find that Germany has got in before us. France will, I suppose, give us fair warning as her aid is indispensable. Cambon [1] writes about you that you are the most remarkable Secretary of State whom he has ever had to deal with. The French are deeply obliged to you for the action you took here which has, they say, immensely strengthened their hands and tended to stiffen up the backs of the Russians.

I shall be sorry if Lamsdorff goes; but his regime has been one of frank funk, in which the Foreign Secretary's chief object was not to pledge himself or his Government to anything whatever; and it is quite impossible (so they all agree) to break new ground with him, though when he has received his master's instructions he carries them out well and loyally and is good to work with. But I don't think we should lose on the whole by having a man here with whom it is possible to talk freely and from whom an opinion can be extracted."

A letter from Sir Edward Grey makes clear that British policy had taken a new direction.

April 16, 1906.

"Dear Spring Rice,

Many thanks for your letters, especially for the personal parts. I want to get on with Russia, but it is not easy. First of all there can be no real business done till the King can visit the Czar and I cannot urge that yet. Things are too unsettled in Russia; the visit when the date arrived might coincide with some outbreak of the revolutionaries, in which case it would be unpleasant; or with some violent measures of repression or oppression by the Russian Government, in which case our King's visit would be repugnant to public feeling here. If I could only be sure of a calm interval in Russian internal affairs, I would do what I could to urge a visit on the King; but one cannot with good hope or even decency advise the King yet to fix a date for it.

And the instability of the personnel of the present Russian Government is another drawback. Lamsdorff won't make definite proposals to us—he wants us to make them. They

[1] M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London. Spring Rice had known him in Constantinople.

are not easy to formulate. I have told Benckendorff that what we want is repose on the Indian frontier; the difficulty is to define in terms what are the conditions which will guarantee repose. I am beginning to consult the military authorities as to this and have got their Indian frontier papers here to read. But if I do formulate some conditions, Lamsdorff may go, and they may simply be used against us by the next man; and even if they are not, they can lead to nothing till the Czar is taking a hand; and that brings us back to the King's visit.

You will see that I am trying to reopen the Bagdad Railway question, so as to get the Russians to come in; and I will bear in mind your suggestions about co-operation if there is a crisis in Persia.

It is possible that China may adhere to the Tibet convention;[1] if she does, I can then tell the Russians what has been done and suggest that it is very undesirable to disturb Tibet, which is one of the few places in the world where to leave things alone causes no inconvenience to anybody.

Your letters are always most interesting and very much appreciated by everybody who has a chance of seeing them, including the King, who judging from his comments is an appreciative reader of letters."

Lamsdorff did go, and was succeeded by Count Izvolsky, who had previously been Russian Minister at Copenhagen. Spring Rice wrote personal impressions of this diplomatist, who later played so critical a part in world history.

St. Petersburg,
May 24, 1906.

"Dear Sir Edward,

I have seen Izvolsky twice and find him very agreeable. He says, however, that he is quite unaccustomed to office work and that he is overwhelmed with the duties of his new office. He has very little experience as he has never served in a big Embassy, except at Rome where the work was not serious. His posts have been Washington, Rome, Belgrade, Munich, Japan and Copenhagen. When at Munich he had a house at Tegernsee where there are a number of residents making a pleasant society in which he played (with his wife who is fond of society) a certain part. . . . Johnstone's[2] despatch exactly

[1] The Tibet Convention between Great Britain and China was signed at Pekin on April 27, 1906, and confirmed the Lhasa Treaty between Tibet and Great Britain. The latter undertook not to annex Tibetan territory or interfere in the administration, while China undertook to prevent any foreign power from doing either of these things.

[2] Sir A. V. Johnstone, G.C.V.O.; then Minister at Copenhagen.

tallies with the descriptions which reach me from other quarters. He is clever and ambitious. He talks well and is fond of society in which he appears to advantage. His wife is clever and amusing and has always played a part in society. He is vain and very sensitive to flattery of any sort, but he can hardly be said to have any fixed policy except perhaps a sort of sentimental interest in the Slavs. The danger is that whereas Lamsdorff had a very great knowledge of the European situation and a clear and impartial judgment, Izvolsky has little knowledge and his judgment may easily be affected by personal considerations which never touched Lamsdorff at all. This, of course, is a serious matter in view of the fact that the Kaiser has an extraordinary faculty of seizing hold of persons new to their job and susceptible to Imperial caresses. I am sorry you missed him in London. He said he had met Haldane and Asquith, who had interested him greatly. He used to pose as a Liberal and when he came over here in November he gave vent to very Liberal sentiments. Whether he will be able to maintain that point of view in his present position is a question, but in any case it would incline him to friendly relations with England. He was much delighted with a friendly message which he received through Johnstone from the King. He is an intimate friend of Schoen the German Ambassador here, and I have no doubt that the Germans will be able to take advantage of this fact. On the whole I should say we may take for granted that he will be inclined to be on very good terms with Germany, more so than Lamsdorff; that the *entente* with Austria which was Lamsdorff's work will be weakened, and that though very friendly to England he will not at first be on such close terms of intimacy with the French as Lamsdorff was. Unfortunately Hartwig left at the same time as Lamsdorff, and thus the Foreign Office loses at a stroke the two men who were really familiar with the European situation as affecting Russia. As his private secretary Izvolsky has Knorring, who was for years at Berlin and who is for practical purposes a German. We may be prepared for a German regime here for a time, but I don't think that it will continue as Izvolsky would certainly resent being considered a tool of the Kaiser's. But it will be necessary to approach him with caution and discretion for if his vanity is touched he may become permanently alienated. He is very far from being that at present."

Meanwhile, Spring Rice had contact with some of the details of Asiatic policy which must be more specially his concern at his new post. He met the newly-appointed Russian Minister to Persia, who

had been head of the Department for Asiatic Affairs, and they discussed a curious emissary who had been received by the Czar. This was the Dalai Lama, who on the approach of the English expedition during 1905 had fled from Tibet. The Treaty of Lhasa had installed the Tashi Lama, its signatory, in his place.

March 15.

To Sir Charles Hardinge.

"Hartwig came in a very amiable way to announce his appointment. He said that he hoped we should get on and keep our people quiet and help the Governments to avoid rows which is what both wanted to do. He said that the new German is no end of a pusher and that his appointment means that the Kaiser is soon going to develop a new policy in Persia, possibly connected with the Bagdad railway. He seemed to be nervous as to this.

He told me in rather a shame-faced way the story about the Thibetan mission. I expect that the Emperor is immensely pleased at the compliments lavished on him by the Dalai Lama. According to Thibetan traditions, the country, in order to give itself up to spiritual occupations, must choose an earthly protector, who is the sword of the Lord to defend the godly from their enemies. This rôle has been held out to the Emperor, who likes being called the stepson of heaven and the 169th incarnation. Lamsdorff and the F.O. don't approve of this, and can't prevent it. It is evident that the Lama wants to get back to Lhassa, and that the Russians think he is going there. So there will be two Lamas in Thibet, one a Russian and the other an English sympathiser, and both anxious for protection from their possible enemies.

The Emperor has had a sad disappointment. There was an inscription on the embroidery which was presented to him and he thought it was one of his new titles. It turned out to be the Chinese advertisement of a Shanghai firm. How Curzon would squirm with indignation!

The distinguished guest got a flattering reception and on April 12 Spring Rice wrote to Sir Edward Grey:

"The return of the Lama to Lhassa with the Imperial telegram in his pocket is not an agreeable thing to contemplate. On the other hand, the Russians believe the Tashi Lama is to play our game and be our agent. If we could agree on a written convention of some sort and base joint action in Persia on the convention, we might prevent further difficulties."

There were hitches; not only did the Czar telegraph good wishes to the Dalai Lama but provided him with an escort of forty armed

Buriats. Now, by the Treaty signed between England and Tibet after this expedition of 1904 Tibet was pledged to admit no expedition from any foreign country without the consent of England. Spring Rice thought that the whole had been done on the Czar's initiative; that he had resented the Tibet war as an attack on the Dalai Lama who was his friend and supporter, and that he now thought it a sacred duty to accord the Lama protection.

> "The real reason is the idea which he has fixed in his mind that, if he assumes or is given the right to act as temporal protector of the chief centre of the Buddhist faith, he will become the moral chief of the continent of Asia."

Characteristically, the grant of this escort was concealed till Russia had got out of an embarrassment. Part of the loan which had been negotiated in Paris was to have been taken up in Germany, but the Kaiser, in anger over Algeciras, forbade the transaction; English financiers stepped into the gap, and this also helped matters towards a better understanding.

It appears also from the correspondence that in a minor incident of these times both Russia and France gave diplomatic support to England. The Sultan of Turkey demanded that Egyptian troops should be withdrawn from an island in the Gulf of Akaba which was a convenient anchorage, and also from certain places in the Sinai peninsula. England proposed a joint boundary commission, but Turkey refused peremptorily. Then the Mediterranean fleet moved eastwards and an ultimatum was issued, giving ten days delay. Turkey gave way on the tenth day. Spring Rice, on the eve of his return to England, wrote to Chirol jubilantly his views on this and on the Bagdad Railway proposals.

> "You are rather alarming about the Turco-Egyptian business. We should have been lost if we had not stuck to it. Here our influence would have received a severe shock and I suppose it would have been worse in Egypt. As it is, the whole affair has much increased our authority, the more so as we did what we did with the full knowledge and consent of our neighbours. The help of Russia was given ungrudgingly and was very effective. It frightened the Germans and made them see that after all Europe must be reckoned with in Constantinople, in spite of the change of Government in England and in spite of the Battle of Moukden.
>
> As to the Bagdad railway. I don't see why we should not come to an arrangement by which all parties interested, including Russia and Persia, should participate in an international concern mainly managed by Germany with proper guarantees. Persia is greatly interested, as the line from Kermanshah will be a very important one for her. And Russia because she has

her line ready laid as far as Tabreez. But we must have the proper guarantees which have hitherto been lacking. I rather doubt whether Germany will now surrender any part of her political and commercial control. She wants money and will offer good terms to the bankers in connection with the terms of emission. As for the rest, the bankers won't care. That is why she is talking only to the bankers and not to the Government.—I shall see you soon, so why should I yarn away ?

Spring Rice returned to London, where he made his first acquaintance with his daughter, and at an early day went to kiss hands on being invested with the K.C.M.G. The latest news from Russia had been sent him on June 21 by Lord Cranley (now Lord Onslow), who by Spring Rice's intervention was being transferred to Berlin, to serve under Sir Frank Lascelles.

The news was bad :

" From Ekaterinburg to Warsaw there are nothing but strikes, murders, pogroms, robberies, agrarian disorders and mutinies. The Duma are getting more and more intransigent—mainly because of the idiotic attitude adopted towards them by the Government, which by ignoring them makes it impossible for a moderate party to form itself."

" The agreement," however, was " making great strides," in spite of hitches. It had become a question whether Russia should be free to send missions to Tibet to make geographic and scientific discoveries. Lord Cranley thought the geography must be conceded, " But we could never allow the latter, for ' political science ' would be the most interesting study of the Russian missions."

Spring Rice replied :

OLD CHURCH, ULLSWATER,
July 25, 1906.

" DEAR CRANNLES,

I am delighted and so is Lascelles that your appointment is determined on. This will be good for your health and Lady Cranley's and especially for H.M. Embassy at Berlin.

Your letter was most interesting and afforded me matter for my conversation with the King when I kissed hands. He is tremendously interested in Russian affairs and his personal affection for the Emperor is quite touching. The interest everyone takes is very striking. . . .

The Government is quite determined to go in for peace and goodwill but if their efforts fail there are signs that the country will not be unwilling to back them up in matters of self-defence. Grey has a tremendous position in the house and if C. B. goes will probably be first favourite. . . . "

CHAPTER XVII

PERSIA 1906-7

The choice of Spring Rice as Minister in Persia was very natural in the public interest. Negotiations for a general agreement with Russia, to lessen the chances of collision in Asia between the two great powers, had been begun by Lord Salisbury in 1898. From 1902 onwards they were resumed by Lord Lansdowne, and had been carried to the point of hopefulness, when strained relations resulting from the Russo-Japanese War destroyed this hope. After the Treaty of Portsmouth, when the beginnings of a new order of things existed in Russia, it was possible to entertain the idea again, and, as has been seen, Sir Edward Grey on coming into office, at once directed policy towards a better understanding. Some clear arrangement was the more desirable because of the constant fear lest Russian agents in Asia, smarting under their loss of prestige, should seek brusquely to reassert those claims to a dominant influence throughout the East which Russia had not abandoned.

One of the chief danger points was Persia. Spring Rice knew that country well; he was fresh from the centre of Russian political life in St. Petersburg. He had studied closely the political movement which had revolutionised Russia—and which was already extending itself, by contagion, to the bordering territories in Persia.

In this sense, the choice of him for the mission was flattering. But he was sent to a post which in itself scarcely seemed a promotion, and at a time when its occupancy involved arduous and painful work. Great Britain's influence at Tehran had increased during the period of Russia's depression. If an agreement with Russia were to be reached, it was clear that no British diplomatic victories could be looked for in Persia. There the question must be, how much could Great Britain give up?

Added to this was the fact, not yet fully realised by Spring Rice or anyone else, that a harassing trouble of health—polyps in the nose—already affected him, and that the harsh Persian dust would aggravate it. The climate at best is trying to a European, and he was none too strong a man. What was good for the public service was in this instance not good for the servant's health.

There was already acute trouble in Persia between agitators for a great reform in its government and a weak autocratic ruler; and when the Shah threatened the popular party, its members resorted to a

usage which had grown up, and took "Bast," or sanctuary, in the grounds of the British Legation—where they were, by custom, under British protection. They were the more encouraged to do so by the knowledge that a huge Liberal majority was in power at Westminster. To add to these complications, the Shah's death was expected from week to week.

On August 8, Sir Edward Grey wrote asking Spring Rice to come and stay with him for a night or two in Northumberland, and added, between annoyance and amusement:

> "Something must be done to cope with this custom of 'Bast.' There are now 14,000 Persians in the British Legation and my private belief is that sooner or later the Shah himself will take 'Bast' there."

Again on the 12th:

> "The number of 'Bastards' at the Legation has suddenly dropped from 14,000 to 200; and Grant Duff [1] is a proud man, but he seems reluctant to let the 200 go; they consist, he says, of Persians who have 'official grievances.' I expect every day to hear that Grant Duff has been proclaimed Shah. . . .
>
> The whole resources of the Treasury, or failing that, of the Secret Service Fund, are to be placed at your disposal to make a new start with the Legation garden; I imagine it must have had a splendid top-dressing and its fertility will now be such that it will be really worth while to spend money upon it. What glorious roses you will have for the next year or two!"

Apart from the prospects of trouble, there were reasons why Spring Rice did not go to his post with enthusiasm. One of them is mentioned in a letter to Chirol, which leads an outsider to believe that the Foreign Office and the India Office regarded each other with some detachment.

107 Ebury Street,
Aug. 30, 1906.

"Dearch,

This is what happened at the India Office. I enquired for the Under-Secretary. I was told Godley was away—Sir H. Walpole was in. Could I see him? I was shown into the Council room. Soon the private secretary of Sir H. Walpole appeared and asked whether I had anything particular to say to the Under-Secretary. I said, No. I was Minister to Persia and was leaving very soon. Perhaps he might have something to say to me. I was shown in. An elderly, kind old gentleman received me—said he was glad to see me, etc.—a pause. I said

[1] Sir Evelyn Grant-Duff, K.C.M.G., then chargé d'affaires at Tehran.

I should like to hear if the India Office had any particular observations to make on certain subjects which I specified. He had no suggestions to make except that I should see Mr. Morley's[1] secretary. I went to see Mr. Morley's secretary. He said he understood that Mr. Morley had seen me—which was quite true—and that he had said good-bye. I assented and observed that perhaps in view of later developments, the I.O. might have some last words to say. He said that what was particularly occupying the attention of the I.O. at present was the question of the partition of expenditure in Persia between the India Office and the Foreign Office; that the latter had recently reduced their contribution by £500. I said I was aware of this, as the economy had been made by reducing the Minister's salary by that amount.—The India Office, he could tell me, thought that their contribution should also be made less by a similar amount.—I observed, If the economy were also to be made in my salary, the question was of some interest to me—but had he any other observations to make? He thought for a time, and said he believed not. I thanked him for his instructive conversation and said good-bye. Voilà tout. Such are my last impressions of the India Office before leaving England."

Also, letters from his former colleagues or friends continued to show that affairs in Russia, to which no one in Persia could be indifferent, were anything but tranquil. One man described general strikes and rioting at Baku; another had seen an engagement between warships and mutineers in the Baltic; and, above all, the Duma had been suddenly and peremptorily dissolved on July 21, with the intimation that a new Duma would be convoked for March 27, 1907. And Stolypin, who now held control, though a Liberal, was using reactionary methods which were answered by an attempt to assassinate him.

On the other hand, there must have been solid satisfaction in some of the letters which he received. Mr. Hugh O'Beirne, who had succeeded him as Counsellor at St. Petersburg, wrote:

"I must express my gratitude for the valuable materials you left me for studying the financial question. I don't know how I'd have got on without them. Your Memo. on the debt, prepared for the Indian Government, was especially precious, and I think that thanks to you I am beginning to have an elementary knowledge of the question."

This was not the first indication that Spring Rice's service in the Egyptian *Caisse* had been an education. A year earlier, one of his best correspondents, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, wrote from the Embassy

[1] John Morley was then Secretary of State for India.

at Paris (of which he was then Secretary) that the Memos. on Russian finances circulated in the official print had greatly enlightened him.

All the sweeping generalisations of which so many are reproduced in these volumes were based on a very close study of detail in many fields. But none the less, the distinctive gift of Spring Rice's mind was to rise out of detail into a wider survey. Dr. E. J. Dillon, one of the ablest publicists of that day, expressed this in a letter from St. Petersburg.

St. Petersburg,
Dec. 20, 1906.

"Dear Sir Cecil,

If I were to write to you every time I contemplate with regret that you are no longer here, I should send you a letter at least every day. For St. Petersburg is no longer the same to me since you went away, and every two or three hours I am reminded of the fact keenly, painfully. Events which, reflected from your brain, would then have stimulated me, now leave me almost unmoved. Your *coups d'œil politiques* were as attractive to me as a survey of the kingdoms of the world from the high mountain . . . you know, was once supposed to be.

This event takes place and that incident happens, but there is no one here now to piece them all together and make a complete sequence of events, as you so often and so successfully used to do. I am sure your presence is missed by many others here as well as myself, indeed, I know it is—by Baring, for instance, whom I occasionally see; but I much doubt whether any of them feel the loss so keenly and so continually as myself. It is as if part of myself had vanished for a time—and unhappily the best part and for a long time. . . ."

The same correspondent wrote in 1909:

"Of all the persons I know in British diplomacy you are the only one to whom I would entrust a University course for lectures on the philosophy of politics. You have the secret of finding the hidden causes from which the sources of politics, and therefore of contemporary history, spring. You make one see and realize that two seeming bits of threads, wholly disconnected in appearance, are but one and the same thread, not cut at all. That is a gift which I set higher than any other akin to it."

At the same time, it is to be fully realized that no one man always sees further than others; and, judging after the event, we must admit that Spring Rice's views of policy at his new post were mistaken—from the standpoint of England's advantage.

Writing from Washington in 1913 about the Mexican imbroglio, he said to Grey : " I recognise now that in Persia I could not see the wood for the trees " ; and he argued against neglecting the general interest for an object of detail.—In 1906-7 two causes misled him. One was his sympathy for Persia and its people. Yet it is perhaps not proper to attribute error to this. He himself at all events would have continued to contend that it was England's interest to support the cause of free institutions and honest government, wherever that cause was asserting itself in a sphere which English influence affected.—The second, however, undoubtedly impaired his vision. It was that innate tendency to pessimism in all things, which took the form of suspicion when he was judging the action of all but those whom he trusted and liked ; and he disliked Russians, with few exceptions, and distrusted the race proportionately. He had none of that cordial feeling for the popular movement in Russia which he showed to that in Persia—though he knew all the weakness of Persian character. But then it must be remembered, Persia was no danger to his own country ; Russia had been that—and, in his judgment, always would be. That is where others saw further. Especially it was a case when Sir Edward Grey's broad optimism was wiser than even the most sharp-sighted pessimism.

When Spring Rice with his wife and child reached Tehran at the end of September 1906, the movement for free institutions had attained at least its first objective. On August 15 the Shah had found himself obliged to publish a rescript, promising to institute " an assembly composed of representatives of the Princes, the Clergy, the Kajars, the Nobles, the Aristocracy, the Land Proprietors, the Merchants, the Traders, to be elected by the above-named classes so that they may lend to our Ministers the necessary aid . . . in order to bring about reforms for the good and weal of Persia. All the people of the country will be able in the assurance of perfect security to state their views for the public welfare—to be submitted to Us through the Principal Personage of the State to receive Our signature, and to be subsequently carried out."

On October 11 Spring Rice attended the first meeting of this assembly, the Mejlis, and described his impressions to Chirol :

> " All I saw of it was a crowd standing in a garden—troops, mullahs, merchants, students, all sorts ; a mass of trees, rather irregular flower beds ; a large deep pond, paved with blue tiles. The crowd waited patiently enough and at last the troops saluted and the national anthem was played. Then at the window above appeared the Shah seated in a chair, the high priests at first standing, then at his invitation sitting round him ; the great officers of state standing. Then a professional orator with a loud voice, below, made an oration in praise of the Shah. Then a prince stood up and read the speech which he took from the hands of the Grand Vizier, who took it

from the hands of the Shah. The speech was long and rambling. The sense of it was that now all classes of the population should work together for the good of Persia and that everyone must remember that their duty was to think not of themselves but of their country. There was a loud and enthusiastic shout of ' Long live the Shah '—and the ceremony was ended.—It is curious that I have seen the two—the opening of the Duma and the opening of the Mejlis ! "

The rest of this letter contains a sceptical examination of the movement towards an Anglo-Russian *Entente*.

" We take for granted that Russia means what she says when she says she does not intend to take up a position in Persia which would facilitate the invasion of India. We prove by deeds as well as words that we intend to give her professions a fair chance of being realised. We persist in this policy in spite of certain indications, which if generally known would not increase the ardour of the British action in persisting."

The truth was that Spring Rice, posted in one of the three debatable regions concerning which an agreement was projected, could see no signs of the approaching harmony that the Foreign Office aspired to. The Russia with which he was in contact at Tehran was the old Russia, the traditional enemy.

Broadly, the Government were endeavouring to elaborate a general agreement with Russia concerning Asia, of which the chief artificers were Lord Hardinge at the Foreign Office and Sir Arthur Nicolson at St. Petersburg, with the Foreign Secretary pressing them forward in the cause of European stability and peace. The arrangement chiefly concerned three sectors where Russian and British interests clashed ; Afghanistan, Tibet and Persia. Each subject was studied separately and brought tentatively to separate conclusion, but the main engineers were more concerned with the whole than with any of the parts. Spring Rice, in Persia, saw and felt more sensitively what was immediately under his eye. Under his eye there was no evidence that England was dealing with a new Russia, yet in this belief lay the pith of Sir Edward Grey's hope. On the other hand, he evidently thought the British Foreign Office slow to realise that a new Persia was struggling to be born. It was certain anyhow, and Lord Hardinge admitted it, that the Russian Foreign Office had no sympathy with what the Persian people strove for.

" They call it a revolutionary movement, and we call it a reform movement," said Lord Hardinge.

Also, as the negotiation developed, Persia became aware of what was contemplated ; that Britain should recognize one zone in Persia as the special field for Russian enterprise, and should undertake to abstain from action in it, while Russia in the same way pledged her-

self to undertake nothing in another region. Between the zone in the south-east, left to England, and that in the north-west, left to Russia, a kind of debateable land remained open.—Naturally enough, Persians construed this as a partition of their country, and Spring Rice had much sympathy with them. This made it all the harder for him to take the step which he felt necessary and abolish the privilege of "Bast." If there was going to be even a show of constitutional rule in the country, it would be inconsistent for a Liberal power to afford protection to the subjects against their own Government. But he was unhappy and his disquietude was evidently reflected in his despatches, for Sir Edward Grey wrote on November 30, 1906:

"My Dear Springy,

I am afraid you have got depressed. Don't let distance make you feel out of touch. It's true I was afraid of Hartwig spiking Isvolsky's guns before the latter had got under way, but the telegrams weren't meant to depress you and I think everything is going all right now. I don't mean that we are getting on fast. Reactionaries are getting uppermost in St. Petersburg, and I fear our negotiation will make no progress and perhaps come to nothing, but whatever happens I will not go in for a forward policy in Persia.

You were quite right to discourage 'Bast': I see it was a horrid thing to have to do, but we should have become the champions of Persia and raised expectations, which would have led to disappointment and made our position worse in the long run. And there must be a limit to the hospitality of our Legation and Consulate.

If the next Persian Government is a better one, it will find us a good friend, but we can only help those who help themselves. We might do a good deal to say 'Hands off' and help the independence of Persia, if it would show itself worthy of independence; but we can't let it lean upon us while it is rotten. . . .

My job here is really inhuman during the Session; though the H. of C. doesn't trouble me much except by questions; I have to spend some hours there working in my room, and am interrupted by the divisions. . . .

I end as I began—don't think you are in a backwater or getting out of it. You are in the main stream, though a disagreeable part of it, and you won't lose ground."

The affectionate nickname is here used for the first time by this friend. Spring Rice's visit to his chief, in the north country which they both loved, had no doubt developed intimacy between men so

congenial to each other ; and the last word of the letter goes back to a scene near Fallodon.

"I hope I may live to see you sport upon the shore of Dunstanburgh once more.

Yours ever,

E. GREY."

A matter which no doubt added at this time to Spring Rice's low spirits was the appointment of Mr. Bryce to replace Durand in the Embassy at Washington. The choice of a distinguished outsider can never be very popular in the service, and Spring Rice's name had been inevitably among those canvassed.

"Many persons were discussed," Lady Helen Ferguson wrote, "including your knightly self and Ronald. I fancy you were supposed to be too much *au mieux* with the President, and the Senate and other luminaries do not like personal appointments."

Mr. Norman, who had been second to Spring Rice at St. Petersburg and was now at the Foreign Office, wrote with more malice.

"I spent yesterday a really amusing morning (this is no flattery) reading your admirable despatches which had just arrived. If all work was like that, who would not be head of the Eastern Department ? I now feel, besides, that I know for the first time something of the situation in Persia.

We have all been admiring your most sensible telegrams about the loan, and Sir E. Grey's minutes have been most flattering to you. . . .

What do you think of Mr. Bryce ? I suppose the Yanks will be charmed, as what they want is to feel that we recognise that an ordinary dip. is not good enough for Washington because it is the most important post of all, and that we must send them a celebrity. I think *any* celebrity would suit, as long as his name was really well known to them. . . . But I think you would have done better than any, and, of course, it is only *partie remise*. Had you been on the spot and not been wanted badly for Tehran, I expect you would have got it. It was bad luck. . . ."

Returning to the detail of events in Persia : the Assembly had assembled, but as yet no constitution existed under which it could act. Also, the Shah was dying, and, as often happened in Persia, there was a disputed succession. England and Russia, however, had combined to support the claim of the Valiahd,[1] Governor of Tabriz.

[1] The recognised successor to the Shah.

On November 9 Spring Rice wrote to Chirol:

"With regard to the general question of the Anglo-Russian *Entente*, Hartwig and I and the French Minister desire it. The Persians hate it and our own officials no less. The diplomatists, especially the Germans, don't believe in it and do all they can to thwart our efforts at conciliation.

Of course all the staff here, and especially all the Indian Consuls, are dead against a reconciliation which is contrary to all their traditions and also takes away their occupation. So you see that the task even of getting on with the Russians here without friction is a very hard one. As for the Government, you will have noticed Isvolsky's movements. I won't particularise but what I think has happened is that he began with a keen desire for an agreement and that then the War Office interfered. As you know, what they desire is an outlet on the Indian Ocean, outside the Gulf, connected with Russia by a railway across the tableland but by the easiest gradient, with probably a branch to Seistan. The *Novoye Vremya* took fire at the rumours of an agreement and pointed out that all the hopes of Russia were now at an end. There can be little doubt that this paper represents the Court, Grand ducal and military party and that it has great influence over the Emperor."

Another letter to Chirol recounts further developments. Russia had endeavoured to secure the privilege of making a loan to Persia; British influence, strengthened by British sympathy for the popular movement, set on foot an agitation against a transaction which would put Persia tied and bound into Russia's hands. Then a joint loan from the two countries was proposed. But by an unlooked for spread of the popular movement, priestly influence was thrown into the scale against it.

Dec. 5, 1906.

To Chirol.

"Since last I wrote things have moved a good deal. The Shah is much worse. The German doctor arrived and without asking the advice of the doctors who had hitherto been consulted he set to work on his own treatment. He gave out (and the German Legation too) that there was nothing seriously wrong with the Shah and that there was no reason that he should not live for some time, say a year or two. He gave stimulating medicines and the effect was for some time satisfactory, but a change soon came about, as the other doctors had anticipated, and now the condition is very serious. The other doctors are naturally very much afraid that he will go away before the Shah dies and leave them with the responsibility of killing him

as the Persians will say. They maintain that his idea was to come here, say that the Shah was all right and then go away with his fee and leave them to bury the Shah. However, it seems unlikely that the Shah will survive the remaining fortnight of the contract. In the meantime the doctor is treating Persians of importance gratis and spoiling the practice of the resident doctors, which he can afford to do as he gets a fee of six thousand pounds from the Shah. The Shah has given to the doctors who have attended him hitherto a shawl worth about two pounds. . . .

I get on very well with Hartwig, who I believe is playing straight. I have no proofs whatever that he is not playing straight and I have every reason to believe that he has warned his subordinates everywhere to keep on good terms with the English. This is a matter of great difficulty. I find him ready to co-operate and very frank. As to the general situation, this is what I see at present.

The Popular movement attained very considerable proportions and took the Government and the Russians by surprise. Whether intended or not, it was identified with the British Legation and its success added immensely to our power and prestige. . . .

When I arrived here all sorts of congratulatory messages reached me from the popular party who hoped I would continue the support which they believed they had already received. I told them that H.M.G. had strong Liberal sympathies, but that they were very economical and peaceable. They would not spend money and they could not send soldiers. They therefore gave the popular party their blessing but would not promise them any assistance. What they could do was to ask the Russians not to help the other side on condition that we also promised to be neutral. This was a great disappointment and disenchantment and led to a great fall in English prestige. I was assured that Russia would step into the vacant place. I said, If so, so much the better, as the popular party would benefit. I quoted the Koran to prove that if liberty was not won by the people for themselves it was not worth having. But I can't say I gave satisfaction. The general belief is that we have given Persia up as a bad job and that we have sold her to the Russians as part of a general scheme of buying and selling, which we call peace negotiations.

The people are certainly aroused. Sermons are being preached in the mosques where women in floods of tears offer their jewels to save the country from the foreigner. For years the rulers have trafficked in the honour and independence of

Persia and now the final sale is to be made in order that the Sadrazam[1] may buy some more properties and the Shah's courtiers spend more money in Parisian hotels. 'Let the people give their money and found a bank and buy out the foreigner.' So when it was announced in the Mejlis that the Sadrazam had concluded another loan there was a storm. It was at once apparent that the Mejlis with the best will in the world would not dare to consent. The great priests were present and spoke occasionally, although not members. The people (I among them) sat on the floor in the meeting room and listened with applause or the reverse. It was decided that no foreign loan should be allowed, but that the people should be asked to contribute. Contributions came in, but unfortunately they were only in promises to pay. There was no coin. There were exceptions. For instance, a deputation of little boys came in and said that they had subscribed among themselves twenty *tomans* for the nation. There were many tears among the audience when the President rose to thank the deputation and asked if the people would learn from their own sons what their duty was. But unfortunately facts are facts, and the fact is that there is no money except in the foreign banks, and the foreign banks won't give their money except to the Sadrazam according to the loan contract and not otherwise.

The real objection on the part of the Sadrazam is not the want of popular sanction but the fact that we have demanded a strict account of the expenditure defrayed out of the loan and this would prevent him having his bit.

The Valiahd[2] is *en route* and if he comes full speed he will be here on Sunday. He started on Tuesday with some hundred horses whom he will have to leave behind. If the Shah dies before he arrives there will be looting in the town and the bazaars will be shut. The soldiers, even the Cossacks, are unpaid and they will certainly, some of them at any rate, take the chance of a bit of looting. The Palace is full of greedy hangers-on who are waiting for the Shah to die to lay hands on the valuables. We have laid up a store of provisions, have warned the provinces and await events. The money is ready to pay the troops as soon as the Sadrazam consents to the loan. I wonder if anything will happen. I don't suppose so, but if it does, give us all a good obituary notice, but not a service in St. Paul's until you get our death certificates. . . ."

[1] The Grand Vizir.

[2] Mohammed Ali, who succeeded his father as Shah, Jan. 1907.

Jan. 3, 1907.

To Chirol.

"Happy New Year. We have celebrated ours here by the new constitution. What do you think? Of course it is quite on the cards whether it succeeds or not. If it does it means a change with a vengeance. As you will agree, if Persia reforms herself, she can defend herself, and at any rate she will not give occasion by her weakness for foreign nations to take hold of her. She is now trying to organise a national bank to restore her finances and is going to engage foreigners (from 'an independent nation') to assist her. I wonder if this is Germany? However this may be and whatever the outlook, there is a great change for the moment. Germany may be the country who will now be influential here. But the old dispute between Russia and England will have changed its character. If Persia reforms herself, Russia can no longer hope, by lending her money, to get complete control over her policy. She isn't likely to attack Persia by force, because if she did so England would have to take measures to guard her own interests in the South, and the way to the Gulf of Oman would be barred for ever. At least I presume that the Liberal Government would take this step. If not, of course, Russia can act as she pleases. The Russian Government, or at any rate Hartwig, have acted with great tact. Hartwig has advised the Valiahd to come to terms with the Assembly. The Valiahd, whatever his prejudices against liberty, has consented to act with the people, because when he came to Tehran it was apparent that he had to choose between that course and entire dependence on Russia and perhaps the loss of his throne or his life.

The popular movement may break down but it will get up again. I don't think it can be permanently destroyed now. The result will not be pleasant for foreigners (as we have seen in China) but it will put an end to the chance of peaceful penetration for some time to come. If Persia ceases to invite interference, the main cause of our disputes with Russia will come to an end, and we get something better than an *entente*.

I can't tell you how refreshing it is to hear the Persians talking about their new liberties and the things they are ready to do for their country. As a matter of fact although the officials have not been paid for a year and would have got their pay if the Government had accepted the advance from us, they are quite delighted that it has been refused. This is business and I don't see that we are justified in laughing at the Members of the Mejlis because they sit on the floor instead of on chairs, and

receive subscriptions from children to the National Bank in tears and standing."

A letter from John Morley contained at least some sympathetic reflections.

India Office,
Dec. 5, 1906.

"My Dear Spring Rice,

Your letter is most interesting to me, you may be sure It brings the scene and the actors before me in a way that despatches and 'sections' and blue prints naturally miss. Certainly your skies are not over-full of sunshine, and when I see all the tracasseries of the Meshed-Seistan wire and the pretty artificial definitions of 'status quo,' I wonder how you feel in moments of langour—if you ever know such things—about the precise place of the moral element in diplomacy. You recollect our friendly tilting—if tilt it was—on the eve of your departure ?

However, let all these things be as they may. You and Nicolson are fighting what is, or ought to be, a fine campaign. I often think how much easier it is for a Secretary of State in Whitehall to carry on his battle for a policy in despatches than it is for the diplomatist actually on the ground to face all the worries and entanglements of contests with persons. To me, bred in the pharisaic complacency of the library—tempered, I admit, by twenty years of the H. of C.—the squalor of it would be mortal. Still, the diplomatist may console himself by the reflection that it is upon him that it depends to get the work done or leave it with a ragged edge undone. . . .

Yours very sincerely,
John Morley."

It was not all work. Spring Rice, even when the sense of duty was most feverish on him, never lost the faculty of enjoyment, and Persia kept its fascination for him, in the literature, the people, and the scenery. There were many excursions. But first and last he hated ceremony and a certain amount of this was obligatory on a Minister. A letter to his sister Margaret gives some picture of their way of life.

Dec. 7, 1906.

"As a rule we get up pretty early. I breakfast before eight. Then go and give my horse an apple and then have a Persian lesson in my room. I am translating a letter of advice from the great Ali to the Governor of Egypt which contains the accepted principles of government under the Mussulman of the seventh century; all of which principles, like our own, are systematically neglected. Then I go out if I have time and trundle the pram.

Then return and read despatches and telegrams and interview people. A correspondent (English-American) a Persian merchant, perhaps a Parsi—they are the most honest—a delegate from the Persian F.O. who wants something or other—beggars high and low, sometimes a foreign dip.—not often, as I don't think our Legation is regarded as of much importance. Then lunch with four or five of the staff who compare notes and have a good time. They are all very pleasant, thank heaven. Then a pause for smoke and reading. Then a ride. Sometimes up the hill; sometimes across the plain E. of the town. The other day we went and took lunch at a hunting box of the Shah's—beautiful water, an elaborate vaulted pavilion, flowers, a view over the Tehran plain, mountains close behind —and then a magnificent canter back across the plain; the party (about ten horsemen and women) scattering in all directions. My horse is a very good one and so is Florence's. She enjoys it mightily. Then return and go a visit to some colleagues or a Persian; or better still, sit and read till work arrives. Then work and dinner and read afterwards. We always dine alone if we can. Sometimes the whole afternoon is spent in visits as that is the only way of collecting information. This is very exhausting indeed—I had rather sit and work for hours than sit and talk for minutes.

I wish I were home; in five years from now I may be having my pension! Till then I shall stick it out."

But the very strength of his sympathy with the Persian people was a pain to him, because by the *force majeure* of political considerations, he could not side with them as he would have wished. There is evidence of this in letters to the Fergusons, who counted almost as near as his own kin. Their concerns were as keenly present with him as his own even across that distance. He had been sharply disappointed when Ferguson was not among those chosen for office by the Liberal leader; but he maintained continually that a country gentleman representing the interests of his own shire had enough to fill any man's ambition; and he was greatly pleased when the town of Kirkcaldy chose his friend for its chief honour, the provostship. Respect for such recognition fitted in with his life-long allegiance to Walter Scott—of which also there will be found a trace here.

To Ferguson. Feb. 21, 1907.

"My Dear Provost,

What fun you must have! I am so glad you like it. Please tell me more about it. I am sure it is the right thing to do and I do hope that you will grow in favour and power every day and end as King of the Kingdom of Fife. The more I see of the

world and the larger it grows to me, the higher opinion I have of the little spot called home, and wish I had one. If I had, I should see my last of railways or steamers and never talk a word of foreignese more. But I have some years more before I get my pension and I think when I do I shall shut up and rest contented. At least I think so now. This is rather an absurd job, as it is all pretending that that is which isn't and I know it isn't but mustn't say so. However, it all tends to peace and quiet in the world which is a good thing. Grey seems to be doing very well and he makes a good chief. As for America, I could hardly have hoped to have been appointed now. I can't make out what it was which turned out Durand prematurely. . . Well, well ; rather a warning not to stay too long in Persia. In fact, I don't think it is worth the risk to one's intelligence and energy and I shall make serious efforts to get away after two years.

Politics are in a nice mess now, aren't they ? I refrain from comment but should like to hear yours. Here the popular movement was set going, at first artificially, but it seems natural enough now. It is both national and religious. It is a sort of desperate last attempt to set Persia on her legs again. The feeling is that foreign nations shall *not* have her, yet a while ; but unfortunately the energy to set things right is still lacking. It is quite pathetic to see. It is a wild struggle against time for if the reform movement is not successful in a short time, it will be no good trying any more ; for reforms will come from without. Poor Persia. Russia and England are holding their hands off and will continue to do so as long as possible. The danger is that there will be attacks on Europeans which will justify interference. At any rate, if it comes, it will not for some time at any rate lead to serious trouble, and if you compare this with what would have happened under similar circs. two years ago—it is a real step in advance. My impression is that it is no good arranging our scheme for national defence to include India, because if Russia, with two million men and more, seriously wished to conquer it, no scheme of defence of which we are capable would be enough to secure its safety. Its safety lies in the fact that it isn't worth anyone's while to attack it because there is no pretext—our empire there does nobody any harm (*good, pace* Chamberlain, as long as others have equal treatment) —and its conquest would be an extremely costly operation, owing to time, space and much sand, and not worth the result. Presumably there is a Canadian frontier question—3000 miles of it—but it doesn't lead to our expending much money on it. If Russia cares to pursue a frankly barbarous policy of conquest

(I don't say she doesn't) we can show her up and prevent her borrowing money at the expense of our friends. This is a small but a safe satisfaction. In the meanwhile we can make all possible safeguards, short of tying our hands in Europe for the sake of a black Empire, glorious as it is. England won't cease to exist if India is lost, and it is certainly not a question of life and death for us. Paris is nearer than Calcutta and London nearer than Paris. And on questions of Indian defence we are paralysing our home defence; for compulsory service is not compatible with service *out* of the country. It is only a means of *self-defence*.

I suppose residence in the East makes one rather pessimistic —which is the way I feel at present. It is quite interesting here, however, and I shall tell you more about it if you care to hear. I must say I prefer Fifeshire. Do you think I could venture a letter to the *Scotsman* and the *G. Herald*, asking for a small sum to devote the interest of it to the up-keep of the cemetery in which Sir Walter's son Charles and Sir H. Bethune (Earl of Lindsay) are buried. I went to see it in state, *i.e.* with the Legation guard, and impressed on the Armenian priest to whom the charge of the church is confided that three million Scotsmen would have his blood if a *scratch* was made on the slab. He is looking after the graves most carefully, but I should like to give him a sum regularly, and to provide that this is done when I have gone. The interest on £100 would be enough.

Another letter to his sister gives some detail of the Ministerial life —sketched with rather grim humour.

GULHEK,
May 29, 1907.

"MY DEAR MARGARET,

I am bad at writing, but F. makes up for it, I hope. We went to town on the 27th, starting early in the morning. Florence's maid is, I believe, in love with the man servant and (1) forgot to pack up F.'s skirt and (2) forgot to call her in the morning. The result of No. 2 was that there was rather a scurry.

I started on horseback. It was warm. The night before there had been a most terrific thunderstorm which had kept us all awake except the baby, who sleeps through everything when she feels like it. We got to town, F. driving in a carriage with her usual magnificent escort. There I changed into a gold coat and cocked hat and we started riding—the staff with me, six gholams in red in front and six Indian sowars behind. The Shah had had a row with his people the day before, as he was accused of ordering a certain robber chief to lay waste a fertile

but revolutionary province, and his telegrams of encouragement had been intercepted. As a result all illuminations had been prohibited and the foreign legations had been warned not to attend at the palace to congratulate the Shah. Fortunately there had been a reconciliation during the night and we weren't interrupted. Indeed our procession was greeted quite nicely by the people. I must say a cocked hat and gold coat with a weighted coat-tail isn't a very good riding costume, but we went at a slow and majestic walk, F. photographing us as we started on our way. On arrival at the palace we were herded together with the other diplomats and proceeded through the gardens escorted by very ragged soldiers, slightly interrupted once or twice by mules carrying water. We were brought into a room all looking-glasses, and a certain extremely disreputable foreign nobleman who acted as master of the ceremonies put us in line like schoolboys waiting for their master—each Minister with his staff standing behind him. The Shah appeared with a few Ministers behind him and the Turkish Ambassador made a speech of welcome, during which H.M. turned his back. When it was over, H.M. walked down the line and devoted half a minute to each diplomatist which made us all rather indignant as we were each charged with a message of congratulation. When it was over he went off escorted into a private room by a certain Russian Jew who is his chosen confidant. So the audience ended and we went back. There was a German banker there whose mission has made a great stir ; he occupied himself in photographing the various missions as they departed. The Russian drove with a Russian carriage and coachman done up as for a Russian winter ; poor man ; a character perfectly well known throughout the whole of Persia—looks like an Archbishop and is the only foreigner here who is universally respected. Twelve Cossacks in purple formed the escort. We got rather sick of the majestic walk on the way back and broke into a trot ; the Colonel had borrowed F.'s horse, who didn't approve of a clanking sword, and played hell and Tommy all the way ; much to the delight of the spectators. My horse behaved like an archdeacon and looked occasionally at his stable companion as if he thought him no end of a fool. We had to stay about in the garden (pretty hot) till it was time to dress for the state dinner, to which F. was asked. The absence of the petticoat was then observed. She borrowed one from a lady friend and we went off in the carriage—fortunately shut, for a tremendous storm came on—dust first and then rain and lightning. We waited one hour and a half before dinner was announced, owing to the fact that some of the more important

guests had refused at the last moment because it had been announced that our host who hadn't paid the soldiers (but himself) was going to be blown up with a bomb. However, nothing happened. We dined in a room all looking-glasses, on boards over a tank ; the boards shook in a very alarming way. On the drive home we stuck in a torrent and had some difficulty in getting through but arrived all right at one.

This is a merry day to record, isn't it ? F. will tell you the more interesting details."

For another trait of the man, Etonians will like to be informed that Eton's festival, the Fourth of June, was celebrated at Gulhek in 1907 by a dinner for which the Minister drew up a menu consisting of such dishes as

Potage Vertu (de Necessité)
Canard Persan Salar-ed-Dowleh
Bombe Carabinée and the like,

" washed down with Mumm('s the word) " and " Liqueur Entente Cordiale (Russe 1907)." But, "none of these excellent things being available," says the record, " we ate what we got."—One poet makes many ; there was always verse-writing wherever Spring Rice went, and on this occasion a member of the staff, Mr. Robert Vansittart,[1] broke out into an " Eton Ballad," inscribed " To C.S.R."

Here is the motto and the first verse :

" ' Qualibet exules
In parte regnanto beati.'

As the Roman intent on the Dacian
Looked back to the City of Cheer,
As in Asia the Greek with elation
Looked West, and glanced East without fear,
So I look, as I pour this libation
To names that to-day are most dear,
From the confines of civilisation ;
We are England and Eton out here."

There should be added here some mention of a letter which reached Spring Rice in 1917, when he was British Ambassador at Washington, and the writer, Mr. W. L. Smart, was attached to the Consulate General at New York. Writing as " an incorrigible Persian," Mr. Smart, who had served at Tehran in 1907, expressed his joy at finding himself " under the aegis " of Spring Rice, in " this material refuge which we have sought against the spiritual East."

" You were for me," he said, " a great humanising influence at my entrance into the unemotional world of officialdom." Though the

[1] Now Mr. Robert Gilbert Vansittart, C.M.G., author of many literary works.

East was far away and done with, and for a sign of finality all Mr. Smart's Oriental books had been sunk by a German submarine on their way from Tangier to London, still he craved " to sit again in the Gulhek garden with the old Mirza and waste an hour discussing the peculiar formation of a single roseleaf."

That speaks, at all events, of times of relaxation. But as compared with the records of his earlier Persian period—even at the time when he was in charge—it is impossible not to see that Spring Rice in 1907 found Tehran a most uncongenial post, and the letters that follow show why. He loved the Persians, he hated the Russians ; and he had no faith in the future of the projected *Entente*. He wrote to Lord Cranley :

March 28, 1907.

" Your letters were most interesting and instructive. I can't say that things here are very pleasing. We are expected to co-operate with Russia in suppressing the popular party, which is hardly a game which H.M.G. can play with impunity. There would be a row at home, and if we engage with the Russians in a campaign against the patriotic party here, we shall have to pay the piper in being the object of popular attacks. So far we are free of this, but how long will it last ? H.M.G. have one eye on the Russian alliance, but they had better keep one on their own constituencies. An anti-popular policy here, in alliance with Russia, will not be a popular policy in England, unless the English are gone quite mad over the Russian *Entente*. It was easy for two civilized and Liberal nations like France and England to come to terms and act together ; but common action between an English Liberal and a Russian bureaucrat is a pretty difficult thing to manage. A wild ass and a commissary mule make a rum team to drive. . . .

The policy of the Russians here is to interfere in favour of the Shah, as, if they don't, they think he will have to yield to the patriotic movement and co-operate with the Mejlis, which would, of course, ruin their game. As they can't interfere without a pretext, they are trying to seek a pretext, or invent one, and sooner or later a pretext will be found. The question is how far the Anglo-Russian *Entente* includes a joint campaign against Liberal principles here ; and our position is embarrassing as I am entirely without information as to what is happening about Persia in St. P. except an occasional note from Nikko,[1] which is unintelligible as I have no information as to the basis of the agreement.

You see that it is not considered advisable to consult me and my *amour-propre* is naturally rather wounded. In another

[1] Sir A. Nicolson.

sense it provides me with plentiful opportunities for making disagreeable remarks to everyone all round.

Don't come here. The climate is pleasant, but it is hard for our Legation, having occupied a very prominent position here for some time, to take a back seat, and indeed to spend a good deal of trouble and time in putting the back seat together in order to sit on it.

This place is rather like Morocco. The anti-foreign policy is growing, although the leaders are doing all they can to keep it in check and to prevent attacks on Europeans. If Russia and England combine to suppress the popular movement, the people, and perhaps the Government, will turn to Turkey and Germany, and I expect we shall have to pay the piper. That Germany and Russia have not already come to an agreement, I do not and cannot believe. I am sure at any rate Tsarskoe and Potsdam keep one another informed in a friendly way how things are going, and haven't failed to make a little arrangement of their own. I don't suppose it is to our advantage. Here it is curious to see how extremely frank all the Russians are in their hatred of the popular party. I can't find it in my bones to join our old friends the Russian bureaucracy in treading down a people trying to reform its own bureaucracy."

Sir Edward Grey was aware of these discontents and careful to supply encouragement. He wrote on April 15, 1907, his thanks for letter. Then followed a description of his "normal day"—work from 9 a.m. till midnight.

"All this to excuse myself for not writing to you. You mustn't think you are going downhill. Things are going all right. Persia for the time being is an unprofitable place and all you can do is to keep us out of rows on the spot (which you have done) and mark time till we see the result of negotiations at St. Petersburg, which are going on well at present.

I am afraid you get depressed at a distance and think we at home must be getting cold and hard, because we are far away and overworked; but it isn't so. When I have time to feel anything, I feel just the same."

Again on April 17th in reply to one on March 20th.

"Of course we want to keep out of anything which would look like co-operating against the patriotic movement. We have been working against an open interference by force in the internal affairs of Persia at St. Petersburg, hitherto with success. You have done the same with success at Tehran.

I gather from your letter that the Russian officials on the spot

would like to force the hand of their own Government, and I quite see that the situation is difficult for you. But I hope, by continuing to steer the same course of deprecating interference, we shall avoid having to take any sort of action such as you fear.

Indeed, we shall not take it unless attacks upon foreigners make it absolutely necessary to do so in self-defence, and even then our action must be limited to the ports.

A few weeks, now, will decide whether Russia is going to come to an agreement with us about Persia. If she does, the tension will be relieved."

After this come some personal letters.

April 23, 1907.

To Lady Helen Ferguson,

"... It isn't bad here. I am sitting under a tent on the terrace outside the house; bright sun—a splendid wisteria; running water—a nightingale—all the trees freshly out. Judas, quince, etc. Baby squealing with amusement (got a pansy in her mouth probably), in fact peaceful and rustic enjoyment.

I am just back from the mountains where I went with a Colonel—he to shoot ibex and mouflon, and me to collect bulbs. Shall I send you a consignment of mountain tulips? I have a lot of weighty questions to decide—one is how long I shall stay here. The fact is I ought to have had an operation on my nose before starting, but the doctor said it would take some time and that the Tehran climate is good. The last assertion proved false as I have got worse, and I can't be operated upon here and so must return to England—perhaps to stay there. I hope to remain till October but I don't think I can stay longer. This is an awful bore and expense. Florence as usual takes it philosophically and is already prepared to pack silver and baby and carpets, etc., and trudge off again. I wouldn't be a diplomatist's wife, not for a hundred Embassies. You were precious near being so.[1] I wonder if you would have liked it? I wish it had been possible. I suppose Grey couldn't send his own pal. I shouldn't think that the occupation was a very satisfactory one for the Ambassador, and probably less so for the Ambassadress. Whether Florence or I will ever go there is extremely doubtful, as I should think the place would be reserved for politicians, rising or extinct.

It looks bad for Florence and me, so I am casting about for a side-door out; but I have still four years to run before I get pensioned. I tell Florence, if she was only an American heiress I could scoot now; but she answers (with truth) that if

[1] Alluding to the suggestion of Ferguson as Ambassador to U.S.A.

she was an American heiress she would insist on staying to be Ambassadress.

Politics here are highly amusing. The Russians are engaged in spoiling their own Duma at home and teaching the Shah how to spoil his Mejlis here. The dear Liberals at home are trying to get social recognition from the Russian Emperor, and to obtain this are encouraging him in his policy of extinguishing the liberties of his own people, and are about to help him to extinguish the liberties of Persia. Some day I shall have the great amusement of showing the whole game up. I shall be dead then ; but won't my ghost have a good time !

Let me hear what you are doing. I think Ronald the Mayor will have a better time than Ronald the Minister, especially if he takes to drilling the young Kirkcaldian. I'd give a good deal to be brought up on a property, with lots of timber in it and stout young men whom I could persuade to devote a certain number of days to drill. I'd go once a month to the House of Lords to say what I thought of them; I'd know every soul on the land by sight, and I'd paste up the drawing-room door."

His spleen against Russia and consequently against the *Entente*, was most fully poured out in letters to Chirol—of whom he said, " I notice you are the only person whom dips. are willing to talk to." Much is too technical and detailed for this book, but part of what he wrote on April 27, 1907, has a general character.

" The assembly is losing power but mainly because so many asemblies have sprung up. Liberty is killing its own children. But liberty is here. There is no doubt that a new spirit has come and will have to be dealt with. Remember that Persia has always absorbed her conquerors—that the Persians in Baku are quite separate and independent—that the Caucasus is there as an object lesson of misgovernment—that the Shiah religion is more *national* than religious. You will see that the popular movement here is national as well as religious, and that it is easily directed from race as well as religious motives against an alien dynasty in the pay of an alien empire.

Think this out and you will see the difference between this and Egypt. Here you have the elements of a real race-religious-reform movement. For a reform movement it is: a protest against as bad a system of government as ever existed.

The patriots were confronted with the fact that at the very moment when they came to the fore and had a chance of saving the country, their natural ally, England, went over to the enemy and put her hand in that of the oppressors. That is the

game I am playing now. You will easily imagine what are the feelings of the patriots. God help us! The god of Persia help us. All the world abandons us, even the familiar friends in whom we trusted.

I don't think this is really weakening the patriotic cause; it acts as a cold douche—and there are always Germany and Turkey to fall back on.

The Turk[1] is odd. He tells me that in Turkey he could recommend absolutism because the King was Kaliph, but here the King is neither a Persian nor a religious head of the Church and he has no hold on the nation except force. Therefore as force is no longer his, he must make friends with the people—it is his only chance. This is the advice he has given. To me he says: If intervention takes place, Turkey *must* join in. We can't see our frontier occupied by Russia—nor can we see the fall of one of the few remaining Mussulman states.

He asked me if England hates Mussulmanism so much that even when a Mussulman nation becomes a free one, England fights against her freedom! I fear our abandonment of the cause of liberty as soon as it is adopted by a Mussulman nation—our alliance with the enemy of liberty, because it is a Christian power—all this leaves its impression.

And have you counted the cost in Russia? Do you suppose your prostrations before autocracy, your longings for social recognition at all costs for the oppressor will escape notice? Already the Cadets are bitterly complaining of the courtly effusions of the now recognised correspondent of the *Times*.[2]

We are catching at the reluctant hand of this rapidly vanishing imposture of autocracy, and the new power which is advancing is watching our frantic efforts with amusement. When it comes to power, it won't forget.

As to the agreement with Russia, it is made on the supposition that Russia will join us against Germany. Will any sensible person tell you this is true or that St. Petersburg in any possible eventuality would act against Potsdam—except occasionally. And at moments—and in form, and appearance—in order to get a loan of money? It is absolutely out of the question. The two courts are as thick as thieves and for the same reason. They will lose their plunder if they quarrel.

When I see the way France is treated and spoken of by these clothed barbarians, and think that we are doing our best, we English, to have the privilege of supporting the other leg of the Russian footstool, when I see day after day the endless

[1] That is, the Turkish Minister.

[2] Then Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace.

manoeuvres to which here I am expected to submit, when I think of the splendid professions as to freedom, etc., of our present Government, I don't know what to say.

Well, bless you and prosper. I have much consolation in some of the more denunciatory Psalms ; the Jews knew how to curse."

In reply to his main contentions about the Anglo-Russian *entente*, Chirol told him he was exaggerating. Spring Rice wrote back on May 24, 1907 :

" Thanks for a timely word of warning. Quite possibly I have lost sight of the wood in my Persian rosebush. However, hear the word from the bush. . . . "

There followed a long review of Russian action in the past.

" All these arguments are overthrown at once if the character of the Russian Government is altered and she no longer is an autocratic predatory bureaucracy, as hostile to the liberty of other people as to her own. Then I think a real understanding would be possible, because she would respect the independence of neighbouring nations and would devote her energies for some time at least to making her own people happy instead of other people miserable. If the character of the Government changes, we could perhaps make some form of permanent agreement. At present I don't see how we can. At present, moreover, we are bargaining with a man who may not be long in possession. Would it not be wiser to mark time and wait until we see who is master in the house ? I am all in favour of a policy of conciliation and friendliness. Because the devil is the devil there is no reason why you should be always pulling his tail. But there is no reason for asking him to supper, and if you do, you should bring a long spoon.

You know that the great snare in business is imitating a successful coup under quite different circumstances because they look the same. In the case of France we made an *entente* which works admirably. Why ? Because the French people have the same order of ideas as we have, and sympathy between two nations who are fed on the same books and have a common history is easy. Also because there was no military inequality between us. That is, both could do the other harm but there was no great coup which one could deal the other. And both were satisfied with their possessions, and both feared and hated the same danger. Look over these conditions and see how many are fulfilled in the case of an *entente* with Russia. The difference between us is after all a very simple one and begins and

ends in one simple fact. You have not spent three years in Russia. I have. . . . "

It is only right to add again that Lord Kitchener did not think that Spring Rice exaggerated. He wrote:

SNOWDON, SIMLA,
June 19, 1907.

"MY DEAR SPRING RICE,

I have just read your despatches of April 11 and April 19 and others up to April 26, with the greatest delight. Nothing could be better, I congratulate you most heartily on them, and entirely agree with all you have so ably said. We out here are indeed glad that you are in Persia, for we feel the utmost confidence while you are there, that all that can be, will be done, to protect Indian and Imperial interests, and to follow the line of policy most in accord with British traditions.

I wonder what effect your clear statement of the case has had on the Government at home. Will they be induced to pause in their dangerous philandering with the bearded Cossack, —or have they already gone too far? . . . "

A summing up of Spring Rice's views may be taken from another letter to Chirol on June 21, 1907:

"As to the *entente*, I consider it an excellent thing if it isn't misunderstood. I should do like the County Council on light bridges and put up a notice, 'This bridge is not intended for heavy traffic.' We mustn't mistake the whale for the island. Russia agrees for a term of years not to go further than she can, in that term of years. Very good, and very satisfactory; but we mustn't conclude that therefore she won't go any further when that term is concluded.

We have a breathing space in which to see how we stand and to prepare for what will come. What Russia has done is a very wise thing. Acknowledging that she has no money and no navy at present, she realises that she can't take a Port Arthur in the Indian Sea with a railway through Persia *now*; but that by making an agreement with us not to do that *now*, she will get the money from us and France to build the *first part* of the necessary railway; just as if she had made an agreement with Japan not to build her railway beyond Harbin and had got the Japanese to provide the funds for the Harbin railway. This is highly ingenious. It has been done by painting the German devil on the wall. We are all hard at work at that job, including the Germans themselves, and one of the reasons

why I hate 'em most is that they are forcing us into an agreement with Russia. . . . "

He put the matter more picturesquely to Ferguson on July 18, 1907 :

" I wonder whether you will take part in a debate on the Anglo-Russian *entente*. My impression is that now Russia has successfully changed her constitution and got rid of her Duma, she won't be very anxious to see another Duma next door, and will take measures to get rid of it. As the Shah is of the same mind, they are two of a trade and will act together. This would give Russia entire control of the Persian Government, which has hitherto been impossible, for the Shah's Government was anxious to maintain the balance between England and Russia. Now the Shah and his Government have gone bodily over to the Russians, while the people's party have been told that England won't help them, and can't help them if she wanted to, so that they owe nothing to her but barren thanks. We shan't get much out of that. Therefore the Russians, having complete control of Persia, are less anxious than they were to come to terms with us ; for in Persia at any rate they would be receiving from us what is theirs already, and giving us what is theirs when they want it.

There is, of course, little in the agreement unless it is backed by force, and if it is backed by force it is needless. But if rightly taken it might diminish the friction between us ; mainly by our yielding without a struggle what we used only to yield after a struggle. This isn't a bad thing. But it doesn't make us safer in India. You can't keep an elephant out of a potato plot by tying a parchment to his trunk. The defence of India must be men, not paper. . . . I fear Grey will have a tough time if the Persian agreement comes before Parliament, because Russia has clearly worked to destroy the popular institutions here and Grey will be attacked for his anti-popular policy. On the other hand Curzon and Percy will thunder on the abandonment of priceless interests. Persia is a damned hole and hardly worth an outside sheet of the *Times*. If he can get *real* agreement with Russia, it is well worth while sacrificing Persia—though I doubt whether a great country can afford to be mean even in the smallest things.

Grey is doing very well, I think, and makes an excellent chief. He must be awfully overworked. So am I, with less reason, and am getting pretty tired. I am longing to get away."

The actual Convention concerning the relations of Great Britain and Russia in respect to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet was signed on

August 31. So far as Persia was concerned, Great Britain agreed to leave Russia a free hand in a sphere across the north of Persia, receiving a similar freedom from Russian interference in a sphere across the south. In the zone left between these two spheres of influence, subjects of either power might apply for concessions. This plan of partition gave offence to Persian feeling, and in addition its terms were disclosed in the press before they were officially communicated. It had been intended by the Foreign Office that Spring Rice should come home for medical care when the negotiations for the agreement were finally concluded. But for the moment, emergencies in Tehran were such that he did not feel justified in going.

"They have thrown a stone into the windows here and left me to face the policeman," he wrote to Chirol. "Neither Nicolson nor the F.O. informed me that the agreement was signed till three days after it had been published here. This was, I suppose, a sign that Persian public opinion was not to be considered."

He wrote his feelings explicitly enough to Sir Edward Grey; but the draft in its original form began "My opinions are neither asked for nor desired." Even as it stands, the letter is not one which would have been written by one solicitous to please those who could decide the success of his career.

Sept. 13, 1907.

"My Dear Sir Edward,

I congratulate you on the signature and I hope you are enjoying a well-deserved rest. Your difficulties are over for the time. I venture, however, to warn you that difficulties here may be beginning. It is not necessary after Moroccan experience to point out why. The Persians are beginning an agitation which may be formidable; that is, formidable to the English who are here or have interests here. There is the further consideration of the effect of the agreement on Mahommedan public feeling here and in Afghanistan. This, of course, you are prepared for.

Hartwig shares my feelings. He says it is difficult to persuade his Government that Persia has changed. They seem to believe that the old state of things continues to exist and that Persian public feeling can be safely ignored because the Persian people are not serious. A child with a match-box is not a serious person but he can be a dangerous one. That depends not on the child but on the matches. In this case the matches do burn.

I do not wish to be alarmist but it is impossible to ignore what is happening here; the entire disorganization of government; the feud between Shah and people; the conviction that

Russia is secretly on the side of the Shah, and that the Shah is determined to organize disorder throughout the country in order to bring on intervention ; the belief that the two European Governments are privy to the plan and have made their arrangements to profit by it.

If we take no measures to safeguard our interests and our people, we do not know what may happen at any moment. If we do take such measures, we are accused of preparing for annexation and a division of Persian territory with Russia. We are worse off than the Russians because we are not feared as they are, and because we are regarded as having betrayed the Persian people. All assurances, English and Russian, are regarded as so many blinds; and it is unfortunately true that, though the Russian Government has made the most satisfactory promises and explanations, those who are supposed to be in the confidence of Russia and are known to frequent the Russian Legation are the open enemies of the new order of things which the Persians are so proud of, and to which they look to cure all the ills of the country. And we are supposed to be accomplices, for our own advantage and for a consideration.

Under these circumstances I could not well run away just when the agreement is signed—leaving the Russian Legation to bear the whole brunt of the attack and giving the Persians the impression that, having deceived them for a sufficient time, I was retiring to a safe distance to avoid the awkward necessity of explaining my own words.

I am not worse than I was last year and I think I can stay with safety though, of course, I might have to go. Marling [1] is an excellent man and can be depended on. But he has bad eyes and I doubt whether he could stand the work at present. I have persuaded him to go to Europe for a cure. I hope you will see him.

I quite understand that comments on the agreement from this quarter are not desired and that the local conditions here are regarded as of very small importance in comparison with the European situation. But this was Delcassé's view [2] and it proved to be a wrong one. The French Minister here has described to me an interview which he had with Delcassé, in which he urged him (speaking from recent experience) not to disregard the local conditions. I make bold to urge that in the present negotiations everything possible should be done in order to

[1] Sir Charles Murray Marling, G.C.M.G., then Counsellor to the Legation at Tehran. He was chargé d'affaires during the *coup d'etat* which followed in 1908.

[2] In regard to Morocco.

conciliate Persian *amour propre* and the sympathy of other nations. That is why I should recommend that Persia should be associated with the formal communication of the terms of the agreement to other powers. Fortunately for us, Turkey and Germany have spoilt their own cards, Turkey by the invasion,[1] Germany by the threatening language and exaggerated demands which she made in connection with the Bank project. But we must use our advantages while they are still fresh. The impression will soon wear off.

I am, of course, quite incapable of judging the political situation in England. But it would seem that there is at least a prima facie case for those who are ready to criticise you for all you do either in co-operation with an autocratic power or in opposition to the liberties of smaller nations. There are people here who may be able to persuade sections of public opinion in England that the Mahommedan liberal movement is a real and an earnest one and that you were blind to its importance. And I need not remind you of what you said yourself, namely that the value of the agreement will depend on the manner in which it is carried out. It is possible that Russia will use the agreement as she used the agreement with Japan about Corea, in order to carry on her old designs under a new cover. It will be more serious from the point of view of public opinion if the old policy is still carried on under the new Convention. For the breach by treachery of a formal agreement is a far more serious matter than the open prosecution of a policy of undisguised hostility. You see that in the case of Corea. The action of Russia there after the conclusion of the two formal agreements was what really brought on the war. In this sense the agreement brings us (in a way) nearer to war than if it had not been concluded.

You see that I am painting the black side. This is not a very welcome proceeding. But I think you will understand my motives. In the middle of your triumph a warning voice may be useful. The Romans thought so."

All men have their failures and Spring Rice was unduly sceptical about the stability and the value of the Russian *Entente*. His prepossessions were too strong. Russia inspired no sympathy in him—scarcely even the Liberal movement in Russia. On the other hand, he was a lover of Persia and his heart went out to the effort of a

[1] In 1906 Turkey refused to acquiesce in the delimitation of a neutral zone between its frontier and that of Persia (which had been made by joint Anglo-Russian commissioners in 1865). Turkish troops entered territory claimed by Persia, and there was a collision with Persian troops. England and Russia intervened, but there were further raids across the border in 1907 and the dispute remained an open sore.

country with so illustrious a past to preserve its national existence. And, so far as Persia was concerned, his foresight was amply justified. Russia might experience internally a movement towards the extension of freedom, but had no wish to see Persia free. There might be an Anglo-Russian *entente*, but little of its effect could be perceived in Tehran, and events were not slow to prove this.

Spring Rice left Persia in November 1907. In the following summer, while he was still in England, news came that on June 23 a *coup d'etat* was carried out by the Shah at Tehran, acting through the Russian-officered Cossack force: the Mejlis was suppressed. Liakhoff, commander of the Cossacks, became Governor under martial law and there was wholesale proscription of the constitutional party.

Passionate letters came to Spring Rice from Prof. Edward Browne at Cambridge:

> "So brilliant and hopeful a movement quenched in fire and blood. I can hardly bear to think of it and I dare not write how I feel about it."

From Teheran one of the Legation staff wrote to his old chief:

> GULHEK,
> July 16, 1908.
>
> "DEAR SPRINGY,
>
> I hope you have no regrets at having missed this last crisis. If so you may well banish them; it has been about as disagreeable as possible. It is perhaps a comfort to know what to expect, instead of merely suspect, in the future, but it is about the only comfort to be had.
>
> The only Russian for whose behaviour I have the slightest admiration—rather the sort of admiration one would accord to Judge Jeffreys or Claverhouse—is Liakhoff. He has just gone straight ahead without caring what anyone cared, thought or said. He makes no secret of it; he has played for the greater glory of Russia and what is to him, and to many others of his kidney, the natural corollary—the humbling of England. He carried out the *coup d'etat*; he determined that his work should not be spoilt by a Bast at the British Legation; he deliberately insulted the Legation by posting his mangy Cossacks round it, perfectly indifferent of the consequences, quite heedless of any paper agreements or humbug of that sort; he let go, even if he did not send, all his Cossacks round the town to say that if there was a Bast *chez nous* he would bombard the Legation; he did his damnedest to make us eat dirt, to destroy our name among the people, in the evidently justifiable conviction that his Government would take no notice of his extraordinary action.

If H.M.G. had not played up—and they have played up splendidly—he would have been completely successful.

When will people understand that you can not interfere in Persia? We saved the lives of a few poor devils and the consequences have been tremendous in proportion, for we as near as possible undertook hostilities against the Shah, and even may do so yet."

What Spring Rice himself felt was put briefly in a letter to Ferguson on July 1, 1908:

"... Poor Edward Grey will catch it in Parliament about Persia as there is little doubt that the Russians are at the bottom of the Shah's proceedings. It is all right making an arrangement with a burglar not to burgle your own house; but when he interprets the agreement into a joint agreement to burgle other people's and you get run in by the police—well, then you are in a bad way."

When the expected trouble in Parliament came, Sir Edward Grey's defence of the *Entente* policy was that but for the Anglo-Russian Convention Russian interference with Persian liberties would have been much more drastic. Indeed, since the country was in a state of civil war till the Shah was deposed in 1909, and not much more peaceful under the Regency which followed, it is clear that Persia would have been an easy prey for Russia to swallow, but for the express commitments.

But long before this Spring Rice had ceased to have any direct concern with Persian affairs. He went home on leave, and it was immediately plain that he would not return to Tehran.

CHAPTER XVIII

ENGLAND 1907-8

NEARLY a year elapsed between Spring Rice's departure from Persia and his actual entry on his next foreign mission. He was during this period more or less an invalid, and officially, on holiday. But he never stopped working at his chief purpose, which was to persuade his Government and his country of the growing danger from Germany.

Then he was sent to Sweden—a country as free as any in Europe from political embroilment. But it was near Germany. The years which he spent there were years at an observation post.

The Liberal Government had endeavoured to check competitive shipbuilding by a well-meant gesture; instead of three ships as arranged, they laid down two in 1908. Germany's corresponding action was not immediately realised, but it consisted in redoubling effort so as to diminish the dwindling gap between the two fleets. Alarm in England did not become serious till 1909, and by that time Spring Rice had gone to Sweden; but in 1908 Lord Roberts was already campaigning for universal military service, and the movement grew too strong to neglect. The Liberals in answer to the demand for more preparedness pointed to Mr. Haldane's scheme for a territorial army, introduced in 1907—about which professional military opinion held that it did not provide a valuable military force, but did provide the cadres, or skeleton organisation, which could be easily filled up by the application of conscription.

The letters that follow enable us to follow Spring Rice through this period. The first, written from Lord Farrer's house, Abinger Hall, on December 4, 1907, was to Mrs. Roosevelt—meant for the President.

> "I have been ill—under a doctor—operated on and then in a nursing home (nothing dangerous) or would have answered the kind letter I received before. I am likely to be under doctor's orders for some time to come and must not leave the neighbourhood of the good man.
>
> The result is that I have had to leave Persia and am now more or less at a loose end, and will I hope receive a harmless and quiet post when there is one vacant, or else retire—which I shouldn't at all mind, as I have reached the moment when the job appears rather a poor one, and the traces begin to rub a little. I wonder

what your own ideas on the subject are, although there is not much comparison possible between the greatest of official positions and mine. But it seems to me that there is a good deal to be said for the Eastern point of view that when one has done one's job, one can claim the right to retire—not into a position where one does nothing, but into one where one can act through others rather than by oneself. However, this is all in the future. At present I am watching your active proceedings with the very greatest interest. It seems to me that everyone who fights for the public against individuals is certain to be successful in the long run, so far as the work is concerned, but to be *personally* sacrificed. The individuals never forgive, and the public never remembers. You will find the hostility and the obloquy great and increasing: the newspapers, though they may be obliged to be outwardly with the people, are themselves in the hands of the enemy, because they are possessed by great capitalists or men who hope to become so by alliance with capitalists. You will see that here, where the point of view is more or less impartial, the great newspapers are with you because the English public is mainly interested in honest finance in New York and has practically no concern with the control of the great corporations. But I don't see how your press as a whole can be anything but hostile at heart; and it will take the first opportunity of changing 'Hosannah' to 'Crucify.'

The whole Government of this country was in the hands of a sort of family trust which exploited the Empire for its own benefit. The press, without exception almost, was in its favour, but this did not prevent an overwhelming defeat because the people as a whole felt that they were being 'done.' But if the Liberal movement had been led and organized by one man, he would be the object of a steady persecution which would do for him in the end, as it did for Gladstone. In our case the movement was without a leader. In yours it has a leader, and he will have a very bad time of it some day. I don't suppose he will mind much.

Isn't it curious how the great racial questions are looming up? There can't be any doubt of what will come or that the power which can't defend itself will have to yield."

It was Roosevelt himself who replied. He was then close upon the last year of his Presidency.

Dec. 21, 1907.

"Dear Cecil,

As usual, Mrs. Roosevelt and I were equally pleased and interested in your letter. You speak as if you were to have a

little holiday from official life. Can not you take advantage of it to bring your wife over and spend a few days with us at the White House? Not so very much time remains now, and I do wish we could see you both here. Do not leave the diplomatic service unless you have to. You have worked through the years of mere drudgery. You have made your reputation. You are at the very time of life when your training and experience will enable you to do your best; and even if the harness galls a little, you will be happier doing steady trace-and-collar work. If you have to get out, well and good. You have done honourably; you have won your spurs, and it is all right. But if you can go on, by all means go on. My own case is peculiar, for I am not very clear that there will be anything possible for me to do after a year from the next fourth of March. But we are all on the knees of the Gods and must await events; though when the opportunity comes we can improve it, and, indeed, can to a certain extent make it.

I do very much wish to talk with you over some of the questions which you raise which I can hardly discuss at length in a letter. . . . Fundamentally, my philosophy is yours, though not so pessimistic. . . .

The thing that astonishes me is not that I should be now attacked, but that I should have been triumphant for so long a period, for I have awakened the bitter antagonism of very powerful men and very powerful interests whose memory is as long as the memory of the public at large is short, and their attacks on me through the papers which they subsidise (and these are the big papers of the biggest industrial centres) never cease for a moment. They misrepresent everything I say or do; the wonder is that anyone should have any belief in me at all. But it is all in the day's work. I have had an uncommonly good run for my money; I have been treated mighty well and favoured by fortune above my deserts; and whatever comes in the future, I am ahead of the game.

It certainly is curious how the great racial questions are looming up. I was glad to see your agreement with Russia; but, of course, we are all perfectly ignorant of what Russia's future will be. As for the governing class in England having no real foreign policy, of course our people tend to have even less, and the melancholy fact is that the capitalist and educated classes are those least to be trusted in this matter. . . . I have fought, not very successfully, to make our people understand that unless freedom shows itself compatible with military strength, with national efficiency, it will ultimately have to go to the wall. . . . I abhor and despise the pseudo-humani-

tarianism which treats advance in civilisation as necessarily and rightfully implying a weakening of the fighting spirit and which therefore invites destruction of the advanced civilisation by some less advanced type.

Good-bye, Springy ; and do bring Mrs. Springy over to see us some time this year.

The reply, on Feb. 16, 1908, was again addressed to Mrs. Roosevelt.

"... I think I can understand, at least partially, what is happening with you. There are many signs here of similar movements which will no doubt have similar results. At the end of the Boer War when it was generally felt that something was wrong, Chamberlain started the cry of protection —not inspired by any thought of industrial protection (at first at any rate), but by an Imperial idea. It was at once apparent that preference for the Empire meant food and raw material dearer in England, and Imperial preference soon was dropped to all practical purposes to make room for protection for local industries. I think if Chamberlain had really been a great man, he would have headed a movement for the regeneration of the national character—self-sacrifice, national defence and devotion of all departments to the good of the nation—a sort of general moral reform. The time was ripe for it. The only result of what he did and said is to arouse the cupidities of people interested in their own prosperity. On the other hand, the Liberals are more and more falling under the control of narrow and selfish interests, and persons who appeal to the material desires of the poor and dependent. The fight is of selfishness against selfishness ; everyone is anxious to gain at the expense of someone else ; no one seems to care for a prosperity in which each has a fair share, and to which each contributes. For England as a nation, the serious aspect of this is that no one is willing to submit to the self sacrifice of all for the common defence, and this must lead with us to more serious consequences than with you, because the danger is nearer to us, while yours is yet in the distance.

I suppose there is little doubt that all the selfish interests— those who wish to benefit themselves not by honest work but by stealing other people's properties, whether they are the interests of the poor or the rich—will be banded together against the President's policies. I wonder how far they will be successful. They are always awake and they never forget or forgive. They can conceal their action and yet pursue it all the more efficiently because it is concealed. The popular conscience is

good, but what is everyone's business is nobody's business. The people sleeps while the others keep watch and ward. The main hope is that when the people does wake up, it wakes up sound at heart—that it has not lost its great inheritance of healthy goodness, and its right instincts, while it is asleep. I suppose this is the business of the women, to teach their children the right things in the right way, and of public men, like the President, to lead the masses in the right direction and to raise a fearless voice, with authority, for Justice and Truth. I am glad that he has determined not to stand again because I believe that now his authority will be greater than if he were President; his authority will be in himself and his character and not in his office. I hope the fight will be continued. I don't believe in immediate success—only I hope for some progress.

I have been ill in consequence of an operation and have been in Switzerland in a very delightful place—ski-ing in the woods and on the hills. There is something most delightful and exhilarating in wandering about in the snowy woods among the mountains and the great smooth snow drifts. Yesterday there was a big storm and I spent the afternoon outside—don't you love the feel of driving snow when one feels it is not one's master? I have had to give up returning to Persia and am waiting for employment, if I get it. If not, I shall employ myself."

It is plain that he was busy, not only with pen but tongue, impressing his views upon those in authority; and as early as January 12, 1908, a letter to Ferguson indicates that his emphasis on the German menace was not approved by the Ministry. He wrote:

"Thanks for the hint about my alarmist tendencies. My giving this impression is bad for me, but it doesn't do any harm to the general. If I am wrong it only matters to me, but if the Government is wrong it matters gravely to us all."

That autumn of 1908, just before Spring Rice left England, Ferguson wrote to him:

"I am pointing out to Grey and others that whether you are taken as alarmist or not, you were the first of our agents to put us on our guard. That, no one else had really done."

A natural result was that Spring Rice, having a conviction which official persons regarded as an obsession, felt estranged from his official chiefs, and drawn to the persons who shared his conviction. Chief of them was Lord Roberts; and all sorts of considerations—moral, theoretical and practical—urged him to support Roberts's campaign for national service. Morally, he condemned the idea of

paying for safety by buying ships, and hiring men to use this costly machinery; it was a negation of self sacrifice; theoretically, he was not convinced that safety could be so given; and practically, he saw that the spectacle of a rich nation, controlling all the choice sites in the world outside of Europe, and blocking the way to other ambitions made a provocation, and that the hope of swift descent on an unarmed country incited ambitious powers to immense preparation. He confided much of his thought about this time to his former subordinate, Lord Cranley, who was in Berlin.

"The Defence Commission is sitting again and Roberts has forced himself on its attention. He resigned membership originally in consequence of the attitude of the Admiralty towards the question of Land Defence. Since then, he has been agitating for Imperial Service. The difficulty has been that Balfour's speech on the impossibility of invasion has always been thrown in his teeth. He has ascertained that this speech was based on the material supplied by the Admiralty some years ago, as to an invasion from France. Now the circumstances are connected with German military preparations are essentially different, because of the large amount of shipping which is always in hand in the Elbe. Roberts asks Balfour to withdraw or modify his statement. This he refuses to do, unless the Defence Committee endorse the new facts which Roberts assisted mainly by A'Court[1] has presented. The subject then comes up before the Defence Committee. Fisher[2] is against Roberts and maintains that an invasion is out of the question. A'Court works Roberts and induces him to press for further investigation. The Admiralty are afraid that money for the land means money lost for the Navy, and opposes Roberts strenuously. Asquith is doubtful and rather indifferent; Haldane naturally rather favourable. Grey says nothing, but listens. Tweedmouth's[3] incapacity and ignorance are glaring.

Gleichen says that he doesn't believe concentration could take place without our knowing it, or that the Government and Kaiser desire to bring on a war, or that the Navy is being formed for our destruction. On the other hand, many people tell us that although the Government is friendly enough, the German people have been worked up to fighting point, and would be, (or the majority at any rate) in favour of an aggressive war against England. So that the Government are now, so to speak, lagging behind the people. What is your opinion? I should dearly love to hear it. It seems to me that the action

[1] Lt.-Col. C. A'Court Repington, writer on military affairs for the *Times*.

[2] Admiral Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord.

[3] Lord Tweedmouth was then First Lord of the Admiralty.

of the German schoolmasters and journalists has not been without effect, and that the people are really worked up to a point where a little incident might lead to an explosion. It is difficult to judge, but the accounts received by residents and travellers of an unofficial kind tend to show that the state of feeling in the country at large is by no means peaceful. It is natural enough after thirty-five years of peace. . . . "

Again on March 24 :

" The Committee of Defence represent a desire to avoid all action by arranging a continuous conflict between jarring interests. The naval solution is a mutual understanding to suppress evidence. This is very convenient for Balfour and other leaders of parties. The Navy is afraid that if the truth were known, money would be expended on coast defence and taken from the Navy. The Army is afraid that if the truth were known the enthusiasm for the *exercitus Haldanianus*[1] would be sensibly diminished.

So, as a result, they both agree to sit on the people who want the truth known. Each party is anxious that the other should be committed to compulsory service because that means for the party so committed no less than destruction."

In this letter of March 24 there is this sketch of a lost leader. Mr. Chamberlain had been paralysed since the summer of 1906.

" I saw J. C. He looks all right but you know his situation. It was most touching to see the care taken of him by his wife and the family affection which surrounds him. He spoke a good deal of C. B. whom he described as a clever man and a brave man, and deprecated the attacks made on him by Balfour. He was kindly in all he said of his past associates. I almost wish I hadn't seen him ; it is so sad to see that sort of power nearing its end."

MOUNT GRACE, NORTHALLERTON,
June 21, 1908.

To FERGUSON.

"I think Haldane did very well in the army debate; the proper game is to give his scheme every possible chance and if it fails to try something else, with his system as the skeleton. I see in the Queen's letters, Vol. III., some very pertinent remarks about the army and navy. I wonder where she got the ideas from, if it was from Prince Albert or elsewhere. Anyhow they show that the same differences existed in the 'fifties and the same

[1] The newly-created Territorial Force.

difficulties in Parliament even under Palmerston. I have been reading up about Germany, and I collect the general impression that if we avoid interfering with German interests Germany won't make war, that is, not a war of pure aggression. But this depends on what German interests are. If it is considered that a British tariff is an infraction of German interests, we should be in an uncomfortable situation if we entered on a tariff war with Germany without the means of defending ourselves by land and sea. If we persist in our present policy as to army and navy, we shall have to sing very small in our foreign relations; the F.O. must not bark unless the W.O. can bite. But this is rather a difficult job. Parliament demands interference in the Congo and in Macedonia. The latter may lead, very possibly, to a row with the Commander of many faithful, some of them residing in Egypt and India, not to speak of the warlike Turkish nation. If we have a row in any part of the world which withdraws our ships from the N. Sea—then the danger is a very real one indeed. If we are very conciliatory to Germany, the usual result seems to be, to increase Germany's inclination to kick us, which in the end might lead to our kicking back. If we are not conciliatory, then Germany has a good case against us at the bar of public opinion in Germany. But for the present—that is as long as the German canal, harbour works, and fleet are in a state of transition—I don't think Germany will play anything but a waiting game. Nor is there any need whatever for Germany to excite public opinion at present because the navy bill is voted and the new army bill doesn't come up for $2\frac{1}{2}$ years. Meanwhile the Reichstag majority is secure and the Government has nothing to fear. The danger will come when the present Reichstag is drawing to an end and the new army and navy bill are impending. At that time the Tories and Protectionists have a good chance of being in power and the danger will be a considerable one. Thus the Liberals are quite justified from the party point of view in preaching peace and retrenchment. They will not have to face the consequences. Nor do they wish to irritate the electorate by bringing in such an unpopular measure as conscription. The consequences I draw from this are that defence should be no party question, and that the only course for those who wish for the continuance of England on the old lines is to agitate among the people, that is, to create a public opinion which will govern the situation. I don't know how far this is possible. It was done in Germany by the professors and the Navy League. But as Asquith said, we can't brigade public opinion in England. That is to say, we can't govern on modern lines. Well, I hope it will last Asquith's time.

Sir Hugh Bell's son, who was a keen yeoman, says he hopes the new scheme will be successful but it is almost impossible to work it efficiently. Most men's jobs in the English trades are one man's jobs, and it is hard to replace a man for a fortnight. Then his experience in the S. African War makes him believe that shooting, etc., don't matter so much as the habit of discipline, and that can only be acquired by continuous drill and practice—not under a year. All the same, he is doing his best and so are most people here ; still, the conviction grows that nothing short of a year's service is much good and that all other expedients are learning to swim without going into the water.

Grey made a good business of his last speech, didn't he ? He, at any rate, has gained ground."

Spring Rice acted to the full on his belief that it was necessary to " agitate among the people "—though this was in no way a congenial business to the diplomatist. But one of the things which (in a notice written after his death for the *Eton Chronicle*) his old tutor recalled as most significant was the " almost unprofessional earnestness " with which he " set himself to stir our young men to prepare for the inevitable Prussian War." " I am telling you not what I think, but what I know," was the burden of his preaching.

It is not necessary to reproduce any of the documents by which he urged the case for military preparedness. But ever since 1903, if not earlier, he had dwelt on the fact that the German fleet was being designed for use within a confined radius—the North Sea and the Channel—not, like the British, for distant waters ; and that the economy in coal-carrying capacity made it possible for German ships to carry armament superior to that of British of equal tonnage. They had, in short, he wrote to Lady Helen Ferguson in 1903, " the advantage of a fleet constructed for a special offensive purpose over one built for general defensive purposes." Secondly, he stressed always the need for a general staff, " for the intellectual preparation of war,"—involving a reorganisation of the Foreign Office, " so that general questions of policy, which must after all be determined by the naval and military exigencies, are considered as well as the separate and individual matters as they arise. Naval and military organisation, planned out with a view to the political situation, should be in the first line ; alliances and foreign policy in the second, depending on them. In a business house the first question is not how to get an order, but whether it can be executed when got."

" Please think over these matters and try to get other people to do the same," he wrote in 1903.—In 1908 the warning signs were much plainer.

The elections of 1907 gave the German Government assurance of support in whatever foreign policy they chose to undertake. Spring Rice accepted Bismarck's doctrine that Germany could not enter into

a war without the support of the German people. Two processes had therefore been necessary, to pave the way for hegemony of Europe. First, military preparedness must be accumulated; and this had been done so effectively that in 1908 Spring Rice believed that Germany's power as compared to that of other states was not less than Louis XIV's, or Napoleon's. But this preponderance had been achieved largely by keeping peace while France, Russia, England and Italy all wasted their strength in wars overseas or in other continents. It was therefore necessary to generate in the peaceful giant a spirit as martial as constant war could breed. Spring Rice held it to be clear that the education of the popular mind had been completed, in part by nominally private societies (the Navy League being chief), and in part by directing effort in the schools and universities. The German Government could count on a spirit of self-sacrifice in its people equal to that by which Japan had amazed the world. Both the power for war, and the will to war, as a means of national aggrandisement were present in the highest perfection.

So far as this estimate of the material and the moral strength of Germany, events proved Spring Rice to have been completely right. But the danger when it came did not take the shape he anticipated. He considered that a defeat of England offered the greatest prize to German arms, and he looked forward to an invasion of England; but not as an act of open aggression. His idea was that Germany would force a quarrel on England, in such manner that England would be technically the aggressor, like France in 1870. Yet Germany would wait till Germany was ready, and Germany would not move without a reason. He thought it likely that England would adopt a tariff directed against Germany, and that this would be the real occasion.

In another respect his forecast was wrong. He did not believe that Germany would find Russia in arms against her. The peoples, he held, were naturally hostile, but the dynasties had interests and bonds in common. In truth, he over-rated German statesmanship. He believed that Germany would adhere to the Bismarckian *real-politik*—which he described as "the art of using the force of a nation where force can be employed with most effect and most advantage, and abstaining from the use of force when nothing useful can be thereby attained." He did not foresee that Germany, by backing Austria unreservedly in South-Eastern Europe, would hurt so terribly the dynastic interest and the dynastic pride of the Russian throne. He did not look to see Germany driven to fight a land war on two fronts.

Broadly speaking, he undervalued at this time the military value of the Russian *entente*; and there is no sign that he foresaw how the sense of being encircled would create a desperation in Germany. Also, he underrated at this time the determination of France: in 1912 events caused him, gladly, to alter this view. Being a pessimist, he felt bound to consider the case in which England would be exposed alone

to a threat from Germany at Germany's selected time. He was not convinced that there could always be concentrated in English waters a fleet sufficient to keep the seas clear against Germany's rapidly-growing armament. The only way that he saw to ensure England's security, and the peace of Europe, was to adopt national service.

Thus the essential quality of his thought was a recognition of Germany's mobilised strength, and of England's rashness. The real objective of Germany's constantly increasing armament was, to his mind, England; the danger to Europe's peace lay not more in Germany's resolution and long-planned preparation than in England's unpreparedness.

He had also a besetting fear that in a day of trial, the English might prove too "soft." Roosevelt, in a letter of this period remonstrated against this disposition of his mind.

OYSTER BAY, N.Y.,
July 21, 1908.

"... Springy, I think you sometimes idealise the past. The dangers of the present are very real, and there are plenty of evil tendencies at work now that were not at work in the past. But on the other hand, we have overcome many of the evil tendencies of the past; and while I do not wish to be a foolish optimist, I can not help thinking that on the whole things, though bad enough, are better and not worse than they were a half century, or one century, or two, or three, or four centuries ago. It may be that we have reached the condition of the Greek world after Alexander, of the Roman world after Trajan; but frankly, I don't think so. Moreover, it is rather a comfort to know that the prophets of dire evil are generally as much mistaken as the prophets of the Millennium.

At any rate, come good or come evil, our duty is the same. It is our business to do everything we can individually, collectively, and nationally to be both decent and efficient under conditions as we actually find them. ..."

In July, at Mount Grace Priory, in Yorkshire, near the home of his wife's uncle, Sir Hugh Bell, Spring Rice received news of his new post:

"I am appointed to Stockholm," he writes to Ferguson, "and expect to go there in September. I am very much pleased at my appointment which just suits me."

The Foreign Secretary's letter about it is characteristic of both men and their relationship.

ICHAN ABBAS, ALRESFORD,
July 19, 1908.

"MY DEAR SPRINGY.

I liked the account of Hugh of Lincoln's swan very much. Did you translate it yourself? But I don't think they ought to

have chevied the swan about to catch it for the Bishop; he ought to have gone to see it and it would have followed him. I like very much his saying that the true miracle of a holy man is his holiness. There is depth in that.

I hope you will like Stockholm. I think it ought to be a comfortable place."

It was arranged that he should not leave England till after his wife's approaching confinement. She had been away from him in the late spring, and one of his letters to her describes a visit to Oxford, apparently undertaken to hear Lord Newton preach the gospel of universal service—which was in Spring Rice's view the only and the honourable way of safety.

May 13.

To Mrs. Spring Rice.

"I went to Oxford by the early train and found it quite beautiful—all the flowering trees out and generally splendid. Drove to Balliol, my old college; the Master was away. I hadn't been there since Jowett's death. Walked about in the quadrangle; bright sun and fresh green grass—'lovelly gass,' as Betty would say. It is lovely in Oxford. Master returned and I talked with him in the dreaded room where I used to interview Jowett. Went to lunch with little Smith—history teacher of Balliol—who told me the College contains large numbers of coloured members; also that the Kaiser appoints vulgar rich people to be Rhodes scholars who don't have a good effect at all, and who, when they are drunk threaten the others with invasion and castigation at the hands of the German army. One of them shot one of the deer in Magdalen and was removed by order of the Kaiser. Curzon is making himself objectionable[1] and ruling Oxford like an Indian province. Generally speaking, Oxford is under the heel of London; they say Cambridge is provincial but Oxford suburban. In that case I should prefer Cambridge. Walked about through the colleges and met Newton and his boy, with whom we saw the pictures and halls of Magdalen and Christ Church. Then I went to New Garden and sat there mooning for some time. No one was there. It is a piece of lawn surrounded by the college buildings, the old town wall, and an old Norman church of which I am very fond. Then I went on to New for the service. The singing was good but the service not so devout as King's. Afterwards I dined in hall at the high table and watched the undergraduates eating. They only drink lemonade, which I should think was bad. Then I went to Newton's defence meeting in the Town Hall.

[1] As Chancellor of the University.

About 300 men and women. Newton made a good speech about universal service. Then a doctor got up and made a very fine speech indeed from the point of view of health. Then the Vice-Chancellor. Then the townsmen—a radical leader—'I want peace not war—and it's for peace I want us all to serve.' Great enthusiasm at this, but on the whole the meeting was sombre. The Vice-Chancellor said if we didn't have compulsory service now at our own free will, we should have it afterwards under German officers."

Another letter, of May 20, describes a visit to the original seat of his ancestors, the Springs:

To Mrs. Spring Rice.

". . . We had a very nice time at Lavenham. The town is an interesting old place with lots of quaint old houses. We arrived in the morning and went to lunch with the clergyman who had kindly asked us and then went over the church. It is a big place with an immense tower built by the Springs (who were cloth manufacturers), and the de Veres, Earls of Oxford. The arms are on the fabric, mixed up with the sign or mark of the clothiers' guild. There is a fine porch with the de Vere quarterings and the town has the combined arms below and the Spring arms (recently given by K. Henry VIII.) above. The Spring of the fifteenth century built a sort of chapel at the west end, and the Spring of the sixteenth century built a very fine chapel on the south side, covered over with his newly acquired arms. In the interior is a very fine erection in wood put up by a Spring as an enclosure to his tomb. It has just been restored by a Spring in India who is president of the harbour works in Madras and has spent a lot of money on it. The church itself is about the best perpendicular church in England. The people of the town, or rather the village, who are quite wrapped up in their church, were much interested in hearing our names and told us that the last of the family (English branch) disappeared about fifty years ago—I shall have to subscribe to a restoration fund, worse luck.

We wandered about the place poking into the old houses and gardens. There was a wooden house of the sixteenth century with beautiful Gothic carvings on it quite neglected, and some very attractive Jacobean houses—small with gardens. One to let which I inspected. But it wouldn't do for us, as the country is dull and flat. Living is pretty cheap, as the pay of workmen is about 12 shillings a week on which they bring up families of 15 children. The number of old people of 80 and 90 is enormous, so it must be healthy. It ought to amuse you to go

down and see it. I bought a door knocker which we shall affix to our house as a relic. . . . "

His second child, a son, was born on September 15, and this letter went off the same day :

9 Mandeville Place, London,
Sept. 15, 1908.

" Dear Mrs. Roosevelt,

Would it be possible for the President to accept being godfather to my son, born to-day ? It would be a great honour and pleasure to us and as we are quite insignificant people it wouldn't be in the papers. Please don't mind refusing if you don't feel like it. With us there are no duties attached to the position except to allow the use of the name. If you approve could you write here ? I leave for Stockholm shortly but Florence of course stays here. She got through it very well and has now forgotten all about it ' for joy that a man child is born into the world.'

This was, of course, accepted and the godparents of Antony Theodore Spring Rice were Theodore Roosevelt, Gerald Spring Rice and Lady Farrer.

Another letter went the same day to Mr. Luxmoore and in the answer the old man changed " My dear Cecil " to an address that seemed more suited to his pupil's new dignity :

" My Dear Friend,

I have just read your welcome note, and not a moment shall be lost before I put on paper my thanks and my congratulations. Glad indeed am I that there is an heir and a manchild to bear your name and echo parental honours, and glad I am that you should care to write it to me, for I value you and your friendship and rely on it more than you know. . . . "

Lady Helen Ferguson, writing to congratulate, drew from him expression of the apprehensions which always and everywhere crowded so thick in his mind—even in moments of joy.

9 Mandeville Place, W.,
Sept 22, 1908.

" Dear Lady Helen,

I was so glad to get your letter. You see it don't much matter to me how Antony turns out because I shall be in my grave before he has time to take to drink or marry into the Gaiety. I quite agree that it is an awful gamble, and as we get on and have a more complete knowledge of life, the gamble seems a more tremendous one. Finally no one has any children at all and that is the end of everything. Anyhow, two are

better than one. The anxiety was really awful before. Whenever Betty was the least bit ill, the world was the vilest place ever made. Now I hope we shall care less. I suppose all people with children envy those who have none and vice versa. The wisest thing is to keep up the habit of being kind and loving human things, and then one wouldn't depend on a thing which physically belongs to oneself, because it belongs."

Thus, though he went to Stockholm alone, leaving his wife to complete her recovery, he went with a light heart.

In the month before he left, King Edward sent for him; and there is a note of the interview, jotted down on Club paper at the Travellers' Club, evidently immediately after he had left Buckingham Palace.

It is cast in dialogue form at the beginning, and the King's words are throughout reported in the first person. The memorandum throws a clear light on Edward VII.'s methods and preoccupations.[1]

H.M.—The news from Tehran very bad. The Shah refuses to receive the British Chargé, pleading illness.

S. R.—I said that the Russians on the spot were not acting in accordance with their Government's professions.

H.M.—I spoke to Mr. Isvolsky most seriously on this subject; he promised he would see to it and that H.[2] would be shortly removed, when Pohlevsky would take his place.

S. R.—I said P. must insist on having a diplomatic staff. He would be otherwise in the hands of the local officials who are pronounced anti-English reactionaries.

H.M.—I will speak to Pohlevsky this afternoon about it and will insist on this point.

You are going to Sweden. I wish you to impress on the Government not to bear Norway a grudge. Now let bygones be bygones and let them make friends gradually; this is quite possible if they take pains.

"The King[3] is most anxious to do the right thing. The people are very much pleased with him now, though at first they thought he was a mere sportsman and cared about nothing but lawn tennis. We are much more popular than we were. The Queen is the god-mother of Queen Helena, a most charming woman. Try and find out when the King comes here, whether he goes first to France, whom he brings with him, servants, suite, etc. Also try and persuade the Queen to come. She is a little *malade imaginaire* but she would be let off very easily—

[1] The distinguishing "*H.M.*" and "*S.R.*" have been added for clearness. Otherwise the reprint is exact and complete.

[2] "H." Hartwig, Russian Minister. [3] Of Sweden.

one state dinner; one visit to the city. Let the Master of the Household know the first and Lord Knollys the second.

"President Roosevelt is coming out as a penny-a-liner; he's made a contract with a publisher to bring out a book at so much a word. This is a great pity. The President is a very distinguished man and I hope to meet him and talk with him. Who will be the next German Minister? This will be very important.

"Sir F. Lascelles feels that if he stays too long he will get stale. Let him arrange about his farewell audience—write to Hardinge about it. He will be the King's representative at the marriage[1] on October 22."

The observation as to President Roosevelt would no doubt have been put much less crudely had there been any suggestion of its seeing print; and the objection is really to the methods of the publisher, who had advertised the price per thousand words that he was undertaking to pay for an account of the big-game expedition in Africa which the President had projected, as a holiday on his retirement from office.

This project, it is scarcely needful to say, filled Spring Rice's mind with unpleasant apprehensions, and he wrote a letter of warning and advice to Mrs. Roosevelt, which drew the following reply from the sportsman:

Oyster Bay, N.Y.,
Sept. 17, 1908.

"Dear Cecil,

Oh! you beloved Mrs. Gummidge! If you feel as melancholy over my trip in Africa as you do over the future of the race generally, at least you must not share the feeling too fully with Mrs. Roosevelt. I laughed until I almost cried over your sending her the pamphlet upon the 'sleeping sickness,' and explaining in your letter that it was perfectly possible that I would not die of that, because (in the event of my not previously being eaten by a lion or crocodile, or killed by an infuriated elephant or buffalo) malarial fever or a tribe of enraged savages might take me off before the sleeping sickness got at me! I am bound to say, however, that the letter gave Mrs. Roosevelt a keen though melancholy enjoyment, and she will now have the feeling that she is justified in a Roman matron-like attitude of heroically bidding me go to my death when I sail in a well-equipped steamer for an entirely comfortable and mild little hunting trip.

Seriously, both of us were really touched and pleased with

[1] Prince Augustus William of Prussia, the Kaiser's fourth son, was married to Princess Alexandra Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein, in the Chapel Royal at Berlin on this date.

your letters and with your thought of me. I feel excessively melancholy at being separated for so long from Mrs. Roosevelt, and I shall be so homesick, especially when, as I suppose will be the case, I have a slight attack of fever or something of the kind, that I shall not know quite what to do with myself. But I am convinced that it is the wise thing for me to go, and also I freely admit that I am looking forward to the trip! I should like to have stayed on in the Presidency, and I make no pretense that I am glad to be relieved of my official duties. The only reason I did not stay on was because I felt that I ought not to, and I am exceedingly glad that I am to have the interest of this African trip before me.

I must see you when I am in England, which will be in May 1910. Did I write to you that I was to deliver the Romanes lecture at Oxford? Can't you get there then?

I am intensely interested in the Liberal movement in the Moslem world. Of course, it is very complicated. I earnestly hope that in Turkey the parliamentary talkers and the army fighters will be able to keep together and act not only in harmony but with moderation. Of course one of the things I fear is their being misled by false analogies. For instance, the fact that reform is necessary in Turkey does not in the least mean that it is now to the advantage of Egypt to have a parliament, and the fact that the Duma would do good in Persia does not mean that there ought to be a great legislative body at this time in Hindustan."

The letter which called out this protest is not extant, but there are echoes of its contents in another of September 6, which may close this chapter. The Young Turk movement had burst into action in Macedonia at the beginning of July, 1908; by July 24 the grant of a constitution was announced in public at Salonica. Everybody was enchanted. Enver Bey, the hero of the movement, came to London and was entertained by Liberals, to whom this handsome young soldier talked in halting French about Turkey's entry on the "path of civilisation and progress." But the balance of Europe, which had rocked since Russia's overthrow, was now set swaying dangerously.

95 Sloane Street, S.W.
Sept 6, 1908.

"Dear Mrs. Roosevelt,

A friend of mine, a queer eccentric but good-natured man, is going as British Consul to Zanzibar. He has promised me to look after the President like a father. You must keep the people here informed of your exact movements in order that proper preparations can be made.

The great event in recent weeks is the Turkish reform move-

ment. It was quite unexpected. The Turks got tired of seeing their country misruled by a tyrant who was gradually parting with the possessions of the country to foreign adventurers and whose misgovernment was leading to the separation of important provinces. The reformers look to England as the representative of liberty—England and America alike. You know that America founded the College at Constantinople which has really been the nursing mother of all reforming statesmen in Turkey and Bulgaria. Unfortunately they think that England can help them against the reactionary governments. It's little enough we can do, as we want all the forces we have to protect ourselves. My poor Persians have failed in the necessary art of self-defence. The real reason was that they believed the Russian armies would march into the country if they resisted the Shah, and so they did not resist. Now we hope that the Persians will not do anything to alienate the new movement among Mussulmans which is gaining strength every day. But in Persia it has failed because it had no army ; and in Turkey it succeeded because it had the army. But a political movement based on an army, without a Cromwell—a parliament of talkers backed up by an army of fighters—it's a bad look-out. The fighters will get sick of the talkers one of these days and then there is nothing for it but a dictator. Perhaps they will return to the Sultan again. But whatever be the end of it, it is most interesting ; the movement affects Egypt as well—in fact, all the Moslem world from Morocco to India ; and of course we English are confronted with very serious problems indeed.

Our philanthropists have again appealed to the Kaiser to stop arming ! As if they had any chance of succeeding except by arming themselves. The new German forces by the end of 1911 will be so great by land and sea that there will have been nothing like it since the time of Napoleon. The nations of Europe are in a quiver of anxiety. In fact, peace depends on the will of one man. Fortunately he is really of a peaceful disposition. I wonder what Theodore would do in his place ! He naturally sympathises with the fighters, and unfortunately the more civilised a nation gets the more reluctant it is to fight, and this gives a most serious advantage to the nation which is ready and armed. Still, I hope all will be well, at any rate during the year you are in Europe. If France and England were more willing to fight there would be less danger of war ; because then they would be too strong to be attacked. All this peace clamour invites the attack of the warlike people. You will find the same in America when the time comes, which I am glad to see won't be for some time yet."

CHAPTER XIX

IN ENGLAND AND IN SWEDEN
1908–1910

BEFORE Spring Rice had entered on his new post, the first consequence of the upheaval in Turkey was felt. Unstable equilibrium tempted all ambitions to push what was swaying, and in the first week of October 1908 a double *coup* was made. Bulgaria seized that part of the Oriental Railway which lay in her territory, declared her independence of Turkey, and Prince Ferdinand assumed a royal crown. Two days later the Emperor of Austria declared the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in his dominions. At the same time Austria evacuated the Sanjak of Novibazar—which, like Bosnia and Herzegovina, had been under Austrian administration. The actual change was not great; but the Treaty of Berlin was thus altered by one Power without consent from the other signatories.

Nobody knew whether Austria had consulted her ally Germany, who was the pledged friend of Turkey; everybody guessed that Russia had been induced to consent by the promise of Austrian support for a proposal to open the Dardanelles to Russian warships. This promise had in fact been given.

England resented the breach of international good faith and declined to be a party to opening the Straits, a further violation of Turkey's rights. Italy was furious. But above all Serbia, having always aspired to incorporate Bosnia, felt the challenge and prepared for war.

These happenings had the keenest interest for Spring Rice because D'Aehrenthal, now directing Austria's policy, had been Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg while Spring Rice was chargé d'affaires there.

The letters which follow, written to his wife, illustrate the comment which ran through all diplomatic centres. The first was sent from Berlin where he had stopped to visit her father, Sir Frank Lascelles—then approaching the end of his long service as Ambassador.

BERLIN,
Oct. 6, 1908.

To LADY SPRING RICE.

"Just off. I shall find your letters at Stockholm to-morrow morning. . . .

Sir F. is doing very well and there is a long chorus of regrets at his going from everyone. Pansa, Cambon and Szogeny [1] join in their despair. It is very nice of them.—Stemrich [2] said that much to his regret, and the regret of his Government, Germany would have to espouse the cause of her ally Austria; the origin of the affair, so far as Germany knew it, was in a conversation between Schoen and D'Aehrenthal in which D'A. alluded to the annexation as a remote contingency. The Vienna telegrams in the meanwhile boldly say that Germany gave her consent. This is probably taking the wish for the deed. The explanation believed in here is that D'A. wanted to glorify his bald forehead with the crown of victory; in fact, Ferdinand and D'A. are a pair of them. We are shouting too much, especially against Bulgaria, who wasn't a party to the Berlin Treaty and always said she would break it when she could. . . . "

STOCKHOLM,
Oct. 8, 1908.

To THE SAME.

" I have got here! It really is odd; but here I am. Well, I left Sir F. yesterday morning. . . . He was very nice and dear and I regretted very much leaving him, although he has been very much bucked up by this Bulgarian affair. I am writing to him. At 8.45 the train started. There were two Germans talking politics, and looking occasional daggers at me and another man who turned out to be an English nose and throat doctor. The unfortunate doctor stumbled over one of the Germans as he went out; I heard one of them say, ' Natürlich nicht besonders höflich,' [3] and then there were muttered imprecations on the island race. I read Professor Schiemann in the *Kreuz*; he was carefully and systematically *not* unfriendly; but *relevait* the unfriendly remarks made about Germany, as well he might. I noticed the frank and outspoken manner in which some of the German papers wrote about Russia. This is something quite new. On the whole the tone of the papers was very reserved. ' We haven't any business there, but as our friends are in it, of course we must be in it too.'

This afternoon I met M. de Trolle, the Foreign Minister, who was most agreeable and I look forward to seeing a good deal of him. He doesn't believe for a moment that Bülow [4] was as

[1] Count Pansa was the Italian, M. Jules Cambon the French Ambassador, and M. Szogeny the Austro-Hungarian.

[2] Herr von Stemrich had been German Minister in Tehran in 1906-7. He was now at the German Foreign Office.

[3] " Not specially polite, of course."

[4] The German Chancellor.

ignorant as Stemrich ; but does believe that no one in Berlin knew anything at all. He says that there is a wonderful decline of animosity against the Russians here, which is rather curious. Does it mean that they are no longer feared ? At any rate I believe that the Swedes are quite capable of looking after themselves and don't need much advice."

Oct. 16, 1908.

" I have read the telegrams to-day with the feelings that you can guess at.[1] There will be a considerably strong demand in Russia for the exclusive opening of the Dardanelles. As this is clearly a breach of the sovereign rights of Turkey—for it means that a foreign power has the right of using Turkish waters for belligerent purposes—the unfortunate Turks will have to submit to a new loss of prestige, and this time we shall be jointly responsible. It is hard to see how Europe can accept this view of the case and if Europe doesn't, of course England will be held responsible by Russia, and the grievance is renewed. But if we agree, then the Turks are sick and we have the odium, not for our own advantage but for the profit of our former enemy to our own detriment, as the owners of the confiscated ships [2] know too well. It is incredible that English public opinion—especially merchant opinion—will accept the Russian demands. But if they are not accepted, there is no doubt that we shall again become the object of Russian abuse. It is also amusing to think that Isvolsky's conversations with us are to be subject to revision and inspection at Berlin and not till the final appreciation by Bülow, will our ' agreements ' be *gültig*. And all the time we are yelling and shouting and calling bad names. I wish we could imitate the dignity and reserve of the French. Grey's speech and Lansdowne's praise of him are very satisfactory. It is easy—it looks easy—to be right—but it really isn't, because for most people, it isn't being right but seeming right, that is the object. The weak point is that what seems so easy and straight forward now, the appeal to legality, was the very argument used against the Bulgarians by the Russians —against the Belgians by the Prussians—against the Italians by everyone. If the Congress of Vienna had not been broken, where would Italy and Germany be now ? It is amusing to see how the poison of one generation is the food of the next. I expect W. T. (Tyrrell) will not approve of these views. It is so strange being here completely out of it. Not that I mind very

[1] It was announced that, as a result of discussion in London between Grey and Isvolsky, England and Russia insisted on a Conference to deal with matters arising from the recent violation of the Treaty of Berlin.

[2] Confiscated in Russo-Japanese War as carrying contraband of war.

much, because I get the correspondence and can think it over from an abstract point of view."

Oct. 26, 1908.

To THE SAME.

". . . I have been plunged in Jewish foreign politics in the seventh century B.C. There was Assyria, the real menace; there was Egypt, which *used* to be very powerful but which was on the decline, with fits and starts of energy. The people wished to get Egyptian help against Assyria. The prophets (Isaiah and Jeremiah) said that Egypt was no good, a useless and unreliable power, that Assyria was the real danger, and that the Jews were not strong enough, or brave enough or good enough to defend themselves, and therefore they should submit themselves to Assyria. This however they didn't do, and the result was final destruction, not however by Assyria but by Babylon, who took its place. The prophets were like our leader writers and affixed their ' prophecies ' to the walls of the town. They were generally very unpopular. It seems to me that our friend Spender[1] is playing the part of Isaiah and Jeremiah, that is, he advises us to yield to the inevitable. But that means that we are finished, done for and hopeless. I hope it hasn't come to that. Shall we spend seventy years in captivity in Berlin ? Poor Betty ! I wonder what Antony will live to see. Fortunately we don't care much beyond to-morrow, which is what chiefly matters. The Bible is always alluding to the circumstances of birth, which evidently make a great impression on the Jewish mind—especially the awful threat, ' I will bring to the birth and there shall not be strength to bear.'

The house in Berlin[2] was a real home to you, and vicariously for me, and now it is well over. I am glad for your father's sake. Only, I do hope he will be made a peer. He has done good service ; he has sought the peace and ensued it ; he has never suffered an insult and never given one ; he has done no one a bad turn, and he has maintained the view which he believed to be the right one—that is, charity, kindness and peace, among people who would have none of it. That is a good record and all the more creditable in that as we know he had a personal dislike for Bülow, who was Chancellor most of the time, and yet this never once was allowed to interfere in the dispassionate transaction of business. . . .

[1] J. H. Spender, editor of the *Westminster Gazette*, then the special organ of Liberal opinion.

[2] The Embassy.

I went out a long walk by myself yesterday afternoon. There are wild woods quite close to the town with big oak trees ; wide stretches of grass and a background of firs. I came back along the water, and the sun was setting behind the towers of Stockholm, which were reflected in the calm bay or fiord which leads up to the town. All the trees are turning now and the sky and the woods together made a most beautiful harmony of colours. Really, I thought, this will do very well ! . . . "

Nov. 6, 1908.

" What a nuisance to get no news from you ! The storm is still continuing here. Stemrich, I have no doubt with truth, says that Germany knew nothing about it and is in a very embarrassing situation between her ally Austria and her friend Turkey. The Russians, far from being informed, seem to be extremely angry and using very strong language. Altogether D'Aehrenthal seems to have made a considerable noise in the world and to have upset a good many applecarts. Who would have thought it of him ? The dips. are buzzing round like bees when a hive is upset. The only dips. I have seen are the Norwegian and the Swede, from whom I have not gathered much. I don't think there will be war, because Ferdinand will undoubtedly wish to spare his handsome head as long as he can, especially now that he has adorned it with a crown. It was made in Buda-Pest about two years ago and has been in a box waiting for events. The Bulgarian people will have to pay for the debt which they take over and for the railways, so that taxation will be heavier than it was. The powers who are debt holders will see to that. So all is not beer and skittles.

I see the English are howling. I wish they wouldn't. It so reminds one of a chained dog."

Stockholm,
Oct. 26, 1908.

To Ferguson.

" Here I am. It's a *very* nice place. I wish you would come. . . .

Bless you, my dear Ronald. I wish I had seen you before I went. Edward G. has done it fine, he really is a friend to be proud of, and you and Lady Helen ought to pat yourselves on the back for having assisted at his education. But he and Isvolsky talking together remind one of Genesis, chapter iii.[1]

It is very annoying to see how the *Times* has been pitching into the Germans. This is unnecessary and unprofitable. Every word said against Germany unjustly and without due cause

[1] Which describes the conversation between Eve and the serpent.

strengthens the hands of the Germans who desire to stir up feeling against us. In this last business we had an excellent choice of openly acting hand in hand with Germany in support of Turkey. Had we done so it would have been increasingly difficult for our enemies in Germany to say that England is hostile to Germany and that therefore Germany should arm herself against England. I think we should seize every possible opportunity (as the French are wisely doing) of showing friendship to Germany where this can be done without sacrificing our interests or our rights. Politics should be like chess; one should have no prejudice in favour or against any piece in the game. . . . "

Ten days later, Spring Rice wrote again to Ferguson, after the *Daily Telegraph* had published a statement alleged to be made on the Kaiser's authority. This declared his friendliness towards England, and was supported by surprising affirmations, calculated to embroil all powers. When protests were raised in Germany, it was admitted that Count Bülow had seen the article and had sent it on to the Emperor, who agreed to its publication.

Friday, Nov. 6, 1908.

" . . . These people [the Swedes] are a fine sturdy race and have all our damned disagreeable but efficient attributes to a high degree. At present they are engaged in becoming Socialists as rapidly as possible. On the other hand, the rich men combine and there is no country out of America with such an elaborate trust system. The cost of living is forced up to an unholy extent. You should just see the rents. They are also very protectionist and are becoming more so. At present I have been very high toned and have seen principally kings and princes. I hope to get lower or higher in the scale soon. I am struggling with the language. I wonder if you will come out here or not. It would be awfully nice if you would. All the forest lands, the water power and the iron will soon be acquired by the state—a gigantic system of state ownership. Wood has gone up 30 per cent. in two years! I wish it profited you." [There was much forestry at Raith and Novar.]

" What you say about defence is very interesting indeed. I fear it may be too late. I see that the Germans are beginning to pick a quarrel with the French. This is merely because they want to get the new taxes voted. Whenever there is a want of money, or of a new army or navy bill the German Government always raises a war scare; it was so in '75, in '87 and in '91. It will be so in 1908. I shouldn't wonder if Bülow had let the Emperor's indiscretion pass through his fingers with an object.

Anything to raise a storm! It is a bad thing for us. The Kaiser was really peaceful, and now is made as angry with us as possible because he has got into a row for our sakes and we tell him he is a fool for his trouble. As you very rightly say, 'The measure of resentment against the Kaiser seems to be the measure of the hostility to us.' This is certainly a moment to keep powder dry. Do you see (1) those beasts who are howling about Salisbury plain [1]; (2) those pigs of motorists who won't raise a cent for flying-machines? We are not in a brilliant moral state. . . ."

Jan. 14, 1909.

"DEAR LADY HELEN,

There never was a letter so full of information as yours and I am simply knocked of a heap.

The news about the Kaiser and the President is most particularly interesting. Maxse says he has been told by persons who have seen part of this correspondence that the Kaiser wrote in a spirit which was not very complimentary to the President—as if the P. was a fool and could be led by him. Maxse also maintains that for a time the P. *was* led by him, and is to a certain extent still. One of the reasons, and a sound one, is that the Kaiser disposes of a million German votes, or says he does. This, however, is doubtful, but it wouldn't do to run the risk of having a solid German vote against one, and the P. is quite a leery sort of politician. He believes of course that we are soft and effete; so are his own Americans, and in some respects even softer than we are. He can't help sympathising with a nation of soldiers; how he'd love himself to have one to boss and to ride at the head of a million men! I don't expect, though, that he quite understands his Kaiser's rôle. The Kaiser wants to be talked about, to have his fingers in every pie, and to be the general arbiter and referee. He loves the idea of being head of a great coalition of nations, surrounded like Kublai Khan by subject princes. He'd love to go to Pekin or Constantinople with a train of kings, with Edward among them. But he doesn't want to fight, partly because he is no soldier, and knows it by sad experience at the manoeuvres, and partly because whenever matters have looked like fighting, the possible adversary has cried off, so that there was nothing to fight about, and he daren't go to war without a just cause, or one that looks just. I think he is sensitive to European public opinion and wouldn't like to be quoted as the disturber of peace, the tyrant destroyer of nations.

[1] In opposition to the use of it for a military exercising ground and camp.

This makes him hateful to the ring of generals and admirals and professors who long for war because they know how ready Germany is and how unready are her possible enemies. They swear they will punish him for preventing war with France, by yielding at the last moment [1] to the cry of European public opinion, voiced by an artistic, unchauvinistic, cosmopolitan coterie. They have been waiting for him round the corner with a gun ever since. And the worst of it is they seem to have got him this time.[2]

The great guarantee of peace used to be our friendship with Italy and Austria, who could be counted on to dissuade their ally Germany from making war—and the Kaiser's fear of giving the order to begin the great struggle. But Austria now is become our bitter enemy—the Lord knows why. As to the latter, the Kaiser has lost his influence, and to regain it, the only thing for him to do may be to give the fatal order, which he has avoided so long. But, as Grey says, I am a pessimist. Why don't the ladies of England make a national defence league and refuse to speak to any man under 30 who isn't a soldier? We have Primrose leagues and Liberal leagues, but I really think you ought to start a national league and I am sure you could do it.

The same difficulty exists here. They know their danger, but there is a strong anti-military party which makes it very difficult to take the necessary measures."

Meantime there was a crisis in England. The naval estimates for 1908-9 had been reduced by the suppression of one Dreadnought—two being laid down instead of three. This followed on a friendly visit from the Kaiser to England at the close of 1907—and on a speech at the Guildhall in which he expressed his private desire and that of his people for the maintainance of good relations. In the autumn of 1908 King Edward visited the Kaiser, at Cronberg, and the Emperor of Austria (who had just celebrated his Diamond Jubilee) at Ischl. He conveyed the fact that the rapid growth of the German fleet caused uneasiness in England. But at the close of 1908 the British Admiralty learnt Germany's answer to the retardation of the British shipbuilding programme. It was to accelerate theirs. England's answer came in 1909 when the Government announced a programme of four Dreadnoughts at once, and four more if circumstances dictated. The *Times* demanded eight at once; many Liberals thought even four too many, but the Foreign Secretary threw his weight into the scale. In the outcome, eighteen of these vessels were built inside

[1] In 1905-6 on the Morocco dispute.

[2] The protests against the *Daily Telegraph* article led to open censure of the Kaiser in the Reichstag.

three years, and the super-Dreadnought, unforeseen, appeared among them.

But this method of deciding armaments by a sort of plebiscite did not appeal to Spring Rice, who hated pacifists almost as he hated war. His letters of the time show his immediate reaction to the controversy; in one to Lady Helen Ferguson he compared the rest of Europe to England, not to England's advantage. He wrote of what he saw in Sweden; he wrote also of the debate in the Reichstag on March 29 when Prince Bülow had repudiated the idea of entering into any arrangement as to naval programmes—though, as Bülow stated, the British Government had announced their desire for one. This was followed by a speech from Tirpitz setting out the formidable power that Germany would have in 1912.

British Legation,
Stockholm,
March 31, 1909.

"Dear Lady Helen,

What a delightful letter! And now Ronald also has written so that my poor bald head is singing with coals of fire. Florence is going to England to take one of the offspringies (thanks for the name, which will abide for ever).

Well, you are having a time. I wish I could tell you something in exchange. These people would make good teachers for us. They are mad on defending themselves and if possible on attacking somebody else. I have seen a good deal of their military manoeuvres in the snow. The men and horses are having a royal time of it and all as keen as mustard. The training goes on as if war was at their doors, it is hard as hard can be all the time. All the sports are mixed up with fighting business; one of their great events is military despatch-carrying on skis from some remote point to another. They did over 100 miles on foot in 16 hours. Horse-racing takes the form of military steeplechases, professional jockeys and betting forbidden. Everyone who isn't a soldier is a member of some shooting association. Our footman is a gold medallist. The Crown Prince dined with us and remarked the medal, and said he had only the silver one himself. When the Russians were talking about the Aland Islands,[1] the Swedes had every intention of fighting. They had a better fleet than the Russians and all Finland could have joined them. There was no doubting

[1] As a consequence of the disturbance caused by Austria's breach of the Treaty of Berlin, questions were raised concerning the Aland Islands. A Convention of 1856 prevented Russia from fortifying them—which would have been a threat to Sweden. Russia still claimed sovereignty over them; but by an Agreement signed between the Baltic Powers, the *status quo* in the Baltic was guaranteed.

about the matter! They bitterly repent not having fought the Norwegians[1] and would be only too glad for an opportunity of having a go at them. I regret to say that they seem to have a good deal more respect for the Germans than for us, although they do like us very well. Especially the Gothenburgers.

What events we are living through! It is plain as a pike-staff now that in spite of all our fine phrases, 'the sword is the maker of kings,' as Lyall puts it. He who has the sword can do what he likes and the man with the pen has to go under. The Germans are naturally pleased with themselves. I have just read the debate in the Reichstag. They are perfectly delighted with their Chancellor's bold and successful policy. In the same paper was a summary of Edward Grey's speech which in clear language described the English view of the foreign situation. I noticed that there were some significant omissions. For instance, he was made to say that a cause of war would be an attempt to isolate Germany, but he wasn't made to say that another cause would be an attempt to isolate England. A moral of the whole story is that Russia wasn't in a position to help Servia, her own blood and bone.[2] How then can she be expected to help us? Nor did France offer to help Russia, her ally. Would she help us, who are only her friend? We shall have to look after ourselves on our own account. The reason the affront was put on Russia and not on us was that we would probably have resented it and at any rate built some more ships. Russia was a safe kick. Our turn will come. Another moral is that Germany went far beyond the letter of the treaty in order to help Austria in the South. It is clearly to be expected that Austria will go far beyond the letter of the treaty in order to help Germany in the North, and Austria is ship-building hard. So that while we are alone, and will remain alone, Germany has a trusty and sure ally. But all this would mean nothing if we had adequate means of defence and the will to use them in defence. The present crisis will, however, be used by the other side to help the cause of tariff reform. Now, nothing is more certain than that a tariff against Germany would lead to the threat of war if Germany were not quite ready, and to war if she were. Dear me, I am writing as if I were an Ambassador and you a Minister."

In a letter written to Ferguson six months later, when he had gained inside information, Spring Rice explained the premature disclosure of Germany's hand. In 1906, they had decided to accumulate, but not to use, an immense plant for shipbuilding so that they could

[1] When Norway decided for separation in 1905.

[2] When Bosnia was annexed by Austria.

suddenly leap ahead. But the yards in the meantime, finding themselves able to build faster, speeded up ; and so the alarm was given, and the new Dreadnoughts were laid down. But, he added,

"The point is that in 1911, when the time comes to accelerate, it will be quite impossible for anyone to compete in the way of celerity. The danger is there."

This came later ; throughout the spring of 1909 his mind and his pen were busy with the "naval scare." He wrote to Ferguson :

April 8, 1909.

"I have been thinking over the peerage question a great deal.[1] It depends to a considerable extent on whether the reform scheme is getting on. If it is, and if there is any chance of its being carried out, it would of course alter the situation. As it is, I should be rather inclined to support the idea. There is a lot to be said for the Upper House, especially for anyone who is ready to go in for a lot of committee work. On the other hand the speaking there must be awful and the contrast after the House of Commons very depressing. Much like dying and joining the society of ghosts. If you have a lot of interest at home and are keen about doing business without any of the fun and excitement of the H. of C., then the H. of L. would give you quite enough to do when you came to town without being so absorbing. What is evidently true is, that the H. of L. plays a big rôle now and isn't by any means to be despised. But would you be pledged in any way to the party which made you a Lord ? Most people aren't and behave as Knatchbull Hugessen did when 'he belonged to the party as long as there was anything worth fighting for,' which meant, he left it as soon as he got his peerage.

I see Lady Helen is playing her part in the game, which is satisfactory. I don't know whether England asleep or England awake and yelling with fear is a more admirable spectacle. The *Daily Mail* has already left the subject of the scare and is returning to adulteresses. How long will the scare last and what will be the result ? I must say, though it's disgusting that the navy should become a party question, I don't see how in view of what the Government are doing or not doing, Balfour could have taken any other course. Grey, of course, was admirable ; so admirable that the German papers carefully garbled his speech. The Germans are admirable. On the one side is England, screaming, yelling, going to meetings and theatres—and *not* building ; on the other is Germany steadily carrying out a programme conceived in 1897—twelve years ago, and

[1] Whether Ferguson should accept one.

steadily developed since then with as little fuss as possible, in a business-like programme which enabled the firms concerned to make their plant and borrow money in the security and certainty that the Government would pay over a certain sum yearly. When the time comes that the yearly sum is to be paid, the Reichstag votes it without comment. There is no comment in Reichstag or press on the row in England, the most tempting opportunities for rejoinders are neglected, the most chauvinistic of peoples utters not one word of protest or hostility against England—but steadily, industriously prepares its destruction. When the time comes to destroy, the work will be done, the explosion will come; till then, all will be quiet. 'I behaved very gentle,' says the accused. 'You killed him,' says the judge.—' Yes, sor, I did, but I didn't use no cuss-words.'

It is striking here to see the immense pains taken by the Germans to influence public opinion through the press. The sympathies of Sweden are undoubtedly with Germany; partly from admiration for strength and determination, and partly from hatred for Russia, the year-long, hereditary enemy. The Swedes like us, but not so much the Stockholm nobles as the Gothenburgers. The Civil Service is German, and the army distinctly Prussian. The army would much like to go for Norway, and a war is by no means out of the question. The present Conservative Government represents the minority; but it is strongly supported by court and nobles and is strongly German in sympathy. The majority of the people are by no means Conservative; but they are divided between Socialists of an extreme class, and moderate Liberals, and Radicals, who can't unite to form a government."

The next letter to Lady Helen shows that even this far-thinking man only thought of airships as a vague menace; but also that he had thought seriously.

May 31, 1909.

"DEAR LADY HELEN,

. . . The world is getting painfully interesting now. I wonder what the feelings of young people are. Are they getting soft, or are they ready to put up a fight? Unfortunately we are living in an age of professionalism and machines. Amateurs are no longer any good against a professional team and the clever handicraftsman is no good against a superior machine. In the time of the Italian renaissance, professional soldiers were everything and the citizen soldier could do nothing. Consequently the liberties of the free cities went by the board very soon. And yet while we know this perfectly well, and don't

compete at football or on the river without a carefully trained team, we leave the highest of all interests to amateurs—the defence of the country. It is plain enough that the cry for more dreadnoughts is another step towards defence by machinery. We prefer to buy machines to serving ourselves. But I wonder what the real spirit of the country is? Especially Scotland. It would be amusing to go a-talking there and see how they take it. Do you remember in the *Antiquary* the description of the alarm of the French invasion? It is wonderfully well done. Scott himself was there—he rode 100 miles in twenty-six hours to be there, when the alarm took place.

Here in Sweden they are hard at work. They have just introduced compulsory service and the soldiers are made to go through a very severe course of physical training. The Radicals and Socialists are, of course, opposed to the army but as yet they have been voted down. If they had their way here, in Denmark, and in England and France, the free nations would be left a defenceless prey to the great bureaucratic Empires. Finland is a delicious example. There women have votes, there is a large Socialistic majority—there is no army; instead of serving in the army the Finns pay an indemnity to Russia—and as soon as Russia chooses, she will send in a few regiments and put an end to the whole comedy.

I wish you two could come out. There is an exhibition here and there is this house and such lovely expeditions to be made all round! I went out to-day and yesterday all day long; first on a steamer and then sitting on the rocks by the sea—watching for the sea-serpent who has got himself lost in an inland fiord here and been seen by several people in the last two years. Think if you went back to England having seen the sea serpent! Almost as good as the air-ship. I wonder what the truth is about this. Some time ago there was talk of air-ships in the German fleet, and the distance traversed is certainly not excessive. It would be perfectly natural and not at all difficult. We know the German War Office has a type of its own and that they are very good at keeping secrets. We also know that four years ago they determined not to renew the international prohibition against dropping explosives from balloons; so they must have had a scheme all ready then."

STOCKHOLM,
May 12, 1909.

To LORD CRANLEY.

"... I am alone here and hate it. I mean being alone. Not Stockholm—which is delightful.

I suppose you realise that Sweden is in effect a province of Prussia, not in will but in necessity. They feel here that Germany could set Russia at them whenever she wished, and if she wishes is the only effective protection against Russia. But the Swedes simply hate it being said or thought that they are dependent on the Germans, and personally Germans are very unpopular here. But in case of war I think we should have to regard Sweden as German in effect, much as Denmark would be, and probably Holland—out of sheer necessity and *à contre-cœur*. Give us some news of yourself. I am pretty wretched in spirit—partly being alone and partly thinking of the perfectly damnable political position. If I were you, I should make arrangements to take a part in case of invasion. It would be damnable to have to sit with folded hands, which is what I should have to do. In the meanwhile what we must be prepared for is, like Russia, to accept a smack in the face,[1] rather than fight when we are not ready to fight. A smack in the face will be an excellent thing to wake us up—next best to an abortive invasion. But I fear the Germans are much too clever for that ; if we are hit it will be once for all. As the boxing-master says, Don't let him get up again."

Politics apart, he approved highly of the Swedes, and nothing shows it better than his sketch of Sweden's tribute to Sven Hedin, the explorer—who became a friend of the British Minister and was indebted to him for various good offices. The letter was written to Ferguson on January 20, 1909 :

"Sven Hedin arrived here and was greeted with the whole population in cheers. The city turned out to meet him on the quay ; students sang their songs, 'Hold fast, thou bringer of the light.' The King sent to fetch him and met him with all his court and ministers round him to thank him for bringing honour and glory to the Swedish name. The Crown Prince proposed his health at the banquet in the presence of 300 and deputations of little boys presented him with Swedish flags. It's like some Viking rover coming back from Constantinople or the Volga ! They are quite a sporting people, rugged but a nurse of heroes."

It was natural in these years of so much closer contact with England that English ties should intensify ; and notably the old affection with Mr. Luxmoore got yearly more nourishment and filled a larger place in Spring Rice's life. But friends across the ocean were not forgotten. Here is a letter from Theodore Roosevelt, no longer President, to whom Spring Rice had cabled a message on the day of his successor's inauguration—evidently to greet Roosevelt's return to private life.

[1] Over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

March 10, 1909.

"DEAR SPRINGY,

We all think it was just dear of you to cable us a welcome home. Give my love to your wife and my godchild. Am I not to see all three of you in May 1910 when I reach England?—that is, lions, mosquitoes and the tsetse fly permitting. I have had a great time as President, and have accomplished a reasonable proportion of what I set out to accomplish, and I have fought up to the very end.

By the way, I hope that you happened to see and to like what I got the chance to say about 'The British Rule in India.'

Of course, I would like to have stayed on as President—any strong man would have liked to continue to be President—but I am more than content to be back at Sagamore Hill, and I am almost ashamed that I do not miss the White House."

Answering that, Spring Rice wrote on April 2, 1909:

"Well, what do you think of Europe now? If ever there was an object lesson to the text, 'The strong man armed shall keep his goods till a stronger than he cometh,' it is now. Germany and Austria have developed their strength and practised each a wise renunciation which has concentrated their strength while others have wasted theirs. Their comparative superiority in armed strength has continually increased, and although they have not shown it too evidently till now, it was growing all the time. Now they have declared themselves, they have forced their will upon Europe and Europe has accepted it—after a good deal of kicking and squealing it is true, but Europe has finally yielded. Now we have a state of things which is a return to the primeval—the reign of force. Europe has preached and shouted about Treaties and written promises, and has forgotten that their sanction is force and nothing but force. Europe has now been reminded, rather painfully, of what Carlyle would have called the fundamental facts, which are that they shall take who have the power and they shall keep who can. It's rather odd that in the long diplomatic Anglo-American dealings, we have never once had recourse to this simple expedient for getting rid of an awkward obligation. It is almost pathetic (in view of recent European History) that you accepted so long the pre-historic obligation of the Clayton Bulwer Treaty and are still disputing about the interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht."

Following up this thread of American associations, the next letter from Roosevelt was dated:

On Safari by the Guaro
Nyiro River, B.E.A.,
Oct. 6, 1909.

"Dear Springy,

Here I am, way out in the desert, with nobody but the hunter Cuninghame—a trump—and the funny, grasshopper-like blacks. Sometimes I have shot well, sometimes badly; and I am now an old man, and wholly unable to make exertions which once I should not have regarded as exertions at all; but still, on the whole, I have done pretty well, and from the scientific standpoint this trip will be of real value.

You *must* be in London next May. I have any amount of things to talk over with you, especially as regards what I have seen in your African colonies. I greatly like and admire your officials, and your settlers seem to me in all essentials just like our westerners. It is difficult for me to remember that I am not a fellow countryman of theirs; and they certainly act as if they thought I was an especial friend and champion, who sympathised with and believed in them.

Give my love to Madame and Bébé. Tell the former that I am dreadfully homesick for Mrs. Roosevelt; catch me ever leaving her for a year again, if I can help it.

Ever yours,

Theodore Roosevelt."

From another American home that was almost home to Spring Rice, tragic news came. Bay Lodge, the young poet, had died suddenly. Spring Rice wrote a letter, which discarded all words of consolation; but the mother wrote back that it had been read and read and read again, for it recalled their son as he had seemed to their own inner knowledge of him.

Stockholm, 1909.

"Dear Mrs. Lodge,

The first time I saw him was at Nahant when the children were all there together; and since then I have always seemed to know him closely and intimately. We bathed together there and I remember so well the immense joy he had in jumping into the water, and then lying out in the sun until he was all browned—as strong and healthy a human creature as I have ever seen, and exulting in his life. Then we rode together at Washington, and I can see him now galloping along in the woody country near Rock Creek. It didn't strike me then that he was anything but a strong healthy boy, absolutely straight, sincere, and natural.

It wasn't till I saw a good deal of him in Berlin that I realized what a rare and extraordinary mind he had. He was then

studying hard at philosophy. In an extraordinary quick time he learnt German and seemed to take naturally to the most difficult books—just as he had done to the sea, without any conscious effort. We had many talks then, and his talk was most inspiring. He constantly lived face to face with immense problems, which he thought out thoroughly and earnestly, things men often read and study in order to pass examinations or achieve distinction ; but I am quite sure with him there was no object except just the attainment and the presence of truth. He had a most living mind, and a character absolutely independent ; resolved on finding out things by himself, and living by his own lights and thinking out his own problems. Nothing would have stopped him or interfered with him. In all my experience of people about the world, I never knew anyone so 'detached,' deaf to the usual voices of the world; and so determined to live in the light of Truth, taking nothing for granted till he had proved it by his own original thought. He had greatly developed when I last saw him in Washington, during the few days I spent there. I had two long talks with him in his house. I think he was the sort of stuff that in the middle ages would have made a great saint or a great heresiarch —I dare say we have no use for such people now ; I wonder if he found he was born out of his time, and that ours was not a world for him. I am not thinking of what he wrote or what he said, but of the atmosphere in which he lived, and the surroundings of his own soul—what his thoughts lived and moved in.

In that detachment and independence and courage, I have never known anyone like him. Yet it was hardly courage, for he didn't give the enemy a thought.

I wonder if one often meets a man in these times who is literally capable of standing alone, to whom the noises and sights of the world, which to most people are everything, are nothing, absolutely nothing—the state of mind of some one who is madly in love; but with him it seemed normal and natural, an everyday habit of being.

It was only last week I had a long think as I was walking about through these lonely woods here, and I was wondering whether I should see you all soon again, and I was saying to myself : At any rate Bay will have grown—he won't disappoint me ; he is the sort of man who is bound to get bigger every day and he is younger and stronger than I and he will last.—And about how many men of his age could one say *that* with certainty, that time would surely improve and perfect him, and that with every new meeting one could gain something new ?

And that is how I thought of him naturally.

C. A. S. R."

Henry Adams wrote afterwards :

" I believe I gave you all the books I have written, except the *Life of Bay Lodge*, and that, I know, was sent to you by the family. I have always wanted to express my gratitude to you for the letter that you wrote about Bay, which was the only really solid support I had for my view of him and his character. I put it in with the greatest satisfaction."

Spring Rice himself was learning in this time the pains that can come through children—though indeed from the first he had been foreseeing them. But now the elder child had to be taken home for an operation—leaving her father racked by all the pains to which his nature was prone.

" Every child," he wrote to Ferguson, " represents a hundred thousand anxieties of different sorts, each one more disagreeable than the other. Our ancestors had children by the dozen and left nature to choose the fittest and let the others go. We coddle and coax the few we have to keep with us—I don't know which system is the best."

In this case, providence, which never left him short of friends, saw to it that he should be relieved by a kind watchfulness. Through all this correspondence, we find him in close and affectionate relations with one Minister's secretary after another, first Villiers, then Mallet. Now, Sir Edward Grey's secretary was Tyrrell. But this last tie had a special quality, for it was between two men each of whom had children ; and affairs of state slide into the background to let more important matters come first. Tyrrell wrote a hasty line to say that he had " met Mother Rice, who looked very happy after the great success of the operation that morning."

Here is the answer :

June 13, 1909.

" My Dear W. T.,

Bless you ! It was a *most kind* thought. How queer it is, these abysms which open suddenly before us and close (with us inside them or not) ; and then we emerge and talk together in the most ordinary way as if the earth were really as solid as it looks !

What did you think of Balfour's speech ? I liked it a good deal. Grey was so extraordinarily natural, direct and himself. Nothing could be more convincing. The fact is, England is an artificial creation, made by the character of Englishmen, and will last as long as the character remains, but will not last longer. The question for us is—Is that character gone, or is it not gone ? And if it is gone, can we get it back again ?

Dizzy, in his oriental way, had a good deal of intuition. He

looked on the Empire, in an aloofish way, as a historical phenomenon, or a work of art. His saying was : ' England cannot begin over again.' Lord Salisbury at his prime made a speech in the House of Lords about Ireland, in which he asked people to remember that England was not a natural development, but highly artificial, the elaborate product of concurrent forces and complicated conditions. We can't play with it lightly.

The burning convictions of Meredith and F. Harrison[1]—so much unlike—are enough to make one think. Listen to our talk ! If we really meant business, we would each of us put ourselves under the immediate obligation of being killed, if the enemy came, by enlisting. Instead of which we talk about new machines. The Germans don't talk, they vote without talking and each one of them will have to serve when the moment of peril comes.

Bless you for writing."

Returning now to political matters, it does not seem necessary to reproduce the diplomatic controversy, in which he was officially concerned, as to the conflicting claims of Sweden and Russia over the Aland islands. These were further complicated by Norway's voice in the matter, for Norway, separate since 1905, had been partner with Sweden when the treaties which affected their claims were framed. The view of the British Foreign Office was that this problem admitted of no expedient solution, and, like that of Russia's claim to opening the Dardanelles for her ships, had better be let sleep.—In truth, Stockholm would have been an easy post for a man who desired an easy time, and Spring Rice was sent there largely on account of the state of his health. But an easy time was not possible for him. He was a man with a mission, and no one knew better than he that a man with a mission is readily accounted a nuisance. Nevertheless he persevered in his mission, treating his position in Sweden as a kind of observation post from which he could watch at close quarters the advance of Germany. He interested himself in all manner of things, as for example the application of electricity to the treatment of steel —a matter closely concerning armament. He reported to his official chiefs, as lay within his duty ; but he went far beyond mere obligation. He used all means that lay within his reach to influence the English press ; Leo Maxse of the *National Review*, St. Loe Strachey of the *Spectator*, were in constant correspondence with him ; he briefed Mr. Garvin in an article for the *Quarterly Review*, edited by his friend Mr. George Prothero ; he wrote his view of the German menace in a long letter to Mr. Basil Williams of the *Times*.—In all these cases, he obtained the consent of his official superiors to his furnishing information, provided that he himself did not write, or receive pay.

[1] George Meredith and Frederic Harrison, both strong Liberals, wrote vehemently in favour of compulsory service.

As to his influence on his own chiefs, a letter from Tyrrell written in December 1909, when Spring Rice was home on leave, concerns an interview with Sir Edward Grey. The British fleet had visited Swedish ports and Spring Rice had noted that, though there was a friendly reception, the King of Sweden and the chief Swedish naval authorities were markedly absent.

"Your letter to Sir E.," Tyrrell wrote, "has made a distinct impression on him and I don't think he will accept the reason given to account for the absence of the naval staff. You have done good work, my dear Springy, as you have often done before. The seed must now mature, helped on by a little digging now and then."

But then, Tyrrell shared Spring Rice's views about Germany.

The propaganda did not stop at persons in the Government and in the press. Spring Rice was a close friend of Mr. Gerald Balfour, brother of the leader of the Opposition, and a letter to him may be given as an example. It was written in England on December 1, 1909, when the House of Lords were on the eve of precipitating a constitutional struggle by throwing out Mr. Lloyd George's Budget.

"I own to looking at the present situation with some alarm. Perhaps because I have been in Scandinavia where the belief prevails universally that the struggle is coming soon. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are, of course, very deeply interested, because the struggle must affect them nearly. They seem to take for granted that we shall be the under-dog. In Sweden (perhaps because of our agreement with Russia) the army, navy and Government are distinctly on the side of Germany. In Denmark, Germany is hated and we are liked, but Germany is feared and we are not. In Holland, as you see recently, the cry is (as in Denmark) for fortifications on the sea side, that is against England, not because England is hated more than Germany but because it is believed that England will try to effect a lodgement from the sea; and that such an attack *can* be warded off, while a German attack from the land side can *not* be warded off. You see also in Belgium that it is believed there that Germany will attack France through Belgium; and most inadequate preparations are being made against such an attack. The general impression to be collected from these small states (which are useful indicators, like the birds which stir and fuss when the tiger is on the move) is that the time is drawing near when Germany will assert her superiority. On the other side in Italy and Austria there is the same feeling. Austria doesn't wish to be drawn into the struggle, but may be forced owing to recent events, and to the pressure of the German element. Italy sent us frantic warnings: 'Arm in time, or we shall be

forced to take sides against you, or to be neutral, though that implies the loss of independence.'

As for Russia, a friend of mine has recently taken a British ship to the Baltic ports. The reception was tumultuous. The English were evidently looked on as the allies in the inevitable struggle. This was from the junior officers; the higher ones seemed to feel that their Government was under different influences, and that it was wiser to abstain from demonstrations. So you see that anyone who takes a calm survey of the state of European public sentiment will say: They all expect a struggle between Germany and England—and I think most people would add: They expect England to be beaten.

If one goes to England, the impression is quite a different one. I don't think that apart from occasional panics there is a very lively fear of war here. The principal interest of people is in purely internal questions—in the constitutional struggle, and the question of protection and free trade. The Ministers are naturally most interested in the question of their own position and existence. Most people would behave just the same way. In the department which is mostly concerned with defence, the Admiralty, the questions which receive most attention are personal questions. In the Government and the Navy there is a sort of civil war, and naturally this is more interesting than an external war. As to public opinion, it has been stirred up by the discovery that Germany is building ships as fast as England. But in 1906 it was proved to the Admiralty that over three million pounds were being spent on machinery, for the purpose of being able to build as fast as England, or faster. The information was ignored, and though it is now known that the information was received three years ago and was not acted on, nobody seems to be greatly surprised. The obvious conclusion is: Why was there not some means of testing the truth of such information and bringing the results of the enquiry before the Government? It is notorious that the machinery which exists in Germany under the name of the General Staff for army and navy, does not exist in England, or at least not on a scale to compare with the German. And yet nothing is done, or can be done, to remedy this, because public opinion doesn't demand it. Public opinion wants ships and only ships, that is, the shop window, and is satisfied. Yet a navy doesn't consist of ships alone, but of the organisation and the means of building and repair, and many other things. Your dinner isn't only beef and mutton, but the kitchen and the butcher.

So anyone, like me, who comes home from abroad, with the habit of collecting facts and reporting to some distant master, would say: Here is all the world talking of war between England and Germany, except in England, and there people are occupied in fighting each other; and if they do demand naval preparation it is in a form which satisfies the eye—'looksee.'

As for Germany, as far as I can judge from hearsay, the people have no wish whatever for war, certainly not immediate war; but they themselves confess that if their masters order war, war will come. The general feeling is: War will come, if German interests are threatened, and German interests will be threatened by protection in the British Empire.

I don't know (or rather I do know) what you would say at the bare suggestion that we are to refrain from protecting our own industry or consolidating our own Empire, because a foreign country thinks that it will be hurt by what we do. It seems inconceivable, uttermost depths of ignominy. And yet that is exactly what is happening at this moment in Sweden with regard to their new measure for a tariff. Sweden, however, knows her weakness. Perhaps we are right in not believing that we are weak. But have we taken the right means to know whether we are right or no? That is mainly a question of good information and impartial weighing of evidence by persons who have the time as well as the talent. I doubt whether our Governments possess the means of forming a right judgement. People generally believe we are all right and can enter on a struggle with safety—especially the people who believed the same about the South African War. But if they are wrong? Suppose they are wrong, then a foreign power which controls the press of the world would have an excellent opening for bringing on a successful war, at the time most convenient, by some 'incident' like the Hohenzollern candidature, in which England would seem the aggressor. Quite lately Metternich offered a sort of ultimatum about Servia. Russia at once yielded, and though *we* did not, at first, we followed Russia's lead. If *we* had been in Russia's place, would our Government have yielded as the Czar did? He could, because he was autocratic. He knew the weakness of his country and could afford to surrender and bide his time, as William did at Olmütz, Japan at Shimoneseki. There was no Parliament to be feared—an Emperor or a King can't be deposed like a Government by a storm of five days.

The moral I would draw, which is the most commonplace one in the world, is—Let us remember how war was brought on in 1870; let us, before fighting, be quite certain that the cause is

adequate and that our resources and means of defence are also adequate. It is so evident that during a constitutional crisis, when a rebellion in India and Egypt is almost imminent, a well-equipped foreign government will have its opportunity, especially with such a people as ours, no longer calm and stolid, but easily excitable and led by a few newspapers. I think moderate people should remember what the danger is, and be prepared to meet it. They know the typhoon season is coming on and they should make up their minds what they will do and how they will do it. . . . If we fall, the fall is final. We are not like Russia or China ; we are a Parthenon not a pyramid, and can we hope that Germany will repeat her error of 1871 ? She fixed an indemnity which France paid in three years, and Germany had to withdraw her forces and passively look on while France prepared her revenge. She saw her fault and tried, but in vain, to repair it. She won't repeat the fault with us. We shall be bled white. That is why the struggle is of such terrific importance, and we are talking of it and judging it and taking our decisions in view of it, as if it were the Boer War, or an expedition to Pekin. In your capacity of flyer, I send you two little notes from newspapers.

Westminster Gazette, Nov. 27.—From Germany. Account of the new military airship, its speed, dimensions, etc., etc. (Note in its construction ' electro metal ' is used, an alloy of steel made by the electric process which Krupps adopted from Sweden.)

October 20 (?), *Stockholm Gazette*.—Description of the Onge Air Torpedo, invented and manufactured in Sweden. The ' caster ' weighs very little—the torpedo can be aimed with fair accuracy, it travels by its own motor power—150 torpedoes purchased by the German Government which sent a special steamer to bring the torpedoes and caster to Germany for trial. (Swedes believe object to be attack at night on, *e.g.* Dover Harbour, or on arsenals, and if occasion serves on ships.)

There are unfortunately one or two places where there are open questions which are being kept open and which may suddenly be converted into burning questions. These are connected with the Persian Gulf and Liberia."

This was followed by details as to the electric steel furnaces. Mr. Balfour's reply, written nearly a month later, gave not only his own comments but those of the ex-Prime Minister. They conveyed that the Unionist leaders, and probably the rank and file of their active followers, were convinced of the danger which confronted them ; but the question was, how to stimulate English public opinion without inflaming that of Germany.

For the time, however, everybody in England was neck-deep in the political campaigns and preparations for a general election, to which the Lords had challenged the Commons. Spring Rice went to stay with Ferguson at Raith, where Sir Edward Grey was also a guest. On December 10 he was writing a letter from Sir Hugh Bell's house and once more was inventing or remembering telling points for Ferguson to use in election speeches. For instance:

"The Lords are mostly composed of people '*dont le père avait tant de talent.*' As the Yank said, 'Your old families are like the potato, the best of them's under ground.'"

(It may be wondered whether a Munro of Novar used that particular argument.)

On the same day Ferguson wrote:

"You are a brick, and I feel your great kindness all the more that I wasn't the help I ought to have been to you here.

There's no friendship I feel so close as yours, and sometimes I presume upon it. You may be sure of this, that if I go short at times, it's the carelessness in putting your friendship before all others. I must begin to think that I'm not so sure of your friendship and then I'll be all *petits soins*. God bless you, dear Springy. I *was* glad to see you better and I'm very glad you met Edward, but I wish more than anything else that I had spent all Monday with you.

Yours ever,

RONALD."

It so happened that among the other guests at Raith was Professor Lodge the historian, who remembers vividly a Sunday walk with Spring Rice. He writes of it:

"He expounded to me the German menace. I had never heard it so authoritatively stated. . . . I recall equally vividly the discourse in the smoking room between tea and dinner, when he and Edward Grey quoted Wordsworth against each other for some two hours."

Spring Rice had certain minor literary activities at this time, as is shown by this letter of May 8 from Gertrude Bell:

"MY DEAR SPRINGY,

I can't tell you what it was like to read the *Spectator* review, after all the drivel that has been poured out over my book. I read it without knowing that it was yours and marvelled to see into what cunning hands *Amurath* had fallen. It was like breathing another air. It praised all the things that I had written with most pleasure—and I began to think that one's pleasure in writing was no criterion to the result produced, for

no one else had said a word about them. Now I'm up on a pinnacle again, ready to back my own view with yours against the universe. Bless you for writing as you did. . . ."

Everybody seemed to be converging on London at this time. The Spring Rices were there on leave; then came this letter from Roosevelt, on the way with Mrs. Roosevelt to Stockholm for a reception—whence they also were to go to London.

Apr. 21, 1910.

"DEAR CECIL,

What a trump you are! And Springy, what an able fellow you are! I don't think you have ever been able to use your great ability to serve yourself so much as to serve others, and I have always wished that you had a little more power of putting yourself forward. Now you give me in your letter just the very information as to Swedish affairs which I beyond all other things wished, telling me what I had hazily guessed at but did not know, and what no other human being dreamed of telling me—and I'll get the credit instead of you! Well, I am sorry not to see you in Stockholm, but I look forward eagerly to our meeting in London.

With love to Lady Springy and my godson."

Then came—in the middle of the fiercest political struggle that England had seen since the Reform Bill—the sudden death of King Edward. Spring Rice's first movement was to write to Roosevelt the letter which has already been printed,[1] about the gift of a miniature at the time of Roosevelt's inauguration in 1905. But the last paragraph, though given already, shall be repeated here.

"I am quite sure that if you had seen him you would have understood some things which seem rather difficult to understand—that is why he did as a fact exert a great influence, and how very thoroughly and sincerely he desired certain things and did do a great deal to promote their accomplishment. I am very sorry you didn't see him but I daresay you won't forget what I tell you now—quite privately and for yourself."

It marks the relations between this group of people that Whitelaw Reid, afterwards American Ambassador, asked the Fergusons to meet Roosevelt at lunch.

". . . Nobody else is invited, excepting the Spring Rices. . . ."

After all the funeral ceremonies were over Spring Rice wrote on June 3 to his old tutor:

"I saw our new King, who looked tired, but spoke very well and sensibly, I thought. I expect he will be a good king, and

[1] See above, I. 452.

make us a little harder in the grit, which is what we want. I also saw old Chamberlain. The old lion said, 'He will be a Great King and I know it.' Roosevelt has turned us all topside down; he has enjoyed himself hugely and I must say, by the side of our statesmen, looks a little bit taller, bigger and stronger. I am not sure he doesn't look the right thing. Our statesmen looked the wrong one—some of them."

CHAPTER XX

IN SWEDEN. FROM THE ACCESSION OF KING GEORGE TO 1913

By August 1910 Spring Rice with his family was back in Sweden. But the post did not make him happy. Contrary to his hopeful expectations, the climate increased instead of lessening his liability to asthma; and he was living in a political atmosphere which he felt unfriendly to England and friendly to the German aspirations which he dreaded. Always a moody man, he was depressed in those years; and the unsettled state of politics in England, where the conflict between parties was now openly a conflict between the two Houses of Parliament, distressed and disquieted him. He suspected everybody and every nation—not least his own nation; and he did not hide his trouble from the Fergusons. It will be seen that he had found a name that delighted him—"Helen of the High Hand"—for Lord Dufferin's daughter.

SVERIGE,
Aug. 12, 1910.

To FERGUSON.

". . . It is very kind, and just like you to think of speaking in my favour. As far as I have had any knowledge, this has never been done on my behalf and will not be done. I have nothing to complain of, having made hitherto a fair average career. . . . I have no reason to complain that I know of. Even if I had, I should be sorry to allow my life to be embittered by the action of third parties, not very greatly superior to myself. I am sure it's difficult enough to treat Providence with the respect which is no doubt his due (as somebody said), without having to say prayers to two-legged creatures. . . . You aren't Prime Minister, but if you were, would you have no bothers? And if God, who presumably is a greater even than a Prime Minister, is contented and pleased with his own achievements in the way of this visible world, he can't be all he is cracked up to be.

How is H. of the H. H.? I wish to God she were Prime Minister."

Again from Stockholm on August 27, to Ferguson :

" I am living quietly and lazily by a fiord with granite boulders and fir woods behind the house and water in front of it, and two noisy children inside who are having the best time possible. They both run about and shout all day when not sleeping or eating. Walter Lawrence, late of India, is staying near here, and he has told us some amusing things about Imperial George Curzon whom he faithfully served and cordially loves. He has a most sincere admiration for his thoroughness, though he gives some very curious instances of his tact. Imperial G.'s mistake was not quitting his job soon enough, and after his visit to England his chances of success in India were much diminished for he had treated all his late colleagues (of the home Cabinet) like black beetles. So they in their turn when they had him safe out of the country ' larned him to be a toad.' K. of K. has left no stone unturned to be Viceroy and only Morley's determined resistance defeated him. Morley thinks he will boss Hardinge [1] as he bossed Minto. Will he, do you think ? What a tyrant Morley must be.

Respectful love to the 3 H.'s."

Another letter to the same is interesting, for later events have answered its pessimism.

Sept. 18, 1910.

" I hope the Swedes will keep their independence of spirit and not succumb, like the Dutch and the Belgians or the Danes, contentedly, or at least resignedly into a position of slavish dependence. They have still the gait and manners of free men and perhaps a little of their swagger. But that is better than a slouch.

The workmen are unfortunately full of class hatred and are prepared to begin the fight again soon. I think it is very essential in view of the signs of the times in England that we should be ready to take over all essential branches of labour if there is a general strike. The general strike failed here because people who usually wear black coats were quite ready to take them off, unload ships, dig potatoes, run electric trains and gas-works and clean the streets. Are we ready to do the same ? If not, we shall be beat. The thing to do is to *have it in one's mind*, with a ready made plan, in case of necessity, to be ready to form a corps of workers and apportion the tasks, and above all to have a hand ready to put to hard work without shrinking. I think the time may come in England before we are quite

[1] Sir Charles Hardinge had become Viceroy of India and been raised to the peerage as Lord Hardinge of Penshurst.

ready for it. The supposition is that the ' gents ' can't exist without the ' labourers ' because they can't put their hands to the work on which daily life depends. That was what the workmen's leaders thought here ; they found their mistake and are greatly repenting now."

At the end of this September came a startling incident. Spring Rice was going to take his wife and daughter out on the lake and was standing at one pier with the nurse and child, while his wife was getting the boat ready at the other. Suddenly he heard shouts. Lady Spring Rice who could not swim had fallen in and was in deep water. He was just in time to catch her and bring her in. " Lucky I had been to Eton and knew about the water, and lucky she kept her head." he wrote to Mr. Luxmoore. On October 10 in a letter in reply to Mr. Luxmoore's sympathy he commented on the fact that his wife had not suffered at all in her nerves.

" Curious that being face to face with the old gentleman for two minutes should not have made a deeper impression. I dare say, for the person concerned, such an interview is a good deal less imposing than is generally supposed, and that the presence of King Death is as little alarming as the presence of other sovereigns. I remember the first time I saw the Czar, he was at the height of power in and out of his empire, and Europe and the East were prostrate, his people were abject, and there he was, a pleasant-spoken little gentleman chattering about lawn tennis and babies. There is certainly a great advantage in having been taught to swim as we were at Eton in a really business-like way. The result was that there was not one second wasted. Since that time it has occurred to me that the ideal for a nation, and each member of it, is bodily and mental preparation for certain crises which may not happen, but if they do happen must be faced at once and without hesitation if they are to be faced with success. For instance, fire. I remember reading in *Aunt Judy's* at the age of 12, a story of a lad who had an old uncle who told him exactly what he should do to get into a burning room. That is to put a wet handkerchief over his face and *crawl* with his nose on the ground (to get out of the smoke). Well, when I was at Balliol, College caught fire; a man dropped a match into his dirty linen and there was a blaze. Nobody could get into the room because of the smoke. I suddenly recollected *Aunt Judy* and acted accordingly. A man called Inglis, an Indian Civil servant, did the same and between us we got two big cans of water along the floor to the place where the fire was and put it out. Jowett came in and seeing Inglis and me standing by the burnt corner said viciously,

'Who lit it?' Just like the old boy. He never asked who put it out. It was odd how the *picture in the mind* of what is to be done acts as the impulse, and there is no effort of will or exercise of thought whatever. This must be true of lots of things, poison, snake bites, etc. But it is most true of war. In Germany everyone knows exactly what to do, because it is all thought out beforehand. He has no trouble to think, no room for doubt or hesitation. With us the great and first question will be—What shall I do? And the result *may* be that I do nothing; and the result will probably be that what I do is no good. That is the point of being a part of a trained organisation. But the mind must be trained too. You must be made *οἷος* and this is the meaning of education.

I wish I could dig. I have been trying it in our garden, but I begin to sneeze and also I begin at once to get very tired. I couldn't earn my living that way. But I can weed a path and plant bulbs. How awful it would be to be a workman, a hand labourer, and to come to the moment when one has to say: 'I can't, sir. I fear I'm past my work, sir—give us a ½d.' Since I failed digging I have become quite a sympathiser with the old-age pension.

Oh, the beauty of these days! All the leaves are dying; but each has his peculiar and separate form of death, some as long about it as Charles II., and some as sudden as plague or Ananias. The best of all is certainly the service, or white-beam, of which we have five in the garden. The rocks are brilliant white with a heavy lichen, which when looked at, is like the antlers of the reindeer, and the woods are one mass of mosses, and scarlet-leaved bilberries, or blae berries, with bracken every possible colour except green. There were northern lights, solemn beams striking across the sky and then fading away and beginning again somewhere else. The next morning, dazzling sun on the woods and rocks; water of course everywhere and so everything is doubled. The birds are a great amusement as they are getting in supplies; so are the squirrels. Betty is rampageous. We took her to the top of a rock over the sea and she went quite mad, running round and shouting, waving her hands, dancing round the trees and generally making a fool of herself: Antony disporting himself on his own account in a more solemn way. Betty knows all the trees and birds—she doesn't much like big dogs or capercailzie because of the noise which seems to frighten her. But she is on the best terms with quiet things. I heard her break off in some yarn and suddenly say, 'Oh, you funny little things, what are you talking about?' It was two lily buds shaking in the wind at each

other; another time she stooped over a flower bed and said, 'He said, here I am, look!' It was a single nasturtium we had sown and which (late in the day) had produced one singularly impertinent single flower. Children are odd things. However, these are the last days for us. In a week I shall be alone in Stockholm, and F. and the babies at the abomination of Kingsgate. Betty loves the prospect."

There followed expressions of disparagement about his children. Spring Rice always spoke about them as the Indian mother does who fears the anger of some jealous god.

Mr. Luxmoore's reply began with protest against these slanders, quoting testimony in support of his belief. He also said, with justice, that Spring Rice seemed to him a pathetic figure "pacing the shore of your island all alone." Then he went on:

"You ask me to write about Eton. I *can't* when I am an outsider, how can I? I touch the place at so few points, and find it so difficult to know what goes on. Once a week a dozen boys come in and read Shakespeare for an hour on Wed. eve. Your nephew and namesake [1] among them. His voice is not quite so good as I expected from his face, but he is up to our standard, which is not very high. They seem keen and interested and never miss. I enjoy it vastly because I get to know them but it is a tie. Last Friday I read a paper to about twenty-five or so, mostly Sixth Form and K.S.'s [2] in Fellows' Library. It is such a charming room and their nice manners and faces make it very pleasant and they seem to attend. No doubt there is another side to these ingenuous, interested, nice-mannered lads, and out of sight they may be the Rabelaisian English schoolboy, but it is difficult to realise; and when one contrasts their kindness and niceness with the roughness and offensiveness of fifty years ago, it is difficult to doubt that the improvement is deeper than superficial. Of course, there is the danger of softness with these softening manners but they don't show it otherwise. They had as I told you a record recruiting in the Corps after their first really nasty and regular camp.

Now that you are alone, will you go on with that preface to a selection of sonnets? Or would you rather put some of the miscellaneous things together? You must do something, at present I feel rather bilked."

The project of publication had been in Spring Rice's mind; for during this time of comparative leisure and of solitude he was writing

[1] Dominick Spring Rice, son of Stephen.

[2] King's Scholars.

a good deal of verse and played with the thought of a volume. He wrote (in June 1910) to Mr. Luxmoore.

"I have a large number of poems or verse on various subjects which are not of great merit but give me a good deal of satisfaction in the making. If I had a garden my mind would find a more satisfactory outlet. But I haven't a plot of land I can call my own outside my own skin. Inside, I hope every year to have a little more."

But his decision went against publishing; probably from the fear lest it should cause him to be taken less seriously in his profession. Lord Dufferin advised another well-known diplomatist to avoid being known as a poet.

A change of the diplomatic representation in Holland provoked wishes and regret; but when the matter was over he wrote to Ferguson:

Nov. 1, 1910.

"I don't know why I fussed about the Hague—I suppose because of Florence's journey and the children. Please don't do anything. Brussels is to be given to C. Greene, who deserves it a good deal because he has been in Roumania, and I don't think I should prefer Brussels to Stockholm. I shall just stay here till I leave altogether or get promotion. I think it better not to appear discontented in any way. I am not as badly off as you, and you don't complain. My ambition is to have a hole to retire into in England before I am quite finished. But it is a question of getting money. I haven't the right to a pension yet and so I must wait in any case. Besides, I don't yet know how my infernal health is. I have had a blasted cold for some time which has made me very useless, although I have had no asthma, which is a blessing. Who is Pacificus? Who is Oliver? [1] I think the idea is a good one and inevitable indeed. It is quite unheard of that a mere majority, and that not homogeneous, should decide two grave constitutional questions—such grave ones as the House of Lords and Home Rule—the two which are at the root of government and empire. Especially when one sees the character of the people who govern the majority [2]—who, in fact, are avowed enemies of both empire and government. On the other hand, if a mere majority of ancestral legislators are to decide that nothing is to be done at all, are we better off?

Supposing a man to be pretty sick and to be in want of a remedy, what is his situation if he has to choose between his

[1] F. S. Oliver was then writing letters to the *Times* which advocated a federal solution of the Irish problem.

[2] That is, the Irish Nationalist members.

grandmother, who says she won't hear of these new-fangled medicines, and a quack doctor who has insured the sick man's life in his own name? And that is about our situation now.

I agree about military service, but there isn't very much time. The main thing now is to impress on oneself that there are a good many people now who are very anxious to have a pretext to put an end to us, and that we must see to it that they don't have the pretext and that if they try it on, it will be a costly business. It is odd that the Jews and Catholics are doing all they can to injure us; the heir of Austria[1] hates us and so does the whole Catholic party in Austria and Germany. The Jews look on the question as a hyæna does on a fight; he will get a bit anyway, and he means to be on the winning side—which evidently he thinks is Germany. The Turks are, of course, purely and simply anti-Christian and as they played off England against Austria, now they are playing Germany against Russia and England. Russia's policy is to keep still and prepare, in the meanwhile, to make friends with Germany as far as she can; this is all right. Nothing can prevent the Russians or the French from seeing that if we are exterminated their turn will come next. Sweden, like Holland, and other countries of the same size, think that we are certainly going under and that the wisest course is to bay with the largest pack. I don't believe the German people wish to abolish us in order to crown the Junker with a gold laurel crown. But they will be delighted to see the proud Briton on his knees. I should vote for the friendliest policy towards Germany if that is compatible with liberty and self respect; if Germany's conduct makes this impossible, there will be a world struggle in which we may go under for a time, but which can't possibly end in a European despotism. Such a thing has never yet existed and never will until Europe has lost all semblance of character. But that may be the case? I hope it will last my time; that is about twelve years at most."

The real cause of his discontent in these years was the constantly recurring separation from his wife and children, leaving him both lonely and in ill health. At the end of 1910 this took a serious turn; he was being treated for his nasal trouble, influenza took hold of him, and there came a formidable attack of erysipelas in the head. Lady Spring Rice was telegraphed for; meanwhile the Swedish doctors gave an antitoxin which got rid of the erysipelas, but the reaction in so sensitive a body nearly carried him off.

By Christmas time he was able to write to the Fergusons his reflections on this experience, and also on the political situation pro-

[1] The Archduke Franz Ferdinand—murdered at Sarajevo in July, 1914.

duced by the second general election of that year, which left Tories and Liberals as before equal in numbers, with eighty Irish Nationalists and forty Labour men balancing the decision. Ferguson was once more returned for the Leith boroughs.

STOCKHOLM,
Dec. 22, 1910.

"How delightful Novar sounds! How I wish I could have been there with you—and I have never been there at all. I was near coming to a final end of all my wanderings but I am over that now though very weak. I shan't be normal for another six weeks, if then. I hope to be back in England Feb. or March and then we shall have a talk. I am so glad about Leith. Please congratulate H.H.H.

I suppose the new element has come to stay and we must make up our minds to accept it, as the Tories had to accept the new England of the Reform Bill. If one remembers the rule of Arthur & Co.—their attempt to hold office long after their mandate was over, their attempt to get tariff reform by throwing out the Budget, etc., etc.—I'm not quite so sure that L. George is so much worse. We are in for an awkward time with the Germans, who have squared Russians and French and must have a diplomatic victory over *us* before their elections.—I mustn't say Happy Xmas to a Scot, but H.H.H. is Pisky and I will say it to her."

A letter also went to Lady Helen with thanks for a gift of Lord Dufferin's Letters.

BRITISH LEGATION,
STOCKHOLM,
Dec. 26, 1910.

"DEAR LADY HELEN,

This is a most delightful present—for the subject, for the writer, and for the writer's daughter. I can't read it yet because I am not allowed to use my eyes much.

What an election! Bad at the time and bad afterwards, like a bad dinner which you don't like when you eat it and get indigestion after. But I suppose we are in for a new order of things and we must just take it as it comes; the climate is changed and we must change our clothes. I shall have my children taught a trade.

I ought to be full of solemn thoughts, as I have, so to speak, been in the antechamber of death, waiting for an audience, and even had a look in through the door. But I feel rather like the Yorkshire girl who had an audience with King George, whose father said, when they asked him if she was shy: 'No, you see,

she'd often been into Norton on market days and spoke with the farmers.'—I don't see there was anything very odd in the experience and nothing more tremendous than one experiences in sea-sickness. I am glad I made the acquaintance of hospital nurses and know what a wonderful life of self-sacrifice and devotion they lead. I suppose your sister will have given you some idea, but I had none and it makes one believe in goodness, as to which one gets a little sceptical at times. I mustn't write any more but I thank you with all my heart for a most kind and welcome thought.

Just think of the 500 new peers! I do hope for amusement's sake that it will come to pass and that having done their job they will vanish. 'Theirs but to do and die, noble five hundred.' What a lot of fun we would have! I am reading, or rather F. is reading aloud, Dizzy. What an amazing story. That the old English party of old England should find its leader in an Italian Jew, and choose as its incarnation and patron saint a foreigner, and foreign not only in England but in Europe! We are now taking Ll. George, a Celt from the lower regions, nearly as foreign to our respectable Saxon dam. Germany for years was content with a denationalised mountebank like Bülow. So I suppose we are in the fashion. . . ."

Mrs. Lodge also had a letter about this narrow escape of his—completed by a winter picture of Swedish life, and leading up to grave political thoughts.—He wrote in January 1911, and it was known that in that year German preparedness would be complete.

"DEAR MRS. LODGE,

I am so delighted to see that Cabot has been re-elected and that Mass. has proved faithful again, knowing when she has a good thing. I wish to goodness I could see you all. I *nearly*, very nearly went beyond reach once and for all, and I am sorry to say that if I had had the disposal of it, I should have gone—I wished so much to have it all over. It is interesting to know for certain that the *end* has no terrors at all, only the going there is unpleasant. My poor wife had a bad time as she had to be with the children in England and came over, not knowing what would happen while she was travelling. Fortunately it was all right when she came. Where are you now? Last night I dreamt most vividly I came to the end of Mass. Avenue and walked up it from the direction of Dupont Circle and rang the bell at your house and found you all sitting in the old room. I wonder when that will really happen. I have two more years before, even if I am invalided, I can get a pension (which unfortunately is necessary), and my

leaves are now so precious, as the children have to live part of the year in England and I join them in the winter or spring. I really think you might in one of your European tours see what Sweden is like. I have been staying for a fortnight to convalesce in a place called Rattvik in Dalecarlia, where the people go to church in costume and the country is deep in snow. There is an immense lake just under our windows which is hard frozen now and makes the oddest noises in the process. I remember on the Hudson they called the noises Rip van Winkle playing bowls. It sounds like it. I have been a good deal on skis and it is rather fascinating going long expeditions through the forest and then coming out on a long snow slope and gliding down it, even with a tumble at the end.

What an odd state of affairs in America! I see the *Times* correspondent is not too revolted Republican.[1] He seems to think the Democrats will have as much difficulty as the most unregenerate Republicans in keeping pledges. Here in Europe we are on the verge of interesting things. For a long time the ship has been sailing on an even keel, as if her balance was all right; as a matter of fact it is all wrong and the slightest wind will send her over. I mean that since the Boer and the Japanese wars the Central European powers have a great military predominance as well as financial resources, and all they have got to do now is to assert their predominance. The old order of a balance of power is upset, and it remains to be seen what sort of a Europe is the consequence. At present there is a reign of terror almost like that under Napoleon; but only among those who know the real situation. The small powers are like the villages on the slopes of a volcano and are eagerly watching the signs. Their minds are quite made up as to which horse is going to win and they are laying on their money accordingly."

It is as well to add here, though out of place in the series, another letter to Mrs. Lodge which makes a pendant to the winter study. Also, in the meantime, the volcano had threatened eruption.

Oct. 22, 1911.

"We have been spending the summer in a little house by the sea, or rather an inland arm of the Baltic; granite rocks and fir trees behind the house—rather like the Beverly shore: but the sea and the lakes turn up unexpectedly in all sorts of odd places, as the land and water are quite mixed up. It is quite wild

[1] Discontent with the administration of President Taft, Roosevelt's successor, led to a split in the Republican Party and finally to Roosevelt's third candidature—which let in the Democrats and made Wilson President.

inland and one can walk about in the woods all day without seeing anyone. This is a habit which grows on one. You can't do it on Nahant, but one used to be able to do it near Washington. Even in Stockholm there are big woods within reach. We had a garden and the children lived in it when they weren't sleeping or eating or being hauled up the rocks by an energetic English nurse. When we went off to England they didn't display any sorrow, indeed they were rather pleased than otherwise, because they could stand at the window and wave flags. However, you know all about it, and what it's like. The summer was pure joy—bright and warm with delicious bathing and rowing. Then we had to go up to town because there was an alarm of this hideous disease, infantile paralysis, which has been bad this year. Now we are all in town and are trying to settle down to civilisation—I have hardly been in the apartment since I was so ill and it is an odd feeling to live in the rooms again. Except for the sayings and doings of the infants we don't have any particular adventures ; this is about the only corner of Europe which is moderately peaceful—as for diplomatic work, it simply doesn't exist, except and saving an occasional tea party.

What an extraordinary place the world is now. It is upsetting. One might as well carpenter in an earthquake as try to settle down to any quiet reading—the papers take all time and all thought and leave one in a state of uneasy disgust. I wish I could be like an Indian and get away from it altogether—only it wouldn't do to stand in Piccadilly with a porridge bowl and no clothes on. This is what I used to talk to Bay about and he maintained that it was quite possible to keep an impregnable citadel inside one and be quite safe. When one arrives at the time of life when one can't begin again, what is to be done ? You give up ? Clearly not, because in that case, to be logical, if one can't use life, one should lose it and cease to live, and if one doesn't do that, then one must find something to live for. How I should love to see how you are and hear your talk and see Cabot sitting in the corner and smoking. How he must be pitching into the Canucks ! Well, I believe that I shall get over and see you soon—I must—the only difficulty is the horrid shortness of life—and means. Love to all of your dear people.

Ever your affectionate,

CECIL SPRING RICE."

These are the facts which in 1911 had caused such perturbation: In Morocco the Sultan's authority was negligible, the tribes around Fez rose and cut off the capital ; Europeans were in danger, and the French proposed to organise a relief column to march up. Germany

suggested that this would be a breach of the agreement reached at Algeciras. Spain heard of it, and took action, landing troops at Laraiche and occupying El Kasr, ten miles inland. Spain's justification was that France was about to establish a Protectorate over the whole country. Germany diplomatically said the same and proposed compensations elsewhere for acquiescence. But openly on July 1 the Chancelleries were informed that a German cruiser, "The Panther," had been sent to Agadir on the Moorish coast. This was an act of usurpation, for Agadir was not one of the harbours open to Europeans. Sir Edward Grey at once protested vigorously. But it was known to Germany that the Foreign Secretary did not enjoy the confidence of the Radical wing. It was therefore desirable that the utterance of England's support for France and resistance to Germany should come from another mouth; and Mr. Lloyd George, speaking in the city (of his own motion, as Sir Edward Grey has emphasised) told the world that "National honour or our great international trade is no party question."

This meant that England was in the ring, to fight if necessary. Tyrrell wrote to Spring Rice:

Aug. 1, 1911.

"Don't ever forget to teach your children to keep alive the memory of Lloyd George who by his timely speech has saved the peace of Europe and our good name.

I shall never forget the service rendered by him. His courage was great, as he risked his position with the people who have mainly made him.

His co-operation with the Chief is delightful to watch. I breakfasted with him last week and I was much struck by his 'flair' in foreign politics. From your and my point of view, he is as sound as a bell and it hardly needed the Germans to undeceive him. I feel quite happy now after Thursday in the House. We are sound—that is the main thing."

Negotiations dragged, but Germany yielded. Ferguson wrote:

"Our friends[1] lying between us two seem to have found out for the second time that they can't have their way. It has been quite refreshing to see how much better France stood up to the shock this time.[2] Meanwhile Rosyth[3] goes merrily on and our position in the N. Sea is always strengthening. We are now beginning to organise our veterans. Old volunteers, soldiers and terriers passing out. I've a dinner to start the movement in this district on Wed., and in Fife alone we expect to get together 1000 men, three-fourths of whom should be very serviceable for Home Defence.

[1] The Germans. [2] The first was in 1905; see above, I. p. 459 *sqq.*
[3] The new naval base for the North Sea, then in course of preparation.

I was with my Lib. Club last night and used the situation as cause absolute for adequate defence and expenditure, and they all seemed to agree very cordially. . . . "

Spring Rice answered on October 24, 1911 :

" . . . I think Edward Grey has done well because he has been perfectly straight throughout. Each nation has its own line in which it can do better than other nations, and also a line in which other nations can do better than it. It's a pity when we try the latter. The English line is a sort of stolid honesty, a little bit inclining to the stupid. When we try to be clever it doesn't come off ; it's like a dog standing on its hind legs. We go further four-legged, though we shouldn't make such a show. This is the trouble with our German friends ; they are naturally honest enough, but they labour with infinite pains to acquire a painfully-won habit of mendacity, and the result is that they are always lying and never deceiving. And the great disappointment of our neighbours who counted on our playing our friends false and were bitterly deceived, thanks to themselves —is working like poison. I am afraid that this won't be forgotten and that the whole business will cost ships and yet more ships."

About Christmas 1911 he was again back on leave, and wrote these notes for Ferguson, who proposed speaking to his constituents.

" . . . Germany raised *no* objection to France sending troops to Fez but merely said she would reserve her rights, to which France replied that she would withdraw her troops, (which she did). France and Germany had already begun to negotiate in a friendly way, when suddenly for some unexplained reason Germany sent a ship to Agadir, *although* she had violently protested against a French ship being sent there a short time before, and *although* she had no subjects there, and could not have, as it was not a free port. Germany must evidently have been looking for an occasion for making a fuss ; because if she had wished to have *no* fuss she would have warned France.

The reason is clear enough by a view of history. In 1870 the military law came to an end by which the army and navy expenditure were fixed. Parliament would not renew that law, and therefore war *had* to be made as the only alternative. In 1875 the same circumstances came about, and war had to be made, *or* threatened, in order to get Parliament to vote a new army law. As Morier showed, war was avoided because Russia and England intervened. The same occurred on two later occasions, notably the Russian scare in '84 and the second French

scare (the Schnaebele incident of 1887) ; on both occasions the object was to get the Reichstag to vote a new military law.

Now there will be an election, and what is wanted is to have a Parliament which will vote the new Navy Bill which is being prepared. Therefore it was necessary to cause a scare, and if the French had not gone to Fez and if the French and Germans had negotiated amicably, as the French policy intended, there would have been no scare. The plain object was not to get part of Morocco, or part of the Congo, but to get a new army and navy bill.

If Germany is sufficiently strong by sea and land, she can then take what she wants without any negotiation, as she did in '64, '66 and '70.

She would have continued this process in '75, but Russia and England interfered, and since then the object has been to prevent a repetition of such an intervention. If England, France or Russia can be induced to stand aside while each is being separately dealt with, then the problem presents no difficulty. Remember the parable of the sticks."

He continued his dissertations after Mr. Haldane had been despatched on a mission (which according to Lord Grey[1] the German Emperor had invited), to discuss a possible agreement about naval armament.

STOCKHOLM,
Feb. 10, 1912.

" Think of old Haldane with angel wings and the olive in his hand ! I hope he'll succeed. All the same, if I was a lion with a good appetite I don't know that a deputation from the rabbits to perlitely request me blunt my teeth and pare my nails would have much effect.

I am told that the elections over in Germany have been quite discounted and really make no difference. The Government wants to have new armaments, as it always has since 1852 and always will, as they have proved always an excellent investment. The crisis of the summer was meant to show the people the necessity of armament and was as an object lesson, very successful. The elections were held and resulted in a practically unanimous vote for armaments because no Socialist speaker dared advocate any policy except one of adequate defence. If he had, he would have been hissed down. What will the end be ? Our ancestors went on improving their armour until a man couldn't get up from the ground if he was knocked down, and was opened like an oyster by his enemy.

[1] Twenty-five years, I. p. 250

Well, I hope and trust peace will be maintained in my time; but the only way to get what one wants in that line, as in all others, is to deserve and earn it. There never was and never will be a short cut to anything really worth having. All we can do for one another is to let it be generally understood that if we are to be eaten, it must be at one gulp for the lot and not in mouthfuls. No one would eat beef if he had to swallow an ox whole. . . . "

So the year wore on—peacefully enough in Sweden where the Olympic games were revived with great glory to Swedish athletes; but Spring Rice noted a coolness to his nation when a British squadron entered Swedish ports. Nothing actually happened to disturb the peace of Europe till autumn; but in Ulster there were the first hints of civil war and on June 8 Spring Rice wrote to Ferguson:

" France is producing revelation on revelation, each worse than the other, and Russia behaves as if she had resumed possession of the whole of Asia. She's a bad horse to be tied to the tail of. We are having a ride à la Mazeppa. Yet I don't see that we could have done anything else than make an agreement."

Meantime he was possessing his soul in patience as best he could, at a post which he disliked, and which ill suited him and his family, while the prize for which he had hoped so long was dangling before him.

On December 27, 1911, Sir Edward Grey had written privately:

" Bryce wants to leave Washington and come home for good as soon as he can.

I have proposed to the Prime Minister, and he agrees, that you should succeed Bryce as Ambassador at Washington. If this is agreeable to you I will submit your name to the King and take the usual steps at Washington after hearing from you. . . . "

Tyrrell wrote exulting:

" You have been rewarded for a damned plucky fight you put up at an age when most men would have chucked up the sponge."

In February, 1912, came a telegram saying that the appointment was approved but that Lord Bryce proposed to stay till September, in order to complete negotiations concerning a conflict which had arisen over the Panama Canal Tolls.[1]

Needless to say, Spring Rice at once anticipated the worst and wrote to Grey, begging that if it were more convenient to substitute another man, his feelings should not be considered. The answer came in one of those personal letters by which the Foreign Secretary gave example

[1] See infra p. 178.

of how a considerate chief should deal with a valuable but difficult agent.

From GREY.

"As soon as Bryce goes I shall proceed with the usual steps for your appointment to Washington; the delay implies no weakening of my intention and the postponement of his departure is entirely Bryce's idea. He had previously pressed to be relieved as soon as possible after the end of last year. But I think the postponement is a good thing. The Presidential nomination takes place, I believe, in June; it seems quite possible that Roosevelt may be nominated (I know only what the newspapers say); if he were actively engaged in a Presidential contest against Taft, your position as an intimate friend of Roosevelt, but Ambassador to Taft, might be a little difficult. If Roosevelt is nominated, Bryce can now wait till the Presidential election is over; the way will then be clear for you; if he were elected, your friendship with him would be an advantage—if he were not elected, your friendship would be no drawback, for he would be definitely a private citizen for another four years; the same would be the case if he were not nominated. . . ."

It was true that Roosevelt, discontented with the conduct of Republican politics by President Taft, and thinking that the Trusts were acquiring too much control, proposed (in defiance of all American precedent) to become candidate for a third term of the Presidency.

Since henceforward Spring Rice's interests were bound up with America, that side of his correspondence may again be emphasised. On April 12, 1912, he wrote to Mrs. Augustus Gardner, Senator Lodge's daughter:

"I agree most confoundedly about T. R. I wrote to him some time ago, not knowing what was on his mind, but he didn't answer. A safe rule is to leave a thing or a person before they leave you. (No application to Gussy.) What you say is unutterably tragic, especially about his meeting with your father. I suppose his point of view is that there is work to be done, and he the only man who can do it. We can't judge other people justly without knowing all that goes on inside them and in this case it is impossible. Everyone said he was a fool to leave the Navy Department and go to the war[1] but he was right. Perhaps he is right now. At any rate one loves him just as much. . . ."

A correspondence with Henry Adams carries us on to the autumn.

[1] The Spanish-American, in 1898.

Adams wrote :

South Lincoln, Mass.,
July 27, 1912.

" My Dear Friend,

Your letter of the 11th aroused the most grateful emotions in my mind. I had not heard from you for years, and was consumed with desire to know how you were getting along among the Swedes. If you have survived the games, you must be fairly well. I have not had any games to survive, and I am fairly on the road to dissolution, but shall still hope somewhere, somehow, to see you again. I do not know whether you would like it in this country where you were formerly so ornamental ; but, like most elderly gentlemen who have not any offices, I like it very little.

As you probably see in the newspapers, your old friend, Theodore, has dropped us all, and has gone in pirating on his own account. I should be delighted to have him President again, but he did not ask me my opinion, and he is not likely to get it. Unlikely as it seems, I should not be surprised if, after all, he won the election. It depends much more upon Mr. Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic candidate, than it does on him. No one knows what Mr. Wilson might or might not do, and it is perfectly possible that all the parties between now and November may go to pieces. In that case, Theodore would be pretty surely the one to survive. We know all that is to be said against him, but we know very little about Mr. Woodrow Wilson, and altogether too much about President Taft. I am afraid that if you were here, you would be apt to take sides and be very much against everybody. I am very much in favour of them all, and really don't think it matters a great deal which succeeds. This is the only affair that seems to have interested us in America, unless it is the tolls of the Panama Canal, which are stupid enough."

The rest of this letter (which ended " In future, don't forget me so long ") was concerned with glacial wreck in Massachussetts and the work of interglacial men in the Dordogne region of France. Spring Rice replied in kind—giving some idea of what the talk must have been like, for scope and range, at Adams' house in Washington.

To Henry Adams.

British Legation,
Stockholm,
Aug. 30, 1912.

" My Dear Uncle,

Reading your letter, I could almost hear your voice in its old tones, with the result that I couldn't believe I was the least



HENRY ADAMS

From a chalk drawing by John Briggs Potter

older than what I was when I last heard you complimenting the universe on its system of government in Lafayette Sq. Mrs. Cameron wrote about you and your summer home and made me much wish to slip across again as I did last time. You would have enjoyed being here this summer—not for the games, but for the congress of archaeologists. It was interesting, not only for their opinions but for the ferocity with which they maintained them. I didn't know there was so much politics in the third and fourth millenniums. The Russians maintained that all civilization as we know it came from a Slav race which spread from East to West. The Germans, with undisguised scorn, asked if any sensible person could doubt that outside the Germanic nations neither art nor civilization existed. This was a little too much for the Swedes, who suggested that something sometimes might have been borrowed from the South and the East. However, this may be, it seems agreed that the climate steadily improved after the retreat of the ice till about four hundred years B.C. Up to that time millet and other warm grains were grown; then the climate got rapidly worse and reindeer invaded the country from the North. People began to leave; tombs became scarcer and art shows a plain decline; then the climate improved again, that is, it became what it is now. What a time people must have had as the years grew steadily colder and the fields poorer, while iron was introduced and new facilities for mutual killing were afforded! What a pressure there must have been for the good land that remained, and on the nations who lived in more favoured regions!

They have just found a deposit in an old lake in the North which shows the number of summers since the ice retreated. The number is between six and seven thousand, so that we now know how many years have passed since the glacier covering left South Sweden—that is, between fourteen and fifteen thousand. If you care, I will send you some good pictures of the products of these years as shown in the museum collections. There is nothing of your pre-glacial artists; we were then under a hopeless mass of ice here, which was taking away all the stuff from Sweden and making Germany of it. What there is, shows an extraordinary amount of skill in the stone, bronze and iron ages and a good deal of feeling for ornament—as long as this doesn't imply anything of the human variety. What figures they made were miserable adaptations of the worst of the Byzantine coins. Brother Brooks [1] used to say that 'by their coins thou shalt know them' and that the coinage of a nation showed the stage of its civilization. From this point of view it was extraordinary

[1] Brooks Adams.

to see the gold coins earned by the Goths under the late Roman and fourth century Byzantine Emperors. To think that the men who made these coins had before their eyes in the arena at Constantinople the finest statuary in the world! What a condition of things, when Greeks were minting such horrors, and Rome was paying barbarians from the North to defend the frontier of Italy, in coins of which the very Sikels would have been ashamed eight hundred years before! A visit to a museum of this certainly cures one of either optimism or pessimism—one becomes simply a take-it-as-it-comes-ist.

This particular country is on the top of an optimistic wave. The Swedes are quite convinced that they are the first and greatest people in the world; and this may very well be true. They have the longest lives and the finest average figures; next to Holland they have the highest average number of celebrated professors, and as the proportion of illegitimate babies is the highest in the world, it is satisfactory to note that science has emancipated them from old-world prejudices. Their attitude toward England is interesting. Our Naval attaché says that all the Swedish officers speak to him in a semi-sympathetic tone about the approaching destruction of the British Navy. As the fall of the British Empire will follow at a short interval, you will see that the work, to which for many generations the energies of the Adams family have been devoted, will come off at last without your assistance. This consideration leads a Briton to sympathise with the Turk. It has been the custom for centuries for newly appointed ambassadors to inform their Governments that the Ottoman Empire can hardly last another ten years. And there it is, just as strong and just as weak as ever—in fact, if it hadn't been for our particular patent nostrum of representative institutions, it would be a good deal stronger than ever it was. My poor old Persia is in a pretty bad way since we began to prescribe for it; China is having—what my doctor called "a lively reaction," when I nearly died under his remedy; my dear Japan, where everybody used to be perfectly poor and perfectly happy, is one of the most afflicted countries in the world. Liberty is indeed enlightening the world as to her own character. All the same, what would become of you and me if we weren't allowed to pitch into our rulers and governors? Think of you up before Taft's star chamber, or gasping out under the rack of confession as to the language held about our Teddy by members of the Adams family. I have just been reading a little book by a Jew-boy of the name of Lee (late Levi) about the great Englishmen of the sixteenth century—More, Sidney, Spenser, Raleigh, Bacon and Shakespeare. One was starved,

one condemned for bribery, one shot, two beheaded. The dramatist alone had the sense to retire on £1000 a year and breed cattle. Isn't this a sufficient reason for the belief that he wasn't a real poet? The Jew biographer can't contain his enthusiasm for the really great achievement of the dramatist, namely, the good investment of his capital. I remember a tale old Tennyson was very fond of, how two countrymen were overheard talking of him. One said, 'They say he's a poet.' The other, 'What does he get?' The first, 'They do say two thousand a year,' The other, 'Then he must be a great poet.'

So you are in the middle of a pretty interesting fight. I wish I were at Washington because I might make a pretty pile by selling to one party a commendatory letter in favour of the other. I wish to goodness I could come over and hear your voice. I *can't* make any new friends, try as hard as I may, in spite of my cheerful and sunny way of putting things—as you may gather from this letter! I am filled with shame. But this is the fourteenth day of continuous rain, and we had a hope, a slight hope, of sun yesterday. And to-day the rain and wind are worse than ever—and I can't go and cut throats as our ancestors did when the climate became unbearable.

What do you think of Europe? I won't ask you what you think of America. I must say I find both vastly interesting. But having a growing family I sometimes wonder what they are growing into, and what the world will be when they are grown. After all, a hundred years ago the world seemed even more hopeless as a place to live in, and (for those who weren't starved or frozen or shot) it turned out a very pleasant place in the end. My wife is going away to-morrow to join the children who had to stay in England to avoid the long journey. They came into the worst summer ever known in England. I stay on here alone which is not very pleasant as the year is closing in and the sky is persistently darkened—and there is no one to talk to—By the way, I see in the museum the skulls of men of the stone age which have been trepanned successfully! A professor here told me grimly it was probably the method by which the learned men of that age introduced new ideas into the heads of their pupils. I shall be here all the autumn and a letter will be a very godsend."

Adams replied:

Sept. 20, 1912.

"Mrs. Cameron sailed to-day to rejoin another of her invalids. Martha, to wit—and leaving Don [1] younger than ever. As for

[1] Senator Cameron.

me, I am a ridiculous old imbecile, hardly vigorous enough to be a paralytic; but for want of a proper hospital I may have to sail myself next winter to visit my thirty-thousand-year-old infant in the south of France. In solemn secrecy I admit, too, that the twentieth century bores me. I do not complain that you find it interesting! Oh no! Go your ways gentle shepherd, and be happy! Only to me is my dear Theodore a bore—and others. They are all bores, every one, and their so-called ideas are worse, and their acts worst of all.

But on this matter I have said enough, and read enough, and used profanity enough to be merciful. Perhaps, after all, bores have lived before. Perhaps the real doubt is whether anybody except a lunatic ever lived who was not a bore. Plato must have been crushing. What can be said for Marcus Aurelius or the infinite Kant? I do not know. I can but speak for myself and the less said on that score the better.

I am an outsider here and sure to be mistaken, but I much fear that our dear Theodore is a dead cock in the pit. Everyone tells me that all interest in him or the election has passed. Now Woodrow Wilson is President till next advices. If any one asks you about him you are safe in saying that Mr. Wilson is a College Professor. I cannot write a paper to show that a Professor is by essence incapable of acting with other men.

My instinct leads me to smile on Mr. Wilson, and go on smiling and have as little to do with him as possible. Yet I am all agog to know whom he can make his secretary of State. He can hardly be so grotesquely imbecile as Mr. Taft and Mr. Knox,[1] but he may be as incapable in another way.

On the whole, the alarming ferment of a year ago seems subsiding. People are busy making money. People who are busy in that way will perhaps cheat more or less, but they will not fight, unless they have a great chance at a big theft. At present we have none in sight.

It is all very flat, and it may go on for ten thousand years, but I think not. To me the mental exhaustion is evident. Indeed, here it is itself exhausting. I see not a trace of mental vigour. Our literature is *nil*. Our Universities are unconsciously dull—and, oh, so well-intentioned! Only our medical men and sanitarians and experimenters on processes, delude with the idea of mental activity.

It is a happy world, and shows its joy in life by grumbling. To-day's Boston newspaper, twelve pages, contained not one allusion or item regarding the world outside. Possibly the money articles may have quoted some prices, but no more."

[1] Taft's Secretary of State.

In November President Wilson was elected—the first Democratic President since Cleveland in 1892. Roosevelt's separate candidature defeated Taft by splitting the vote.

It was now considered right to announce Spring Rice's appointment, and he wrote at once to Ferguson :

STOCKHOLM,
Nov. 18, 1912.

" I put off writing because I wanted to say what was impending, but had to keep counsel, as I had given a promise. It is an immense relief to be appointed there—mainly, I fear, from the point of view of the children. It was getting *impossible*, this continued separation. Now we shall be together. Also it is an immense relief to have got what is considered as the final step in one's profession—so that there is no bother about promotion, etc. As for the post, you know as well as I do how impossible it is to ' succeed ' in the newspaper sense. One must offend either one party or the other, or both. But after all, if one does one's best without looking for personal consequences, I don't see that it shouldn't be possible to make a fair job of it. I daresay in a few years I shall be fired out with an evil reputation like poor Durand. In the meantime I propose to follow your advice, ' Stick to the last, don't speak, nor travel.' You might have had the job yourself if you had wished, I suppose, and I owe a great deal to you in this as in many other things. What does H. H. H. say about it ?

I am about sick of this place owing to the absurdity of the position. The Swedes pretend to be quite independent but are really, morally speaking, a province of Germany. But it would be improper to hint a word of this and one has to behave as if the country were really independent. Combined with this is an overweening arrogance (based on very solid facts, it must be confessed) compared with which the U.S. pales its ineffectual fires. Oh, how glad I shall be to get away."

"I stay here where the climate is vile, and the people, though white, swollen headed to an extent which must really tempt Providence if Providence has any sense of humour," he had written to another friend.

Meanwhile he had " feared writing to T. R." as he told Ferguson. But " T. R." was not tongue-tied.

From ROOSEVELT.

Nov. 12, 1912.

" Three cheers ! But now I feel horribly at not being President. Under the circumstances it will not do for you to

see very much of us, I fear! Give my love to Lady Springy. It is simply fine to think that both of you are to be on this side of the water, and, of course, we will be able to catch a glimpse of you now and then."

There was a flood of congratulations. Lady Helen Ferguson's letter has one passage which reads ironically now.

"I think it will be a good thing for you, being removed for a time from the German orbit, and I hope you'll spend a few years in forgetting all about them. I suppose you'll take to making our flesh creep with the Yellow Peril instead."

Shrewd and witty lady! but the German peril was nearer than even Spring Rice believed. There was an amusing line too from Gertrude Bell, who had seen a letter saying that he wished to be congratulated when he got his pension without a scandal. "Of the five last Ambassadors two were dismissed, two died at their post and Bryce is Bryce—that is wholly exceptional."

"My Beloved Springy,

I laughed heartily over your letter——its unmitigated gloom was so characteristic. There can be little doubt that you will speedily return in disgrace from Washington (*vide* the examples cited), if not extinct."

There was a really kind letter from Lord Curzon:

"My Dear Cecil,

Where are you, and how are my earnest congratulations to reach your ear?

I was in Washington when the last vacancy occurred and discussed with T. Roosevelt, then in power, your chances of coming. Had you gone then, it might have been thought that you owed it to your friendship with him. Now no such plea is forthcoming and you march on to your own amid universal acclaim, because you are the best and the right man for the post.

It is good to see things come to the patient, the deserving, the competent, and above all the dear friend of a lifetime, and I rejoice to see you setting forth for what will be both a labour of love and a field of fruitful service. Shall I see you before you go? Let me hear."

From Eton, of course, came rejoicing.

"My Dear Cecil,

I suppose I may now say what is in my mind. The papers and the public accept it as settled and you will be deluged with

letters and congratulations, for few men have deserved it so well or have earned such hearty sympathy. That flood of letters is a thing I dread and deprecate; like the bore on a tidal river, or in the other sense, it swamps all one's time and energy in answering. What a beast then am I to add to it needlessly, for you would never doubt my feeling! Yes, I am a beast, but I can't help it because it really overjoys me that you should be thus honoured. You have done some fine things in your official life, you have given up wealthy positions and 'suffered for conscience sake' (that is a phrase used by an old Eton civilian in writing about it to me) and you have powers and gifts not yet fully shown and you love your country so much that every step in her service is precious to you. So here goes up the hat of an old friend, one of the oldest, and a good part of my voice is added [1] to the chorus, with wishes of health that is so great a thing, and good work, and my love and pride.

Is Roosevelt's campaign a trouble and his failure a disappointment to you? I daresay it is an added difficulty because your friendship is so close that rivals may impute partisanship or prejudice, but you are too old a hand and too honest a man for that. I think till this came you had a sense of not having had the full scope of your utilities given you—so that this must be an encouragement of the keenest kind; indeed, what a position it is! What greatness opens therefrom; you lay your hand on the pulse of the world, one may say, and at a critical time, for Panama is a revolution almost in commerce and relations, and Canada's work with the Empire may lead to such enormous ends.

Well, my dear Cecil, remember you are not to answer this at all. Only keep me in your heart and know that my affection is and will be unchanged.

Always yours,

H. E. Luxmoore."

It is tedious to quote too many; but this is a book of Friendships as well as of Letters, and Sir Herbert Stephen's last word must be quoted, recalling another very old affection begun at Eton, that of J. K. S.:

"I always feel inclined when you meet with any good fortune to give you Jem's felicitations as well as my own. So consider that you have the essence of these, though you can't get their verbal expression."

His own colleagues from all quarters of the globe sent good wishes and rejoicings, but in nearly every case they agreed with what Sir

[1] "Vocis accedet bona pars"—a memory of Horace.

Esmé Howard said, writing from Berne : " It is the most difficult Embassy we have."

There was, of course, no perception of the portentous nature which it would assume : Panama and Mexico were enough trouble to go on with. Yet already guns had begun to go off in Europe.—One letter among the congratulations is tragic rather than merely pathetic in its irony, for it comes from one who had been a close friend in Sweden and looked forward to renewing that friendship in America—as indeed it was renewed for a full year. This is how Count Dumba wrote, mixing his rejoicing with comments on the Balkan war.

VIENNA,
Nov. 15, 1912.

" DEAR SPRINGY,

Hurrah three times, for your appointment to Washington. Now I made up my mind to go there too in spite of all the inconvenience and upsetting of our arrangements. The Balkan crisis, I am convinced, will be settled in a few weeks (of course, only temporarily because the Albanian state and our difficulties with Servia will not find a solution of a permanent character) but the acute state of things will, I hope it most earnestly, be over before one or two months, and then we may go to the new world.

Please let me know as quickly as possible when you are likely to start. It would be too funny if we could cross on the same big steamer. I'll write soon more and in a coherent way. To-day I am full of exultation at the good news which was confirmed to me by Russell, whom I called on at your Embassy."

A month before that letter was written, the Balkan States in league had risen against Turkey and had inflicted a series of shattering defeats, so that on Nov. 3, 1912, Turkey was calling for the intervention of the Powers. Austria marshalled an army on the Serbian border ; Russia warned Bulgaria that the Black Sea fleet would enter the Bosphorus if Bulgarian troops approached Constantinople. But a Conference of Ambassadors in London was set up and kept the peace of Europe at least patched together.

Count Dumba, an amiable optimist, wrote again from Vienna on December 26, 1912 :

" The London Reunion of Ambassadors worked very satisfactorily, but it is time the creation of an autonomous Albania was accepted beforehand by Russia. But how will this work ? I am afraid the solution is a lame one, and all to Italy's advantage, who simply reserves Albania for herself. In Austria the military party was strongly in favour of occupying Servia and chastising this country for her impudent attitude towards us. The

agitation in Slavonic circles in favour of Servia was very violent. In the argument that the bigger Servia, with an army exultant over its great successes, will exercise an irresistible attraction on the millions of our Serbs and Croatian countrymen, and that this agitation will also seize the army, there is a good deal of strength and truth. But this danger does not warrant, in my mind, what I should call a preventive war with all its dangers. We must try to administer Bosnia and Dalmatia better; give more railways and good roads and give the Servians in our monarchy more chances to attain ease, comfort and political influence. Then the Hungarians must re-establish the constitution in Croatia, which province is on the verge of revolution. Then let us give Servia a more favourable commercial convention (we sadly want their oxen and pigs for our starved population) and the Servian danger will gradually dwindle down to nothing. Instead of this, our military jingoes propose to kindle a world war with all its unspeakable horrors and endless misery and ruin, without any distinct political aim but to chastise three or four millions of Servians because they are jingoes and wanted to get an outlet to the Adriatic.

Happily that Berchtold[1] stood firm and was supported by our good old Emperor who won't go to war unless openly attacked. According to me, peace is assured to the big powers."

"Peace is assured to the big powers." There is no doubt that this colleague of Spring Rice's, whose heart was better than his judgment, was no less sincere in this belief than in the affectionate messages with which the letter ended, in the last days of 1912.

But when the words are read to-day, what a savage irony of fate tosses them back with that sinister echo!

[1] The Austrian Chancellor.

CHAPTER XXI

WASHINGTON

THE MEXICAN DIFFICULTY. OUTBREAK OF EUROPEAN WAR

Between the announcement of Spring Rice's appointment and Mr. Bryce's long postponed return, four months elapsed during which the ambassador designate occupied himself (not without chafing at the delay) in trying to get abreast of the American situation—which was complicated enough.

In the first place, he wanted to be informed about the newly-elected President, a new figure in American public life. Taft, who would remain in office till March 4th, 1913, he knew; Roosevelt, who by presenting himself against Taft on the Republican side had let in the Democratic candidate, was well known to him. Woodrow Wilson he did not know. He sought information of Henry Adams who being professedly a detached observer and indifferent to political fortunes might tell him something.

Also he wished to know where Roosevelt stood on the question of the Panama Tolls, which Mr. Bryce had hoped to settle before he retired. This had arisen out of an enactment that all United States coastwise shipping should use the canal free of tolls. Traffic from one port of the United States to another had long been limited to vessels owned in the States, so that no handicap was placed on competitors who could not compete. But by the Treaty arranged in 1900 between John Hay as Secretary of State and Lord Pauncefote (McKinley being President), it was provided that either commercial or armed vessels of all nations which observed the rules laid down for its neutralisation should use it on equal terms. Great Britain protested against discrimination in favour of United States vessels, as a breach of treaty, and proposed arbitration. There was, however, a strong party which claimed that the United States owned the canal, and should therefore do what they would with their own.

It may be stated at once that this question was settled in the first year of Spring Rice's tenure of office, not by arbitration but by the resolute attitude of President Wilson, who convinced Congress that it was bound in honour to repeal the clause which Taft had signed in August 1912.

But while this was still in debate, and while Mr. Bryce still remained

at his post, a much thornier problem appeared. In 1911 Porfirio Diaz, who had ruled Mexico since 1877 as a kind of perpetual President (though periodically re-elected) was forced to resign at last in his eightieth year ; and Madero, the leader of opposition, was inaugurated as President. But the new ruler did not succeed in establishing his authority, and in February 1913 Mexico City was captured by revolutionaries. They were ostensibly partisans of the Diaz faction ; but when Madero was forced to resign, General Huerta, head of the revolt, was nominated President. Madero and his Vice-President, Suarez, while being transferred from one prison to another, were shot (as so often happens during periods of anarchy), " attempting to escape."

Within a month, opposition to the new regime was declared under the leadership of Carranza, whose most powerful supporter was Villa ; and this party, claiming to represent the legitimately elected Madero, styled themselves Constitutionalists. According to all the information which is in Spring Rice's papers, these personages were all ferocious brigands ; but the general view of foreigners resident in Mexico was that Huerta was the likeliest candidate to establish order ; and the representatives of several European powers, including Sir Lionel Carden, then British Minister in Mexico, accorded recognition to Huerta. This, however, President Wilson's administration refused to do, on the ground that it would condone Madero's murder. There was further a widespread belief in the United States that British diplomatic action in Mexico had been dictated by the interests of Lord Cowdray, who as the head of Pearsons' firm held large concessions. Americans in Mexico, however, inclined to Sir Lionel Carden's view that Huerta offered a better prospect of peace than any of his opponents.

The inherent difficulty of the situation was that Mexico had fallen into a state of disorder which threatened not only the property but the lives of foreign residents ; and very soon both lives and property were lost. But no European power could intervene without raising opposition from the United States, in the name of the Monroe doctrine ; and the United States for as long as possible declined to intervene by force, and when it did intervene, did not intervene effectively.

No solution of this question was reached in Spring Rice's time, but at least America was not embroiled with England on the head of it. Both he and the Government which he represented were more than commonly anxious to keep on good terms with America ; for Europe at the beginning of 1913 was a kennel of snarling dogs.

The Turkish dominion in Europe had crumbled with amazing swiftness. By November 1912, within a month after the leagued Balkan States had arisen, Greece was in possession of Salonica, Bulgaria was threatening the lines of Tchataldja which defended Constantinople, and Serbia had seized a part of the Albanian coast. Austria, seeing her own plans for gaining a larger seaboard on the

Adriatic blocked, concentrated an army on the Serbian frontier, and this brought Russia forward as a champion of Serbia's claims.

Everybody saw the peril; and Sir Edward Grey, a commanding figure in Europe, had the chief part in bringing together a Conference of Ambassadors which sat in London. But thereupon the menace of war spread wider. Russia assembled forces on the Caucasus, aimed at Turkey from the East; Germany replied with a warning and a partial mobilisation. Russia gave way; and Austria was allowed to strip Serbia and Montenegro of their gains—leaving Serbia still without access to the sea. What Serbia was allowed to retain was Macedonian territory, largely Bulgar in population; and Bulgaria now attempted to seize this debateable land. So began the second Balkan war, fought between the victors in the first; and Roumania took part in it, to strip Bulgaria to the bone. Meantime the Conference of Ambassadors was busy adjusting the terms on which Serbia must relinquish her gains on the Adriatic; and for months it seemed as if another war could not be avoided.

A review of all will be found in Spring Rice's letters to Henry Adams—to whom he wrote always more as one detached student of events to another than as the professional diplomat. The date must be noted. Bulgaria while he wrote was still besieging Adrianople, and pressing on towards the Bosphorus; Serbia was establishing her hold on the Albanian coast, defying Austria's menace. In America, Taft's administration was still in office, but the Democrats, untried men, of whom little was known, were due to assume control in three months.

To H. Adams. British Legation,
Stockholm,
Dec. 15, 1912.

"Dear Uncle Henry,

I want another letter, please—but it must be sent care of Foreign Office, London, as I am leaving to-morrow to rejoin my babies who have been absent on leave for some time. How are you getting on, I wonder? Will you write to me your impressions of your professor's victory? [1] Be careful as to what you say because you must remember that I am, though only in embryo, a British Ambassador, and you must repress your natural tendency to be insulting. I daresay you may have seen that I am to go over when the Panama Canal question is settled, so that I shall arrive about the beginning of Teddy's fifth term. You will then have grown so young that you will be running races with Martha's [2] grandchildren round Lafayette Square.

Isn't it curious that we are all supposing ourselves to be

[1] Wilson's election to the Presidency.

[2] Martha was Mrs. Cameron's daughter, married to Sir Ronald Lindsay.

standing on the edge of the most terrific disaster (for Europe) which has ever taken place? Even the hardened dip. looks a little solemn when the subject is alluded to at dinner. The appearance of the *Red Man*[1] in a particularly realistic manner, in the middle of the cocked hats and laced coats, has had rather a calming effect. It is like what I remember seeing in Egypt, the first cholera case in a village feast. One gets accustomed to it, but there it is, and one's turn may come. In the meanwhile your friends the speculators are making their piles over it, and the covert rush for gold is beginning.—Germany has already refused to give gold at the bank and France began refusing some time ago. Is the Red Man this time a paid agent of a few companies, as he was in Morocco? I fancy not. This time he came for other reasons. For centuries the cocked hats and laced coats have been promising help in different forms while the Turk has been killing and robbing; at last the Christians thought they would help themselves. It is curious to see how one thought—revenge—can obsess a whole race. Have you realised that the Bulgarian people do not even ask for the news of the dead or wounded, and are not allowed to ask who so and so (a wounded man) is or where he comes from? And now we are going to distribute the prize of blood. We shall have some red spots on our white kid gloves. But this isn't, yet, the real thing. Austria may at this moment have given the order which may lead Europe to a several-years' war.[2] It looks better to-day, but from day to day it looks better and worse—and worse and better. What is the good of speculating when you will know so much better? But it is singular to think how tremendous are the calamities that may be brought about at any moment by one slight act, based on what look to you the meanest motives. As a matter of fact it is a peoples' question —the struggle for existence between races; and this struggle has been going on for ages and perhaps the moment for the decisive struggle is come.—You have it at home in the U.S., when you have the American foreman, and the Czech or Polish workmen patiently obeying orders. How long will it last that way? Will the Czech's obedience last for ever? In S.E. Europe they say they have had enough and are showing what they mean in a

[1] 'The Red Man' is the war spirit.

[2] Spring Rice, who had studied military science so closely for its bearing on diplomacy, must have known, and rejected, the official military view that war, if it came, would be *la guerre courte*, decided within three or four weeks after mobilisation. He may have known that old Moltke contended against this that it would be a war of exhaustion, fought not by armies but by nations. (See, for instance, Mangin, *Comment finit la guerre*.) At all events, it is a striking instance of his gift for being right in forecasts.

very decisive way. And the dominant race thinks that the time has come to fight for it—and if they don't, the cause will be lost. One is filling the stock exchange and the other the cradle—I suppose the contrast is known also to you.

I wonder when I shall see you or where. My family whom you haven't seen, consist of a wife and two children, a boy of 4, and Betty 6½, and if the summer comes while Panama is still raging, we may perhaps take a place somewhere in your neighbourhood, but you are probably too expensive and fashionable.

Your ever devoted nephew,

C. S. R."

Here is the answer :

From H. Adams. Jan. 22, 1913.

" Dear Lost One,

Your letter has slept a month at Lincoln, I conceive, for it got here only yesterday, and all this time I have been saying that certainly I would write to my beloved to-morrow as soon as I could see someone who knew something. Alas, I knew well that in my whole lifetime only three or four men have lived who knew anything worth knowing, and these all died without knowing me, so that I can never know anything worth knowing, which is sad ; but I did strike Jimmy Bryce and Mrs. Bryce, who bewildered me by saying they should stay till the Panama matter was settled. You know my paralytic stroke last Spring left me dotty—ga-ga—idiotic—and I babbled with more than paralysis. Wait for Panama ! The man's a squeaking loon. It can't be. Does he write rot like that to his Government ? Then his Government is a hospital for feeble-minded ! I've long said it was coming—(see my letter to Teachers) but I could not guess that it was all over us like this. Yet I've had Jimmy before me for fifty years ! I've known him well—others, too—and I ought to have been prepared.

So I sat down and wept long. This glorious universe,—this noble creature man—this wonderful pig-stye of a civilisation—all suddenly babbling of Panama ! Nay, mother, but it *is* ! Don't make excuses, or you are another.

Well ! I didn't write. I said that if all were idiots, Springy was one also, and it was no use to tell him so. In fact, I have told him so very often, and it never did any good. Only, I am going to Europe in January, and put it off to see Sir Cecil Spring Rice, K.G., and so on, and now I am sailing on March 28 and this time I go. Not all the James Bryces that bloom in the spring will stop me—not all the Springs—not all the Panamas—but the grave yawns for you others.

Gibbering thus in the grasp of idiocy, I have only time to point out that you are on the whole well out of it. Taft [1] is as feeble-minded as you are, and you could get only bad words from him. What Woodrow Wilson is, no one knows, but I would keep as far as possible out of his way. Ask nothing, concede everything—let his sweet Democrats cheat themselves and you, all they like. They don't know enough to hurt anyone but themselves.

So, if possible, since you can't get here by the 4th March, wait as long as you can. You'll be out of mischief at least. Europe seems to be as safe as any place—granting that any place is safe. Wise men go there sometimes—when they have to run away."

13 Stanhope Place,
Feb. 19, 1913.

To Henry Adams.

"I wept bitterly over your letter and indeed it was enough to make a very Blue Book moist. It was the thing of all others I had been looking forward to, to march into 1603 with Miss Betty at my heels and introduce her to my uncle. I delayed answering because I had nothing to answer. Then I heard from your friends at Downing Street that I was probably to proceed to Washington in April, when Mr. Bryce had ascertained the probable course of events by calling on the witch of Endor or otherwise.

But where will my uncle be? What ship are you going on? And when? Won't you write this? because I want to see you here if not there and I shall probably not be moving before the middle of April—as far as I can see. What sort of Europe will you find? The news to-day looks particularly bad and yet it is difficult to believe that all Europe is going to fight about two villages [2] the names of which we can't pronounce and never heard till a week ago. And yet I suppose all Europe fought before now on similar grounds. This blessed people don't care about anything but football and suffragettes. There is much talk about an army and the duty of people defending their own country, but, like your people, ours prefers to pay other persons of a professional type to do that for them. I advise you to go to a German watering place, as you are less likely to be disturbed. Besides, you probably would prefer to see them in their own country rather than in other people's. All their neighbours are obsessed with visions of invading Pickelhauben

[1] Taft remained in office till March 4.

[2] Apparently Djakova and Dibra, against the inclusion of which in the new state of Albania Serbia was violently protesting.

—perhaps wrongly. But I rather suspect you of coming over to Europe to see the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Adams family. What will be your share of the sack of London? Probably you could get the statue of Lord John R.[1] cheap. It stands in the lobby of the House of Commons. That institution has reached a peculiar stage of its development. Speeches are made, presumably in the (vain) hope of filling the newspapers—no one, however, listens unless, which is rare, the presence of a hostile audience may be expected to embarrass a speaker—and no one expects that his speech will have any effect whatever on opinion inside or outside the House. So the whole time of members is taken up by divisions—'Nos numerus sumus et fruges consumere nati—' We divide and earn our salaries. It is more and more difficult to get anyone to stand for Parliament and the class of people standing is changing rapidly. Poor middle classes! They stayed in power just long enough to earn the comments of Carlyle and Mat Arnold and now they are swept away: the Philistines like the chosen people have been overwhelmed by the Assyrian—

The net result is that people don't talk much about Panama except to heave a brick at the head of America.—I wonder when I shall see you.

Your affectionate nephew,

Cecil S. R."

1603 H. Street,
March 4, 1913.

"My Dear Spring Rice,

The drums of the approaching inaugural procession are just approaching in the distance. Now Woodrow Wilson reigns. You will soon see your friend Mr. W. J. Bryan.[2] I wish you luck and good humour. Your friends tell me that if Springy only keeps his temper, he will do very well. I did not know that your temper is violent. I used to think it rather long-suffering. Never mind! If you lose your temper with me, you will be kicking a very dead donkey. As for Bryan, *je ne dis rien*!

There it all is! You will find Mrs. Lodge very frail. Cabot—very *sec*, and out of power. No one else is left. Tramcars roar and rush and I walk hours every morning in the woods with a niece. It is much!

Ever yours,

Henry Adams."

[1] Lord John Russell was the *bête noire* of Adams, the Minister, during the American Civil War, while he and his son were at the United States Legation in London.

[2] Mr. Bryan was Wilson's Secretary of State.

The rest of the letter conveyed that Adams was on his way to Paris, with his " many nieces " to join Mrs. Cameron. Spring Rice replied with lamentations ; but there is a note worth keeping in his reference to Paris.

" You will find a very wonderful transformation there. That beautiful coruscating serpentine serpent of old Seine has—turned. 'Tis a good worm, I can give a good report of the worm [1]—What will be the result, heaven knows, but my uncle should get some sport out of it."

So, as always with this correspondent, through riddling allusions and half-quotations he conveyed his assurance that France would no longer give way before menace. The appointment of M. Delcassé, whose dismissal the Kaiser had ordered in 1905, to be Ambassador at St. Petersburg, was a fact that spoke.—The letter ends :

" You will give my deepest and most abject regards to Mrs. Cameron and the nieces. I am starting by the ' Caronia ' on April 19."

Meanwhile he had been corresponding with other friends who were less elusive in their pronouncements. Roosevelt had been fired at by a fanatic during a tour in the West, in November, but by the end of December was, according to Mrs. Roosevelt, " riding and chopping down the biggest trees available, just as he did years ago." His own account of the matter was that he " did not care a rap for being shot. It is a trade risk which every prominent man should accept as a matter of course. For eleven years I have been prepared every day to be shot." Then he went on to politics :

" I hope you come here soon. The Panama question of course should be arbitrated. I am strongly against making promises that ought not to be kept, and therefore I am utterly against agreements to arbitrate questions of vital national interest and honour. But I emphatically believe in the Nation, like the individual, keeping its promise, and our promise to arbitrate applies to just such questions as this of the canal tolls. I think we are right in our position. Moreover, I think that almost all nations have a hostile interest to us and that therefore, in spite of our being right, an arbitral tribunal will probably decide against us. But all of this we should have considered when we made the arbitration treaties. I was lukewarm about those treaties. I only went into them because the general feeling of the country demanded it. But so far as possible I intend to see that the country, after light-heartedly entering into them, shall now proceed to live up to them."

[1] See Antony and Cleopatra Act V, Sc. 2.

Other people did not take Roosevelt's view, and when the Anglo-American treaty of 1908 came up for consideration at the end of the first period of years, Senators opposed its renewal on the ground that it would entitle Great Britain to claim arbitration on the Tolls question as of right. The treaty was therefore allowed to lapse.

In Washington, "the old little coterie," as Mrs. Cameron called it, was broken. "It is a new Washington," she wrote. Yet the remnant of the old were eager to welcome; and one of them, Mr. Winthrop Chanler, who was delaying his departure in order to meet Spring Rice, wrote a description of politics and persons.

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
March 30.

To SPRING RICE.

". . . Wilson has an interesting job before him. He looks a narrow puritan with an intolerant quick temper. His friends say he is honest, of high principles, and lofty intentions, but obstinate and stubborn. Grover Cleveland was honest but obstinate. His party has been outside the fold ever since his day. We may look for mighty interesting doings. No party can play with the Tariff and there is no real party in the country now that the Republican is dead. Messrs. Root, Crane of Mass., Barnes of New York, and Penrose of Pa., deliberately cut their party's throat at the Chicago Convention. There is no real Democratic Party either, nor any organized Progressive. That there will be ructions soon, everyone believes. Meanwhile you will get the canal tolls the way you want them before long. It is such a small matter anyway and the only real opposition I believe comes from the Irish.

Enough of politics. Theodore and Cabot are both my friends. Older and war-worn and battered as they both are, they are still essentially the same as you knew them. Little Ethel [1] who was a baby when you were over here is to be married on the 4th, in five days from now. Hester is to be bridesmaid, so I take her on for the wedding at Oyster Bay. It will be her turn next maybe. You have seen Cabot not so long ago, I believe. He is much aged but hearty and strong as ever. He shows his age by the whiteness of his hair and the intolerance of his political point of view as expressed privately. In public I should say he is better than ever as a speaker, broader, more eloquent, a skilled and veteran fighter. At home he is quite different, does not argue, gets more excited and vehement over trifles, this you know of old. Of course, when he 'unpacks his library' and talks literature, no one could be more delightful and

[1] Roosevelt's daughter. Hester was Miss Chanler.

honest. Mrs. Pinky,[1] (whom may God bless and bid all his angels and arch-angels to glorify for ever) is well and reasonably happy, at all events she keeps a cheerful and undaunted face to the world and to her family. She is as sympathetic, as witty, as understanding and companionable, lovable, as no other woman since the beginning. I have never known her equal and would do violence to any caitiff hound who does not agree with me. Theodore is the same old darling. He too is older. A man cannot be at the Top—the real top—for six or seven years and not show the effects. His egotism has grown on him, but so has his fat. These are trifles like the warty growths on a magnificent oak tree. As I say—no man can be one of the leaders of the world for a number of years and not show the effects. And no one man who went through such a phase in the world's history, perhaps, has come out of it so little harmed and changed. That he will ever be President or even candidate again is open to every doubt, political turn or popular fancy. Look at his victory and look at his defeat. He remains through it all the man we know and have known. . . . "

Roosevelt made it very plain that he was the same man as always. Notes of invitation showered on Spring Rice when he landed. One of them encloses a clipping which " prepared us for the beard "—a new feature acquired by Spring Rice after the attack of erysipelas. But it concludes with a woeful recognition of the fact that the Ambassador accredited to an administration, whose head was the Democrat Woodrow Wilson, must not see too much of the Republican Theodore Roosevelt, who had been Wilson's most formidable opponent.

" Well, I suppose we shall see very little of you ; but if ever you think it safe, do come out and visit us, for as long as possible, and with all the family ; and if you don't think this advisable, let us know when you are passing through New York and we will come in and lunch or dine unobtrusively with you."

There was no such limitation as to the Lodges ; and although the affection between Spring Rice and the Roosevelt household never altered, he saw far more of Senator Lodge and his wife in this last period of his American life than of any other Americans.

But one other name should be mentioned, that of Roosevelt's sister : In a letter to Lady Helen Ferguson written at the end of 1913 he says :

" I agree with you (as generally, if not always) that Mrs. Cowles is the best of the bunch here. She certainly is the most thoroughly satisfactory person to meet."

[1] A pet name for Mrs. Lodge.

He wrote to Senator Lodge from London at the beginning of the year, less on American than on European politics.

13 Little Stanhope St.,
Feb. 23, 1913.

"What a world it is! I met Lord Rosebery the other day (he was my chief once) and he said he had gone to visit Aehrenthal at Vienna a month before he died and that he said to him, 'I am very glad I am going, the world is moving just in the direction I most dislike; and there is nothing that happens in it which I approve of.' The world here is full of pessimists; but pessimism doesn't prevent them from going to the Russian ballet; which is at present the main interest of society after abuse of the existing government. Ld. Rosebery says the disappearance of the horse is one of the minor evils of the time but also one which he feels almost as acutely as the fall of the monarchy. He told King George (as he was looking at the Windsor miniatures and came to Cromwell) 'That is the man we want now.' The King said, 'To cut my head off?' 'No,' said Lord R., 'but to turn out the Parliament.' The trouble—or the blessing—is that Olivers are rather hard to find in these days, so the King can keep his head and Westminster its rump.

What a time you will have with Mexico! I suppose you are sufficiently akin to us to begin as we always do by swearing we will take no step at all, and then go on by taking a good many steps without preparation. A former Minister for India was talking about it to-day and saying that we had always put off preparation because preparation looked like war, and then began operations with forces too small for the job, because we thought it would attract less attention at home. Then when disaster came, we had to use forces which were twice as large as would have been necessary if we had begun with adequate forces in good time. He said another great difficulty was getting out when you once got in, because all the people who had taken your side during the occupation would be massacred when you left."

Lodge answered:

United States Senate,
Washington,
March 10, 1913.

"My Dear Springy,

. . . As to the situation in which you are interested, Wilson, I know, is opposed to the toll exemption. He wanted us to repeal it at the last session of Congress but we could not muster the votes. We can repeal it now if he will simply say the word

and I have strong hopes that he will say what is necessary. The true way to be rid of this thing is to repeal the clause which has made the trouble. It is the more dignified action for the United States, and if it is forced over and the question of arbitration is raised, we may put ourselves in an even worse position than we are now in, by refusing to go to arbitration. . . .

The situation in regard to Mexico is a threatening one. The description of your Indian friend applies to us perfectly. That is exactly the way that we deal with any such question. It is, of course, most important to avoid war with Mexico, which would be an unmixed evil. The moment we cross the border war is upon us, and before we had pacified the country it would have cost us many lives and millions of money. I hope they have got a man now of the Diaz type who will do sufficient throat-cutting to restore peace. That seems an unpleasant thing to say but it is apparently impossible to maintain order or any approach to decent government in Mexico upon any other terms. . . . "

When the time actually came for Spring Rice to sail, farewells and godspeeds were plenty; two ought to be preserved, for they go back to his beginnings.

One came from the Master of Balliol:

The King's Mound,
Oxford,
March 9, 1913.

"May it please your Excellency,

At a College meeting I was deputed to convey to you, as soon as your appointment to Washington should be officially complete, the warm congratulations of our whole body on your elevation to this splendid position. It makes us the more proud of you to hear with what universal acceptation the appointment has been received. You have it may seem a difficult task, to undertake the succession to James Bryce; but would it not be more just to regard it as an encouragement —an inspiration? Of two things I became assured when in the United States; the first, that there could hardly be named a thing so important to the world now as friendship between England and America; the other, that the way to such friendship, which seemed almost beyond hope, has now of late been brought within practical politics. For my own part, I feel sure that you too will help to bring this still nearer; and sometimes when you are feeling this great responsibility, we want you to remember with what deep interest, with what confidence in

you, and (let me add) with what affection, your old College is watching you.

Yours ever,

ARTHUR L. SMITH,
Senior Dean of Balliol College.

The other was from the old man at Eton who never let him out of his care.

From MR. LUXMOORE.

" MY DEAR CECIL,

The time is coming very near for your start.

I have a feeling that you yourself are in better health and trim, and have a familiar ' terrain ' and a more congenial job, and I know that if ever a man had a right heart with a right head screwed rightly above it—each in proper place—and true devotion to country and high ideals without self advertisement or money grubbing, that man is shortly going to the American Embassy, his sometime deferred deserving. But he leaves behind old friends, and of one of them I can say with the best authority that he values your faithful affection more than he can define in a letter, and returns it with interest and admiration that will last out his remnant of lifetime and perhaps longer. I did write to Eustace Percy.[1] I am sure you will like him and he will serve you with all his power. Ivor Campbell, if still there, I should love to hear well reported of. I am anxious about him and want to know that he can do steady work. I can't help caring for him. . . .

Yours affy.,

H. E. LUXMOORE."

In America, it rained welcome: The Roosevelts begged the newcomers if possible to descend as a family on Sagamore straight from the boat. But they both recognised the possible inconveniences; and M. Jusserand, the French Ambassador, and doyen of the diplomatic corps, a trusted friend of both men, advised that for the present a visit should be avoided. Spring Rice had to unpack his heart with words.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON,
1913.

" MY DEAR THEODORE,

I wrote to you from N.Y. and I hope you got it. It was indeed delightful to hear from you, and I propose to have a

[1] Lord Eustace Percy and Mr. Ivor Campbell, both old Etonians, were on the Embassy staff.

real long talk as soon as I can get the chance. It is sufficiently tantalising. Damn it all. Love to you all.

I am to be made an Ambassador by the laying on of hands on Tuesday. I have just read your speech to old Bryce. Mine will be a very dull affair. Oh, T. R., how I wish I could see you. I nearly wept in Rock Creek Park at the rock. I could *hear* you—the flowers are indeed beautiful now. How lovely it all is.

Ever your affec.,

C. Spring Rice."

In the meantime the Mexican affair, from which Spring Rice foresaw trouble for the United States, extended its power to make mischief. Americans were suspicious of the motives which had led Great Britain to accord recognition to Huerta. Spring Rice wrote on August 2, 1913 :

To Lodge.

". . . I see poor Grey has got into a scrape with certain newspapers here. The foreign representatives in Mexico agreed that the best way to secure order was to give money and support to Huerta—and that non-recognition by the U.S. was the chief impediment. Grey was pressed by all the financial people to do something, and so spoke privately to Page [1] to ask him to find out what were the views of the U.S. as to this policy and if they were inclined to adopt it. I subsequently wrote to Bryan,[2] telling him that the press was publishing alarming news about Mexico, and that British subjects might very well suffer if the U.S.G. took violent measures. (The Greasers can no more distinguish between a Britisher and an American than between a crocodile and an alligator.) Consequently I asked that if the U.S.G. decided on intervention or withdrawing its citizens or any other measures of a decided nature, the British Government might be able to warn its people beforehand. This is generally done in similar cases—*e.g.* Morocco and Egypt. The obvious deduction from these two steps is, I think, one which some people would be very loath to draw ; *i.e.* that Britain recognises the dominant position of the U.S. in Mexico, and also their quasi-responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners. Do you think it contrary to your interests (which in the main are the same as ours—*i.e.* the preservation of law and order) that such requests should be made ? If there is an objection to such friendly communications, it is evident that our relations are not so friendly as they are thought to be in

[1] American Ambassador in London.

[2] Secretary of State.

England, and it is always better to face the facts and go in when it rains. . . ."

To the Same. Aug. 11, 1913.

"Of course we are very anxious to avoid a row; we want our people protected but we have no right to ask a foreign government to intervene to protect our people. We can't do anything ourselves except send a cruiser or two to pick up people at the ports. You can't do anything except at the immense cost of intervention. It would be criminal to do anything which might bring on another war."

These letters are dated from the British Embassy. But Spring Rice had already moved into summer quarters at Dublin, in New Hampshire. He suggested returning, to deal with this affair, but Lodge thought it unnecessary.

Aug. 13, 1913.

From LODGE.

". . . There is no crisis and no situation here which in the least demands your presence and there is no reason why you should come back if you do not desire to do so. . . .

I think that Germany and France and England would be perfectly justified in asking protection for their citizens and property in Mexico, from the United States, but I am very glad that they are not doing so, for it would only embarrass the situation, and I hope they will not do it unless they are compelled to do so. The trouble with the situation, which we are allowing to drift, is that they may be compelled to do so, or that we may be compelled to act, for in the existing situation in Mexico something like the blowing up of the 'Maine' may happen at any moment and then this country would flame up. I dread intervention, which would mean a species of war and involve us in most serious difficulties for years to come. Yet I see great danger of intervention being forced, unless we recognise some government. The President objects to recognising Huerta because of the method by which he obtained his power, and I freely admit that neither the man nor his methods are desirable; but they are Mexican methods and sometimes it becomes necessary to recognise a government the head of which has a bad and murderous record. I wish that your country and France and the others had not been so quick to recognise Huerta, because I feel that if we could all act together we should have a much better chance of getting an established government of some sort. Then the fact that Lord Cowdray secured large and profitable concessions from

Huerta, on the ground that he had secured the recognition by his government, has done and is doing much harm. I do not suppose that Sir Edward Grey knew anything about that part of it, but there is no doubt that Cowdray profited by the recognition in exactly the manner I have mentioned.

The President has an idea that the Huerta government is likely to fall. If that meant the establishment of a strong government in its place it would all be very well, but Huerta's fall would only bring on a fresh condition of anarchy for no party has yet been developed with a leader strong enough to take control of the country. . . . "

DUBLIN, N.H.
Aug. 22, 1913.

To LODGE.

" My dear Cabot . . . I have talked it all over with Dumba who has more sense and diplomatic experience than anyone here, and he is urging his government to impress on Huerta that he must be civil and conciliatory. Obviously if he is not, sympathy is with the U.S. ; but the reverse is equally true. I expect all the European representatives will take the same line. The British Legation (that is, I expect, Hohler, who is First Secretary, a very able and sensible man) wires that Huerta is the only man in sight in Mexico City who can hold his own, and that to get him to go would be to lessen the chances (sufficiently remote) of restoring order. All questions of right to the presidency, influence of bad example on other countries, etc., seem of small importance in comparison with the paramount necessity of a strong man with a sufficient force behind him. To give the Revolutionaries help would only lead to more bloodshed and disorder, etc., etc.

It seems to me that all foreign governments can do is to let the U.S. Government know what their information is, and if things get much worse, to advise their subjects to leave the interior, and take them off in warships if necessary. They none of them propose using force themselves, and as you are the only people who can, the decision must rest with you alone. The danger is that *giving information* may be interpreted as giving *advice*, and a desire for peace and order as a wish to back up the efforts of the President in that direction. Obviously it would not do for the powers to suddenly assume a threatening attitude to Huerta while he is the only man at present who can protect their people in the districts he controls. You can defend yours by force : we can't. These are only my personal lucubrations and have no weight. Grey is most anxious to be of use but he has too much experience (after

six months of the London Conference) to attempt to mediate unless both sides are willing to accept mediation—or to express a strong opinion when he is not prepared to back it up by force."

President Wilson's Government succeeded after some months in getting rid of Huerta. According to the editor of Colonel House's *Papers*, this was their only success in Mexico and it was partly due to the good offices of the British. But for the rest of the period with which this book is concerned, Mexico was in constant turmoil, and the United States, refusing to intervene, sought in vain to find a candidate for power whom they could back with credit and advantage.

In so far as harmony was established on this matter between Britain and America, the credit cannot be claimed for Spring Rice, for at the end of August he unexpectedly fell ill. He wrote to Roosevelt that it was " an attack of what they call summer complaint." But it proved to be Graves's disease, a serious illness.

His own first thought was to write and propose that he should be retired from the Service. But Sir Edward Grey replied that he should first take six months sick leave and then have the matter reconsidered. Meantime Sir William Tyrrell took action. There had already been talk of his coming out—purely on a visit of pleasure. He wrote on July 30 :

" Your letter of June 23 to Sir Edward elicited high praise from the Prime Minister which is worth having, as it is rare. I hear nothing but praise of you from both sides of the Atlantic. You had better make an offering to the Gods.

Your description of Dublin tantalises me very much, as the renewal of fighting in the Balkans, and the probability of my having to do a cure, cut off any prospect of a summer visit to you ; but I live in hopes of getting to you in October."

But as soon as word of Spring Rice's illness came, Sir William Tyrrell decided that America would be just the place to do a cure, came out, and stayed until November. In that interval he handled the Mexican matter, first in an interview with Colonel House,[1] and later with Wilson in person—the President preferring not to act through Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State.

On December 14, Spring Rice was sufficiently recovered to write to Tyrrell, who had returned to London.

" House came to lunch. He was very confidential and asked that what he said should be kept quite secret. I presume he had already told you, but I repeat what he said for record. The President hopes to be able to end the Panama tolls question by securing a repeal of the objectionable clause in

[1] Colonel House was President Wilson's unofficial agent, intermediary and counsellor.

Congress. He would treat the question as one of internal policy only. That is he would wish to avoid any diplomatic correspondence and to urge on Congress the reversal of their action, not in compliance with foreign pressure but as a step expedient from the domestic point of view. Any diplomatic reference to the question would spoil his game and he hopes that our government may for a time be satisfied with their statement of the case.

As to the method which House (who has the matter in hand) will adopt in order to influence Congress, I gather that the main obstacle to repeal is Senator O'Gorman. He is a nominee of Tammany—a person appointed because there was too much opposition to others, not from any merit of his own. He is the son of parents who were evicted from Ireland forty years ago, and hates England. . . .

You will see at once why it is essential for the success of the plan that we should stand aside. You know that an Irishman would refuse to go to Heaven if St. Peter were an Englishman.

I wish you could hear what people say about you here. I I think I shall send Lady Tyrrell an anthology.

The President is now on the top of the wave. He has great prestige owing mainly to his refusal to give up doing what he said he would do. So far he has had no set-back. Mexico however remains in suspense and many people say he has taken the wrong line from the beginning. This makes it important for us to have *no* responsibility. We gave a free hand and we would be wise to stick to that.

C. A. S. R."

It is only right to add Spring Rice's own contributions to this anthology of praise for the friend who had so befriended him.

WASHINGTON,
Jan. 13, 1914.

To SIR EDWARD GREY.

" I can't tell you how grateful I am for all your kindness, and especially for your letter which was a great pick-me-up. The Chancery is working admirably and I have very little to do. I think I can do what I have to do all right, and I am growing stronger. I hope your work is not too much. People here are always reverting to Tyrrell and sending him affectionate messages—so you see your self-sacrifice in sending him was not thrown away."

And again on February 3, 1914, to Grey :

" It may interest you to hear that Harry White, who has a good deal of diplomatic experience, says that he never saw so

much tact, delicacy of feeling and unselfishness in such difficult and trying circumstances as in the case of Tyrrell's visit here."

An entirely misleading impression of this episode is conveyed by Colonel House's editor, who says :

" Sir Edward Grey decided to send his secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, to the United States to canvass the whole matter of Anglo-American relations with the President and his advisers. Tyrrell proved to be an ideal selection. He shared the complete confidence of Grey and his views of international relations, so that not merely could he give to Wilson Grey's exact ideas, but he might claim from the President an equal frankness."—" In talking to Sir William we were practically talking to Sir Edward Grey," said Colonel House to the President." [1]

In other words, President Wilson, who preferred to negotiate behind the back of his Secretary of State through a gentleman of his personal choice, was led to believe that Sir Edward Grey had sent out, as it were, his own Colonel House, entrusted with a degree of confidence which the accredited Ambassador did not possess, because American affairs were too important to be handled through the ordinary diplomatic machinery. The simple fact is, however, that Tyrrell, who was entitled to leave, spent his leave in this way because his friend was ill, and that Grey acted through Tyrrell because Spring Rice was invalided. The American situation did not at this time bulk big, and M. Jusserand was well within the mark when he wrote to Spring Rice on October 16, 1913 :

" You can luckily take good care of yourself with a quiet conscience. All that is not Balkanic awakens but the faintest interest in Foreign Offices abroad."

Spring Rice himself wrote on Dec. 15, 1913, to Lady Helen Ferguson:

" I am very much better now and ought to be able to work again in January. Luckily for me, Tyrrell turned up to stay with us and he took charge just at the right moment.

The President is a very virtuous man and an obstinate one too, and he has given his word that he won't recognise the blood-stained Huerta. Bryan believes that a fair and free election disclosing the real will of the people will put everything to rights in Mexico. Between them the various foreign interests don't get much encouragement. The U.S. won't protect their own people nor allow anyone else to protect them. It is singular how the majority of the Americans are rather pleased than otherwise at the losses of rich Americans in Mexico. The rich Americans are trying to get us to take up a more energetic attitude to encourage their own Government."

[1] Vol. i. p. 203-4.

The Ambassador's semi-official letters to Grey and to Tyrrell (now back at his post) are chiefly concerned with the Mexican imbroglio. They are now only of interest to the public at large in so far as they illustrate his view of the men whom he had to deal with later on, in infinitely greater affairs.

These were, chiefly, President Wilson and Mr. W. J. Bryan, the Secretary of State. Wilson, owing to his habit of self-seclusion, was known to Spring Rice hardly more than he might have been to some intelligent member of the public—to Henry Adams, for instance. Their meetings were rare, brief, and after the war began, purely formal; for President Wilson, who advocated an attitude of ideal neutrality, was fearful lest his own repute for complete impartiality should be compromised if he risked a conceivably confidential interview with the representative of either interest. Before August 1914 these considerations did not operate, and an ambassador was no more cut off from him than was a Senator. But the very manner of his personal communications shows how icy was the courtesy behind which he screened himself. Here is one, dated December 29th, 1913.

"My Dear Mr. Ambassador,

It was very kind of you to think of me on my birthday and I appreciate your telegram most warmly.

May I not also thank you for your kind note about the address from the city of Carlisle, the which incident has afforded me genuine pleasure.

Cordially and sincerely yours,
Woodrow Wilson."

There are several in the correspondence, and all on the same model. It would be impossible to say that Spring Rice had any distinct personal feeling toward President Wilson. There was not the material for it. On the other hand, even while he most disapproved his policy, he recognised that it had coherence and ability; and when he approved it, Wilson, even without touching his sympathy, had the power to move his admiration,

All was wholly different in regard to Mr. Bryan. Spring Rice was intellectually fastidious and he had the diplomat's distrust of a demagogue. But long before this, in the winter of 1896, after the more than usually bitter Presidential Election, in which McKinley was elected, Mrs. Lodge, good Republican though she was, wrote to him about the defeated candidate, Bryan.

"The great fight is won and a fight conducted by trained and experienced and organised forces, with both hands full of money, with the full power of the press—and of prestige—on one side: on the other, a disorganised mob at first, out of which burst into sight, hearing, and force—one man, but such a man! Alone, penniless, without backing, without money, with scarce

a paper, without speakers, that man fought such a fight that even those in the East can call him a Crusader, an inspired fanatic—a prophet! It has been marvellous. Hampered by such a following, such a platform—and even the men whose names were our greatest weapon against him, deserted him and left him to fight alone—he almost won. We acknowledge to 7 millions campaign fund, against his 300,000. We had during the last week of the campaign 18,000 speakers on the stump. He alone spoke for his party, but speeches which spoke to the intelligence and hearts of the people, and with a capital P. It is over now, but the vote is 7 millions to 6 millions and a half."

In short, the man was a force of nature; and Spring Rice, however he might resent Bryan's actions or contemn his intelligence, never lost regard for the human being; and though "politics raged," as he says in a letter to Tyrrell, when he was at the Secretary's house, still genial ties established themselves. Once again the link was formed by literature; but this time the literature was Hebrew, though in the English tongue. In 1887 Spring Rice and Mr. Secretary Bayard had talked about Wordsworth; in 1914 Spring Rice and Mr. Secretary Bryan talked about the Bible. The letter to Tyrrell (of January 13, 1914, when the Home Rule discussion raged) notes that Bryan's sympathies were "strongly Protestant" and that he advocated separation for Ulster.

But the Secretary of State's main concern was for the new system of "peace commissions" which he was then elaborating. Since the Senate had just refused to renew several of the previously existing arbitration treaties, Spring Rice observed to Mr. Bryan that the time seemed ill chosen to ask that the British Parliament should approve a new one.

"He said (reasonably, I think) that we could negotiate in the meanwhile in order to have an agreement ready when a favourable moment came."

Accordingly negotiations proceeded, and the Treaty was ready to be signed in the summer of 1914; and in the stress which followed had a certain value as insurance against sudden risks.

On the Mexican issue, Spring Rice noted that the country was "curiously lacking in interest, except for a very strong desire to keep out of war."

"There is absolute confidence in the President, who keeps his counsel from all the world. War is not impossible, and seems to be growing nearer, but the people still hope for peace and believe that the President will succeed in keeping it. There is transport available for about seven thousand men, but this

force seems hardly enough. There will be in all about 40,000 immediately available.

The upshot is: the President is boss of this matter and if we wish to be in his good graces, we must support him, at any rate by severe abstinence from opposition. His policy may be and very likely is the wrong policy, and if we support it we may be supporting the wrong policy. But if we oppose him we can do nothing, and will have to pay in other directions."

To TYRRELL. Jan. 27, 1914.

"The President has maintained and rather increased his influence in Congress and in the country, but he is as mysterious as ever. When he summons the newspaper men, he talks to them at length in excellent language, but when they leave his presence they say to each other, What on earth did he say? When he sees the members of Congress he reads to them a lecture and tells them what he thinks it is good for them to know, which appears to them to be very little. He asks the advice of no one.

It seems from all accounts of his meeting with the congressmen and senators yesterday that he told them he would achieve Huerta's downfall by allowing the so-called constitutionalists to import arms from the U.S. Now it is generally known that Carranza is a mere respectable figure-head, and that the real man is Villa, who has spent his whole life in burning, killing and raping. And if the U.S. army is eventually to interfere they will not be pleased to find a large amount of good American guns already in the country. This the army feels strongly, but the army is not consulted.

Huerta probably will not be able to resist much longer. And there is no one to take his place. And the President says that whatever happens there will be no intervention."

But Spring Rice did not see how intervention could be ultimately avoided. He under-rated President Wilson's power of postponing action, which, in the case of Mexico—though only in that case—prevented war.

In other respects he did full justice to Wilson's leadership, and in a letter to Tyrrell on February 3 described how the President dealt with the matters relating to arbitration, and the Panama tolls dispute.

"The scene must have been interesting when the President addressed the two houses in the persons of their committees on foreign affairs. He spoke slowly in a clear and rather low voice, with great urbanity and no sign of lecturing. He told them that their policy for the last few years had alienated one

nation after the other, till now they had no friends. In spite of what she had suffered at the hands of the United States, England had acted in a perfectly friendly manner and had abstained under great provocation from taking advantage of the various opportunities for revenge which had presented themselves. In Mexico, she could have caused the greatest embarrassment, if she had headed a coalition, which was ready to her hands and had demanded intervention. She was serving the interests of the United States in her pacific policy there and in Japan, and it behoved the United States to bear this in mind and return good for good. He then proceeded to say that the arbitration treaties should be ratified at once and that some way out of the tolls difficulty should be found. He left it to the houses to decide what way. He also strongly urged the negotiations of a new treaty with Russia to replace the old one which the United States in deference to the Jews had denounced. The Senate Committee at once agreed to recommend the prolongation of the treaties, on the understanding that the tolls question and the Japanese land question were questions affecting the honour and vital interests of the United States, and were, therefore, not arbitrable.[1] The solution of the tolls question will therefore be found, if found at all, in legislation.

In this province the wisest course is to say that we express no opinion on the proposed laws and reserve our statement of our opinion until it is a *fait accompli*. The best argument to use against legislation here is that we are demanding it.

The reason for this rather sudden change of front is that the Japanese question[2] suddenly assumed a very threatening character. And the military situation was such that nothing could prevent the Japanese getting possession of the Philippines and Hawaii, and probably also crippling the only naval stations possessed by the U.S. on the Pacific. If Japan in addition effected such an arrangement in Mexico as to leave her free to land troops for an attack from the South, the situation would be even worse. And it was at this moment that the U.S. found herself in the position of hostility, solely owing to

[1] The previously concluded treaties had pledged the United States to submit to arbitration all disputes with the other signatory powers, except questions affecting " honour and vital interests."

[2] There was friction at this time with Japan because the State of California introduced a Bill debarring " aliens ineligible for citizenship " (which included the Japanese and was designed to include them) from the right to lease land for agriculture. This conflicted with a treaty of 1911 between Japan and the United States by which subjects of the two countries were reciprocally entitled to lease land and buildings.

her own action, to the two nations which could do her most good or most harm, England and Russia.

No sooner was the President's statement made than a Jewish deputation came down from New York and in two days "fixed" the two houses so that the President had to renounce the idea of making a new treaty with Russia. They are far better organized than the Irish and far more formidable. We should be in a position to get into their good graces. Their present object is to have a Judge on the Supreme bench. Speyer, the brother of your friend, has lost his influence by marrying a Christian. Bernstorff[1] has sent his son into Speyer's office, and got the German Government to make his sister's husband a 'von.' The principal Jew is now Schiff.

Bryan is as friendly as ever, and he tells me what is on his mind. His profound and haunting desire is to get his treaties through. He is quite indifferent to what becomes of the other ones or what the treaties themselves will bring about. But his reputation and record depend on them. They are his children and the sheep of his pasture. If you want to gain him (for the time), help them on, and you will have your reward. Remember that in this country all things are personal, and that Christ, if he had been an American, would have run for the governorship of Judaea with the Sermon on the Mount for his platform.

The doctors told me yesterday that I was practically cured but that I must not for the present dine out. We are to have our reception on the 22nd of this month."

Feb. 17, 1914.

To GREY.

I presume that even if the Arbitration Treaties are renewed you would have some hesitation in communicating Mr. Bryan's peace proposals to Parliament unless there was a fair chance of the tolls question being put out of the way. It must not be forgotten that there is a considerable party here who object to all treaties as an unjustifiable obstruction to the popular will. If this attitude becomes more pronounced—and this is not improbable when the Senate is elected by popular vote—then it seems hardly worth while to continue making treaties which are only made to be broken, are worth nothing and yet occasion a good deal of friction. The Russians have no treaty at all with the United States and their relations seem to have improved since the Treaty was denounced. But this view is not shared by the President, who is very anxious that the

[1] German Ambassador at Washington.

United States should maintain an honoured place among the nations of the world, and does not believe that his country's credit is increased by refusal to meet obligations. The crucial case will be the ratification or non-ratification of the London Convention for the safety of life at sea. If after all that has passed, the Senate, at the instance of an organised minority, refuses to confirm the Treaty and passes a law inconsistent with it, it will be clearly apparent that the nations of Europe will hesitate before they again make a convention with the United States. This is the view taken by many here, and it might be worth while to give a hint to this effect to Mr. Page, who seems to enjoy the confidence of the President. Unfortunately, talking to Mr. Bryan is like writing on ice. The only argument which he is likely to feel is that his peace treaties, on which he hopes to base a new record, will not meet with a favourable reception until it is proved that the United States keeps what engagements it has already made, and shows the wish to conform to the ordinary usages of diplomacy. I hope you won't conclude from all this that there is any especial unfriendliness implied in this conduct. The United States don't pay their debts not because they dislike us but because they dislike paying."

On the Mexican question he wrote to Tyrrell :

Feb. 7, 1914.

"The President was extremely friendly. He sent you many messages, and spoke warmly of his fellow-Wordsworthian, Sir Edward. His exposition of the Mexican situation amounted to this, that the whole root of the whole matter was the land system and that anybody appointed by a land-holding clique in Mexico City would be a certain failure : Villa, it appears, is the sword of justice which is to do the deed, and put Mexico out of its misery. He assured me that intervention was the last thing he would resort to if at all, and that under no circumstances would American policy be dictated by material interests. He said he was sure that Sir Edward would fully appreciate this. As to changing his policy by talking, this is quite out of the question. There is nothing to do with this hardened saint."

February 8, 1914.

To GREY.

"I have been frequently warned by people who have been in close contact with the administration and especially with

the President, that he is not a man to give advice to or to consult experts. He goes his own way and will consult none till he has made up his mind. He has staked all on Huerta's defeat, and he cannot now modify that decision. But his policy goes further than that, and he has now determined to take up with the rebels, or constitutionalists, and to use them as the instruments with which to crush his enemy. To say that their hands are as bloody as Huerta's is mere waste of time. To give detailed information as to the internal situation, as Hohler can do, is also waste of time. Bryan cannot understand and the President will not. You remember that neither one nor the other has any experience of savage peoples or of the east. They think that what applies to North American politics applies to Mexico. They are rightly conscious of the purest intentions and they suspect all other people as being probably actuated by meaner motives. The only teacher who will be listened to is time. I think you will remember similar circumstances in our own policy, especially about the year '84[1] and after. You will not be severe."

Matters became more acute in the course of February when an English subject, Mr. Benton, was killed by order of Villa, the American protégé.

March 2nd, 1914.

To GREY.

"Negotiations here are rather difficult owing to the peculiar circumstances. The real director is the President, who stands in the background and is practically inaccessible. For it would be impossible to conceal the fact that I had an audience, and if it became known, it would at once be said that special pressure was being put by you upon the President, and this would make it still more difficult for him to take a decision without the suspicion of foreign influence, which is fatal to American statesmen. Mr. Bryan is I should think unlike any other Secretary of State or Minister for Foreign Affairs that has ever been known. He regards the matter simply from the politician's point of view; that is, if Huerta wins it is bad for Bryan's record, and if Huerta falls it is good for Bryan's record. As Villa is the only man on the Constitutional side who can win victories, Villa is the man to whom all his hopes are attached. Any aspersion on Villa is a personal attack on Bryan. When I went to call upon him to ask him what news he had received

[1] The reference seems to be to Egyptian affairs about the time of Gordon's mission.

about Benton, he told me he was dead without one word of regret. He merely remarked that he had attacked Villa (as if he had laid hands on the Lord's anointed), and that Villa had the pistol with which Villa's life had been threatened. It was an act of self-defence, he said. When I said that the incident would arouse very deep feeling in Europe, he asked with evident indignation why Europe had acquiesced in Huerta's crime. When I said that the intimacy of his government with Villa, the fact that Villa had only recently been supplied with arms by consent of the United States Government, and the mysterious circumstances of the murder, would give the press excellent material for agitation, he said, 'We are giving them arms as you are giving Huerta arms, we are friends with them, as you are friends with Huerta. We are no more responsible than you are for all the crimes Huerta has committed.' Then I said that if Huerta, when he was supposed to be under our influence, had caused the death of an American, we should consider the matter a very serious one, and I begged him most earnestly (as he was just leaving for the Cabinet) to recommend the subject to the most serious attention of the President and his colleagues. His manner throughout was extremely offensive, as if it was an impertinence on my part to criticise the conduct of a man whom he delighted to honour. Not long afterwards I received a telephone message from him in a tone of voice which betrayed his triumph to the effect that there had been a court-martial and that Benton had been condemned by due form of law, and that the minutes of the court-martial would be communicated to me.

As you know, Villa had never mentioned the court-martial when he first spoke of Benton's death. He had never produced the pistol which he said was Benton's, nor after repeated enquiries had he given any indications where the corpse was. He had left for the south immediately after Benton was killed. And the excuse given by Bryan for the non-mention of the court-martial was an alleged conspiracy of several persons against Villa's life. Bryan did not seem to attach any importance to the fact that no mention of this conspiracy was made in the court-martial. He merely accepted everything that was said without comment but with evident approval. When I told him that the matter was exciting much indignation in England, he said in best oratorical manner, 'Where was that moral indignation when Huerta killed his master?' It seemed quite vain to point out that my business was with the wrongs of British subjects."

Grey, who had found time on Christmas Day to send Spring Rice congratulations on his restored health and cautions to go warily with it, sent a telegram on March 4 :

"I think you are handling the Benton case admirably : your telegrams give an impression of vigour, tact, and robust health."

In that month, Sir Lionel Carden, British Minister in Mexico, came to Washington and by Grey's request had an interview with the President, to which Spring Rice looked forward with some apprehension. It passed off peaceably, but the only conclusion which emerged was that, since the United States were determined that Huerta should go, and Huerta would not, the only way out of the difficulty was to encourage and assist Villa "who appears to be the best general among the rebels, mainly because he is the cruellest." "Thus," Spring Rice comments, "a Government pledged to be guided by the purest moral principles finds itself supporting the most unconscionable ruffian ever known."

This decision lessened friction somewhat and on March 30 Spring Rice wrote :

To TYRRELL.

"There are not nearly so many attacks against Great Britain as there used to be, although we are reminded that the young American eagle lined his nest with the mane of the British lion."

But none the less President Wilson's action in forcing repeal of the Panama tolls had created opposition.

"I am very sorry to say," the letter ends, "that it seems to be believed that the President's action with regard to Panama has broken up his party, as it has brought to a head all the various animosities which have existed against him since his sudden nomination and election. The elections for the House take place in the summer, and it is freely threatened that those who have voted with the President will lose their seats, partly owing to the Irish and Germans, and the floating mass of ultra-American voters. His act was one of great courage, and I fear that in American politics, honesty and courage are not always rewarded with success."

He had already written on March 16 :

To GREY.

"It seems to be believed that a treaty impairs the sovereign right of the representatives of the people, and until this Government has learnt that there is more to be lost than gained by

adopting this principle, it is most probable that treaties will not be worth very much. This incontestable fact does not in the least affect the strong desire of Mr. Bryan to negotiate new treaties, and there is no reason in the world why he should not be humoured, as long as we do not attach too much importance to the treaties when negotiated. As regards the treaties for peace commissions, which he has negotiated with the States of South and Central America, I doubt whether the Senate will be inclined to ratify them because, if they did, the United States would renounce its right to intervene at once, and by force of arms, for the protection of American citizens in time of revolution. With regard to ourselves, the French Ambassador pointed out to me that should the United States actually occupy French or British territory we could not obtain redress by force until a commission had decided in our favour. But on the whole he is convinced that we have more to fear from precipitate action on the part of the United States than they have from precipitate action on our part, and the treaty if properly framed ought to be a very useful safeguard. The Secretary of State told me that you had informed Page that a draft treaty which you were ready to sign was actually on its way. The French Government very reluctantly has instructed its Ambassador to negotiate a treaty here. Of course, there are great advantages in identic treaties and the French Ambassador, as well as Mr. Bryan, is anxious that French and English treaties should be signed the same day. He has already spoken to me about the inkstand which is to be used on the occasion, and I have no doubt has made arrangements with the cinematograph."

It would appear that Spring Rice was actually entrusted with the designing of the inkstand, which was manufactured to Mr. Bryan's order in England and cost twenty-five pounds. "I shall keep it unused till the treaty is ready when it will be christened," Mr. Bryan wrote on July 1, 1914, after the Tolls clause had been repealed. He added:

To Spring Rice.

"So much feeling was excited by the Tolls debate that I think it would not be wise to exchange formal notes interpreting it.

Instead of that I shall prepare a statement and present it to the committee *in advance* of the submission of the treaties.

I can then send this statement to *all* the countries; this will avoid the appearance of making the interpretations for any one country's benefit.

The statement will set forth the fact that disputed questions can be submitted to the International Commission without submission to the Senate.

This will give an authoritative interpretation, accepted by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. What do you think? I hope you can get the consent of the colonies, so that it can be signed at once, as soon as this point is settled.

The French treaty is ready and the French Ambassador will sign it in France and I, here—the signing to be done at the same hour. Cannot we make the same arrangement? I shall be disappointed if your name is not on that treaty."

The Bryan treaties with France and with Great Britain were both signed on Sept. 15, 1914—when all the world except the United States was at war. Neither Germany nor Austria signed one of these instruments, by which each party was bound, if a dispute arose, to submit the question to a Peace Commission and await its report before taking any hostile action. Neither party was bound to accept the Commission's finding, but a "cooling off period" was provided.

The last of Spring Rice's reports to the Foreign Office before the war, contains some interesting criticisms on the methods of American administration in general and more particularly under President Wilson.

May 25, 1914.

To GREY.

"The position in Mexico is becoming more and more complicated. Carden evidently thinks that there is a great danger of the Government breaking down altogether and that as the army is not able to get supplies of arms nor regular pay, the civilized part of Mexico may be at the mercy of bandits. I asked the State Department what news they had. Their information comes from the Brazilian Minister in Mexico or from their consuls, or from refugees. Each department has its own policy and its own information. The State Department is supposed to encourage news of the sort which suits its purpose and the same is said of the war and navy department. The Minister of the Navy, like Mr. Bryan, believes in "the germ of freedom" theory, that is, that the constitutionalists represent the principle of liberty and are worthy of the support of the sons of freedom. The Minister of War who is a business man thinks that the germ of freedom may prove very inconvenient to the American army, if it sprouts too freely among the Mexicans, and he would like to prevent all Mexicans, whether lovers of freedom or the reverse, from getting supplies of arms. The result of this is that the army has prevented Villa from getting arms over the land frontier;

but now that he has got hold of Tampico he may be able to import arms under the eyes of the United States Navy which will, I presume, obey the orders of its chief. If we can prove that arms have been imported in this manner, and if, as is the case, the United States Government has prevented Huerta from obtaining arms, this government cannot deny responsibility for the conduct of its protégés, the followers of Villa and Carranza. . . .

I think that there can be no question at all that your telegram to me contains the best solution : that is, that you express the confidence that the United States Government will employ the influence which they possess over Villa in the interests of humanity and that you offer no suggestion as to how that influence is to be applied. The reason why I gave the President a copy of your telegram was that the Secretary of War, whom I had consulted as to the internal condition of Mexico, thought that the Cabinet was not informed with sufficient clearness as to the fact that we held the United States to some extent morally responsible for what was done by the party for which the President had declared so marked a preference. The fact is that the State Department, like Villa's house, is very often the grave of visitors. News does not get beyond it. The President is more completely shrouded in mystery than ever and except the sapient Lind,[1] hardly anyone has access to him and no one seems to be consulted except those whose opinions are known to be the same as his own. It is much like the Foreign Office during Lord Salisbury's time, and I fear the comments of the departments are not unlike what they were with us."

That letter closes the series of despatches written before the war. One sentence in a letter from Tyrrell gives the impression which up to this had been produced by Spring Rice on his official superiors.

" The Chief is simply revelling in your success : each time he hears from you his face lights up, and he says, ' Isn't Springy doing splendidly ? ' "

It goes on :

" We are going through a bad time here, but I feel sure we shall get a settlement by agreement."

This is dated May 12, 1914. Reference is plainly to the dominant internal question—whether Ulster's claim and Ireland's claim could be reconciled without civil war.

[1] Mr. John Lind, member of Congress and a personal friend of President Wilson, was sent to Mexico in 1913 as the envoy and personal representative of the President.

Spring Rice with his family sailed for England early in June, and arrived a fortnight before the Archduke was murdered at Sarajevo.

All the ambassadors were then on the wing from Washington; M. Jusserand was due to leave for Europe on July 1, Count Bernstorff on the 7th. M. Dumba went into summer quarters at Manchester, in New England, where the staffs of the Italian and of the British embassies also flocked for the hot weather—and there was no ripple on their friendliness.

No letter from Spring Rice to any of his habitual correspondents survives from these momentous weeks. But he was full of preoccupations as to what trouble in Ireland might bring forth in America. On July 9, 1914, he wrote to Lord Newton who had sent him his *Life of Lord Lyons*:

"I should be very ungrateful not to thank you for Ld. Lyons, which has been of the greatest possible use as well as amusement. There are some very important pieces of advice for a British ambassador in Washington, notably about defending our real interests and raising as few questions as possible.

Now, did it occur to you, in writing, that if the Civil War of 1861 nearly brought on war between us in 1862 and onward, a civil war in Ireland would have the same effect? Both Protestants and Catholics in the U.S. would look on Ireland as the field where they could fight their battles, and both sides would give what help they could—and in a manner not sanctioned by diplomatists—who might quote:

'Puffendorf and Grotius
and prove from Vattel
exceedingly well
that such conduct was quite atrocious. . .

But I fear without effect.

Please consider this in the light of what happened in '62, and also in view of what I believe to be the fact, which is that the latent feeling of hostility is much what Ld. Lyons described when he first got to Washington, and *before* any of the events happened which caused so much ill feeling afterwards."

He wrote also to Lord Lansdowne, who received the letter just as he was starting for the first meeting of the Buckingham Palace Conference—at which, under the presidency of King George, protagonists of the two views on Home Rule sought to reach a compromise.

"I quite realise," Lord Lansdowne replied, "that we have to bear in mind not only the local aspects of the case but their wider considerations to which you refer. . . . It is too soon to speak confidently of the results, but the difficulties in our way could not be more formidable."

That was written on Tuesday, July 22. The Conference sat through that week and reported its failure to agree. On Sunday the 27th came the gun-running at Howth, and troops fired on hostile crowds in Dublin. Civil war looked very near in Ireland. Before the week was out, a larger menace loomed up. The story is taken up by the Duke of Devonshire, who has kindly detailed his recollections in the following memorandum, which shows how Spring Rice felt and acted during the hours when European War was certain, but England's policy not certain.

Friday, Aug. 1.

"I had been intending to return to Bolton all day, but there were so many rumours flying about that I decided to stay in London—at any rate, until the evening—especially as Lord Lansdowne, who had gone to Bowood, told me to let him know if I heard of any developments.

In the afternoon I went to see my Aunt (Miss Lascelles) at 87 Chester Square where I found Florence (Lady Spring Rice) who told me that Springy wanted to see me and had sent a message to Devonshire House; but as I had not been back since the morning I had not received it. Florence asked me to dine with her at 14 Chester Square. This settled any question about my leaving for Bolton.

I dined at 14 Chester Square as arranged. Springy told me that the position was very critical, far more so than I had any idea; but the most serious thing was that a report was being circulated through Europe that the Unionist party would oppose any action on our part. I remember saying that I was sure this was not the case, but he said some action ought to be taken at once. So I decided that I would go right away to see Edmund Talbot (now Lord Fitzalan).[1] Accordingly, I went to his house but it was closed as he was in bed with a bad headache. However, I said I must see him at once and with some difficulty persuaded the servant to take me up to his room. He had a very bad head, but I told him what I had heard. We agreed to meet at Balfour's house in Carlton Gardens, the following morning (Saturday). I got hold of Manners Sutton and told him that he had better not go away for the moment.

Saturday, August 2.—Edmund and I met as arranged at 4 Carlton Gardens. Balfour was in bed. We went up to his room and told him all that I had heard, and asked him to see Springy, which he agreed to do. He said we ought to get our respective Chiefs back and I said I would have the room ready at Lansdowne House for a meeting in the evening.

[1] Lord E. Talbot was then the Unionist Chief Whip.

For the evening Edmund went off to get into touch with Bonar Law, and he telegraphed to Lord Lansdowne at Bowood and went round to Lansdowne House, and told the servant that there would be a meeting in Lord Lansdowne's room in the evening.

Nothing occurred as far as I was concerned until I met Lord Lansdowne in the evening, and returned with him to Lansdowne House. Balfour and Bonar Law came, and just as the meeting was breaking up, Austen Chamberlain, George Lloyd and Sir H. Wilson arrived.

Lord Lansdowne arranged with some of the others to meet at Lansdowne House on the following morning.

Sunday, August 3rd.—The meeting took place as arranged. A letter was drafted which was sent to the Prime Minister."

Those who saw him remember in what an agony Spring Rice returned from the Foreign Office on that Friday, when he believed that his country was going to baulk at the leap. He himself gave a rough outline of the time to Mr. Luxmoore, some weeks later, when the issue was plainly knit.—How great had been his preoccupations from the news of Sarajevo onwards may be judged from the fact that during his stay in England, contrary to all wont, he did not make a journey to Eton.

British Embassy, Washington.
24th Sept., 1914.

"My Dear Tutor,

It was dreadful not seeing you. At the end of July the clouds burst; then there was an awful moment when it seemed that both parties were indifferent to all calls of honour and that we should be politically and morally dead in a week. On the 1st August everything was in suspense, and I heard myself from the highest sources things scarcely credible. Sunday the 3rd was the turning point and then although the moral worst was over the physical worst began. I was perpetually at the F.O. gumming envelopes and the like. They were all working day and night with very tired faces and every one who could be roped in was asked to join. There were some good Etonians there, Percy among them—I tried to get a boat to come away here, but my ship was removed, and then I had to get a berth on an American, which couldn't be taken. The French Ambassador was on board too. Not to make the passengers uneasy, we concealed our names. There was an immense crowd on board the ship which was a "second-class ship" with pretty scanty accommodation anyhow. On the whole, most people were pleasant and took their roughing well. The French Am-

bassadress was with three other ladies in a cabin for two which was about 105° most of the time. She said she was glad to take her share of the discomfort which her people were suffering. She had come from France, and seen the unanimous uprising of a whole nation. I fear we were slow to realise that the time had come when we were to stand or fall as a nation. It seems we do understand now, but I hope we will endure to the end.

Here popular opinion is almost unanimous in our favour, except among the Germans who raise a continual shriek and poison the wells, as usual. A favourite device is to circulate forged speeches. I am not much in favour of asking for sympathy. We shall stand or fall by what we do, not by what other people think: and I don't like these fierce efforts to convince the Americans that we are in the right. Instinctively they feel that our struggle is the same as their old ones for personal freedom. The question is, is freedom strong enough to defend itself? A government is either too strong for the freedom of its own people, or too weak to defend them from a foreign enemy. We chose the last form. However, if there is justice and truth in the world we shall win in the end: and if there is no justice or truth, it isn't worth living here—so we can leave it at that. I am too busy to think, and fortunately also, to remember, or look forward. Only I do very keenly regret not having been to Eton and seen you. You know the 3rd Psalm was that ordered by Queen Elizabeth for her people to read when the news came of the Armada's coming. The Psalms and Wordsworth's sonnets are good reading now."

The third Psalm is that beginning:

"Lord how are they increased that trouble me: many are they that rise against me."

It has the verses:

"I laid me down and slept and rose up again: for the Lord sustained me.

I will not be afraid of ten thousands of the people, that have set themselves against me round about."

Except for this letter, we have no documentary evidence of what Spring Rice felt, thought and said, during the days when the Government of his own country hesitated to enter the struggle. But those who were with him remember, and are not surprised that he should have felt, thought and said hard things during the years in which it was his duty to watch, chronicle and forecast the hesitating course of another English-speaking people.

CHAPTER XXII

THE FIRST STAGES OF THE WAR

HITHERTO in this book there has been no necessity to deal with criticism of Spring Rice's action; but the record of his last and incomparably most important labours must take some account of what has been said in disparagement of them.

The task of an Ambassador has three aspects. First, he is to inform and advise his government concerning the movement of events, opinions and feelings in the country to which he is accredited. Secondly, it is his duty to work on the government of that country so far as is possible by personal contact and representations. Thirdly, he has to direct and govern the staff of his embassy.

The last of these divisions may be taken first, as it is relatively a matter of detail. There is not among all Spring Rice's papers one word of complaint concerning any of his subordinates, nor any application for additional assistance, though here and there are allusions to the fact that they were all very hard driven. He spared neither himself nor them. They on their part answered to his leadership with zeal and with admiration. A message from them, transmitted through his successor, when the sudden news of his death came, has a significant phrase. "We feel that we have lost even more a master than a friend." What that meant, coming from them who followed him in the profession of diplomacy, has been made clear in a letter from Sir Malcolm Robertson, now Ambassador to the Argentine Republic, who served during the war as First Secretary and Head of Chancery at Washington.

> "Spring Rice was one of the two or three really brilliant Ambassadors, whom I have met in thirty years of diplomatic life."

All the staff, he adds, admired the Ambassador's speed of work, and the wit which enlivened it.

> "Often and often have I stood by him for what seemed almost a minute, while he drafted telegram after telegram, clear, concise and to the point, nearly always with some inimitable quip which he never could resist."

They admired also his wide knowledge and reading and his mastery of the English language—whether for serious uses, in prose or verse,

or for the doggerel which he could "turn out by the yard," to their delight. But above all, if they recognised him as a master, it was not only for brilliancy but for that "most essential of all qualities in a Diplomat, an almost uncanny faculty for getting at and interpreting the psychology of a people."

> "He understood the Germans and he understood the Americans. His weekly letters to the Foreign Office—undated and unsigned lest they should fall into the hands of the enemy, dictated at lightning speed—were marvels of accurate diagnosis, interpretation, advice and the most delightful wit. His staff used to crowd round them and chortle over them before they were packed up in an envelope and went off."

As to the more personal aspect, Sir Malcolm Robertson is explicit:

> "The whole of his staff simply adored him. He was one of the few men I can recall towards whom I had feelings not only of warm admiration, but of real affection. We all felt like that."

Then, in a note which has importance, he adds:

> "This was a great tribute to the man, because during the last year of his life, for purely physical reasons, he used on occasions to have almost wild outbursts of temper which startled and frightened. A few moments later it would all pass, he would come back into Chancery, almost like a mischievous boy, and apologise in a way that entirely disarmed one, and made one love him the more."

In this intimate relation between chief and subordinate, no harm was done by an admitted defect. But the matter stands otherwise when we consider the second aspect of Spring Rice's functions, as intermediary between his own Government and that of the United States. An Ambassador is indeed, under democratic conditions, accredited to a people as well as to an administration, and only Americans can judge conclusively the effect produced upon America by the personality and conduct of the British Ambassador during the Great War. The opinion of his friends, which will be recorded later, was not impartial; yet on Spring Rice's retirement, and again on his death, the American press at large publicly endorsed those views which were privately expressed by Lodge and by Roosevelt. But since the publication of Colonel House's *Papers*, we are faced with the fact that House regarded the British Ambassador as ill-fitted for his post in such a time. This judgment cannot be ignored, because House was the most confidential adviser and agent of President Wilson. Access to the President was impossible because of Wilson's deliberate self-seclusion; yet authority and initiative were concentrated in the President's person. If Spring Rice was to conciliate or influence, Colonel House was the most important person within his

reach. Now the *Papers* make it plain that on several occasions the intercourse between these two was stormy. The record cannot be checked, because although there are, of course, many mentions of Colonel House in Spring Rice's papers, there is no criticism of him, except for one passage, which will be found later, in which his value to President Wilson is very honourably appreciated. Thus, we have only Colonel House's account of the disputes. But it is not unlikely that more than once Spring Rice lost his temper with House, and in general left the impression that he was nervous and irritable. He had not the bonhomie and good humour for which Colonel House praises Count Bernstorff—though perhaps without sufficient recognition of the fact that good humour is easier when you believe your side to be winning.

But certain things should be borne in mind. First, in all Colonel House's intercourse with the Ambassador, there was present a suspicion due to Spring Rice's known friendships with leaders of the opposition party in America. House believed, and in his *Papers* he says so, that Roosevelt and others were continually poisoning Spring Rice's mind against the administration. This belief is in no way borne out by Spring Rice's papers, which in so far as they criticise Wilson's policy criticise it as representing America at large, and which in the main are concerned to show that, if America's action was guided by a sense of America's interest, the same would probably have held true of Great Britain in similar circumstances.

In point of fact Spring Rice cut himself severely off from intercourse with Roosevelt. Lodge he did see constantly, for Lodge was not only an old friend but a leading Senator whose constituents were much affected by the British blockade.[1] There is in short no trace of any American partisanship in his documents; but beyond doubt House took offence the more readily that he supposed Spring Rice's criticisms of the administration to be suggested by Republican partisans. Yet throughout the war, Spring Rice was on terms of close friendship with two important persons in the Secretary of State's office, Mr. Polk and Mr. Phillips, and with at least two members of Wilson's administration, Mr. Houston and Mr. Lane. Also, though by preference and on considered policy he kept aloof from general society, a dinner was given at the Embassy every week to keep him in touch with leading persons of all parties.

Secondly, on one cardinal matter there was sharp divergence. House's policy, and Wilson's, was directed to forming an organisation which should impose permanent peace on the world. Spring Rice, as soon as this project began to be bruited, warned his Government

[1] Friendship was the main cause. Lodge told Sir William Tyrrell in after years how he had insisted, as a matter of hygiene, that Spring Rice should come to him daily at the close of the afternoon and 'unpack his heart with words'—saying the worst that he could against America for its abstention. Probably in these lettings off of steam, Spring Rice had forced on him the consideration which he often impresses on his Government —that England, placed as the United States was, might have probably acted exactly as did the United States.

that the public opinion of America would not consent to guarantee the sanctions necessary to make such a League effective. This was set out by him as his own conclusion, and he emphasized it repeatedly; but the only Americans whom he quotes in support of his belief belonged to Wilson's party. It is certain that in discussions with House this disagreement on so vital a point must have made itself sharply felt. Spring Rice cannot be blamed for not concurring with House and Wilson in a presumption which proved to be disastrously wrong. It would, no doubt, have eased matters if he had urged his Government to believe that America would give President Wilson a blank cheque; but it was more important that he should advise his own people rightly than that he should please those whose policy he had to interpret and assess.

Lastly, a man of the world can as a rule discuss conduct without raising moral issues. Spring Rice was never a man of the world; and though he was quite prepared to admit that America might justifiably be guided by America's own interest, there were other admissions which he refused to make, and probably refused with anger. President Wilson at least after a time had come to believe that, morally speaking, there was no choice between the two sets of belligerents, and Colonel House reached the same conclusion. But to Spring Rice even the interests of Great Britain in the war seemed very secondary as compared with the supreme issues of right and wrong. Further, his familiarity with the underlying assumptions of American public life and education made it seem worthy of resentment that Americans should refuse to distinguish between those who invaded and despoiled Belgium and those who resisted the invasion. There are moments when even a diplomat may be angry, and it is probable that Spring Rice was not always to blame for losing his temper with Colonel House—more especially if the Colonel laid it down as a matter of certainty, as he repeatedly does in his correspondence, that England would have made no protest, had France, not Germany, violated Belgium's neutrality in defiance of the recorded pledge. Yet one may allow that Spring Rice might with advantage have been less violent in argument with House or with the Secretary of State, and might thereby have increased his chances of influencing the President whom he could not directly approach.

It is possible that a man of a more forceful type might have broken down these barriers and insisted on direct contact. Yet, given Wilson's icebound personality, would that have succeeded? Is it believable that for anything short of the ultimate coercion of German attacks on American commerce, a President and a people so anxious to keep out of the war would have gone into it?

Colonel House, according to the editor of his *Papers*, held that by a different policy which he suggested, the Allies could have brought America in nearly two years earlier; and one may presume that his criticism of Spring Rice is based on Spring Rice's failure to urge this line of action. It should be noted that Colonel House's approval was (quite naturally) extended only to those who supported his own

views, and his blame of Mr. Page, the American Ambassador in London, is just as severe as his condemnation of Spring Rice. Count Bernstorff earned his commendation by at least the appearance of agreement. Professor Seymour very candidly quotes an observation from Bernstorff: "Of course, so far as Mr. House is concerned, I could hold him off with considerable ease."[1]

But in the long run, neither Wilson nor House was America. Had Roosevelt for instance been President, values would have been altered: Roosevelt would have sought to lead; but Spring Rice discerned clearly that Wilson's purpose was to act only, if he did act, when the mind of America was made up. The supreme function of Spring Rice was, therefore, to interpret accurately to his chiefs the movement of America's feeling and opinion.

He was criticised during the war for failure to do more than this; he was blamed for sitting passive and being "the silent Ambassador," when he might have been persuading President and people to join forces with the Allies. His judgment was against this course, for reasons that are repeatedly given in his letters. No doubt, when he decided on a policy of letting the facts speak for themselves, he knew instinctively his own limitations. It is a great part of ability in a man to use the gifts in which he excels and not to attempt a rôle outside his disposition. Spring Rice was never by nature one of the domineering personalities that have confidence in their power to impose their views by sheer weight of ascendancy. Men with less penetration perhaps have their value in the diplomatic service because, even though they see less, they have more power to make others see. That was the limitation to Spring Rice's greatness as Ambassador. On the other hand, for sheer power of divination and accuracy of forecasts, which were the most essential qualities in that particular crisis in British-American relations, it would be hard to beat his periodic reviews of the American situation. They are not inspiriting to read; his survey was often touched with a bleak irony. But it was always cool, and his exposition always lucid.

However, on the largest question of all, whether he gave good counsel and sound information to his own country, readers must be the judges. But one aspect of the matter requires to be dealt with. It is said by his critics that he was physically and morally unequal to the strain. The strain certainly was terrible. It was in his nature always to see danger, and he was fully aware that by an error of judgment he might cause a breach between England and America fatal to England's hopes. Also, he was deeply affectionate; many of those whom he loved were in danger—one of his brothers, indeed, was killed early in the war. Many are aware, from experience of both states, that men actually in the fighting line suffered far less from apprehension than those out of it. Spring Rice's ordeal was harder to face than that of any combatant, except those in high commands. Nothing less than the existence of his country seemed

[1] House *Papers*, ii, 429.

to him at stake; and those who have read these pages will remember how violent was his reaction to the news of disasters in South Africa, which by recent standards seem petty.

Yet in this war he had a definite task. In 1900, he felt helpless to assist; in 1914, he had at least no cause to undervalue the importance of what he was doing. How he responded to the strain in the first days of it, which were surely not the least shattering, may be judged from the coolness and balance of his reports which were then written.

The first of Spring Rice's letters to the Foreign Secretary comments generally on public opinion. From the outset he warns his chief against hoping too much from America's prevailing friendliness towards the Allies, and indicates the power and resources of the opposition. Also, he advocates concessions to American feeling, even at some military sacrifice; and he lays it down that if England openly opposes any measure which is proposed for the benefit of America, such opposition will defeat its own object and help the supporters of the proposal. Americans might approve or even applaud what England was doing; they might desire to help France for historic sentiment, or Belgium from recent indignation; but an appeal to act, or refrain from action, for England's sake would rouse old hostilities.

To GREY. August 25, 1914.

"DEAR SIR EDWARD,

Roosevelt writes (and I agree with him) that every one must be impressed by the very friendly feeling of this country towards England and its strong anti-German sentiment He says:

'England's consistent friendliness towards us for decades past, and Germany's attitude during the Spanish war and in South America, have combined to produce a friendliness in the U.S. for England as against Germany and a genuine apprehension of German designs. It is a singular thing to reflect that seventy years ago, when there was practically no Irish or German vote in this country, we would have been unquestionably anti-English in almost any contest between it and a continental European power. Now there is a very large German and Irish vote, and yet that does not make the slightest difference in the trend of National feeling being favourable to England. The fact is that for nearly fifty years Prussianized Germany has acted in the spirit of Frederick and Bismarck, and with cynical frankness has shown its disbelief in accepting any theory of international morality, and has acted always in a spirit of entirely brutal selfishness. Gradually all the powers of the world have by personal experience learned to feel that

Germany lacks only the opportunity to inflict on them any injury which she believes will minister to her own interest.'

This seems the feeling of the native American; but there are other elements, and the influence of the Germans and especially the German Jews is very great, and in parts of the country is supreme. We must not count on American sympathy as assured to us. A very little incident might change it, and there are the cleverest people in the world at work with large sums at their back who will let no opportunity pass to do us mischief. Of course, the Japanese question will be exploited.[1] But it is quite plain, to any thinking person, that our moderating influence will be of great advantage to America and that we have the same fundamental interest that they have in keeping the Japanese out of the white countries. Now we cannot at the same time restrict them in the white countries and in China. They must have an outlet in one or the other. It is far less dangerous to have them in Shantung than in America, and if you dam up the stream in one of its courses you must let it flow freely in the other.

Another matter is the question of the transfer of the flag to the Hamburg Amerika ships. It is not a very pleasant business. The Company is practically a German Government affair. The ships are used for Government purposes, the Emperor himself is a large share-holder, and so is the great banking house of Kuhn & Loeb of New York. A member of that house has been appointed to a very responsible post in New York, although only just naturalized.[2] He is connected in business with the Secretary to the Treasury, who is the President's son-in-law. It is he who is negotiating on behalf of the Hamburg Amerika shipping company. The Government proposes to take over the German ships and pay a large sum which would, of course, be used by Germany to draw on for supplies. The Company will get rid of ships which are useless and expensive, and get ready money in return. All this is hardly friendly to us. But the idea which is inspiring the President is that there is a great plethora of goods for export lying idle in American docks for want of the means of export, and that it is a vital necessity for the farmers and other producers to bring their goods to the foreign market. Ships must be found and the German ships are at hand. The President is in favour of a

[1] Japan had joined the Allies and was reducing the German port of Tsingtao. This gave her a footing on the Chinese mainland, and America was always uneasy about the growth of Japanese power in the Pacific.

[2] Mr. Warburg was a member of the newly-elected Federal Reserve Board. He had been a partner of Mr. McAdoo, the Secretary to the Treasury.

plan by which the Government will keep control over the ships acquired and will see to it that they do not perform unneutral services. His plan is opposed by the German agents on the ground that private purchasers can be found. That is a fact, for the German banks here would provide the money; but if they did, the ships would ply in the old routes under the protection of the American flag, and a collision with England is certain. This the President is bound in honour to prevent, and if the Government is responsible, then we can act directly through him in order to prevent infractions of neutrality. Thus I think on the whole that it is in our interest that the Government itself, and not individuals, should take the ships over; but we should, I think, make it very clear that we are making a concession, and that the President who professes entire neutrality is really rendering a great service to our enemy. In return for our concession he should show a real desire to prevent the unneutral use of the ships, and we should, I think, make a written statement of the conditions which we should object to. The President's present idea is to use the ships for the trade with South America.

Bryan, of course, regards the war mainly as a background to his own peace treaties. It is hard to take him seriously, and yet it does seem to me that it would be a good and useful thing, at a time when most serious questions may turn up at any moment, to have an arrangement which ought to make immediate action of the sort taken by Austria against Servia an impossibility. So I think it might be as well to get power from the Dominions by telegraph to sign the treaty, so that it could go to the Senate for ratification before the end of the session.

Your name here is one to conjure with. It is quite evident that the White Paper[1] has worked wonders. On the steamer they were all reading it in turn. A Wesleyan Bishop told me that it was seldom in this world that anyone was so clearly in the right, and he will say so to his people. All the State Department are on our side except Bryan who is incapable of forming a settled judgment on anything outside party politics. The President will be with us by birth and upbringing, but he is very much in the hands of some of our worst enemies, and his name is rather compromised by the Panama affair.[2] He will have to be rather conspicuously neutral, and that he is trying to be. Our line is to say that we are confident

[1] Correspondence setting out the events which led up to the war, published by the British Government.

[2] That is by his having caused Congress to repeal the clause giving special privileges to United States vessels in the canal.

he will favour neither one party nor the other, and that we only ask a fair field and no favour.

By all accounts Barclay[1] has done extremely well here in very difficult circumstances."

The next letter adds, concerning the ships :

"At the present moment the tonnage of the Hamburg Amerika and N. German Lloyd ships in American ports is something under 400,000 tons. The cost of upkeep and pay to the crews is said to be over £10,000 a day. Most of these ships are large passenger ships wholly unsuited to the South American trade. Their purchase will be of great service to Germany in two ways. She will escape the burden of the daily payments for upkeep, and she will get a credit here of six million sterling which will be of great use to her in paying for coal and supplies from this country. We are in want of such a fund ourselves, and to give such a fund to Germany is certainly a favour to her."

September 8, 1914.

To GREY,

"The Secretary of State was delighted with the news that you were ready to sign his peace treaty. He believes sincerely that his plan would be of the greatest use in case some incident occurred which stirred up national animosity. The governments on each side would be able to say that there was a means ready to hand for examining questions of fact and that the case being therefore *sub judice*, international discussion was out of the question. At the present moment he is using your consent as a means of inducing the French to give their consent too, which they are not much inclined to do, their faith in treaties being somewhat at a discount. . . .

A very curious incident has occurred. About a week ago intimations began to appear in the press, especially that part which was under German influence, to the effect that the time had come for this country to intervene to bring about peace.

On the 5th, that is after the publication of your treaty,[2] a wireless message was sent to the German Embassy in which a sentence occurred about not wishing territorial extension. It was supposed to come from Berlin. The same day Oscar Straus, who is a great admirer of yours, and who is now

[1] The Counsellor of the Embassy (now Sir Colville Barclay, K.C.M.G., Ambassador at Lisbon), had been in charge while Spring Rice was in England.

[2] The Treaty which bound the Allies not to make or consider terms of peace except with the consent of all.

engaged in rather an anti-German propaganda, received an invitation from Speyer (brother to the Privy Counsellor, and the chief adviser of the German Ambassador here) to meet Bernstorff at dinner. B. spoke with enthusiasm of peace, and when Straus asked him whether he spoke with the authority of his Government, he made an evasive answer, but hinted that his Government would not, he was sure, object to entertaining the idea of the peaceful intervention of the United States. Straus offered to go to Washington and see Bryan and the two Ambassadors there (the Russian is away in the North). He saw Bryan, and Bryan spoke to Jusserand and me. Bryan insisted that we should give any proposal of the sort a favourable reception to this extent, namely that we should not refuse to say what we were fighting for and on what terms we would make peace. Of course I said that the allies would give a friendly hearing to any proposal made by the United States, but that what we desired was some security against a repetition of what we had suffered, and that what we were fighting for was not only peace but security. I could not help adding that it had unfortunately been proved that the most formal and sacred of treaties afforded no guarantee. Straus came to see Jusserand and me, and we spoke in this sense. In the meanwhile, Bryan had telegraphed to Bernstorff to come to Washington. The next day he came and Bryan saw him. I have received no word from Bryan. But Straus came again and he told me that Bernstorff had insisted most earnestly that the initiative in all this had come from him (Straus) and not from the Ambassador. I asked Straus if he thought that there was nothing in it. He said he was quite convinced that B. had received some instructions. Bryan had meanwhile telegraphed to Berlin to ask Gerard[1] to find out what were the views of the German Government. So far nothing has happened.

You will notice that the movement in the newspapers came before the announcement of your treaty, although perhaps not before the Germans had wind of it. You will judge whether the wish for peace is real and based on economical stress and the desire to take fortune at the top of the tide. I always heard that the bankers and business men were prepared for a month's war but not for more. And no doubt Speyer and German bankers here are anxious for peace. But as regards our position here, it is important to bear in mind that probably the peace negotiations will take place in this country and American popular opinion will be a useful factor. Now nothing would tend to win over the public here so much as the belief

[1] United States Ambassador in Berlin.

that we had refused a fair offer for peace which the Germans had made us, or had refused to listen to a peaceful suggestion of the United States Government. I have consulted some of our friends here and they have advised a course of action. It is that we should at once declare that the allies are anxious for peace with guarantees of permanency.

The feeling of nearly everyone with whom I speak is very friendly, but then the friends I have here are those who would naturally be friendly. Still, there seems no doubt at all that the mass of the people dislike the Germans more than they dislike us. In 1870 the feeling was overwhelmingly German, so there has been a great change. I think that there is a widespread belief (to quote you) that Prussian militarism is the question at issue, and that if it triumphs in Europe America will have to defend itself. The President said in the most solemn way that if that cause succeeds in the present struggle the United States would have to give up its present ideals and devote all its energies to defence, which would mean the end of its present system of Government. He is a great student of Wordsworth and when I alluded to the sonnets at the time of the great war, especially, ' It is not to be thought of that the flood,' and ' We must be free or die who speak the tongue,'—he said he knew them by heart, and had them in his mind all the time. I said, ' You and Grey are fed on the same food and I think you understand.' There were tears in his eyes, and I am sure we can, at the right moment, depend on an understanding heart here."

After that impression it is well to give an important communication which Spring Rice was to transmit to the President. The extreme delicacy of his approach is notable.

Personal and Confidential.

British Embassy,
Washington.
19 September, 1914.

"Dear Mr. President,

I venture to enclose for your information the paraphrase of a telegram which I received from Sir E. Grey in answer to a telegram of mine reporting an accusation circulated in the press to the effect that England was opposed to peace and demanding exorbitant terms.

I enclose this telegram not, of course, with any idea of influencing your policy but merely as the statement of a point of view which I am sure you will be interested to know.

" I have, etc.,
Cecil Spring Rice."

September 18, 1914.

TELEGRAM FROM SIR EDWARD GREY

"I have received your telegram of yesterday reporting the German Ambassador's statement as circulated in the press that Germany was ready to make peace on moderate terms, but that England was opposed to peace.

My view is as follows:

Germany planned this war, and chose her own time for forcing it on Europe. No one was in the same state of military preparation as Germany was when war began.

What we require for our future security is that we may be able to live free from a menace of this kind.

A series of able writers, instructors of Germany, from Treitschke downwards, has openly taught under the sanction of the Government that the main object of German policy must be to crush Great Britain, and to destroy the British Empire. We want to be sure that this idea no longer inspires German policy.

A cruel wrong has been done to Belgium; wanton destruction has been inflicted on her and her resistance has been punished by wholesale acts of cruelty and vandalism. Is Germany prepared to make reparation for these acts?

If Germany really desires the mediation of the United States, these facts must be considered in drawing up the conditions of peace. But we have no indication that Germany is prepared to consider them. Up to the present moment we have neither stated nor heard any condition of peace. There is no evidence whatever that the suggestions which appear to emanate from the German Ambassador are authorised by his government, or really meant."

Then follows, on the heel of these peace rumours, Spring Rice's account of an episode already detailed in Colonel House's papers.

Private and Secret.

September 22, 1914.

"MY DEAR GREY,

On the 19th I received a letter from Colonel House in which he urged me to come at once to New York. I started that night, and he met me at the station and took me to his house. He told me that he wished very much to communicate with you on the subject of the war and American mediation, and that the President had consulted him on the subject. He was extremely sympathetic and showed that he fully understood and admired our policy. He warned me that although

for the present American sympathy was strongly with the Allies, this attitude might be modified by two eventualities. The first was if it could be asserted with any show of reason that Germany was willing to make peace, but that the Allies were determined on war at all hazards. The other was that the real object of the Allies should prove to be not the restoration of the balance of Europe, but its destruction by the entire elimination of Germany.

I said of course that we were glad of American sympathy, but did not ask for it. The struggle was one which we must endure to the end, and the only satisfactory end for us would be a peace that was durable peace and not merely an armed truce; he would himself remember the attitude of his own government as to the war of the rebellion. Then, Lincoln took the view that the war should not have been begun at all unless the people of the North were prepared to fight it through to the end, that is until the object for which they fought was accomplished. He said he understood, but he wished to say a few words for your information. He had, as you know, been sent by the President to Berlin[1] in order to make certain proposals as to disarmament. The Emperor had greeted him in a friendly way, although it was very apparent that his entourage and the Empress and her son were bitterly opposed to his mission, and evidently afraid lest the Emperor should be led away. He was convinced that if the military party in Berlin receive a check, the Emperor would be able to reassert his power and exercise his influence for peace. Mr. House had corresponded with the Emperor, in fact was still in correspondence with him. He thought that it would be a pity not to keep a door open for negotiations, even if they had no practical result. But he thought that the President's intervention was really the best hope for the eventual restoration of peace, and he did not wish the President to lose touch with the warring powers. He went on to say that he had met Bernstorff at Speyer's and that B. had shared House's views. House then suggested that I should meet him: B. had no objection. I said that our treaty bound us not to negotiate without the knowledge of the Allies, and that I could not see B. alone. He then said, could not a message be sent to you? I said I would be very pleased to send one, as I knew you had spoken with him very freely. I then told him of your telegram to me saying what you thought of Bernstorff's statement about our attitude, and what our attitude really was. He at once said that the two *sine qua non* conditions which you had men-

[1] In May, 1914.

tioned[1] would at once win the sympathy of the whole world. It would, he thought, be not a bad thing for the President tentatively to sound the Powers as to their attitude with regard to these conditions with a view to clearing up the situation. I again reminded him of the treaty and said that no terms could be even discussed which had not met with the acceptance of the three belligerent Allies, and that what you had mentioned were just the conditions which would, in your opinion, appeal at once to the British people as indispensable; they were not in any way the enunciation of a policy. I said also that it had been proved again and again that Germany's main object was to break the solidarity of the Allies, and that this was a possible explanation of B.'s willingness to speak with me.

House said he fully understood, but he thought it a good thing for us and the Allies that we should not adopt a *non possumus* attitude as to negotiations, and that it could be only to our advantage that Germany should be forced to show her hand. The reason why it was desirable to begin conversations now, or rather not to stop them, was that if we waited, either Germany or Russia would gain a great preponderance, and this would so much alter the situation in every way as to make terms of peace which might be possible now wholly out of the question. It would certainly much alter the attitude of the President and the American people.

I resumed our conversation in the telegram which I sent you on the night of the 21st on my return here.

It is, as you will remember, in the form of a telegram[2] from him to you, of which he approved the terms. In this message he says that the President might be disposed to take a certain line of action for certain reasons. I presume he has told the President, who may or may not have instructed Page.

The line I have taken and propose to continue taking is that negotiations are impossible without the consent and agreement of all the Allies, but that we have no objection whatever to the President keeping in touch with the warring powers, because the time will almost surely come when the one Great Power which is neutral will have to use its good offices, and also because we have a perfect confidence in the rectitude of the President, his perfect fairness and his understanding of our point of view.

I am very glad to see Churchill's speech reported to-day,

[1] An end of militarism and permanent peace: by compensation to Belgium.

[2] Printed in House, i. 534.

which puts an end to the rumours that have been spread (supported as usual by forgeries) that we are fighting for the destruction of the German people and the division of their territory.

In the meanwhile Germany has absolutely denied that B. was authorized to make peace proposals; so that game is played out."

It will be remembered that the battle of the Marne was decided on September 11, so that these overtures, whether genuine or not, were made after Germany had failed to succeed in the projected *guerre courte*. A letter to Roosevelt which will be found a little further on refers to Spring Rice's opinion that Germany counted on a swift success, and consequently now found her plans deranged.

There is a note in House (I., 339) of a conversation with Spring Rice on September 29.

"I could see that Sir Cecil was thoroughly of the opinion that Germany should be badly punished before peace was made. There was something of resentment and almost vindictiveness in his attitude. He said, to forgive Germany now and to make peace was similar to forgiving a bully and making peace with him after he had knocked you down and trampled upon you foully much to his satisfaction."

If indeed this was vindictiveness, there is no doubt that Spring Rice would have been constrained to plead guilty to the charge. It should be remarked that at this time England had inflicted by far more damage on Germany than she had received. But it did not make Spring Rice less resentful that the injury had been done to England's allies—and to the principle of justice.

A more intimate expression of Spring Rice's mind is given in a group of letters to Roosevelt. Apart from the information they convey, they have great interest for the unconscious change of attitude. Spring Rice had always written to this friend on terms of the closest friendship, yet always with a touch of deference. Official position apart, he constantly treated Roosevelt as a greater man than himself. Now, he is the accredited representative of his country at a time of great issues, and the change is felt in the tone. He bears himself in that new position as he should.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON
Sept. 10, 1914

"DEAR THEODORE,

I have heard nothing from the State Department about peace. I gather that when you intervened in the Russo-Japanese conflict, you had conclusive evidence that your aid was wanted.

You wrote to me about our putting pressure on Japan, and after speaking to Lord Lansdowne, I answered that he could not, as an ally, make any suggestion in the matter, as this

would be putting a sort of pressure on her, and if our help were wanted, we should be told.[1]

I presume the usual course to follow is to ascertain from the Powers concerned whether they wish an offer to be made and then to make it. None of the Powers so far has shown any anxiety to offer terms or accept mediation; but it is quite certain that the Secretary of State will do his best to bring about peace, and that the other side will do their best to prove that they wanted peace, but that we declined it. However, we must make up our minds to do what we think the right thing ('insistence in the right as God has given us to see the right') and to stick to it whatever people say.

It is rather unpleasant to have to confess that this war is quite as savage as any war has ever been. I have just seen the Belgians.[2] I like them. They are modest but very determined people. Especially the socialist. He told me 'When I saw the German ultimatum in the papers, I didn't need to look to see what the answer would be. I knew at once.' That is some talking.

Don't be down about politics (that comes oddly from me) the time is not ripe and other things are doing. I am sure the best thing to do is to collect your reserves and train them upon peace."

10 Sept., 1914.

To the Same.

"Your letter was very comforting reading. Poor Jusserand was glad to hear of your views, but he is a good deal shattered and nervous, and so is she. She looks years older. He is quite determined that the only thing is to go on, and I imagine his people will say and think the same thing. As you will have guessed, the bankers who consort with Bernstorff got your Oscar Straus to come down and plead the cause of Peace to the Father of Words[3] who was delighted. This is not unpleasing to your Imperial friend, but of course, he has nothing to do with it. When one has knocked the other fellow down and he is getting up, one likes to say, 'This fight is over,' but the other fellow may take a different view. My impression is that they calculated on a short war with a striking and overwhelming victory by land and sea (owing to superior organisation, guns, etc.), and then to propose terms of peace which would look moderate, but really leave the

[1] See above, I. p. 474 *sqq.*

[2] This was the special mission sent by Belgium to the United States whose chief persons were M. de Wiart and the Socialist M. Vandervelde.

[3] Mr. Bryan.

western nations paralysed and helpless. So that only two Empires should remain, the German and the Russian.—It looks quite likely that a striking victory or victories will be won in the west, and then the question is, How much punishment can be stood? It is a fearful situation; but so is death, and we must all face that some day. There is no way out of the situation except a horrible one, for, as you say, the whole being of the German people has been converted into a destroying machine—which must either be destroyed or destroy. Nations who are content to exist side by side in friendship and equality may live in peace; but a nation which as one man is bent on domination must either dominate or perish—destroy or be destroyed. There is no middle path. And the process is a terrible one, 'Oh, thou enemy, thy destructions have come to a perpetual end, even as the cities which thou hast destroyed,' says the Psalmist of Assyria or Babylon. I notice that the greatest hatred and fury of the Germans is directed against the English, and if they get into England they will indeed work destruction: one of the most characteristic points is the punishment inflicted on women who had dared to give prisoners cigarettes and chocolate.

As for Grey, he says that he longs for peace, but it must be a peace which gives satisfaction to Belgium for all she has suffered, and a sure guarantee for the future. I suppose the idea is to show the Allies up as furious and blood-thirsty persons, refusing a fair offer out of sheer villainy.

I watch your course with great interest but great regret, because I am sure you ought to rest absolutely till malaria is cleaned out.

Love to Mrs. Theodore. I saw your Teddy wished to fight, and I am very glad he was stopped."

Sept. 16, 1914.

To the Same.

"Bismarck was always so able to engineer the diplomatic situation that he could fool most of the nations while he downed one of them. His successors are not so clever and the nations have resolved to be downed together if they are downed at all. But the diplomatic situation may change, and if a respite is allowed, then Germany will labour to separate the powers—*divide et impera*—as Bismarck did—and then Europe ends. You have a long experience of the diplomatic situations which form and reform, but have always at bottom the same main characteristics. The American people has the right instinct and on the whole can be depended on to do the

right thing in the end, as Lincoln found. There are a number of people neither stupid enough to trust solely to instinct, nor clever enough to judge rightly, who are a pretty dangerous element—all the more because they are so well intentioned.

I hope our people will stop talking and stick to it and do their fighting and not quit till the job is done. I hope and trust they are all right: but being uncomfortable is—uncomfortable; and many people don't like it. It is no good beginning this job at all unless one finishes it, and we have got to do that. By finishing the job, I don't mean finishing Germany: putting an end to the fever doesn't mean putting an end to the patient. We want the patient to survive. If Germany didn't exist, she would have to be invented.

I think you are very pessimistic about yourself which means simply that you still have malaria: *rest* and get strong, and if a crisis comes you will be there to meet it, and you will be badly wanted. In the meantime, *rest*!"

Before that month of September was out, Spring Rice was face to face with the greatest difficulty of his position. Great Britain controlled the seas. She controlled them in the interest of the Allies and with their assistance; but in the main all supervision of sea traffic in the Atlantic and the North Sea was exercised by British officers on board British vessels. America, the greatest of the neutrals, had always exported largely to Northern Europe; now, the demand for American produce was greater than ever in history, and it was America's interest to maintain the freedom of American trade. On the other hand, it was not to be supposed that England, commanding the sea, would allow Germany to be freely supplied.

All belligerent states in modern times have acted upon the principle that contraband of war is liable to seizure by the belligerent. As affecting the relations between the Allies and America, this issue was one of sea transport only.—Enemy vessels with their goods were liable to capture; but goods belonging to neutrals found on enemy vessels, if not contraband, were exempt. As, however, the British Navy had swept all German commerce from the seas, this distinction had no importance. In the early stages, however, a question arose as to whether German vessels, transferred after the outbreak of war to a neutral, were exempt from capture. The British prize courts settled that they were not exempt, unless it could be proved that the transfer would have taken place whether there was war or no. Such ships, transferred to American owners, were seized and detained; and to this America appears to have raised no serious objection.

The first question that created serious difficulty between the nations was America's claim to trade directly with Germany as a neutral. This right was limited, according to international law. No neutral could claim to carry contraband of war with immunity from

capture. Morally speaking, every neutral was entitled to take the risk, but had no legal or moral right to protest if there was seizure and confiscation. All the munitions shipped from America to the Allies were legally liable to capture by German ships. This right of capture was useless to Germany, since her ships were driven off the seas. It could be exercised, and was exercised by all the Allies; but in practice, since the naval control of the Atlantic was maintained by Great Britain, British ships had the duty of seizing contraband of war consigned to Germany, and by consequence it was British ships that barred American producers from an important market.

No complications arose in regard to absolute contraband, that is, articles exclusively for military use; the right of seizure was too well recognized. Further, since the Allies were inadequately prepared for the manufacture of munitions, America had virtually an unlimited market for any armament that it produced. The trouble arose over conditional contraband—articles which could be used either for civil or military purposes.

The first clash began concerning the right of American traders to ship direct to Germany; and the issue was complicated by the fact that in 1909 the British Government had agreed to the Declaration of London by which many articles, in addition to foodstuffs, were declared exempt from seizure. Among these articles were oil and copper, of which America produced huge supplies. But Parliament had refused in 1909 to ratify the Declaration of London, and Great Britain was therefore not legally bound by it. Nevertheless, the Government's attitude was on record, and created a strong prejudice against the seizure of ships belonging to the Standard Oil Corporation. It was, however, clear that in modern times oil is a prime requisite for war. The case was less clear about foodstuffs. Britain justified the refusal to let them go through on the ground that the German Government had declared an absolute control over all supplies in its country. Finally, on March 11, 1915, after and in answer to Germany's proclamation of a "danger zone" around the British Isles, within which all shipping was liable to be sunk at sight without warning, an order in Council declared a blockade of Germany; and Great Britain's right to do this was not disputed by America. It could not well be, since in the Civil War the North had proclaimed a blockade of the South.

There remained, however, the thorny dispute as to shipment of conditional contraband from America to neutral ports in Europe. Germany was in direct touch with Holland and Denmark, and in close touch with Sweden and Norway across the Baltic, where British control of the seas did not exist. Austria was in direct touch with Italy while Italy remained neutral. In all these countries the import of certain articles doubled or trebled, and was plainly in excess of the national demand. England insisted on the doctrine of continuous voyage; that is, that the character of goods was decided by their ultimate destination, and not by the immediate port of deliver The same doctrine had been maintained by the North in

the American Civil War against British shippers, and Britain had acquiesced.

The result was that every ship sailing from America to any port except that of an Allied Power was liable to detention and search; and frequently ships were taken into port to permit of search at leisure. This in itself caused widespread inconvenience and great pecuniary loss; further, the enquiries as to the real and ultimate destination of goods were naturally resented by American shippers and by consignees in the neutral nations. All the odium of this fell upon England, since British ships carried out the control. In practice the operation of blockading an entire country involved restriction of the freedom of the seas to a degree without parallel in history.

Another restriction concerned the mails, which in all previous wars had been let go free except those from or to belligerent countries. Germany in order to evade the blockade began to bring in and out, through the ports of neutral countries, quantities of parcels, many of which contained contraband. The result was that mails were stopped and searched, with great delay, and with frequent losses; and the effect of this touched not only merchants but the whole American community and was deeply resented.

Intimately connected with all this was the opposite controversy as to Germany's use of a new arm. She could not keep surface vessels at sea, but she had her submarines. They also had and exercised the right of search for contraband, and no legal objection could be taken to their seizing or destroying such goods. But the conditions of submarine warfare fitted ill with previous conventions. As German cruisers, they might summon vessels suspect of carrying contraband to stop, at the risk of being fired on. But in practice they could not take captures into port, and consequently could not bring disputed cargoes before a prize court. All they could do was to sink the vessel, and by international law they were bound to give the crew and passengers a fair chance of saving their lives. But a submarine was extraordinarily vulnerable; to challenge, it must emerge, and a single shot might sink it; or, in certain cases, it was easily to be rammed. By traditional usage, merchantmen were entitled to carry defensive armament, as protection against piracy, without forfeiting the right to be considered peaceful civilian craft. Merchantmen used their guns more than once with effect against German submarines. Germany demanded—not unreasonably, in view of the facts—that a non-combatant vessel should be an unarmed vessel. But since the penalty proposed was that a submarine should sink vessels without warning, America, like Great Britain, thought the means of enforcing the demand to be barbarous. England for military purposes inflicted hardships and inconvenience on American citizens; Germany with the same objects inflicted destruction. England, because she had naval supremacy, claimed to police the seas, but she could do so like a policeman; she claimed to supervise the use of the seas, but admitted lawful occasions. Germany in the end sought to deny the

use of the seas to all, and enforced her will by the only possible penalty, sudden death.

These facts, however, took time to develop fully; but from the first there was no mistaking the desire of American producers to have a free outlet for their goods or the desire of the American Government to support their interest. Matters came to a head on September 27 when a despatch was drafted in the State Department concerning the Declaration of London and the modification introduced into it by the British Order in Council of August 20. The story has been told already in Colonel House's correspondence.

October 1, 1914.

To Grey.

"I had suspected for some time that something was up among the lawyers in the State Department, but I could extract no hint of what was intended. The only indication was a rather unfriendly atmosphere. I received one day a sudden message from a friend[1] of yours here, who said he wished to see me. He then told me that he happened to be sitting with the President when a large package was brought in from the State Department. The President was very tired and did not want to look at it; he was told it was to go off by mail the next morning. He read it and to his astonishment it was a sort of ultimatum, couched in not too friendly terms—the sort of document which would really have convulsed the world if it had got out, as it certainly would if it had been despatched. The two men were astonished, the more so as the Secretary of State had been away for some time, tired with his exertions in procuring peace treaties, and was at that moment at a distant watering place with his wife. The President said that the document, although signed, could not go at once. I saw it and was really astonished at the tone in one or two of the sentences. I merely remarked that if it went off as it was, there would be a big catastrophe equal to, or worse than, that brought on by Cleveland's Venezuela despatch. It was arranged that instead of the despatch a telegram should be sent giving the general heads for a friendly discussion. This is now taking place.

The President is very much impressed by the gravity of the question because it touches the pockets and the prejudices of so many of the people. It happens to be just the sort of question which takes the popular fancy and also enlists the monied people as well. He has written a book on the history of the country, and in this book there is a passage describing the appearance of a somewhat similar question

[1] Colonel House.

before the war of 1812, and the unconscious way in which it was handled by Madison, who seemed to have no idea to what a point the question would lead the country. He said, 'I only hope I shall be wiser.' That night he ordered the man chiefly responsible[1] to come to the Embassy, and there we had a talk and drew up a scheme, which seemed to offer some good hope of a solution. But I fear we are not out of the wood yet, as there will continually arise new aspects of the question, and there will be continual attempts to envenom the sore."

From Spring Rice to President Wilson :

September 30, 1914.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

Sir Edward Grey begs me to assure you that he very much appreciates the way in which you have raised the question of the Order in Council, and that he will do all in his power to meet your views.

He must consult the Cabinet, and he hopes to be able to come to an arrangement through Mr. Page with as little delay as possible. Had our government been warned sooner, the question would have been discussed at an earlier stage. The very strong line taken by the State Department about the Declaration of London and the Order in Council (which was dated August 20), suddenly and without warning after so long an interval, has come as a complete surprise. All I knew about it personally was that some objection would be taken to the British attitude, but I was not told what the nature of the objection was. Nor, I presume, was Mr. Page informed or he would certainly have spoken to Sir Edward.

I hear to-day from Grey that he has had a long talk with Mr. Page with whom, as you know, he has very pleasant and cordial relations and whom, if I may say so, he trusts entirely.

I enclose a short account of this interview as described to me by Grey.

'Telegram from Sir E. Grey, September 29, 1914 :

I have just had a conversation with the United States Ambassador. I explained to him that the Declaration of London had not been ratified, owing to the strong opposition which had developed in Parliament. Our position towards the treaty was therefore the same as that of the United States towards a treaty which the Senate had refused to consent to.

[1] House; not the drafter of the message, who was Lansing, afterwards Secretary of State.

The main point was the doctrine of continuous voyage. This doctrine had been upheld in the United States Courts, and it must remain as a part of the accepted doctrine of international law until abrogated by an agreement between the governments. The doctrine enunciated in the Order in Council of August 20, had been applied in previous wars and should be judged in the light of the rules of international law hitherto accepted and enforced.

With regard to the statement that all the powers had acted on the declaration of London, Germany had treated pit props as contraband although consigned to private firms.

The objects aimed at in the proclamations had been to restrict the supplies for the German Army, and also to restrict the supply to Germany of such materials as could be used in manufacturing war munitions.

We feel it essential to have a working agreement with the United States Government in this matter, although we cannot at once withdraw the Order in Council for reasons which will be obvious. But it can be stated at once that the United States has raised the question of the interference with neutral trade under the orders in Council and that the British Government has agreed to discuss these rules without delay. This discussion will, in fact, begin to-morrow with Mr. Page and Mr. Chandler Anderson.

It is most important to bear in mind that up to date the British Government has not confiscated a single cargo. Certain cargoes have been diverted, but payment in full has been made, and the exporter has suffered no loss. Pending an agreement and a change in the proclamations, we will at once examine any case about which there is a complaint.

I cited the instance of a cargo of copper consigned direct to Krupp and the news that Krupp was making large orders of copper for the manufacture of projectiles. The Ambassador said that there was no desire to protect people who deliberately and directly traded with Germany to supply the Government with war supplies, but there was a strong feeling in favour of free trade with Holland.' "

Spring Rice to President Wilson:

October 5th, 1914.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT.

I telegraphed to Grey after receiving a visit from Lansing, making certain suggestions with which you are familiar. I trust that a satisfactory solution will now be found, and I can only say that if this is the case it will be greatly due to

the considerate attitude of this Government and especially, if I may say so, of yourself.

I fear that many difficulties may still be in store for us. The misery caused by the war is not confined only to belligerents. Neutrals, too, have their share. But I am sure that the American people will not forget that in 1861 and 1862 the whole labouring population of Lancashire was thrown out of work; but because they believed the struggle here to be one for liberty and justice, the very men on whom starvation fell were most steadfast in repudiating the demand that the British Government should intervene."

This noble example had been suggested to Spring Rice by a recent reading of George Trevelyan's *Life of Bright*. He recurred to it in letters to several correspondents.

The question was, he said, in another despatch to Grey, "between the imperative military necessities of the war, and the equally imperative necessity of preventing additional complications." He pleaded for "a little forbearance," noting that the Senate had ratified Mr. Bryan's peace treaties. "They at any rate provide machinery for preventing the dispute from becoming too acrimonious."

Ten days later, he addressed the President again on the same matter, with a reference to one particular article in which American exporters had huge interests.

To PRESIDENT WILSON.

October 20, 1914.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I saw Mr. Lansing to-day, and told him that I was without any news as to the seizures of American oilships. I remarked that the immense supplies of oil received by neutrals after the withdrawal of our proclamation, which was made in deference to your wishes, had been nothing less than alarming. The evidence was convincing that an attack by submarines and Zeppelins was contemplated and supplies of oil were absolutely essential to Germany. The measure taken, even if irregular, as to which I expressed no opinion, was a measure of obvious self-defence and was imperatively demanded by popular opinion.

If we are in the wrong, we must of course pay the penalty and see that the United States are not losers by wrongful action.

I am sure, Mr. President, that your people will understand our motives just as well as we shall understand your protest. We each wish to defend our rights. But I am sure you will remember that the rights we are defending are our existence.

The general situation is this. We are trying to conclude agreements with the neutrals, in order to prevent them from becoming the base of supplies for the enemy, and in order to enable them to supply themselves. We have nearly concluded these agreements. I am at the present moment instructing the consuls to attest the signatures of neutral consuls here on documents showing that articles exported from this country are subject to an embargo in the country of their destination, and are not therefore liable to seizure. But these agreements must have a sanction, and unless we are able to threaten neutral governments that we shall resume our liberty of action unless they keep their agreements, those agreements have no sanction. We must therefore have a clause which gives us this power. If the United States protest, we shall either have to issue the Proclamation in spite of the protest or abandon all hope of carrying out measures which are absolutely essential to our very existence.

What Sir E. Grey asks is that the United States should reserve its right to protect its interests in each case as it arises, but that they should not enter a protest against the Proclamation itself *before* it is enforced.

May I add that experience during the Russo-Japanese war showed us that it was possible to settle each question as it arose between us and Russia; and the questions were many and difficult.

I must apologise for taking so much of your time but I have been emboldened by your invariable courtesy to trespass on it once more."

Letters throughout October are occupied with the same subject. Enormous increase of shipment to the countries having direct access to Germany was noted and admitted. A provisional solution was found in an agreement given by the governments of these countries to accept shipments only for the use of their own citizens, and not for re-export.

Salient passages from these letters follow.

October 5, 1914.

To GREY.

"We must be prepared for constant new difficulties to spring up. The most important at the present moment is the question of copper. The copper interests here are very powerful as the exports for last year were valued at nearly thirty million sterling, and at the present moment the mining districts are in a very dangerous situation. We shall have to find some means of crippling Krupp without ruining the mining states

here who possess the ear of the Secretary of State and have a commanding influence in the Senate.

I imagine that the lawyers in the State Department want to put up a historical fight, and to be quoted in the law books as models of patriotism. This doesn't interest the President, but he knows how sensitive public opinion is on all questions connected with the freedom of the seas. The American boy is educated on stories about the war of 1812, which makes him believe that Britain has always been a tyrant and aggressor and has always tried to expel the American marine from the seas. Then there are also great interests involved and the American pocket is being heavily affected."

October 20, 1914.

To the Same.

"The elections are to take place in the first week of November which will decide whether or no the President is to retain his majority in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. At the present moment, as you know, he controls both, and it is very rare indeed that a President succeeds in maintaining his hold during the second half of his term. At this particular moment public opinion is very sensitive, and an incident is looked for by either side as a matter of primary importance.

Such an incident has been provided by the seizure of two American oilships. The German vote is considerable and the vote of those who are intensely anxious for the increase of the American mercantile marine is also very large. Both are ignorant and are easily excited. The German vote is well organised and intensely in earnest. It is feared by both parties and especially in the State of New York.

The matter therefore requires very delicate handling. Mr. Bryan of course is away and will not be back till the first week in November. Mr. Lansing, the Counsellor, is a lawyer accustomed to conduct matters of smaller importance like claim commissions. He finds himself suddenly in charge at a moment when very much may hinge on his personal action.

You will see the difficulty of negotiating with a subordinate who has the lawyer's instinct to make good his case, and of being unable to address myself directly, except by letter, to the person who has the real authority. At the present moment it would not be advisable for me to be seen frequently at the White House; and even if I could see the President, he is notoriously difficult to move when once he has made up his mind. I am sure that although he is very anxious, especially at the present moment, to give the impression (and the

true impression) that he is a firm defender of American rights, he is also anxious to do all in his power to effect an amicable solution."

So far there was no grave friction. Tyrrell wrote on October 9: "One line to congratulate you on the success of your work; it is just splendid and the Chief very pleased and satisfied." The letter went on to announce the approach of Mr. J. A. Seddon, M.P., who was "going to do spade work in the American trade unions."—Mr. Seddon was one of the forerunners in a regiment which but for Spring Rice might have been an army. The Ambassador's attitude towards the proposal of a British propaganda in the United States is amusingly shown by a letter to Lord Newton, who had consulted him.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
To LORD NEWTON. Oct. 21, 1914.

"Thank you for writing. On the whole it has seemed wisest to do nothing against the German propaganda which is conducted by hired agents backed with large sums of money. This seems to be more than met by the willing and unorganised correspondents who answer their articles in the newspapers. Public speaking would be fatal, because people here don't like to be preached at: they like to think they are neutral and make up their minds. First and foremost, we must fight our own battles, and fight them well. The rest will follow of itself. If you came out and talked to people, I am sure you would have an effect on them if you did it in the ordinary way of accidental conversation. But if they thought you came out to preach at them, they would immediately suspect you of imposing your opinions on their free and unbiassed minds.

About ninety per cent. of the English-speaking people, and half the Irish, are on the side of the Allies; and in the glorious annals of German achievements nothing is so remarkable as the fact that Germany has almost made England popular in America. But a very little could change this—and we are sure to have awkward questions of international law in which we shall both be very much in the right and become extremely abusive in consequence. Also we are in the position of creditor—which is not an endearing one even to the willing and opulent debtor—and the U.S. is neither willing nor opulent at present. Two labour members are over now and are doing a good deal of useful talking in the private line—*none* public.

The Irish, on the whole, are with us, but I wish you would tell the censor to let some racy details escape him as to the Irish regiments. An Irishman here was asked if he was

neutral. He said, Bedad he was, he didn't care a damn *who* beat the Germans.

After all, I don't see that I have answered your question. But on the whole I should say—Stay at home."

A letter of November 13 to Sir Arthur Nicolson (then at the head of the Foreign Office), describes one of the conversations in which he was vehement—and also suggests some of the justifications.

"Bryan spoke to me about peace as he always does. He sighs for the Nobel Prize, and besides that he is a really convinced peaceman. He has just given me a sword beaten into a ploughshare six inches long to serve as a paper-weight. It is adorned with quotations from Isaiah and himself.[1] No one doubts his sincerity, but that is rather embarrassing for us at the present moment, because he is always at us with peace propositions. This time, he said he could not understand why we could not say what we were fighting for. The nation which continued war had as much responsibility as the country which began it. The United States was the one great Power which was outside the struggle, and it was their duty to do what they could to put an end to it.—I felt rather cross and said that the United States were signatories to the Hague Convention, which had been grossly violated again and again without one word from the principal neutral nation. They were now out of court. They had done nothing to prevent the crime, and now they must not prevent the punishment.—He said that all the Powers concerned had been disappointed in their ambitions. Germany had not taken Paris. France had not retaken Alsace, England had not cleared the seas of the German navy. The last month had made no appreciable difference in the relative positions of the armies, and there was now no prospect of an issue satisfactory to any Power. Why should they not make peace now, if they had to make peace a year hence after another year's fruitless struggle. It would be far wiser if each said what it was fighting for and asked the United States to help them in arriving at a peaceful conclusion.—I asked him if he thought that under present circumstances Germany would give up Belgium and compensate her for her suffering. If not, how could the United States Government go on record as condoning a peace which would put the seal on the most disgraceful act of tyranny and oppression committed in modern times? I didn't believe there was a man in the country not a German or a Jew who could advocate such a cause.—He got rather angry and said that

[1] See below, p. 274.

if that was what we wanted, why did we not say so. He added, 'Who can tell who was really responsible for what had happened in Belgium or whether the treaty wasn't only a pretext?' I reminded him that he was a great admirer of Gladstone, who was like him, a great lover of peace, and that Gladstone had always maintained that if we had gone to war for Belgium in 1870[1], we should have gone to war for freedom and for public right and to save human happiness from being invaded by a tyrannous and lawless power, and that in such a war as that while the breath continued in his body he was ready to engage. This rather surprised him as he had read in the newspapers that Gladstone had always maintained that the Belgian Treaty was not binding."

A series of letters to Sir Valentine Chirol gives the main movement of events, and also expresses Spring Rice's inner feelings—undiplomatically.

Nov. 3, 1914.

To CHIROL.

"As usual your letters are most illuminating, but to-day it is also cheering. I hope this strain will have cause to last. Here the situation is that the inevitable contraband cases are coming to the fore; we have command of the seas and this is a reason why we are likely to fall foul of all the neutrals. The American conscience is on our side but the American pocket is being touched. Copper and oil are dear to the American heart and the export is a matter of great importance. We are stopping this export and the consequence is a steady howl which is increasing in volume. We should probably do the same. But the howl may become very furious soon. It is useful for Dernburg[2] to be able to say that England is re-enacting Napoleon's decrees of Berlin and enforcing a universal blockade. The State Department is obliged to take the attitude of the stern protector of American rights, or else the most serious consequences will follow. The elections are being held to-day, and the President's power over the House and Senate will depend on the outcome. So far he has done his best to be just and friendly and he and Grey have done good work in getting round difficulties. But the fact remains that there is and must be a very real conflict of interests, and we

[1] When violation of its frontier was threatened during the Franco-Prussian War.

[2] The chief director of German propaganda in the United States. Originally the Chief Manager of the Darmstadt Bank, he was brought in 1906 to preside over the Colonial Department of the German Foreign Office.

must bear in mind how questions of this sort made a permanent breach in the relations between France and Italy. We cannot give up the right to exert pressure on Germany by stopping her trade in some articles at any rate. The Americans seem to have a sort of idea that their ships are or ought to be sacrosanct. This we can't admit.

George Trevelyan had an admirable study in his *Bright* on the attitude of our working classes to the North during the cotton famine. I wish that the Americans would take a similar view of their obligations. They signed the Hague Treaty. That Treaty has been shamefully and repeatedly violated. They never protested and have not once raised their voice against these violations or on behalf of the weak and oppressed. When the Jews in Rumania were touched they howled loud enough, because the Jews in New York had votes. When Jew bagmen were turned out of Russia, they broke off their treaty with the one country which had uniformly been friendly to them in the hour of their greatest need. When Parnell was over here, they gave him a hearing on the floor of the House because there was an Irish vote which congressmen were afraid of. But the President forbids the slightest manifestations on behalf of Belgium. We are fighting, if any nation ever did, for the principles of liberty for which the American is supposed to live and die, and the moment that we take a measure essential to our safety which touches the Standard Oil or the Copper Trust, there is a cry that American honour is being sacrificed. I do not quite understand the basis of this sympathy with the cause for which we are fighting. Is it mere sentiment or is it something else? But if this country goes into Hague Conferences, and if it shouts for freedom and Justice among the nations of the world, the sanctity of treaties and all the rest of it, and then at a moment like this binds itself to ' strict neutrality,' one can't help thinking of the souls in Dante who were neither for God nor for God's enemies, but for themselves, and who were not good enough for heaven, while Hell disdained to receive them."

November 13, 1914.

To the Same.

" The situation here is much the same as far as our position goes with the American public. Dernburg and his crew are continually at work, and the German Jewish Bankers are toiling in a solid phalanx to compass our destruction. One by one they are getting hold of the principal New York papers, and I was told to-day that the New York *Times*, which had a

courageous Jew at its head who manfully stood up for the Allies, has been practically acquired by Kuhn Loeb and Co., and Schiff, the arch-Jew and special protégé of the Emperor. Warburg, nearly related to Kuhn Loeb and Schiff, and a brother of the well-known Warburg of Hamburg, the associate of Ballin, is a member of the Federal Reserve Board or rather *the* member. He practically controls the financial policy of the Administration, and Paish and Blackett[1] had mainly to negotiate with him. Of course it was exactly like negotiating with Germany. Everything that was said was German property. The result was that such arrangements as were made were thought to be for the advantage of the German banks, and the Christian banks were jealous and irritated. A short time ago it seemed inevitable that gold would have to be shipped to meet American liabilities in London.[2] If there had been a drain of gold from here, the Treasury would have stopped gold payments and then there would have been a panic. Now every one is talking of booming trade and increasing exports. This all depends on our keeping the sea open and consequently it is the rule of England on the sea that is preventing a financial catastrophe here. Gradually this is being understood. There is some exasperation at the impediments to neutral trade, but on the whole the public takes it in a calm and sensible way and fully understands that we have to take some defensive measures, and that the United States has been once and may be again a belligerent. There is great improvement in this respect, except among the copper men who are largely controlled by Germans.

Among the Germans there is a party which really does believe in the principles of '48 and is against the Junkers. But the majority of the younger men are violently pan-German: so much so that they are arousing a feeling of exasperation. They organised themselves in opposition to the Administration in the last election on the ground that the President and his Cabinet are friendly to us. As a matter of fact, the President has taken a very strong line, as you know, on the subject of seizures and contraband. But he stopped the use by the

[1] Sir George Paish and Sir Basil Blackett had been sent over on a special mission to the U.S. Government in connection with exchange problems arising out of the war.

[2] Dodd in *Woodrow Wilson and his Work*, notes (p. 158), "When the Great War began, American business men and corporations owed Europeans at least four billions and the gold balances were a little difficult to maintain. When the country went to war in 1917, all the four billions of debt had been paid, Europe owed large sums to America and the great gold reserves of the world were on this side of the Atlantic."

Germans of their wireless installations (which were contrary to the Hague Convention) and this is enough. It is curious to see the violent tone adopted by the German press here against the American public, on the ground that they are Anglomaniac. Their tone is almost friendly to France and Russia, but nothing is too bad for England, and they are almost inarticulate with hate. A great danger here is racial feeling, and if this were to break out the task of the government would be difficult. I think the Government is really afraid of it. There is a distinct feeling of fear in the general public with regard to Germany and a belief that if the Allies are beaten the turn of America would come next and come soon. Twelve million Germans in one's belly is rather a severe weight for a nation which has to fight seventy millions outside. And that is the situation here. There is a decided movement for an increase of the Army and Navy, and the attitude of the American public when Bernstorff talked of the invasion of Canada was such that the idea was dropped at once, but not until it had made a very deep impression. I don't think it will be soon forgotten.

Here are some interesting facts. Last February, Prince Münster came over here and stopped with the Austrian Ambassador with whom he went on an extended tour through all the manufacturing centres on the ground that he was looking for investments for an Anglo-German syndicate. He collected statistics carefully. Among other enterprises, he tried to make a deal with a great coaling company which has since been engaged in supplying the German cruisers. I have been told that he gave people the impression of collecting statistics as to the principal producers of provisions and war material. He went home in April. In April began a series of enormous purchases from the meat packers of Chicago, which continued till within a few weeks of the outbreak of war. They were largely paid for by the sale of German securities, that is American securities held in Germany. In April the German commercial travellers in some cases were warned not to contemplate purchases for the autumn. The great Jew bankers were busily engaged in selling securities on the part of Germany, and as it now appears, preparing for war. "

13th November, 1914.

To GREY.

" I saw your portrait last night at a lecture on the war. It was loudly applauded, and I regret to say that the Emperor William was hissed. The audience was a large one and sym-

pathies were not divided. This is characteristic. The President told me that ninety per cent of the American people are very strongly in favour of the Allies. On the other hand, the German-American is very often, although not always, a very strong and violent advocate of German kultur. The President seemed to fear that the methods of the Germans here were having an extremely exasperating effect upon American public opinion, and that this Government was in some danger of having to face a violent racial division which has hitherto been avoided on this Continent. . . .

The Secretary of State has come back, and seems pleased with the elections. The result is that the President retains a majority in the House and the Senate, although it is greatly reduced in the House owing to the disappearance of the Roosevelt party and the re-union of Republicans. The President and his friend[1] both seem pleased with the result. The professional Democrat is not at all pleased and looks upon Wilson as a beaten man. There is a fair chance that he may lose control over the House where Tammany has the controlling voice. I hope Tammany will not be unfavourable to us. Seddon tells me that the Labour Unions and the Irish are almost entirely on our side in the struggle. The professional Irish, the leaders of the Sinn Féin party, are against us, but they do not carry their parties with them. On the whole, there seems practically no chance of united action between Germans and Irish. All attempts that way have failed. The Catholics are on the whole not unfavourable, although the Jesuits as one man are on the side of Prussia and are in consequence losing a good deal of influence. On the whole, the Professors are with us except some who have been bitten by the Imperial mosquito, and have periodical attacks of Kaiseria. Some of the millionaires would like to have Court appointments in a German world-empire. The Jews show a strong preference for the Emperor, and there must be some bargain. Since Morgan's death, the Jewish banks are supreme and they have captured the Treasury Department by the simple expedient of financing the bills of the Secretary of the Treasury (in a perfectly fair and honourable manner) and forcing upon him the appointment of the German, Warburg, on the Federal Reserve Board which he dominates. The Government itself is rather uneasy and the President quoted to me the text 'He that keepeth Israel shall neither slumber nor sleep.' One by one the Jews are capturing the principal newspapers and are bringing them over as much as they dare to the German side.

[1] House.

Dernburg is perpetually busy, although not so noisily busy, as he was. He is organising through the Hamburg-Amerika the service of the German cruisers and is no doubt steadily working against us in every possible manner. The Paish mission had, as a matter of fact, an excellent result, because it spread the impression that the Bank of England was not going to insist upon its pound of gold.

There seems to be the impression here that you think this Government unfriendly. This is certainly not the case, although their action, that is their official action, appears to be so. They have to defend American interests and to maintain what they believe to be American rights. But they certainly do not wish to offer unnecessary difficulties or to hamper England in her measures of self-defence. In the matter of the ships now in these ports, it is also the interest of this Government that the great Atlantic routes should be free to commerce. I am sure they bear this in mind and will do what they can within the limits of neutrality. They have also urged the South American governments to follow their example. The greater South American Powers, specially the Argentine and Brazil, are friendly to the Allies, and would have liked to take joint action with the United States in order to impress on the smaller Powers the duties of observing strict neutrality. But this the United States Government conceived to be contrary to their traditions which are opposed to joint action."

To the Same. Dec. 11, 1914.

"What is now troubling us is a question of detail. Granted that ships carry contraband and must be searched, it follows that they must be taken into British ports and detained there. The unloading of a ship of ten thousand tons is a long and difficult matter. It is very different from the time when merchant ships contained a load of less than 1000 tons. But it is evident that the detention of an innocent cargo, because there might be contraband on board, and the long and expensive process of loading and unloading, occasion a great deal of loss and inconvenience and lead to many complaints.

The solution of the difficulty is being found. Exporters of innocent articles are very anxious to avoid the delay and inconvenience entailed by the carriage of a suspicious cargo. It had been the habit of the German agents for the transport of copper to ship copper clandestinely, and one of the principal agents obtained a Treasury Order forbidding the publication of manifests. Consequently shippers in order to protect

themselves have proposed that the British Consuls should appoint agents to inspect the loading, or else that United States officials should certify that the manifests were genuine and give them to the Consuls for transmission to their Governments.

But here comes in a point on which the United States Government lays great stress. The sale and export of contraband is legal. The United States must not take any measure in order to prevent the export of contraband, because this would be an unneutral act. But if the exporter for his own convenience wishes that a foreign government should know what is contained on board the ship, there is no reason why such an arrangement should not be carried out. And this is now being done with success. . . .

If there is any chance of the Administration agreeing to such a measure as the prohibition of the sale of arms and ammunition, it will become necessary to point out that such unneutral action would disqualify the government from the office of an impartial mediator. And this impartial mediation is the most cherished ambition of the President, who rightly thinks that he would thereby do an imperishable service to humanity. I have no doubt that this idea, to which prominence is given in his message, is dominant in his mind, although he fully understands that until the proper moment has come his impartial mediation would be worse than the most active and belligerent participation in the present war."

A more outspoken view of the same matters is given in some of the few personal letters which he found time to write or was willing to trust to the post.

November 27, 1914.

To CHIROL.

"I am so glad to see Charles Hardinge's boy has a D.S.O. I heard to-day that two grandsons of an aunt with whom I always spent the summer were killed the same day. I suppose this sort of thing is happening all the time.

Feeling here remains much the same in spite of the frantic efforts of the Germans to influence it. Every one who has had the slightest connection with Germany either in business, science or literature, or whose name is known or who has an official position here, receives special copies of pamphlets and personal appeals signed by distinguished men of letters and scientists. The place swarms with special agents. There is Dernburg for the Jews, a purveyor of movies for the populace, princes for the ladies, even a professor of Celtic[1] for the Irish

[1] Kuno Meyer.

Societies. There is Bernstorff for every one, and he is fortunately always with us. His sole presence makes up for the absence of our British professors. On the other hand, we have Mr. Bernard Shaw who appears to be giving his help to the Kaiser gratis, and whose remarks are being spread broadcast at the expense of the Reptile Fund. Even the Americans are rather surprised at him. Sir Roger Casement is credited with a delicious interview with the acting Secretary of State at Berlin who promises that the German army will land in Ireland, not to pillage churches and sack towns, as is falsely though somewhat naturally asserted, but on a mission of mercy and culture. I hope the good news is being spread in Ireland.

I hear from the Middle West, that is from Chicago, that the Central districts are very full of German sentiment and that an anti-English feeling prevails there. On the other hand, it is quite different in the West. Some one who has been travelling in the backwoods tells me that it is quite extraordinary how strong the feeling is in favour of the Allies. In New England where the German activities are the greatest, except perhaps in New York, the popular mind is made up and the German propaganda has no result. In New York the prominent Jews with one or two exceptions, and the Jew Bankers, are very closely connected with the German Government, and seem to do everything that they are told. It is significant that they are all working for peace. They must have known that war was coming, because it was through them that the war purchases have been made for the last two years and the sales of bonds been effected for the benefit of Berlin. . . . The German vote is well organised, and is a powerful factor in the situation. It has always been Republican and it is now strongly anti-Democrat. Wilson and his Cabinet are accused of being pro-English, with the result that they are disposed if anything to be pro-German. They certainly studiously avoid any action which could possibly be interpreted as partial to us or unfriendly to Germany. A number of cases are arising every day in connection with contraband, and the German Embassy has just issued a very strong note attacking us for our attitude on the Declaration of London, which they very naturally assert we should have unconditionally accepted. Oddly enough, Dumba[1], who was Austrian representative in Sweden is now

[1] One of the singular documents of this time is a letter from Dr. Dumba to Spring Rice, dated Sept. 30, 1914:

DEAR SPRINGY,

I cannot tell you how grieved I am by this dreadful war and all the misery and destruction it entails on the world. I should not have

Ambassador here, and not very long ago he presented me with a copy of an article which he wrote on the subject of the London Conference. In this article he points out that Germany succeeded in obtaining practically everything which was essential to her success. As a matter of fact, and as I think you pointed out at the time, Germany's policy during the conference was directed with a single eye to the interests of a maritime war with England, while we were arguing on the assumption that peace would prevail between us for ever.

There are still people who want us to take a more active part in influencing the press in opposition to the German Press Bureau which is working so energetically night and day. If we could manage a Press Bureau with success it might be advisable to try the experiment. But at the present moment the larger part of the American people are with us or rather against our enemies, not from our merits but owing to the demerits of the antagonist. Their deeds are mightier than their words. Would it be worth while to try and alter a situation which is on the whole favourable? What really would tell in our favour is a cessation of football matches and an increase in recruiting. Some one said very truly of an actor who came here to raise money for the soldiers that he would have done more good for the English cause if he had gone to the trenches. The feeling here is more anti-German than pro-English, and any failure on our part in courage or energy or persistence or earnestness would tell far more against us than any number of German articles. The German may have a false idea but he is prepared to die for it. If we say our idea is a true and good one, it ought to be better worth fighting for than the false German idea, and there ought to be more people ready to fight for it. If this is not the case, it might be felt that there was a flaw in the argument somewhere."

December 29, 1914.

To the Same.

"The Associated Press has published to-day the communication made by this Government to Grey complaining of our action in regard to contraband and the detention of ships. The publication was unauthorized and of course most discourteous. Judging by the form in which it was made,

written to you but for our old sincere friendship to which I now appeal in my personal distress."

Then follows a request that Sir Edward Grey should give leave for Madame Dumba, who had been on a cure at Baden Baden, to come out on a Dutch steamer, secure against the risk of seizure. The letter ends :

"Many heart-felt regards,
From yours, C. DUMBA."

the publication is in the German interest and will give a good deal of encouragement to Germany. The German policy now is to bring about the concerted action of neutrals in order to form a sort of armed neutrality against the pretensions of England. The chosen instrument here is Venezuela whose representative is agitating in this sense. The movement has some danger and has to be carefully watched. Another dangerous point is the movement for the prohibition of the export of contraband. Germany has lived for years by exporting guns and ammunition, but she has quite enough of her own. Consequently it is her interest that the Allies should not be allowed to derive ammunition from neutral sources. There isn't much chance that America should reverse her previous policy in regard to the sale of contraband, in the middle of a war, to please one party, and at great loss to herself. At the same time, the movement for the prohibition of contraband is supported by all the Peace Societies as well as by the united force of the German Associations. The movement will be strengthened by the idea that Great Britain is not acting fairly by America. An embargo on contraband would be the best way to get at us.

I do not think that this publication, unpleasant and hostile as it is, denotes the complete reversal of policy or the assumption of an unneutral attitude. It is simply regarded as a necessary assertion of American rights, and the manner of doing so, if exempt from prejudice, is quite in accordance with American tradition. If we have acted in accordance with the precedents and in defence of our just rights and consistently with the legal traditions common to both countries, we have no reason to fear; we should choose our course carefully, but we should stick to it. I suppose it will strike some people with surprise that the equanimity of this Administration, which had survived the subjugation of Belgium and the ruin of Mexico, should now be so completely upset by the capture of a cargo of copper owned by Mr. Guggenheim. But politics is politics and I suppose human nature will lead to the same edifying results under similar circumstances on our side of the Atlantic. It is rather hard to conduct a reasoned and pacific argument between a nation which is making war and a nation which is making money, but we must do our best."

Encouragement came from his predecessor, Lord Bryce, who wrote from Hindleap on December 23, 1914:

"If you are to be condoled with on the mass of troublesome work that has come upon you through these questions

of neutral trade, and on the sort of State Department with which you have had to settle them, much more are you to be congratulated on the universal approval which has been accorded here and in the U.S., and I doubt not in Canada, to your dignified reticence and tactfulness in an extraordinarily difficult situation. The temptation to break out now and then when the crop of falsehoods was specially rank must have been hard to withstand. However, as the Apostle says, Patience has had her perfect work."

Whether it is to be counted as a fault or a virtue, Spring Rice's patience was strictly a diplomatic attitude, as an exchange of private letters with Roosevelt shows.—It should be noted that he was trying to impress on Roosevelt the need for avoiding espionage—which was active on both sides. Later, it will be found that most damaging evidence of German plots against the United States came to light through a British agency. Spring Rice quite rightly assumed equal activity on the other side; but Colonel House criticises him for the multiplicity of his precautions.

30 East 42nd Street,
New York City,
February 9, 1915.

To Spring Rice.

"Dear Cecil,

Your two letters have come. My letters to you will hereafter go in envelopes without my name on them, so as to attract as little attention as possible.

Now, my dear Cecil, do not feel too badly over things. I am bitterly humiliated at what this Administration has done. I am not merely humiliated but profoundly angered by the attitude of the professional German-Americans. But don't forget that there are lots of Americans of German descent who do not sympathize with these men. My doctor at Oyster Bay is one. My collaborator in the work of The Life Histories of African Big Game is another. Our Progressive candidate for Governor of Vermont is a third. All three of these men are of German parentage, their fathers and mothers being born abroad. All three of them are emphatically against Germany in this fight, and all three of them resent being called German-Americans. We are not an alert people. We do not understand foreign affairs and, when a President misleads us, as Wilson has done, some very good people tend to follow him; but I believe, my dear Cecil, that down at bottom this people is sound, just as I have believed that down at bottom your people were sound. But you are quite right in saying that each nation must trust only to itself. In your letter you say

that your people must trust only to yourselves and also to your present Allies. I believe that they will stand by you through this war; but twenty-five years hence you may be siding with Germany against Russia, for anything you can tell. The extraordinary thing is that the professional pacifists, the very people who have howled most about the hundred years of peace between Britain and the United States, have in this contest done nothing to stand up for Belgium and for the Allies. That task has been left to men who are not professional pacifists, like myself.

Do get over here. I ought to have a talk with you. I will come in town and meet you at any one of a dozen private houses where nobody will know that you have been.

Always yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

P.S.—An English man named Thompson has selected this as an opportune time to write a book praising Wilson to the skies and furiously assailing me, on the ground that my treatment of Colombia was far worse than Germany's treatment of Belgium! There are flamboyant fools and knaves outside of our own native crop!"

To ROOSEVELT.

February 23, 1915.

"MY DEAR THEODORE,

You sent me the most helpful and consoling letter which I have had since the war began and I am very grateful.

I hope that I shall manage to come up very soon and see you and have a good long talk. You have had such an unequalled experience in these matters. I was thinking of some of the experience when sitting in John Hay's house on H Street.

My country is up against it, and I quite agree with you that it is better to be up against a foreigner, however unpleasant, than one's self, and one's own vices. I think that in June I had pretty well made up my mind that the cup of her iniquities was full and that she deserved damnation. Now these are unpleasant things indeed, but after all England and France went in on high motives (at least, it would have been infinite degradation to keep out) and, being in, are holding their ends up as well as they can. The fire is purging them—as you say.

I am not sure that it isn't rather a wise thing to say that a nation will only interfere when its own interests are concerned; otherwise one has an almost endless vista of moral interventions which it is one's patent duty to undertake—

and which would involve untold expenditures of men and money. As usual, the difficulty is to strike the right mean between the busybody and the indifferent. What the U.S. has really done beyond question is generosity in help and money, and this is a great record."

In general, Roosevelt's advice emphasized " the necessity of acting with almost unreasonable moderation in the matter of contraband ; " and this view was supported by the experienced wisdom of M. Jusserand. However, at the beginning of 1915, there was a lull in the controversy as to contraband, and the question of transferring German ships to American owners came uppermost. According to the code recognized by France and Russia (and also by Germany), such transfers were invalid and did not secure the vessels against capture. The English attitude was slightly different ; if it could be proved that a transfer would have been made irrespective of the state of war, the British courts would pronounce it valid. But Spring Rice made it plain, in a statement given for publication, that the Hamburg-Amerika and Nord Deutsche Lloyd were not likely to be able to satisfy such a court that they would have parted with their ships except to avoid their capture at sea.

In the upshot, no action was taken in regard to these vessels, and the consequence of a transfer never came to be tested ; but the fear of what might result was for many months one of the sharpest thorns that vexed the British Ambassador. Yet as early as February 12, 1915, when the Bill to enable the Government to purchase vessels for mercantile uses was under discussion in Congress, he wrote to Grey that the stand of Senators Root and Lodge against the purchase of any vessel from a belligerent had convinced many that such purchase would be an unneutral act. " I do not believe that either English or German ships will be bought, even if the Bill is passed," he wrote. The Bill was passed, but no ships were ever bought.—Once more, he had guessed right.

The main topic in this despatch however, concerned possible developments in the United States if the country became involved in the war. This was now a near menace, because Germany had proclaimed that from February onward submarines would destroy any enemy merchantship in a War Zone around the British Isles, and would have no regard for the safety of non-combatants. The proclamation warned the world that neutral vessels might be sunk by mistake, especially if belligerents continued to hoist neutral flags—a practice which the British Government did not forbid. According to Lord Birkenhead (in his *International Law*, 6th edn., p. 279, footnote), " It is generally admitted that a merchantman may make use of the flag of a foreign state to avoid capture : it is expressly recognised by Great Britain in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, S. 69." British vessels accordingly continued to avail themselves of this device. But it followed that the war vessels of a belligerent

had the right to stop any merchantman to ascertain if the flag truly represented the vessel's nationality. And no submarine could stop a vessel without taking some risks.

The American Government replied to Germany's menace by proclamation that the German Government would be " held to strict accountability " if they should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens.

As soon as the possibility of war came in view, it was sharply realised that there existed in the United States a " German party " which claimed a large proportion of the total electorate. About this, Spring Rice wrote:

To GREY. February 12, 1915.

" They are organised for un-American and purely German purposes. They propose to put pressure on all candidates for office and to carry out their policy by the intimidation of Congressmen and Presidents, either actual or would-be. Their meetings are held all over the country. The Irish leaders, who are paid by the German organization, take part in these movements. The present object of these people is to put pressure on Congress in order to stop the exportation of arms to the Allies. At the present moment there does not seem to be much chance of their success, although both in the Senate and in the House the pressure which they exercise is felt very strongly. Most people who come here are impressed by the atmosphere of fear which pervades Congress and the Departments. The President once spoke to me about the danger of civil commotion, and the spread to America of the national antipathies of Europe. There is also an atmosphere of hatred. For it is inconceivable that the formation of a strong and compact State within the State should not create a reaction. Thus the struggle which is going on in Europe has its counterpart here, and it is felt, sometimes dimly, and sometimes distinctly, that the defeat of the Allies would mean the triumph of the German idea in America as well as in Europe. The result is that the conflict in Europe is regarded by many people here with a dreadful sort of personal interest, and by many with an intense desire to avoid being involved in it. For what would happen should a conflict take place affecting America is unpleasant to contemplate. There is a strong probability that if this country went to war with Germany, there would be something like a civil war here; and it is almost inconceivable that the American people should consent to fight on the side of the destroyers of Belgium.

You will see how much the Government must fear anything approaching to a collision with Germany. Take the present

instance: The recent German proclamation brings us near the possibility of a collision. The fact that the English Government has authorised British ships to carry the American flag is quoted by the Germans as a justification for attacking American ships. If an American ship is attacked and sunk, it means either war or disgrace. Hence, I imagine, the rather surprising fact that the feeling against England for authorising the use of the flag is almost as strong, at least on the surface, as the feeling against Germany for the Berlin proclamation. I expect also that the Government is very glad, if a protest must be made, that the protest should be addressed to both Germany and England, and published in the same newspaper.

It seems rather shocking that this country, and especially this very moral Government, should only protest where its grossly material interests are affected, and for nothing else. But in Mexico and in Hayti things are happening every day which would justify interference, and no interference has taken place. The inaction of the President has met with full approval. Also the inaction of the President in Europe, and his failure to protest, has on the whole been accepted in this country at least with acquiescence as wise and prudent. On the other hand, his protests as to interference with trade, which are not supposed to bring the country into the danger of war, are greeted with approval as not too dangerous acts of energy. All signs point to this Government being determined on peace; but as Roosevelt points out, it is precisely this sort of Government which is suddenly driven into war. I think, therefore, we should be careful, and avoid any sort of incident, and strain a point against ourselves when necessary. I do not see what more we could do in this way than you are now doing. I will warn you, if there are signs of active discontent. With regard to the German propaganda, the Americans whom it threatens most are best qualified to defend themselves, and they ought to be left to defend themselves. The way to combat it as a Foreign movement, is not by creating another foreign movement, but by allowing an American movement to be formed in defence of America. Our record is absolutely clean and I hope it will remain so."

Feb. 26, 1915.

To the Same.

"The President, being human, no doubt desires re-election. At any rate, his party must wish to see him re-elected. What would make his re-election sure would be his successful medi-

ation in the present war. Peace is the object most ardently desired by German sympathizers here, and if the President can bring it about, Germans and non-Germans will be equally pleased. Both he and the Secretary of State are quite determined to take no action which would lose him the sympathy of either of the contending parties. He wants to be equally good friends with both. Thus he is bound, if he can, when he complains of German action, to complain simultaneously of the British. In this way he thinks he can hold the balance even. You will have noticed that he has tried as far as possible to address simultaneous communications to both belligerents. In the present instance this strikes us as peculiarly unjust.

When Mr. Bryan called upon me and spoke in severe language of British disregard for the law of nations, I was naturally surprised. I expressed my astonishment, but he seemed to regard the torpedo and the Prize Court with equal abhorrence. He seemed to notice nothing strange about it, and to be rather hurt at my remark that a deep and painful impression would be caused in England by his simultaneous remonstrances in Berlin and London, as if we were equally guilty with the Germans. Indeed the scene that passed between us was not a very agreeable one.

The next day I called upon Root, who has a reputation of being the wisest head in this country, and asked him what was his opinion of the situation. As you know, he is not a Democrat and has been a most resolute opponent of the present administration. But he is a very fair-minded man, and, of course, a great patriot. He pointed out that the United States Government was in an extremely embarrassing situation. The German Government had taken certain measures against which the United States Government had found it its duty to protest in the most energetic language. The logical conclusion to be drawn from this language was that if an American ship was torpedoed without notice, the American Government would regard this as an act of war. The example of the *Maine* showed with what terrific force popular explosion could take place which would infallibly lead to war. Now, with a large German population, in the heart of the American people, whose allegiance was doubtful, war would be a very serious matter.[1] He would not go into this matter because it was quite uncertain what the attitude of the great mass of the

[1] Ambassador Gerard, to President Wilson, Jan. 24, 1915, quoted in House, I. 361. "Zimmermann (of the German Foreign Office) said that in case of trouble there were 500,000 trained Germans in America who would

Germans would be. But at any rate it was certain that a war with Germany would be a terrible matter for an American Government to face. In addition to this there was the condition of business. War would be disastrous.

In these circumstances it became the duty and interest of an American Government to take every possible measure to avert the impending danger. Germany said that their action was justified by the two facts: one, that Great Britain was preventing the import of food for the civilian population: the other that she was using neutral flags as a protection for her merchantmen. It was therefore not unnatural that the United States Government in the desire to avoid a collision with Germany should object to the action of Great Britain which formed the excuse of Germany's action. I pointed out the unspeakable injustice of putting the two matters on the same level and asserted that we had been absolutely correct in our action and strictly followed the international and especially American, precedents. He quite agreed and then gave the following advice. He said first of all, we should remember that the American Government was thinking in terms of internal politics. We should try and put ourselves in their place and remember the great risk of war in which they stood. The next point on which he insisted was that Great Britain was very cleverly being placed in the forefront by the Germans who were playing on the hereditary dislike of the American for British seapower. France was involved as much as we. Why was Britain mentioned always and France never? There was a profound feeling of affection for France as well as the hereditary aversion for England. The action on the sea should be placed to the credit of both Allies and they should share the burden. Another point was the necessity of employing, as soon as possible, a good and competent lawyer to state our case from the point of view of American precedents. The Northern states had reduced the South mainly by hunger. The question of the prohibition of foodstuffs was not whether the prohibition was lawful, but as to the manner in which it could lawfully be carried out.

I think we may take it that the most earnest desire of the government and people here is to suffer almost anything rather than go to war. Their attitude as to Mexico is significant. But there is a gradually increasing feeling of irritation, and, as we know, the most peaceable countries are those which often

join the Irish and start a revolution. . . . Impossible as it seems to us, it would not surprise me to see this maddened nation in arms go to lengths however extreme—"

become suddenly the most warlike. An incident may happen which may lead to an explosion; this is what everybody fears."

In these fortnightly reviews there is no mention of Colonel House's "Quest for Peace"—the enterprise to which so great importance is attached by the editor of his *Papers*. But the arrangements for House's meeting with Sir Edward Grey passed through Spring Rice. The only indication of the British Ambassador's personal view as to the value of House's undertaking is given by his implied endorsement of what his colleagues believed. He wrote to Grey on January 29:

> "The Russian and French Ambassadors and the Belgian Minister are all three convinced that the assurances and promises that have been made to House here [by the German Ambassador] were simply part of the plan to get the Allies into assuming attitudes inconsistent with one another on the peace question."

It may be convenient to give here a brief account of what came from this journey.

Colonel House's mission was to represent "the desire of the President to serve as a channel for confidential communication through which the belligerent nations might exchange views, with regard to terms upon which the present conflict might be ended and future conflicts rendered less likely." He sailed on January 30 by the "Lusitania." While he was still at sea, the German Government on February 4 proclaimed a "war zone" round the British Isles, in which any enemy merchant ship would be destroyed at sight by submarines without regard for crew or passengers. Neutral vessels were warned of the danger of entering the zone, since they might be destroyed by mistake, owing to the practice of hoisting neutral flags. The American flag was hoisted on the "Lusitania" with Colonel House on board.

In these circumstances House began a series of conversations with Sir Edward Grey from which emerged a proposal for the "Freedom of the Seas"—a principle to be adopted, not during the war, but as part of a convention between nations which would follow on the conclusion of peace. Under this, all merchantmen of all nations would be guaranteed secure passage, subject only to the right of belligerents to search for and seize actual implements of war destined for the enemy.

Sir Edward Grey was prepared to support this, subject to the condition that a League of Nations should be formed, pledged to punish any power which violated the compact. House was prepared to undertake that the United States would join in giving and enforcing such a pledge.

A visit to Berlin, however, convinced House that there was no prospect of obtaining from Germany any advance to the necessary

condition that must precede such a Covenant—namely, the conclusion of peace on terms which the Allies might be expected to accept. What the Germans did with his proposal was to make it a slogan of opposition to England. The Freedom of the Seas was part of the demand pressed by a victorious Germany. And as a step to it they began to execute their threat. On May 7 the "Lusitania" went down with many Americans.—At this point Colonel House concluded that America should go to war. But the authoritative answer was Wilson's speech at Philadelphia with the phrase: "There is such a thing as being too proud to fight."

This, however, was followed by the Note in which the United States demanded that the Germans "should disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complained, that they should make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries which were without measure, and that they should take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare."

House loyally supported Wilson's policy and pressed for a new compact, under which the British Government would agree that all staple foodstuffs should go freely to neutral ports, provided that Germany undertook to give up submarine warfare against merchantmen, and also relinquished the use of poison gas (which had been introduced by them at the end of April in Flanders). The Germans, however, refused to consider this unless all raw materials were included. Germany, they said, was in no need of food.

Colonel House then returned to America, convinced that ultimately the United States must enter the war, against Germany.

Before leaving he thought proper to warn Grey that "Sir Cecil was very nervous and was constantly seeing spooks, and he had told me we would all be pro-German before the end of the war. I did this," he adds, "because I was sure he had written the same thing to Sir Edward."[1]

Readers will be able to compare this opinion with what Spring Rice had actually written in this period. But it may be said at once that again and again he repeated his conviction that the United States would never take the side of Germany in the war. That, he dismissed, as unbelievable.

The series of Spring Rice's letters during the first period of intensive submarine war may be resumed.

April 1, 1915.

To GREY.

"The sinking of the *Frye* by the German ship, and the drowning of an American citizen on board the *Falaba* have made a very painful impression. The feeling seems to be that relations between this country and Germany are in a dangerous condition. No doubt, under these circumstances, it is

[1] House, I. p. 465.

almost a relief that Great Britain and her sea measures are a target at which the State Department and the press can aim their missiles without fear of dangerous results. But there is, of course, a certain danger in this. As soon as the pressure of our naval measures begins to be felt, there will no doubt be an increased agitation against us. The chief dangers come from the cotton states, although the price of cotton is still rising: and secondly from the textile industries, which are in urgent need of German dyestuffs. The best plan to meet this is to make an agreement, not with the importers, but with the Textile industries who are the consumers, and who have a representative in England. The need is a real one, and if it is not met there will be a great deal of suffering and unemployment for which we will be made responsible.

The main question for us is, of course, the question of whether or no the United States Government will place an embargo on the export of contraband. The President has no power to do this unless Congress is sitting. But the financial situation is very serious. By the end of June there will be a deficit of about twenty million sterling. It may become absolutely necessary to convene Congress. If Congress meets there will certainly be a fight, and a serious fight, over the proposal to impose an embargo. The general feeling is that for various reasons it would be impossible to carry such a measure. But the German propaganda in its favour is increasing, and it is reinforced oddly enough by the Pacifist propaganda. There is also the chance that those who suffer by our naval measures will call for an embargo by way of reprisal. It behoves us therefore to act with caution. We must remember that although owing to our present connection with Belgium and France we are not so unpopular as we were, we are still unpopular, and it is always good politics to abuse England. The attitude of the Irish is doubtful. Most of the energetic leaders who were in danger of being put out of business by Home Rule, have taken service under the Germans, and although at least half of the Irish are in favour of England or rather of Belgium, they are not the vocal half and may be ashamed or afraid of coming out publicly in our support. The attitude of the Catholic Church is problematical. Many of the priests take the side of Austria. A good many of them find it essential to their standing with their Irish parishioners to be hostile to England. The Jesuits are certainly hostile to the Allies. On the other hand, many are fanatically against German militarism. The Pope himself has inculcated absolute neutrality, and it is generally understood that the priests are

free to take whatever side they like. Two of the Cardinals sympathize strongly with Belgium, one is violently and openly anti-English. The Protestant clergy, on the other hand, except the Germans and some Scandinavians, feel very strongly and their sympathies are openly with us. Of this I believe there is no doubt, and it is especially true of the Methodists, Presbyterians and Episcopalians."

April 16, 1915.

To the Same.

"Germany seems indefatigable in her attempts to influence public opinion here in order to obtain the prohibition of the export of arms. I have written a summary of the various methods adopted. At present the method most in favour seems to be 'frightfulness.' The newspapers which are under German influence publish long accounts of the terrible treatment to which Americans in Germany are exposed in consequence of the inhuman attitude of the United States Government. The German notes assume an openly menacing tone. It almost looks as if Germany would present a sort of ultimatum demanding the prohibition. It seems as if they had nothing to fear from America. Indeed I am told that open contempt is expressed in German circles for the American Army and Navy.

You will say that it shows a singular ignorance of American character (which resembles our own) to imagine that because an insult is not immediately resented, it never will be resented at all. The supposition evidently is that if a blow is given and not resented, a harder one can be given with perfect safety. This is not the case, and I think the Germans are playing a dangerous game. On the other hand, the attitude of the American Government about Mexico would seem to justify almost any belief in their incurably peaceful disposition. The news from there gets worse, and yet there is no sign of the government being ready to move. Atrocities increase, the losses of property are enormous, the white man has entirely lost his prestige, the agents of the United States are openly flouted, the President's strong recommendations are ignored and yet there is no sign that the United States is taking the matter seriously to heart.

A good many papers ask why there has been no demand for Bernstorff's recall. He has made a habitual practice of what the United States sent Lord Sackville away for,[1] when he wrote one single letter, namely, interfering with internal

[1] See above, I. 100.

politics. The Government is probably well advised in not taking any serious and immediate action. The departure of Bernstorff would only arouse passions here without giving any satisfaction on the real question at issue.

With regard to our own affairs the Order in Council[1] seems to be taken calmly; especially as we are doing all we can to alleviate its operation in individual cases. In the meanwhile the prices of copper and cotton on which so much depends are going steadily higher: there seems to be very general prosperity, and although freights are high owing to the war risks, it does not seem as if they greatly affected the export trade.

I was told yesterday by some one who heard the news from a good authority in Germany that there were four million men under arms with two million in reserve and enough supplies to last two years. He said that all the talk of scarcity had simply been circulated here in order to excite indignation against England and that the measures taken in Germany were merely precautionary. He thinks that the destruction of neutral ships is intentional and is designed to put a stop to all navigation around the British islands. Germany does not want imports from abroad and knows that the Allies do. They have, therefore, ordered indiscriminate attacks on all shipping in order to make transport by sea as difficult and as expensive as possible. In the meantime Bernstorff, as usual, is circulating offers of peace. Straus came to me to-day with a story of an interview with Bernstorff which I absolutely refused to hear. The French Ambassador told me that it amounts to nothing, but that it proved that Germany was no longer so confident of victory.

Your last speech seems to me to give the absolute and complete answer to the German contention. People here do not even now realise what sort of war it is. It is, I think, useless and misleading to depend on these people for help or for practical sympathy, except in the matter of benevolence, in which they are indeed generous. But as a rule we may say that Americans regard the war either as a bore, or as an immensely interesting spectacle provided for their entertainment, of which they are commencing to be rather tired. To complain as Strachey[2] does, of the President's want of sympathy is not to understand the situation. The first interest of a President is to be re-elected, and that is his principal pre-occupation and everything else is viewed in the light of it. I believe the President greatly resents the criticisms made against him. Have we

[1] Giving an extended list of articles that would be treated as contraband.
[2] Editor of the *Spectator*.

forgotten 1870, and the attitude of the British Government towards France and Germany? Gladstone, you know, wished to protest against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, but his cabinet would not allow it. Thiers reproached us at the time with our indifference and prophesied that we would suffer for it. His prophecy has come true. We may prophesy that America one day will regret her own indifference. For the present moment such a prophecy will make as much impression on Wilson's mind as Thiers' did on Lord Granville's."

To the Same. April 30, 1915.

"By this bag a letter goes to Runciman from Trevelyan which will give an account of popular feeling here as he sees it. George Trevelyan is, of course, a great personality here, and his mission here has been extraordinarily useful. As you know, his intense conviction as to the necessity and justice of the war is all the more striking, because of his own views a short time ago.[1]

I am only able to judge from the reports which reach me here in Washington. New England and New York, at least so far as concerns the English speaking population, seem to be fairly solid in our favour. The Irish opposition is not of much consequence. The most serious danger is in the attitude of certain sections of the Catholic church, especially that inspired by the Jesuits who are Prussian in their feelings, and of those under the direct control of the Vatican—which appears to be undoubtedly Austrian. I fear there is an intention to agitate for intervention in Mexico, not only in order to protect the suffering Catholics, but also to secure the prohibition of the export of arms. Another means of retarding the manufacture of arms is to obtain bogus concessions, to buy patent rights and to injure the works manufacturing munitions. It is gradually coming to be understood that the main object of German activities here is to retard the operations of the Allies by cutting off their supplies of munitions. For years German diplomacy has been chiefly engaged in finding a market abroad for the products of Krupp and other manufacturers of arms. As a result, other nations have been deprived of the means of manufacture by being undersold, and the German Empire has been provided in peace times with an enormous surplus of the power of manufacture. It is, of course,

[1] Mr. Trevelyan was an extreme Radical. But he had been in correspondence with Spring Rice during the period when Spring Rice was preaching the necessity of national service: and he had been at least an attentive hearer.

plain that, should the United States enter into a war with Germany, she will be in a hopeless situation, unless she has either greatly increased her present means of production or has the right to import munitions from neutral countries. Gradually these facts are being borne in upon the American people, and are having their effect.

Information seems to have reached the Government as to the existence of an extremely violent and dangerous sentiment among the German population which is almost capable of threatening civil war in the event of America taking any action distasteful to the German government. All this naturally alarms the President and makes him very desirous of preserving in the most absolute degree the strictest neutrality. There is undoubtedly a feeling that Germany is deliberately preparing trouble and that the violent and hostile language held by the German Americans here, the Germans in Germany and the German Embassy in Washington, is deliberately used for the purpose of bringing on a breach of relations. It is thought that Germany intends to procure the prohibition of the export of arms to the Allies by the creation of a state of war or a rupture between the United States and Germany. The German Government is known to have the lowest opinion of the efficiency of the United States' army and navy, and to be convinced of the thorough and capable organization of the German Americans which they believe would entirely paralyze any hostile action on the part of the United States. You know by experience the nature of German official information. It is true in detail and accurately painstaking in procuring the detail, but it is false in the main conclusion. I do not believe that there will be any doubt among the American people as a whole as to what action should be taken in case of hostile aggression on the part of Germany, and I do not believe that the American government and people would acquiesce tamely in a continuance of the present insulting attitude of the German Government. But they are practical. Their chief object and their almost unanimous determination is to avoid war and to keep out of the present horrors as to which they are fully informed. They will not join in the struggle except under the most irresistible impulses and the last necessity. Unfortunately for us, they think a struggle with Great Britain to be out of the question, and therefore they are perfectly willing to engage in every form of abuse and even open hostility which they regard as entirely devoid of danger. That is what makes it very important for us to avoid occasions of offence, because they are readily taken —for the very reason that a quarrel with us is not such a

serious matter as a quarrel with Germany. This is one of the results of the existence of the Peace commission[1] in which, as you know, Germany and Austria do not participate.

I think we may say that roughly speaking you have achieved so far a very great diplomatic success in your negotiations with this Government. You have asserted the rights of a belligerent in a very severe form, because those rights are necessary to the existence of our country. But you have abundantly proved that in exercising those rights you intend to respect as far as is possible the interests of neutrals, and you have lost no opportunity in showing that what you are doing is not done with the object of injuring foreign commerce for the benefit of British interests. You have also shown that in the broad outline you are following the common precedents of the English and the American courts. For the present the feeling is that the moment of discussion is past, and that what remains for us to do is to make separated and isolated arrangements with the different interests concerned, in order as far as possible to remove the hardships which neutrals must necessarily suffer. It was an admirable idea to send Crawford[2] and Broderick here, who are able to deal separately with the different representatives of trade and industry. The attitude of the United States Government is peculiar. They cannot recognise the Order in Council, but they are anxious to promote trade and therefore to assist as far as they can in the private negotiations conducted by Crawford under your direction. I cannot speak too highly of what he is doing or the value of his services, and I hope the Government will bear in mind that they possess here an agent who is particularly well fitted to deal with a very difficult problem. I think it would be just as well to bear in mind that his advice is probably the best that can be obtained, and that the agents of American interests in London, useful as they are, are not quite as dependable as your own agent here.

With regard to the attitude of the English press, I have had some talk with Trevelyan, who has written on the subject. Personally, I think it was quite as well that we should have expressed our surprise that the first diplomatic action taken here was directed, not against the oppressors of Belgium, but against ourselves, her defenders. But there is no doubt that this country and the Government were from the first resolved

[1] Because under the Bryan-Spring Rice Treaty each side was pledged against an immediate declaration of war.

[2] There are many references to the value of Sir Richard Crawford's services. He was sent out as Commercial Adviser in Sept. 1914.

to keep out of the struggle, and if possible to play a part in putting an end to it They sedulously avoided all appearance of taking part or any intervention of any kind except when their own immediate interests justified this intervention. Do you think that your own action would have been otherwise? Lord Granville suffered bitterly from the attacks made against him by the French whom he loved, because of his supposed indifference to their sufferings. But no one will say he was not right in what he did. The position of a neutral is not dignified or particularly honourable, and it is no good pretending that it is so. Mr. Facing-both-ways has never been a popular person, and the President is laughed at as deferring his moral judgment in the present struggle till the struggle is over. But should we ourselves have taken a different attitude if we had been separated from the scene by three thousand instead of thirty miles? The worst of it is that the President is very sensitive to British criticism, especially to the crticism of the *Spectator*. Certain persons have been engaged for a considerable time in assuring us that blood being thicker than water, the United States would intervene at once if England were engaged in a life and death struggle for liberty. Those persons forgot that this population is very mixed, and is much occupied with its own affairs. A large majority do not care for what happens abroad, or if they do, they are interested as Germans or Poles or Catholics, and not as Englishmen. The result of spreading these false hopes and issuing these cheques on the future has been that, when the cheques are presented, and dishonoured, we declare the house to be bankrupt. It is not bankrupt, and we can draw on it for very considerable amounts, but not on the basis of partnership.

It is very touching to see the self-devotion of the doctors who are going out to Serbia from here to almost certain death. It is especially remarkable to record that General Gorgas is willing to give up his commission in the United States army in order to organise a system of sanitation in Serbia and to stop the spread of typhus. He believes he is able to do this, if he has sufficient powers and is supplied with money and personel. The difficulty with the United States Government is the fear that the Austrians may object to the employment of a United States officer in the armies of the Allies even in a sanitary capacity. I think it would be right for us to do all we can to promote his appointment, because every one who knows him is convinced that he is the person best qualified for the job. I hope that we are not forgetting the immense boons conferred on us in Europe by the unparalleled generosity of

the American people. They are granting their help without stint, if it is help in money supplies and personal aid. We must not expect more and I do not think that under similar circumstances, we would give more ourselves.

CECIL SPRING RICE."

The letter, of which this is a copy, never arrived, for it had travelled by the "Lusitania," which was sunk on May 7. That resounding catastrophe marks a stage in the history of America's attitude towards the war.

CHAPTER XXIII

FROM THE SINKING OF THE "LUSITANIA" TO THE AUTUMN OF 1915

In the opinion of Colonel House, Germany's action in sinking the "Lusitania" made it inevitable that America should enter the war unless Germany pledged herself against a repetition of the act. But House was at the time in Europe. Spring Rice in America diagnosed the feeling of the people and the consequent policy of the President more accurately. This letter should be studied in full especially for its comments on the proposal of a League for Peace, in which America should take part.

May 20, 1915.

To Sir E. Grey.

"There has been an extraordinary change in the reputation of the President. During his recent visit to New York he certainly attained a greater degree of popularity than has been given to anybody here since Roosevelt. A short time ago he was generally decried. You will thoroughly understand his position. Undoubtedly the great mass of people here are deeply anxious not to be involved in the European war. Speaking to them he expressed himself in the words which have become famous in England, 'There was such a thing as being too proud to fight.' The answer was instantaneous. The White House was flooded with telegrams and letters saying that the time of yielding was past. He accordingly prepared his telegram to Germany, being sure of the reception which would be given to it. As to the nature of the reception there is no doubt. Public opinion demanded energetic words. The question is whether it also demands energetic action. There is no good prophesying. It seems to me, however, that the Government would welcome a friendly and diplomatic solution of the present difficulty with Germany, if it is possible, and that public opinion would do the same. It may be that both countries have gone too far to retract. But at bottom the people desire to keep out of the European struggle and will do so if they possibly can. They

would no doubt welcome a difficulty with us in order to show their impartiality, and in order to clear themselves of the accusation made by the Germans, that the United States Government is under your spell and acting by your advice. This is an accusation which is sufficiently absurd, but readily finds credence through the central and western states, where every man from the east is liable to the suspicion of being an Anglomaniac. The outcome of this, as regards us, is a strong desire that a note should be addressed to you accusing you of breaches of international law, in order to maintain the balance. Certain German correspondents of American newspapers are urging this course and there is reason to believe that one member of the Cabinet [1] at any rate who is very closely associated with certain German political and financial interests, would welcome such a step on the part of the Government, as the best means of retaining the German vote. For us, the best course is to do what you are doing, and to eliminate one by one the various difficulties which have arisen in connection with the Orders in Council. This will prevent the agitation from becoming dangerous. I gather that certain importing and exporting interests, mostly German Jews, are working in connection with the German Embassy in order to stir up bad blood between us and the United States. For instance, the importers of dyestuffs are raising a cry against us although the imports of dyestuffs since the war have been greater than the corresponding periods in previous years. The cotton planters have sold their cotton at a low price to speculators who want to get as good a price as they can in Europe. These speculators have enlisted certain political interests on their side who are agitating against England on the ground that the cotton planters of the south are being affected by the British measures. It is very doubtful whether the planters are affected at all, as they have parted with their interest. The cotton prices keep up and the cotton exports are accounted satisfactory.

I have just been in Boston and New York. The feeling there among the ruling classes of American descent is very strong. On the other hand there is a mass of sentiment which remains anti-English and which will take advantage of any occasion to do us an injury. The main danger before us now is the fact that it is not understood that a peace, as peace and as a mere cessation of hostilities, is not the final end of the question at issue. Very few Americans do understand this, and I am told it is very important to make plain, if it can possibly be done,

[1] Presumably Mr. McAdoo. Later, when the United States were in the war, Spring Rice will be found recognising Mr. McAdoo's invaluable energy.

to the American public what you have often expressed, namely the absolute necessity of ending, not temporarily but once and for all, the causes which led to the present outbreak. There is a general longing that the war should cease and there will be a general readiness to accept any solution which will cause a cessation of war if only for a moment. The question is how the facts can be brought home to the American people. President Lowell of Harvard thinks that it would be possible to bring public opinion here to the point where the people would accept the participation of the United States in a general peace scheme to be based on force, and to receive the sanction of the active interference of neutral governments against any nation which disturbed the existing order of things. But I fear that the moment such a proposal was made every one would begin to quote Washington's warning against entangling alliances. It seems to me quite clear that unless the United States Government are prepared, which at present they are not, to enforce the decisions of any peace convention, their participation in peace negotiations would not be of much use.

Dernburg and Bernstorff have become silent. Dumba, the Austrian Ambassador, has taken control of the press agencies. The line he takes is that England as well as Germany has broken existing international conventions and that the protests should be addressed to both simultaneously. If the United States addresses such separate and simultaneous protests, negotiations could be begun which would lead to the intervention of the United States and the eventual mediation of the President. This prospect is especially attractive to Mr. Bryan, who has not ceased from the very beginning of the struggle to agitate for peace.

The German-Americans took alarm three or four days after the sinking of the " Lusitania," and almost without exception have gone underground or acclaimed their devotion to the American flag. But the strong impression is that this temporary eclipse will not last and that a great deal of earnest work is going on among the German organisations with a view to a struggle. No doubt many of the Germans here prefer the new country to the old, but some do not, and there is good reason to believe that these latter are not going to sacrifice their position without a struggle.

I have just seen Morgan [1] who will have made clear in London what has been happening here in the way of purchases. No doubt the Admiralty as well as the War Office will have seen him

[1] J. P. Morgan, the banker. British financial affairs were transacted mainly through his house.

in London and will be acquainted with the situation. I hear that the purchases are going on very well, although at one time there were some unfortunate episodes. It will be probably wiser not to collect information as to these latter, if precautions are taken to prevent misunderstandings such as seem to have arisen on certain occasions in the past.

CECIL SPRING RICE."

Spring Rice pushed his judicial attitude so far as to offer consolation to friendly Americans who were dissatisfied with the part being played by their country. Mr. Owen Wister, the novelist, whose *Pentecost of Calamity* was perhaps the most persuasive condemnation of Germany published during the war, received reminders that nobody loved France better than Lord Granville, and yet that Granville as Foreign Secretary—even against the wish of Gladstone—kept Britain completely neutral when Prussia was smashing France in 1870. Here is Mr. Wister's reply :

"... The Granville-Gladstone crumb you gave to comfort me at the end of that most pleasant hour I passed with you doesn't do the trick ! I still feel that we who had signed conventions missed a great opportunity when we were silent. I'm aware the sublime draws perilously close to the ridiculous if you are merely a *vox et præterea nihil* in such cases, but didn't Europe expect our voice, and wasn't that all she expected, and haven't we for ever failed to be something she looked for ? Perhaps I can, as you suggested, rise superior to some criticising Englishman by volleying Granville at him, but I remain dissatisfied...."

On the other hand, some thought Mr. Wilson's voice too emphatic. In answer to his Note of protest, Germany replied that the "Lusitania" was an armed cruiser and transport. Wilson retorted, on June 9, that his Government could not admit any "abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality." He again demanded assurances in respect of the safeguarding of American's lives and ships. Mr. Bryan, who was desirous that America should go to arbitration on the dispute, and was willing to warn Americans against travelling in ships owned by a belligerent, at this point resigned the Secretaryship of State. Spring Rice commented to Grey, on June 10 :

"I say nothing about the President's note to Germany as I have not seen it and it will be published to-morrow. It appears that the very strongest pressure was put upon the President to induce him to recede from the view which he had taken from the

first. He refused to change his policy. Mr. Bryan, on the other hand, who had accepted the previous note sent to Germany, was unable to resist the argument that, if Germany offered the terms embodied in the peace treaties,[1] that is, examination and delay, these terms should be accepted. He insisted that the President should share his view, and when the President refused to change his ground, Mr. Bryan refused to sign the Note.

Nothing is more certain than that the people of the United States are ready to accept any reasonable excuse for accepting Germany's contention, and all Germany has to do in order to preserve the peace is to afford some reasonable excuse. So far, they have done everything they could to provoke this Government. They have not yet entirely succeeded. I doubt if on the present record the United States will go to war, that is, unless some new and striking incident occurs.

The effect of Mr. Bryan's resignation will be to give a visible head to the ' long-haired men and short-haired women ' who are agitating in this country for peace, prohibition, woman suffrage and the prohibition of the export of arms. The Germans who till late were loud in abuse of Bryan have accepted him as a Heaven-born leader. Hearst, who has spent more venom upon Bryan than upon any other politician, now espouses his side warmly. We may expect to find him a very serious factor in the movement for prohibiting the export of ammunition to the Allies. This is, of course, the most serious question of all. We do not stand in quite as good a position with regard to this question as we did. First, there is Mexico. I gather that although the President is most averse to take action he is gradually being drawn into it. He is being assisted in every way by the Germans and the Catholics who, for different reasons, are most anxious for intervention. Together they form a dangerous combination.

Another element in the question of the export of ammunition is the peace propaganda which is certainly assuming considerable dimensions. It is, of course, supported by a good many representatives, including German Lutherans and Catholics of all nations. It is also supported by some of the Labour leaders and a conference of Labour leaders has been called to consider it. It is to be hoped that they will understand that at the present moment the prohibition of the export of arms will be fatal to the cause of liberty. Violent efforts are being made by the Germans to induce the labourers employed in the Arms

[1] Those negotiated by Mr. Bryan with the representatives of several powers—but not with Germany or Austria.

factories to strike. The leaders of the Italians and the Slavs are doing everything they can to prevent it. Mr. Gompers, the President of the American Labour Union, is fully aware of the state of the case. I hope that means will be taken to bring home to him how fatal the action of the Labour Unions may be.

The most serious consideration is Congress. Unless Congress so orders, the President has no power to prohibit the exportation of arms. But Congress will have to be called, if active measures are to be taken either against Germany or Mexico. The new Congress is not like the old one—in the President's hands. The Democratic majority is smaller and Tammany is in control. Tammany has a feud with the President and the leader of the House [1] is the President's opponent. It is evidently of very great importance that no action should be taken in England which would arouse a strong anti-British sentiment among the Irish here. Our friends regard with undisguised alarm the news of a quarrel in England between Unionists and Nationalists.[2] Not only would it put an end to the truce, which now exists as far as we are concerned in the great majority of the Irish party here, but it would also give the impression among the American people that we preferred our civil dissensions to the unity which is so necessary for our defence. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the moral factor here, that is, the effect on public opinion of a visible spirit of self-sacrifice among all classes in Great Britain.

I consider this aspect of the question even more important than the effect on the Irish party taken by itself."

Mr. Lansing, previously Counsellor of the State Department, now became Secretary of State. Though Mr. Bryan's departure was not politically a cause for grief, Spring Rice's personal feeling for the man expressed itself in a kindly note.

WASHINGTON,
June 12, 1915.

"DEAR MRS. BRYAN,

I suppose it is very improper but I can't help writing to you to say how sorry I am that my official visits to the Sec. of State have ceased. They were an excellent lesson in his own

[1] Senator Stone.

[2] A Coalition Government was formed in May 1915. Sir Edward Carson became Attorney-General with a seat in the Cabinet. At the same time office was offered to Redmond, who refused it (the National party being pledged against taking any British office) and expressed a strong opinion that representatives of Ulster should keep out of the administration. The result was a marked setback to recruiting in Ireland.

maxims [1] (which are written on my paper-weight) and I can't say how grateful I am to you both for your invariable kindness and good humour. When I think how aggravating I have often been, I am simply appalled at Mr. Bryan's imperturbable good humour.

I hope you won't cut us off altogether and that we shall still have many pleasant talks.

Yours sincerely,

C. S. R."

WASHINGTON,
June 23, 1915.

To GREY.

" I have just seen . . . [2] and had a long talk with him. I need not tell you his views because they exactly correspond with yours and I think you can count upon his hearty co-operation. Always, of course, with the proviso that America comes first. There is no doubt, always with the same proviso, that his friend shares his sentiments. At the same time you must remember that the East and the West are very widely separated in thoughts and opinions. Washington represents the whole country, and everybody whom I have met who comes from the North-East is struck by the immense difference of sentiment between, for instance, New England and Washington.

The prevailing sentiment is undoubtedly for peace. Not perhaps peace at any price but peace at a very considerable price. Please remember what the sentiments of England were in July and how sudden the change was. American sentiments are much as England's were in the early part of July, and it will require more than the ' Lusitania ' to change them. . . ."

During this period of tension between the American Government and Germany, there were serious plots against all the organisation of supply to the Allies. This culminated in an attack on the life of Mr. Jack Morgan, the leading partner of the great banking firm through which most of the British money affairs were transacted. Spring Rice was staying in Glencove, Mr. Morgan's house near New York. As he with his host and hostess sat at breakfast, the butler was heard shouting for Mr. Morgan to go upstairs at once. All three dashed up at once and searched the first floor rooms for fire; Spring

[1] The paper weight was inscribed, " From Secretary Bryan to Ambassador Spring Rice. Treaty signed September 15, 1914."
" Diplomacy is the art of keeping cool."
" Nothing is final between friends."
" They shall beat their swords into Plowshares."
Isaiah 2, 4.

[2] Probably Colonel House : and " his friend " is Wilson.

Rice ran on to the upper story; then, as they came down again, the butler was seen backing up the stairs before a man who held a revolver in each hand.

This is Spring Rice's account of it.

British Embassy,
Washington,
July 5, 1915.

"Dear Mrs. Lodge,

It was an awful business at the Morgans', except that they behaved so well. I was with them when the butler came in with a most *fearful* voice saying, 'Mr. Morgan, go upstairs!' We all three, having no idea of assassins, thought something awful had happened in the house and rushed up—they to the first and I to the second storey. The murderer went up after without our knowing it and met them as they were coming back from their search. Mrs. Morgan said she would never forget the face of the man as he raised his pistols and said, 'So you are Mr. Morgan.' She sprang at him (being in front) and then Morgan pushed her aside and closed with the man and had him down but not before he was shot twice—I didn't come till he was on the ground and had no part in the fight except vainly trying to get the pistol out of the murderer's hand. I see that the thing to do is to close at once with the assassin and not let him put his arms out. Morgan was really a trump and so was she. Bless you and Cabot.

Yours ever affectionately,

Cecil S. R."

Mr. Morgan's two wounds were slight, though one bullet passed through the skin of his stomach. The assailant gave the name of Holt, but was identified as a German, Erich Muenter.

A letter from Sir Maurice de Bunsen later on to Spring Rice says that he met the Pierpont Morgans at lunch in London.

"They told me you had been splendid in helping the family the day of the attempt on Morgan's life, and that you had prevented the children from having nervous breakdowns by keeping them amused."

The Ambassador in his reports had now to indicate that a wave of nervousness was passing over the United States; and that it was exploited in the German interest.

July 21, 1915.

To Grey.

"It is generally said that the language held by Germans is very menacing indeed. They expect any energetic measures

against Germany to be followed immediately by explosions on board United States ships and at all the arsenals, by the crippling of means of communication, by the appearance of submarines and by armed demonstrations by large bodies of well-disciplined men. This language is held very openly even among Germans who have been born here and never intend to go to Germany. Whether this language is justified, it is impossible to tell, but the outrages on board ships, the strikes fomented by Germans, the opening of letters, the menacing language held in the newspapers, all frighten people to make them believe that something dreadful will happen if the German Ambassador is dismissed.

Extraordinary measures of precaution have now become necessary in all the arms factories, at the docks, and on board vessels, even vessels of the United States Navy. It is probable that German agents are everywhere and excellently organised under the leadership of Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché. Muenter, who attempted the life of Morgan, was known to many Germans here to have committed murder and was entirely at their mercy. From private enquiries I know that he received money from outside sources and had confederates. It is most likely that he was shot by order, as he had promised my informant a full confession the day after he died.[1] It was known in German circles that an attempt was going to be made on Morgan. No one knew that I was staying there until the attempt occurred. Two days later what may possibly have been an attempt on me occurred at night.[2] Outrages of this sort will probably become very common and I am told that the President is more strictly guarded than has ever been the case before. You will be surprised at the universal feeling of fear and suspicion."

Aug. 19, 1915.

To the Same.

"The relations with Germany are such that many people believe that Germany means to force on a war. If this is so, no doubt war will ensue, whatever its consequences. But this country will not take the first step, and if war comes it will be because Germany insists. All the efforts of the Government

[1] He was found dead in prison, and was officially reported to have committed suicide.

[2] Spring Rice was being driven from the Morgans' house when a large car without lights and carrying five men passed him and stopped. The men got out, lined across the road and signalled Spring Rice's car to stop. But the chauffeur drove straight through them. Nothing happened, but the press reported the occurrence as an attempt to hold up the British Ambassador in Long Island.

are directed to maintaining the peace. Proofs are accumulating not only that the German Government is quite indifferent to American public opinion, and determined to carry out any policy on which she has made up her mind quite irrespective of the effect on public opinion here, but also that the Germans in this country are determined to carry out the policy of Berlin, whatever that may be. It is indeed a moot point how far the bulk of the German residents here are in reality more German than American. But there is no doubt that a large number of prominent Germans are filled with the idea that they are a superior race, and that they have a divine right to control the policy of this Government and to dominate the whole country as a ruling race, much as the English dominate British India, not by force of numbers but by force of intelligence.

The recent revelations [1] show clearly the mechanism with which it is proposed to rule public opinion here and to get control of industrial establishments. But it is probable that the papers publish only those relating to a small part of the German operations here. The name of Boy-Ed hardly occurs at all The criminal side of the German operations, except in the matter of strikes, is hardly noticed. Yet the general impression prevails that the Germans have organised an intelligence service in all the branches of American administration and especially in the Army and Navy. It is also tolerably certain that there exists an organization for furthering the commission of crimes of violence, for destroying ships, arms-factories and the means of communication, not only to the detriment of the enemies of Germany, but also, if the occasion demands, those necessary to the existence of the United States. It is known, for instance, that there are about two million Germans of military age, most of whom have received military training, that they are capable of organization, if not already organized, and that their authorities know where to lay their hands on them. It is not known what their attitude and conduct would be in the case of a war with Germany. In some towns like St. Louis the majority of the population are German and they have adopted an attitude of open hostility to the non-German population. Some people think that at the last moment the Germans here will prefer the safer course and would be quiescent

[1] Despatches confided by Dr. Dumba, the Austrian Ambassador, to an American journalist for delivery in Europe were seized. They disclosed the existence of plots to organize by bribery strikes in munition factories. The German naval attaché, Boy-Ed was implicated. Later, in December, further disclosures led to an order for the recall of Boy-Ed and of the German military attaché, von Papen, for complicity in a plot to blow up with bombs vessels carrying munitions to Europe.

even in the case of a war. What is certain is that the number of trained American soldiers is very small and that the Navy is greatly disorganized; that there are many foreigners in both Army and Navy, in some cases very highly placed. It would certainly be easy to place foreigners with foreign sympathies on board any of the American ships. The most secret plans are known to have passed into the possession of unauthorized hands.

Under these circumstances it is quite natural that the Government, even if convinced that Germany means mischief, would act with extreme caution.

With regard to cotton, the attitude of the Administration is that they cannot deny that there is a *prima facie* case for declaring cotton contraband. They are very dependent on the sympathies of the South and they are anxious to prevent a panic. They also think that it is in the interests of the South that the area of cotton cultivation should not be extended in consequence of high prices. That is, their policy is that the price should be stabilized and remain at a reasonable level. It is believed that it will be possible for a small expenditure and with little risk for buyers in Europe to prevent the price sinking below this level. The Germans have, of course, made every preparation to organize a slump. On the other hand they seem to believe that the war is soon coming to an end and have been purchasing stocks to hold over for use when the war is over.

With regard to the bill which will be brought before Congress to prohibit export of arms, the situation has been very much changed by the publication of the State Department note to Austria [1] which is a very striking and telling appeal to American sentiment, and also by the revelations which show how Germany in her own interest has been trying to engineer an American movement for the suppression of the arms industries here by strikes and legislation. At the present moment the impression is that the bill would have no chance. The feeling however may change and it is impossible to predict what will be the state of public opinion three months hence. On the whole American public opinion is becoming more favourable to the Allies, partly because the German danger is growing ever near and looming larger.

Some of your friends seem to think that there is need of an energetic propaganda on our side. A distinctive English propaganda would be a great mistake. It would, however, be perhaps useful if someone could be found who could persuade the Irish that the English Government are not, as is said here, going back on their promise as to Home Rule and that the Irish

[1] In regard to Dr. Dumba's activities.

in Ireland desire to maintain good relations with the English for the sake of Ireland. The French-Canadian question depends to a great extent on the attitude of Rome and this is a mystery which it is difficult to solve. Some mysterious power is evidently at work and the impression here is that something like a bargain must have been struck between the Vatican and the Central powers."

It is curious to find the British Ambassador at this time in friendly correspondence with Mr. Patrick Egan, who in Parnell's day had been perhaps the most prominent and extreme Irish Nationalist in America. Mr. Egan (whose grandson was an officer in the 16th Irish Division) resented German attempts to capture the Irish organizations, and had given his views to the *New York World*. Spring Rice wrote to Mr. Egan, thanking him and deploring the rumours that England intended to break her word about Home Rule.

"Of course, the story is wholly false, but it has worked, I am told, with great success."

Catholic priests, he added, had been active for the German propaganda.

"As a consequence rumours are going about that the whole influence of the Catholic Church in Ireland is hostile to the cause of Belgium and the Allies. . . . I cannot ignore the rumours for they come to me from so many sources, and as an Irishman and Home Ruler they give me great personal pain."

Wilson's protests at last produced, on Sept. 1st, 1915, a definite pledge that submarine commanders would not be allowed to sink merchant vessels unless they resisted or tried to escape when summoned to surrender; and for a long period the intensive submarine campaign was abandoned. In short, America had caused German policy to vacillate. But since the impulse applied had no clear ultimate aim, and could not therefore be followed up, a corresponding uncertainty reflected itself in the movements of American feeling and action.

For instance, Spring Rice notes, in a long letter of September 6, that a peace meeting in Chicago showed that the principal American Peace Society condemned the foreign agitation for an embargo on the export of munitions. They urged that the manufacture and export of arms by neutrals was a strong safeguard against an arms monopoly in the hands of militarist powers. In short, American America was in his opinion waking up to its dangers, both external and internal.

The close of the letter makes reference to the Administration as fluctuating between two pressures, and yielding in some measure to both.

Sept. 6, 1915.

To GREY.

"A very important development in the situation is the action of the Labour Union under their chief Gompers who seems to be convinced that the victory of Prussia would mean the ruin of the cause of Labour. He is said to be pressing the President to take severe action against the Austrian Ambassador. The President himself is not said to be inclined to take any severe measures, and the Department of Justice is generally believed to be very reluctant to do anything disagreeable to the Germans, although they are taking every possible measure to press the indictment against the British subjects engaged in collecting British subjects in order to send them to England. The measures taken were as far as I know perfectly legal and were taken under good legal advice. This has not prevented the Department of Justice from advancing the claim that the British Government, not having compulsory military service, has not the right like other governments to assist its trained soldiers living abroad to return to their own country. I have protested against this as an evident infraction of the American principle that, while compulsory service does not exist, every American citizen is under a moral obligation to serve when called upon."

This refusal was however maintained, so long as the United States remained neutral. A certain inconsistency was apparent in American action, yet was not surprising. Germany's whole line of policy was a direct challenge to established international usages; therefore, unless a breach was to be faced with all its consequences, the American Administration could not punctiliously enforce the rules regulating the conduct of ambassadors. On the other hand, Britain's policy was to adhere strictly to principles which American law and precedents justified, and consequently British claims were scrutinised with a meticulous insistence on the strict letter of the law,—even, as in this case, with some disregard of equity.

On the whole, however, things tended more to the satisfaction of the Allies than of Germany. Dr. Dumba was sent home, as were also the German military and naval attachés, von Papen and Boy-Ed, who had been shown to have plotted for the destruction of munition works.

Again, Great Britain was now seeking a loan in America and Spring Rice reported in September that great difficulties would be encountered; although the situation was eased by the fact that "we own first-class American securities to the estimated value of 600 millions." These could be taken over as a guarantee by the banks. In the outcome, he was able to write to Grey on October 7, 1915.

"The chief event of the present moment is the success of the loan. It is believed that the amount asked for has been over-

subscribed by about forty million sterling. However that may be, the fact of its success is surprising. A short time ago the conditions seemed very hostile. The rate of interest here expected by the public is very high, about six per cent at least. People like to invest in what they can see, and they have never been inclined to invest in state loans. The German organizations did everything they could to oppose the loan. Bryan was openly hostile and so were many of the principal politicians. The only public pronouncement made by a member of the Government was unfavourable. The President at the commencement of the war had stated that he was opposed to a loan to a belligerent. But when it became apparent that a loan was necessary in order to give a credit for American exports to Europe, many secret forces began to act in its favour. The Government itself undoubtedly wished it, mainly because the continuance of American trade depended on a credit being given to America's best customer. But the greatest efforts were taken to explain to the general public that this was not a foreign loan but a credit in furtherance of trade. Government and newspapers did their best to convince the people that there was no politics in the loan and that it was merely business. But still the fact remains that the loan has been successfully floated to a degree without parallel in American financial history. Perhaps one of the important contributory causes was the avowed and unavowed opposition of the German element and their attempt to prevent American finance from taking action to its own advantage because it was also advantageous to the Allies. It was felt that this was an opportunity of asserting American independence from foreign interference. Great credit should be given to Lord Reading and his colleagues. Lord Reading's speech at the Pilgrims' dinner was admirable and had a most excellent effect. He succeeded by what he said and still more by what he did not say. I hope our Government will take his advice as to any public pronouncement. We don't wish to claim a diplomatic victory nor to bewail a defeat. Both would be equally injurious. . . .

Germany has apparently yielded in the matter of a disavowal of the officers who sunk the Arabic.[1] The German Ambassador refused to give this when it was first demanded. The German Government in Berlin publicly professed its inability to make any disavowal. Still the disavowal has been given although in a somewhat unusual and undiplomatic form, that is, in the form of a private letter to the Secretary of State. But it

[1] Sunk on August 19, outward bound for America, and therefore certainly not carrying munitions. Two Americans were drowned.

is hailed as a great diplomatic victory. The President no doubt was warned by his advisers against insisting on a disavowal. But he insisted and has succeeded in getting it.

Now that the German crisis is over (although the ' Lusitania ' case is not yet settled) it is the turn of the Allies. The American note will probably be in your hands when you get this letter. There is not much good in making any forecast of it, although it may be interesting to you to know that the feeling in Government circles here seems to be that the United States must defend their rights, and they must make a good showing before Congress meets, but that the correspondence should not take a hostile character but should be in the nature of a juridical discussion. It is hoped that the Allies will be able to make some concession before Congress meets. We are using this country as a base of supply and we have just floated a loan. We are therefore receiving certain things and must be prepared to give certain things in order to continue to receive what we are receiving now. That is, we may have to sacrifice some of our rights by way of barter.

I hope that the British press and especially *Punch* will refrain from criticising the President. First of all, these criticisms are quite unjust, and secondly, they are very impolitic."

He continued this line of argument in a letter to Grey on October 24, 1915.

" I should like to impress upon you that it is extremely important to be able to yield on certain questions where vital interests are not at stake. Don't forget that George III. lost the United States through the lawyers and by pressing a legal point. I think there are certain moments when you must intervene from the political and general point of view against the lawyers, even at the cost of a legal surrender on a material though not a vital point. For the vital points for us are that this country should serve as a base of supplies, and should not intervene by force, that is by convoy, to break the blockade. To obtain those ends we should be prepared to sacrifice a great deal. I do not mean that we should acquiesce without protest in a pressure from this country by which moral were sacrificed to material interests. We should clearly point out to the United States Government what it means in present circumstances to sacrifice moral to material interests, and what the effect will be for the reputation of the United States in the world and upon their own relations with us. But we should not build upon the supposition that such an appeal would be always and everywhere successful. To come down to a practical point. I

think we may have to consent to a surrender on certain points connected with the export of German goods to this country; we shall either have to make a diplomatic surrender reserving the question of right, or we shall have to consent to some form of arbitral court to sit in Washington."

A single illustration may be given of the difficulties which Spring Rice had to contend with. It is chosen because an unlucky expression in an English despatch led to grave misconception.

The United States vessel "Natchez," sailing from the neutral port of Rotterdam for America, was stopped in the Downs and taken into London because her cargo consisted largely of goods of "enemy origin." The goods in question were printed paper, and they came from Belgium, which being in German possession was counted "enemy"; but they came from a Belgian merchant.

To begin with, there was trouble between the American skipper and over-zealous Customs subordinates in London. This was disposed of, but the question of principle was raised.

"My Government," Mr. Page wrote, "feels that it must insist upon the rights of American owners to bring their goods out of Holland in neutral ships, even though such goods may have come originally from the territories of a country at war with Great Britain."

Grey, in answering this, referred to a previous general justification of the legal right to seize such goods. He added that, whereas the German Government made it a practice to sink neutral as well as British merchant vessels without considering either the destination of the cargo or safety of the crew, the British brought ships into port and submitted the case to a Prize Court. He said that he did not know to what extent reparation had been claimed by neutrals from Germany for such losses, and added: "So long as these acts of the German Government continue, it seems neither reasonable nor just that the British should be pressed to allow goods from Germany to pass freely through waters effectively patrolled by British ships." Mr. Lansing took this as a claim to make reprisals of a lawless nature in return for Germany's lawlessness; and Spring Rice wrote a letter of warning against allowing such an implication to be possibly maintained.

Aug. 20, 1915.

"My Dear Grey,

Please excuse me if I say a word about the 'Natchez' Note. I heard to-day that the Secretary of State spoke privately with great regret as to the terms used by the Foreign Office with regard to reprisals. The view of the United States Government is, as you know, and as I have frequently informed you, that two wrongs do not make a right, and that the business of our Government is with the United States Government and the relations of our two countries, and not with the relations between the United States and Germany.

The view we have taken here, and which has as a whole been accepted by public opinion as well founded, is that we entered on this war in defence of the law of nations and of the principles of law and justice. That one of the belligerents has violated those principles is no reason why we, who entered the war as their defenders, should abandon the principle for which we entered the war.

Our controversy with the United States Government is not and cannot be a controversy as to the existence and validity of the question of law. We differ from the United States, not as to the law, but as to whether the altered circumstances do or do not justify a change in the application of the law. The controversy between Germany and the United States is as to whether any law at all exists except the law of force. More than any two nations in the world, the United States and Great Britain have a common inheritance not only in respect for the law but in the very terms of the law itself. Our Courts are again and again on record for the principle of the gradual evolution of law according to the circumstances, which vary from time to time, though the principles of law remain the same. The existence and history of the United States Supreme Court are the most striking monument existing in the world of this principle, and the United States people are more proud of their Supreme Court than of any other institution.

It would be a great pity if for some temporary advantage in argument, or from the natural effect of temporary passion, we should throw away the immense advantage which we have hitherto possessed throughout this struggle, and more especially and particularly in our discussions with this Government.

You will not, I hope, think me impertinent if I remind you what your signature means to the world at large, and that I hope and pray that that meaning may never be impaired."

The matter was settled in the particular instance by release of the cargo; and the incident contrasts oddly with accusations that the British Ambassador could never see any justification for America's protests. Indeed, upon a general view of the correspondence, it will be seen that Spring Rice in his official capacity was continually making himself the apologist of President Wilson's action—not basing his defence on high moral grounds but simply on the facts of the case and of human nature.

As a private individual, having body, parts and passions, he had his own way of looking at the same facts; and, it is certain that the tone of his private thought is better given by a letter to his nephew Dominick Spring Rice, which glances over the ground that

had been covered by his despatches. Essentially there is no difference in the judgments expressed, but the irony is less restrained.

To Dominick Spring Rice.

Sept. 17, 1915.

"Would you like news from here? The papers probably give better news than I could. But the situation is simple enough if one thinks it out rationally. The U.S. has ceased to be a whole—that is, a uniform population moved by uniform feelings of patriotism, etc. It also has been busy on commerce and politics for a considerable time; making money and getting votes have been the main occupations of this country, as of our own, and these occupations don't tend to encourage a very idealistic frame of mind, except only so far as an 'idea' makes a good voting platform. For instance the 'idea' of 'uplift,' the edification, etc., of the people—is a good voting platform, but of course it is primarily based on the fact that, if carried out, the people get more money than they did before 'uplift' was started. In fact, the process here is the same as with us; while Germany was gradually getting all the elements in the nation to think alike in national terms, we and the U.S. were encouraging our people to think only in terms of *personal* not national advantage; we care for the honey, not the hive (as Oliver points out).[1]

This is 'in the air,' but the basic facts are that the current feelings in this country are connected with the personal advantage, etc., of American citizens. Now, gradually, owing to emigration, and still more to the conscious development of national feeling among the citizens of German origin, the country has become divided into entirely distinct and separate sections, which do not speak the same language, or think the same thoughts. Incomparably the most important of these sections is the German. For thirty years a steady and continual process of consolidation has been going on, and the active co-operation of the Jews has very much assisted in the process.

Thus when the war broke out, the Government found itself confronted with a fact. The old view had been that the U.S. was a united nation, founded with a view to certain fundamental ideas of liberty and so on, and animated by a strong and united desire to carry out those ideas at home and assist other nations to carry them out abroad. They found that this old view had ceased to be true. There was no united feeling, there

[1] F. S. Oliver's *Ordeal by Battle* was at this time greatly read both in Britain and America. Spring Rice has many allusions to it. But it is in the Life of Alexander Hamilton that Oliver says that Hamilton cared for the hive and Aaron Burr for the honey.

was a majority and a minority feeling; but the minority were in earnest and ready to act, and the majority were only ready to talk. To avoid internal difficulties it was necessary to declare 'neutrality in thought, as well as in deed.'

I think the criticisms of the President are quite misplaced. He has to go with the majority, and the majority want to keep out of war. Confronted with a threat, such as Bernstorff publicly made the other day, that if he is sent away, there will be war in three days, the U.S. people are perfectly prepared to yield almost anything, unless their material interests are in imminent peril, that is, unless they have indirectly more to lose materially by yielding than by not yielding. The point of view of national honour, as to which the U.S. people were thought to be so sensitive, gives place to the point of view in each section, and class, and nationality, that what they have to do in this world is to look after their own skins. For instance, in California there is a complete contempt for the affairs not only of Europe, but of the middle and eastern States. The middle States think in terms of wheat, and the southern States in terms of cotton, just as the Welsh miners think in terms of wages. What is a Government to do under these circumstances? Just to act as the majority desire, and the majority desire to make money and not to make war.

This point of view ought to help us in the matter of the loan, if we look at it as solely a matter of interest and not of sentiment. If the U.S. wants to sell, they must facilitate sales; if they don't facilitate sales, they cannot sell. This and not the European struggle is what interests them, and I daresay we should be the same.

The fact that the East is greatly stirred up by family and business and sentimental or ideal reasons, should not mislead us. Business is supreme in this country at large, and what the country at large desires, the President must do.

Of course it would be a great mistake to do what the Germans do, and deny or ignore that there are other things in the world besides fear and greed. But it would be a still greater mistake to lean in any way on this particular reed. 'Their strength is in sitting still.' Many nations have been ruined since the Jews by leaning on broken reeds, and I hope we shall profit by their warning. And it would also be a mistake to be angry with the President for being a very fairly just representative of his people, or with the people for not doing what they never promised to do. From the beginning of our history there have been many people who came over from here to Europe and expressed themselves heart and soul with European nations,

mainly because they felt that way, and also because it is a natural thing to say to one's hosts. Englishmen over here go out to dinner and hear many friendly things about the old country, etc., and believe them. The people here who say such things don't get on in politics. They have to repudiate them at once.

But a good many people like Strachey take for granted that the U.S. as a whole is actuated by feelings of warm friendship for England and liberty, and when this wholly false idea is proved false, they squeal. A man asks you to dinner and you draw a large cheque on him the next day. If it is dishonoured because you have no effects, there is no reason to complain. But as I said, the sentiment does exist, and may be a growing one or not; but it does exist, and it is accompanied by a vague feeling of fear and surprise that about 12,000,000 American citizens are speaking a foreign language and look on the old inhabitants of this country much as the Puritans regarded the Indians—with at best a superior sort of pity. If the war had not taken place I expect the Germans would have captured the U.S. by peaceful penetration in another ten years. It may be too late to try now, but the struggle is on."

But how far Sir Cecil Spring Rice was from the philosophic calm, which he inculcated, may be judged by an episode of November.

Roosevelt was from the first an advocate of the Allied cause, and from the sinking of the "Lusitania" onward he vehemently urged America's intervention by arms. Spring Rice constantly quoted Roosevelt's opinion to Grey, and in April 1915 when there was a rumour that Roosevelt might visit Europe, the Ambassador at once informed the Foreign Secretary. A telegram came promptly:

"Hope that Roosevelt will find time for another walk with me if he comes."

This invitation at such a time from the Foreign Secretary, who had spent a day in 1910 with this other naturalist counting over the various bird songs in the New Forest, touched Roosevelt greatly.

But Spring Rice and Grey between them gave more practical proof of the value they set on Roosevelt's help and counsel. They gave him the life of a man. A young American was convicted of attempting to get into the wireless service on board the British fleet for the purpose of betraying secret signals to the enemy. His parents in America appealed to Roosevelt, who wrote to Spring Rice. It was arranged that a plea of insanity should be accepted and that he should be returned to custody in America.

In acknowledgement for what was said of his services, Roosevelt wrote to Spring Rice on October 25, 1915:

"Abraham Lincoln, when told that a given course of action would not achieve results, responded that at least he was

keeping his own conscience clear. I am afraid that is all I am doing. But it is possible that there are people who agree with me, and I do think that as regards preparedness and hyphenated Americanism, I have goaded the Administration into the reverse action from what it took years ago."

He instanced, as an example of what he was doing, an article in *The Metropolitan*.

A fortnight later came a message from Grey that precisely this article was being quoted to convey the impression that England was neglecting the duties incumbent on her as an ally of France. Spring Rice had to convey to his friend Grey's distress and disappointment; and there is no denying that both in the letter which he wrote to Grey and in that which he wrote to Roosevelt, there were passages unfair in tone. He was on edge against the attitude of America as a whole, and he now unfairly identified his friend with the commonalty.

There is a satisfaction in recording misunderstandings between good men which are ended by the goodness that is among them; and in this case Roosevelt, knowing himself to be wronged, wrote a full defence to Grey, and then turned upon his intimate and—with well-padded gloves—pummelled him strenuously.

To Spring Rice.

Nov. 24, 1915.

"... In your letter you say that no American statesman (meaning myself) 'can be expected to refrain from the national habit of speaking ill of our (your) country, however great the crisis.' I had supposed that you had read my article in the *Metropolitan* and can only ask that you do now read it. In that article I certainly speak far more ill of the United States and of Germany than of England; and I do so in the effort to make us fit ourselves to meet a great crisis and with the further effort to get this nation to stand so as to help your people in this great crisis. I condemn us for failure to act on behalf of Belgium. I say nothing in praise of America whatever. I speak in the heartiest praise of the British Navy and of her army at the front. I particularly explain that England has done far better than we would have done. I had no idea that what I said would be quoted in England. My whole article was an arraignment of our people for failure to perform their duty in this crisis and for failure to prepare for their own defence in future crises. . . ."

The typing ends "very sincerely yours"; this he crossed out, and wrote "always yours, Theodore Roosevelt." There followed in the big sprawling hand: "Good luck—Bad Springy! Love to Lady Springy." A day later came a practical proof of Roosevelt's desire to make amends, in a proposal that he should write a further letter to

a Frenchman, for instance, M. Hanotaux, to praise the great work of France and the tremendous effort of Russia.

"I shall then point out how very much England is doing; all that her navy has done, her great army now in France, an army that will steadily increase in size and efficiency, her financing of the allies, her present great output of guns and munitions. I shall say that the war, on such a stupendous scale, caught her unprepared, for Democracies are generally unprepared—the U.S. is utterly unprepared; that a few years ago there was a great party in France that wished France to be unprepared; but that these same Frenchmen are now just as staunch as the others; and in the same way England is now, at the end of sixteen months, doing her part with constantly increasing efficiency; that within the Nations, and among the Nations, it would be criminal not to keep the eyes of all purely on the present and future; and in the present and for the future England, like France and Russia, is doing everything; and the three nations, and Italy, must stand shoulder to shoulder with entire trust and confidence. This letter you would show to Jusserand and Bakhmetieff [1] before it was sent and consult with them so as to get it exactly straight."

Spring Rice answered:

WASHINGTON,
Nov. 26, 1915.

"MY DEAR THEODORE,

I think the idea excellent and have informed Edward. I sent a wire which I hope you received.

Thinking over the matter, I do not think it a bad thing you should now once and for all have established the fact, so that even the stupidest can see, that your first and only thought from the beginning has been the interest and honour of your own country, and that in pursuing that main object you should consider as a featherweight what foreign countries and their Governments should think of you—or even what your own countrymen should think.

So far as we are in accord, it is not because you are English or French in your sympathies, but because the principles on which our policy is fundamentally based are those to which the U.S.G. 'is dedicated'—that proposition of which Lincoln spoke.

If in the whole extent of this country there were not one single living man who sympathized with us, we have still with

[1] The Russian Ambassador.

us the dead of Arlington,[1] and the words of the dead President who being dead still liveth.

We have nothing to fear from an American America—a German America would be fatal—perhaps an English America equally fatal. For the strength of our race is that wherever we stand, that spot for us is the spot to which we owe our whole allegiance, loyal to our own homes with an entire loyalty, not to a foreign Power whether of our own race or another. It is still the old story of the Puritan—' to walk with God and our fellowmen, according to our own conscience ' and not according to the will of King or Emperor or Pope. There is more real community of feeling between men who think the same, according to their own free will and judgment, than between men who act together in obedience to another man, be he who he may. Our kingdom is within us. C. S. R."

The last word on this is Sir Edward Grey's.

PARIS,
Dec. 20, 1915.

" MY DEAR ROOSEVELT,

Your letter has given me the true perspective of your article, of which I had only seen an extract, selected no doubt by part of the English press whose views it suited to publish it in that form.

I enjoyed reading your letter, which seemed to me full of vigorous right, and made your point abundantly clear. . . .

I wish I could spend a day with you at this moment—even your letter is quickening to read and your presence would be more so.

Yours sincerely,

E. GREY."

There were other friends besides the Roosevelts to whom the British Ambassador was bound by old affection. Senator Lodge had in past times pained Spring Rice by his political hostility to England ; but in these days his eloquent advocacy of the Allied cause was a comfort.

For instance, in the newly-given Widener Library at Harvard, Lodge spoke on " The Meaning of Books "—a congenial theme, handled for the most part with reference only to literary associations. But at the close another note crept in—the voice of one who thought that other ends were to be pursued, even at the price of peace.

" They mean so much, these books, so much more than I in these halting sentences have been able to express. For there is to books a human side, inherent in the silent leaves, which even Cicero and which Doctor Johnson and Matthew Arnold wholly passed by.

[1] The cemetery where many soldiers of the War for Union were buried.

"We find that single thought in the mind of Whitman, when he wrote of a book:

'Camarado, this is no book,
Who touches this touches a man,
(Is it night? Are we here together alone?)
It is I you hold and who holds you,
I spring from the pages into your arms—decease calls me forth.'

"Rightly considered in this aspect, the books mean so much, just now, when freedom of speech, and freedom of thought, when liberty and democracy are in jeopardy every hour, that I must turn at last, if I would find fit utterance, to the great champion of all these things, and repeat to you the famous sentences of Milton:

'For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain potency of life in them to be as active as that soul whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they are as lively, and as vigorously productive as those fabulous Dragon's teeth; and being sown up and down may chance to spring up armed men' . . ."

Spring Rice was quick with his gratitude.

July 20, 1915.

"My Dear Cabot,

I am greatly touched and very grateful to you for sending me your speeches (including the *excellent* one on Force and Peace).

I can't tell you how greatly I was stirred by your speech at the Widener Library. You have shown as much as anyone I know that 'books are not dead things' for they enter into your life, and your life shows it. I hope that other people too will show, when the time comes, that all the manifold feelings and expressions embodied in books have become part of those who read them. It doesn't matter then if the libraries are destroyed and the books burnt, if the life is there,—that is, the thoughts and the beliefs remain alive.

The quotation from Walt Whitman sounded well-tuned to the Milton. What an extraordinary thing it is, till one begins to think about it, that all great literature is really one—the word of God, as Isaiah called it! 'As the rain cometh down and the snow from Heaven and returneth not thither but watereth the earth and bringeth seed to the sower and bread to the eater —even so it is with every word that proceedeth out of my mouth, it shall not return to me void, but shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it.' I thought of your speech as I read this in Isaiah the other day."

This thought found another expression; for the Ambassador's relaxation in these days was verse-making, and according to old habit

he sent a budget of his lucubrations to Mrs. Lodge. Many were doggerel; but among them came this elegiac inspired by the Senator's Library speech.

A Book.

(*Louvain*)

A harmless sheep's integument,
Some linen rags, some printers' ink:
And certain men above me bent
To read and read, and think and think.

They gave the price; they paid the toll:
And when they called me, I awoke—
And from the page a living soul
To living souls arose and spoke.

Because I said a certain word,
And certain people understood,
And spoke a message, not unheard,
From good and grave, to brave and good,

The ancient pile in which I lay
And I myself went up in smoke.
The body dies, but oh, not they—
The soul of me—the words I spoke.

Mrs. Lodge was something of an invalid in these times, and partly to amuse her, but more because he had always done it, he sent more of the flying stuff.

To Mrs. Lodge. Sept. 13, 1915.

"It was very kind of Cabot to come and we had a very good time, at least I did. I sent the speech, which is a most eloquent and touching one, to Laurier.[1] I hope that it will be repeated in the other French papers.

Now don't you think, considering how we love you here, you might give us a call? It would be such a delight to us and wouldn't do you any harm. Please think about it. Here we are doing nothing in the world but just waiting.

Also, don't you think that you ought to devote yourself just for a bit entirely to yourself? You gave me some very good advice which I took. Now I am giving you good advice and you had better take it.

I made another defence poem, and I send it to you:

When ships were wood and guns were brass,
And we were young and brave,
We thought a donkey was an ass,
A coward was a slave.

[1] Sir Wilfred Laurier the Canadian Statesman.

And there were things we didn't say,
And certain things we thought,
As we watched the good ship on her way
And blessed the men who fought.

When guns were brass and ships were wood,
The world was full of lies,
And people seldom understood
Where true advantage lies.
And now the wood is in our heads,
The brass is in our throats,
And tranquil in our prudent beds
We bless the man who votes—"

That must have been the last of his letters to this most treasured of the women friends that America had vouchsafed to him. His bulletin to Grey on October 7 ends:

"We have sustained a terrible loss in the death of Mrs. Lodge who died suddenly of heart disease. I don't know what the Senator will do."

To Roosevelt he wrote three days later:

"Mrs. Lodge's death is the end of many things—more than I can say. It is a blow quite irreparable to my wife and me. What a centre that house was and what an amount of pleasure we have had there! Jusserand is deeply depressed. She is the last of what I think, and he thinks, the most delightful circle of friends we have ever known. How the world changes! Poor Cabot! It is dreadful to think of it!

What times we had in Washington and what things we can remember! What immense changes, not only in the friends who used to meet and walk together but in the background. At any rate, we are the masters of our own souls. I used to think that if the times required a desperate remedy, in the form of an entirely new birth, that if the whole character of the world changed, because the point of view of the people in it changed, if the old principles were forgotten on which men based their hopes and fears—you might be the medicine, and make them understand the text: 'The axe is laid to the root of the tree. If the tree brings not forth good fruit, it shall be hewn down and cast into the fire.' This is the lesson we must all learn or perish."

Later, he prepared a volume of verses which at one time or other, in almost thirty years of friendship, he had written for this friend. It

was published (but after his own death), with the title *In Memoriam, A. C. M. L.* The closing poem is this sonnet:

"Art thou a living guardian, ever near
To watch and ward thine own? Or far away,
Bright with the brightness of eternal day
Among just souls made perfect, dost thou hear
The song which stills in music doubt and fear
There, where at last divine compassion dries
The bitter drops that cling to mortal eyes,
Yea, even the mourning mother's sacred tear?

I know not. This at least I know full sure:
There dwells a living presence in the heart,
Not I, but in me, high and strong and pure,
Counsel of right, a bringer of good things,
A fount of joy from deep eternal springs;
O friend, lost friend! that which thou wert, thou art!"

MRS. LODGE

CHAPTER XXIV

FROM THE AUTUMN OF 1915 TO THE SPRING OF 1916

At no time during the war did the Allied cause look less hopeful than in the close of 1915. There was deadlock in France, and attempts to break the German line were costly and unsuccessful, culminating in the disastrous battle of Loos at the end of September. The great adventure of the Dardanelles, which had roused unbounded hope, was on the point of being abandoned after some 400,000 British casualties had been incurred. As a result of its failure, Bulgaria came into the war, and combining with this new force Mackensen wiped Serbia out of separate existence. Above all, to the East of the Central Powers, Germany overran Russian Poland, and in concert with Austria pushed back the Russians from Austrian Poland where the sole important territorial advances had been won for the Allies.

To set against this was the sea, from which England had cleared every trace of German commerce and the last stray German cruisers. But the essential military value of commanding the sea was to secure uninterrupted supply for the Allies from America—above all for Russia, whose losses were largely due to lack of ammunition—and to limit Germany's power of manufacture by denying her raw material. Germany's only possible answer to this pressure was the submarine; and from September 1, 1915, America by the threat of war had constrained Germany to abandon the use of this weapon in its most effective form, namely, against traffic from America to the Allies.

It remained for Germany to influence America's action through the German element. Three ways were tried ; first to curtail the supply by inducing America to put an embargo on munitions export; secondly to push the opposition to Britain's control of sea traffic up to the point of a breach with America. These were the constitutional methods. The third was frankly unconstitutional and meant organised interruption of supply by criminal acts, such as the burning of factories and blowing up munition carrying ships ; it meant also threatening internal war if America not only persisted in a course which helped the Allies but actually sided against Germany.

Nothing like rebellion occurred in the United States. The threats remained unfulfilled. But on August 26, 1915, before the Germans agreed to limit submarine war, House wrote to Wilson that attempts

would be probably made " to blow up waterworks, electric light and gas plants, railways and bridges in cities like New York." He advocated the increase of garrisons at important points. On November 22 the Federal Authorities thought the matter serious enough to send a message to all the States, calling on them to use all efforts to suppress the incendiarism and other acts of violence by which an attempt was being made to prevent the manufacture of munitions. In December the Secretary of State demanded the recall of the German military attaché von Papen, as concerned with plots to prevent manufacture of armament, and of the naval attaché Boy-Ed, as having abused his diplomatic position by arranging from the Embassy despatch of supplies to German cruisers.

But in the meantime, as Spring Rice repeatedly pointed out, it was necessary for political reasons that when Wilson took a step unpleasing to Germany's backing, he should follow it by some assertion of American rights where they were limited by the Allies. This was the truer because parties were already taking their ground for the Presidential contest in the autumn of 1916. President Wilson's surroundings considered that by the concession of September 1 in regard to submarine war he had got satisfaction from Germany, which House described as " the greatest diplomatic triumph of the generation." On the other hand, nothing had been conceded by the Allies to the complaints of American exporters.

A Note of protest was anticipated and, as appears from Colonel House's *Papers* (II., 72), there was a discussion of the issues between House and the Ambassador, in which Spring Rice lost his temper. The episode is of no great importance and Spring Rice's papers make no allusions to it; but there is one passage which should make us a little suspicious of Colonel House's talent for accurate recording. According to him, when, by a display of firmness and authority, he had reduced his opponent from anger to contrition, Spring Rice apologised. " He spoke of the President in the highest terms and said he wished to God Great Britain had such a man directing her destinies, since there was no one in the world to compare with him."

Now certain things are unbelievable, and one is that Spring Rice ever for a fleeting second entertained this wish or this estimate. Nor is it likely that he would have said this insincerely, for a man so subtly minded would have perceived it to be too gross a flattery. Flattery was none of his methods. But he was exceedingly and perhaps unfortunately addicted to the use of irony, which presupposes a responsive intelligence in the person to whom it is addressed. Colonel House's wish to give an accurate report is admitted; but it is hard not to think that at this point he took literally what Spring Rice said ironically. No man in his senses who has read Spring Rice's correspondence will believe that he expressed during the Great War—and more particularly, during America's neutrality—an aspiration that someone like Mr. Woodrow Wilson should govern Great Britain.

The feelings which got the better of him on October 14 in discussion

with House are summed up in one sentence of a letter to Grey on October 28, 1915.

"For everything that is said against Germany, a newspaper thinks it must say something against England. . . .The American public are ready enough to condemn Germany for her cruelty, or praise her for her efficiency, but they have no generous word of sympathy for England or of recognition for her sacrifices."

He recognised that politicians must make allowance for this lack of sympathy, as well as for the actual admiration which German success inspired. Further, in the same letter he dwelt upon the fear produced by German methods.

"The administration can never be sure how far it would be safe to go, and they are acting very much as an Indian colonel would have done at the time of the Mutiny when he was not sure of the loyalty of his regiment. The German Americans of Massachusetts have come out squarely in condemnation of the President personally, and this in the strongest language, insulting to him personally and still more insulting to the Chief Executive. In spite of this, both Democrats and Republicans in Massachusetts have humbly bid for the support of their honoured German fellow-citizens. The President no doubt intends to appeal to the spirit of undivided allegiance in America against the spirit of sectional loyalty to race and religion. No doubt his platform, on which he intends to stand—Defence and Allegiance—shows the two elements which he thinks most necessary for the country now. On the other hand, defence costs money, and allegiance to the nation is a fine thing in words, but not so practical in use as obedience to the local boss. Everywhere throughout the country this great question is being tried out, and no doubt in the elections we shall see the result. If defence becomes really a practical issue, it is not outside the bounds of probability that the United States might become a practical member of a league of neutrals to guarantee treaties of peace. But this is at an immense distance. It is agitated as a pious wish and has hardly yet arrived even so far. There is, of course, a very strong desire that the United States should be a mediator, but not the slightest indication that they would appear as guarantors of the peace which might result from their mediation.

You will have received the Note. They say here that it consists of 10,000 words and has been added to considerably at the last moment, probably with the intention of making it more palatable to the party which desires energy, at least in words. I think it would be a pity to take words too seriously. The

Germans have not, and they have not suffered. The best comment that our press can make is nothing at all. There is no good giving advice to people who don't intend to take it; or complaining of Americans for being, like ourselves, keen on the dollar. The *Spectator* is a good deal read here and has caused, I believe, a good deal of irritation in the President's mind. As the President is the principal object of the German abuse, it seems rather hard that the French and English should single him out for attack. We should always remember, first, that he refused to allow the State Department to send out their first note to us in a violent and offensive form; secondly, that he absolutely refused to take Mr. Bryan's advice and send us a violent note about contraband before he had cleared up affairs with the Germans about the 'Arabic.'"

The truth was that the problem of attaining agreement was insoluble. As Grey himself wrote to House:

"The real question is not one of legal niceties about contraband and other things, but whether we are to do what we are doing, or do nothing at all."[1]

Consequently we find Colonel House deploring not only Spring Rice's irritability but Grey's failure to see things in a proper light; Page, the American Ambassador, came in for censure almost as severe as that bestowed upon Spring Rice. And so in practice, rather than do nothing at all, Great Britain continued to do as it was doing in respect of sea traffic. Spring Rice's function was to keep an eye on the pressure on the safety valve, and report how American public opinion manifested itself. He wrote on November 21, 1915.

To GREY.

"Senator Root told me that he has made very careful enquiries as to the opinion of the country. He says that the feeling against Germany is undoubtedly growing stronger and that there is a growing sense that the victory of the Central Powers would be an immense calamity to this country. The jealousy and dislike of England remain much what they were but their importance is diminished in consequence of the feeling excited by Germany. This is not surprising. At the present moment the trials are going on[2] in which Germans are accused of organizing systematic breaches of neutrality laws by supplying the German warships, of falsifying passports, of blowing up American factories and of fomenting civil war in

[1] House, II. 78.

[2] Connected with the revelations as to Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen.

Mexico. A meeting of 6000 Germans was recently held in New York in which cries were raised of ' Shoot the President.' Rumours are current that plots have been discovered of a far-reaching character. In the Movies are representations of the sack of New York on the model of Louvain by persons of an evidently Teutonic aspect. There is as much talk of German spies here as there was in England a few years ago. As Root says, the people never had the habit of thinking about foreign affairs and are only very slowly taking to it. They cannot think intelligently yet even in the east, and have hardly begun at all in the centre and west. The danger is that if eighty per cent are in favour of the Allies, they are in favour of them as we are of Church-going. The remaining twenty per cent are in favour of Germany as we are of eating our dinners. There is indifference on one side and intense earnestness on the other. There is certainly as yet no strong national feeling to which the Government could appeal, and there is a prevailing feeling that whatever happens America must keep out of the war, and while it lasts make as much money out of it as possible.

What is certain is that people here desire that the war should be stopped, and most Democratic politicians desire that the President should stop it. The President's friend [1] is evidently most anxious that he should perform this great task. To perform it he would have to be well seen by both sides. It would therefore be fatal to take too energetic action against one or the other side. Therefore we may expect that the administration will not deal too severely with Germany. On the other hand, if Germany continues her present policy there will gradually grow up here a demand for more stringent action. When it comes, the President will no doubt comply with it, but he will certainly do nothing to make the demand more urgent.

I have not written about finance. You know that our credits will be exhausted at a date of which you have been informed. The question of a further loan will then have to be considered. With this object in view, it would of course be highly desirable to conciliate such powerful combinations as the packers, and also to placate banking circles and the industrial world by concessions in the matter of imports. The Cabinet will no doubt consider these aspects of the question. At the present moment there is a danger that people here may be encouraged to demand more than we can give, and to entirely ignore the situation of popular sentiment in England. I have been obliged to use rather strong language as to the state of

[1] Col. House.

feeling at home. It seems to be taken for granted here that there is a difficulty in Congress but none in Parliament.[1]

The brutal facts are that this country has been saved by the war and by our war demand from a great economical crisis; that in normal times Great Britain and her colonies take forty per cent of the total export trade of the United States. We have therefore the claims of their best customer and at the present moment our orders here are absolutely essential to their commercial prosperity."

Dec. 3, 1915.

To GREY.

"The great event of this week has been the German trials and action taken against the German naval and military attachés. The State Department objected to the name of Boy-Ed being brought into Court, on the ground that this violated diplomatic etiquette. This objection gave the impression that the Government was afraid of proceeding against Boy-Ed for various infractions of his duty towards the United States, which he was known to have committeed. The German Embassy even went so far as to demand an apology, at least through the Press. A communication to this effect from an agent of the German Embassy in the Associated Press created a very bitter feeling in the country, and popular opinion called for action.

The Government shows its earnest desire to maintain absolute impartiality and to keep the peace. I see in England there is a disposition to criticise this Government and the People. It cannot be wondered at that the American People are determined to keep out of the war which is frightful in itself to those that take part in it and very profitable to those who do not. The President and his Cabinet undoubtedly reflect the feeling of the country which they represent. People have expected more of the United States and those who have expected the most are now the bitterest because their hopes are disappointed. We are now in the position, owing to our supremacy at sea, of being in conflict with American interests in every direction, while Germany hardly comes in contact with this country at all. It is true they are drowning American citizens who travel in our ships, and killing Americans who are

[1] This should be compared with House II. 99. "Nov. 17, 15. I arranged with Sidney Brooks to see Frank Polk and discuss trade questions between our two countries. Polk says these are becoming serious; that the British Ambassador 'blew off the lid' again on Monday and practically threw down the gauntlet. Brooks maintains that this is not the feeling in [British] Government circles, and I cannot think that it is." Mr. Brooks was a British journalist.

making munitions for us. But the drowned people are millionaires, and the exploded people are mostly foreign workmen. Neither have great influence in the polls, and the country at the present moment is not much inclined to sentiment. This is deplored by many of your friends, but I think there is little doubt about the fact. It seems to be rather hard on the President and his Government that he is denounced with equal fierceness in every country in the world."

To the Same.

Dec. 9, 1915.

"There has been a great change in the situation since I last wrote. The continued publications as to German plots and German outrages have gradually aroused public opinion and the excitement appears to be growing. I cannot tell how far this feeling, which certainly exists in the east, extends in the centre and the west. But it is generally understood that the sentiment against Germany is growing stronger and the President will follow with the sentiment of the country. Of course anti-German does not mean pro-English. If this country has trouble with another country, it will be for its own reasons and not for ours. But there are reasons of its own why this Government should take action hostile to Germany. I have again and again enumerated the outward and visible signs of the German organization here. They have lately taken a form which can leave no doubt in the minds of the general public as to what the intentions of the German Government here have been. They were to use this country as a base for hostile operations against the Allies, and if this Government refused to accede to their desire, then to adopt in America, and in the quality of American citizens, a hostile and disloyal attitude towards the Government of the country. The President himself has been the object of the most savage personal attacks and it is generally believed that these attacks have been of the most vindictive and intimate character. Politically, the German-Americans have denounced the President and have arrayed all their forces against him. For a long time he appears to have hesitated, and to have done all he could, not to conciliate them, but to suppress open and visible signs of anything like disunion among American citizens. He is said to have done all he could to spare the German and Austrian officials, who have violated their duties. Rumours were prevalent that the soft pedal was being put on all the proceedings taken by the Department of Justice or the State Authorities. Gradually, however, the feeling of the country

rose and a demand was made for more energetic action. When, in compliance with the German Ambassador's desire, the subservient 'Associated Press' announced that the Embassy was going to demand from the United States Government an apology for having mentioned the German naval attaché in a criminal prosecution, the popular excitement almost unanimously demanded some action, and the Government announced their demand for the withdrawal of Boy-Ed and Papen. The German Embassy through the Press put forward the claim that these officers could not be withdrawn unless the Government stated exactly what were the charges brought against them. But this demand seems to have been withdrawn on the plea that the considerations were naval and military and did not involve the Ambassador.

The passage in the President's speech[1] denouncing the disloyal action of the hyphenated citizen was greeted with great applause and is now the predominant element in the present situation. It is believed that the President, having written this passage thought for some time of withdrawing it, but finally he determined to read it as it had stood originally. He has thus crossed the Rubicon. He has openly attacked the German-Americans who have as openly attacked him. His rival, Roosevelt, led the way and perhaps by his language made it advisable from a political point of view that the President should take some action, in view of the growing indignation among the people.

As I have often said, the President feels that he is not Woodrow Wilson but the President of the United States, and that he can take no action unless he is supported by the American people. He has continually waited for an indication of what is the popular will. When the popular will has been expressed he has done what the popular will seemed to demand. Until then he has held back. He is known to be of a very determined character, not prone to yield or to forgive an injury or an insult. But he is not supposed to carry personal feelings into public affairs. His policy from the first was to maintain absolute neutrality and he certainly did his best to keep the straight line.

[1] Third Annual Address to Congress, December 7, 1915. The passage contains this sentence: "There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life: who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they found it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase our policies to the uses of foreign intrigue."

If the people desire action in regard to foreign affairs inconsistent with neutrality, and this desire is clearly expressed, he will no doubt take it; but not until the expression is clear and definite. There is an impression that he once bitterly complained that the people of the United States demanded energetic words but would not consent to energetic action. He is believed to have said that he would not approve drawing cheques which the people would not honour. Hence a policy of extreme caution. I have no means of judging at first hand, but my impression is that he is deeply moved by the signs of disloyalty among a large section of American citizens, and he is absolutely determined on uniting the American people in a movement for the suppression of all disloyalty and for the reinstatement of the Union in the position of undivided allegiance which it once held in the hearts of all American citizens.

There is a passage in the President's address to Congress which I have quoted in my letter which very correctly and completely describes the policy of the Allies in Europe in carrying on this war. Those words are applied only to the duties of the United States towards the American continent and the peoples which inhabit it. But no words could better describe the spirit which animates the democracies of Europe at the present time.[1] Gradually, as the struggle goes on, the Kings and the Priests are found as of old, arrayed on one side and the peoples on the other; the war becomes, like many former wars, a struggle for Empire on the one hand and security on the other; more and more the principles of democracy are at stake, and as they are at stake, not only the principles on which this Government is founded but also its political interests and its own security become more and more in danger. This is the feeling which is growing here and it is fair to surmise that it is also in the mind of the President. The visible sign of the struggle which is plain to all is the odious policy of treachery,

[1] This is the passage referred to: "Great democracies are not belligerent. They do not seek or desire war. Their thought is of individual liberty and of the free labour that supports life and the uncensored thought that quickens it. Conquest and dominion were not in our reckoning, or agreeable to our principles. But just because we demand unmolested development and the undisturbed government of our own lives upon our own principles of right and liberty, we resent, from whatever quarter it may come, the aggression we ourselves will not practise. We insist upon security in prosecuting our self-chosen lines of development. We do more than that. We demand it also for others. From the first we have made common cause with all partizans of liberty on this side of the sea, and have deemed it as important that our neighbours should be free from all outside domination as that we ourselves should be; we have set America aside as a whole for the uses of independent nations and political freemen."

disloyalty, outrage and crime which is being pursued before the American people and on American soil by the agents of a foreign government, and which is more and more working its effect upon public sentiment.

Under these circumstances I am sure you will think that we must do our best not to allow the situation to be complicated by any action on our part which may appear to have an unfriendly character towards this people and its interests. It is of course true that we have vital interests which we cannot neglect. It is also true that there are many things which this Government has done or refrained from doing which fairly deserve criticism. The main thing before us, however, is that a great issue is making itself more and more clear before the minds of this people and that they are beginning to see things as they never saw them before. We cannot ourselves do anything by action to bring this issue more clearly before their eyes. Should we attempt to do so, we should be acting contrary to the principle that has animated American politics from its commencement. All that we can do is to make people understand that although engaged in a life and death struggle, we are willing to do our very utmost to spare neutrals from avoidable loss or injury.

All this may change and the people sink back again into indifference. I do not believe that more than three per cent of this people would willingly embark in war. Whether that will change or not we cannot tell, but we can tell that there is a change which is operating at the present moment and that this change is in favour of the Allies."

The situation had now grown so critical that the President and his friend thought it desirable that Colonel House should again visit Europe. House's own account of the mission is on record. Here is Spring Rice's report of a farewell interview, with his comments. In this case he does not confine himself to transmitting a picture of American sentiment; he sets out clearly his own view of what the situation demands.

Dec. 23, 1915.

To GREY.

"I saw Colonel House in New York and he told me he was going over to London and Paris and perhaps Rome in order to convey personal messages from the President to the United States Ambassadors. *They* could not leave, nor could Mr. Lansing. But there were many things which could only be fully explained by word of mouth. Therefore the President and Mr. Lansing had approved of his journey in order to convey to

United States representatives abroad and from them to the Government here the local atmosphere in the United States and Europe. Colonel House assured me that he had no mission of any description and conveyed no proposals and would not even make a suggestion of a political character. But he would do his best to explain to everybody he met what was the feeling of the administration and of the country, and when he came back he would try and faithfully represent to the United States Government what impressions he had collected in Europe. I told the French and Russian Ambassadors what he had said to me, and they think such a journey would have an excellent effect. You will see him soon I presume and as he is a better judge than I am of what is happening here you will have the advantage of first-class and first-hand information. I can only give my own impression of the situation as I have learned it by word of mouth from various informants and from the press.

I understand that the impression prevails here that this Embassy is rather too firm in upholding British rights and that a more conciliatory attitude would be welcome. It is perfectly true that any appearance of unfriendliness on our part would have an unfortunate effect and perhaps the present moment is a good one to choose for any concessions. But there are certain things we cannot concede. We cannot allow a claim on the part of neutrals to export German goods and so establish German credits abroad. We cannot allow a claim on the part of neutrals to import goods into Germany and so break the blockade. We cannot allow a neutral to claim the right of extending the privileges of the neutral flag to ships which are in reality owned and controlled by German interests for the advantage of Germany. There is no good giving the impression that we can yield on these vital points. Unfortunately these are the very points which are claimed as included in neutral rights.

United States exports have again surpassed the record. The internal trade is declared by the Secretary of the Treasury to be on a firm and satisfactory basis altogether independent of the war supplies. The trade of the Allies has decreased immensely. Before the war began the United States were threatened with a great crisis. Owing to the war this crisis has been averted. The United States Government seems now to be laying claim to the right to trade with the enemy as well as with us and neutral nations, and so still further to increase the immense figures which are astonishing the world. The right may exist, but the motive to insist upon it at the cost of war, especially a war on behalf of militarism against liberty,

seems to be lacking. In the American War of North and South, England refused to intervene though impelled to intervention by the most overpowering economic stress. No such stress exists here. At the same time we should not insist too much upon this point of view, and where we can yield without yielding a vital point I think it will be desirable to do so. You have most abundantly shown that this is also your view and I am sure you will continue to do so. But do not count upon purchasing effective help by any concession. You would build on sand. Even if you could do so, it would be far safer to assume that you could not.

With regard to the situation in Congress, there will no doubt be bitter and determined attacks upon us; but there are many subjects which Congress has to decide, and perhaps we would look with composure from some points of view at any rate on a possibility of an embargo in the summer. I hear that Canada is now very well organized and that the output can be greatly increased. I wish I could describe to you the sensation one has when one crosses the border and finds oneself among one's own people, determined as one man to see it through to the end. Unfortunately in this I do not include the French Canadians who are more Catholic than French. I am sure that your reliance should not be placed outside your own people. Whatever the sympathy here for our cause—and it is very strong—between Canada and the United States there is an almost indescribable difference."

The sentiments expressed in the last paragraph are more fully developed in an interesting letter to Lord Onslow, his former subordinate at St. Petersburg.

To Lord Onslow.

Washington, Sept. 23, 1915.

"My Dear Crannles,

The colonial situation is most interesting now. The U.S. was regarded as the eldest child of liberty, the principal incarnation of the Anglo-Saxon idea of independence and self-sufficiency, and of the hostility to outside control. In Australia and Canada, for instance, it was taken for granted that the occupation of Belgium and the triumph of German militarism in Europe would arouse the unanimous condemnation of the American government and people. But the government was silent and inculcated in the people "neutrality in *thought* as well as deed"—that is, an absolute complete and systematic indifference to what most people regard as one of the greatest

crimes in history. When at last the U.S. government did speak, they spoke not on behalf of oppressed liberty, but in the name of certain commercial interests affected by the command of the seas enjoyed by the allies. Naturally the English-speaking world outside the U.S. came to the conclusion that the U.S. was actuated solely by its material interests, and not by those principles of liberty to which they were supposed to be dedicated. In fact the result was much the same as when the British, instead of taking sides with the Northern States when they declared war in the name of personal freedom on anti-slavery principles, appeared to sympathize with the slave-owning South. England now, and not the U.S., is fighting for the cause of liberty, and the U.S. and not England is holding aloof. The result is that the natural hegemony of the free English-speaking world falls to England, and the free colonies are fighting on her side as bound together in the common cause of freedom. This makes our relations with the Empire particularly intimate, and all that affects the parts of the Empire affects the whole."

There is no further reference in the papers to the mission of Colonel House. Its purpose was outlined in a letter from House to Grey, dated October 17, 1915, which suggested that "The time may soon come when this Government should intervene between the belligerents and demand that peace parleys begin upon the broad basis of the elimination of militarism and navalism."

House proposed to go first to London and secure the consent of Great Britain to this intervention. Given this consent: "I should proceed to Berlin and tell them that it was the President's purpose to intervene and stop this destructive war, provided the weight of the United States thrown on the side that accepted our proposal could do it. . . . If the Central Powers are still obstinate, it would probably be necessary for us to join the Allies and force the issue."

The word "probably" was added to the draft in the last sentence by President Wilson, a significant addition.

Grey cabled to ask if the United States accepted the proposal made by him in a letter of Sept. 22, 1915, for "a League of Nations binding themselves to side against a Power which broke a treaty; which broke certain rules of warfare on sea or land; . . . or which refused, in case of dispute, to adopt some other method of settlement than that of war."

To this, House with Wilson's approval answered in the affirmative.

House was at the time of opinion that Spring Rice was a serious danger to the relations between England and America. He wrote in his diary on November 17: "The irrational . . . Ambassador may at any time precipitate matters." The context and indeed all the tenour

of the book indicate that the omitted word is "British." He notes again on Dec. 6, 1915: "Sir Paul Harvey called to bring a message from the British Ambassador. I listened to it with scant courtesy, for it was a repetition of the Ambassador's comments upon the American policy, particularly as regards peace measures."—Again we have no means of knowing what these comments were. But a sentence in Spring Rice's letter of October 28 may be recalled. "There is, of course, a very strong desire that the United States should be a mediator, but not the slightest indication that they would appear as guarantors of the peace which might result from their mediation." Spring Rice was not likely to urge his Government to commit themselves to a policy on the faith of what President Wilson authorized Colonel House to say that the United States would "probably" do.

Apart from this, it will seem surprising to those who read the letters which follow that their writer should have been regarded as a firebrand; and it will be found that he was blamed in Great Britain for urging too much toleration for the American claims in matters at issue between the Governments.

Jan. 13, 1916.

To GREY.

"The situation here, so far as politics are concerned, has not improved in favour of the Allies. The spirit of Congress is somewhat menacing. Congress was opened in stormy meetings in which violent attacks were made upon our commercial policy. Senator Lodge's intervention in the Senate, in which he said that his heart was more moved by the thought of a drowned baby than an unsold bale of cotton, was very effective and changed for a time the tone of the debate. But the general tone of the debate was not favourable to us. The same could be said of the House of Representatives. Violent language was used against the measures in restriction of trade. Lodge's son-in-law, Mr. Gardner, of Massachusetts, did what was very rare in Congress, that is, made a speech in favour of England. He was reminded by a subsequent speaker that he did not enjoy the privilege enjoyed by the majority of the House, of having a considerable number of German-Americans in his constituency. The German-American exercises a very unmistakeable influence and this influence is not diminishing. No doubt the German Government has counted upon this temper in Congress and is directing its policy with a view to influencing opinion among the members. With this object in view, Bernstorff has apparently been instructed to offer satisfaction on the various questions at issue, and to the surprise of everybody Germany intervened after the sinking of the 'Persia' with a wholly

unexpected apology and a guarantee for the future.[1] It is expected that an arrangement on the ' Lusitania ' question will shortly be announced, and then, as they say here, the sheet of Germany will be cleared and the account against England re-opened.

You may think it astonishing that there is such indifference as to what we feel to be the real nature of the struggle. This astonishment is shared by many people here. But I do not think that there is any sign of a radical change, or that this country is likely to be aroused, at least for some time, to take more than a passive interest, while deriving as much advantage as possible from the great events of which it remains a spectator. Meanwhile the prosperity of the country increases, and it seems to be in a fair way of gaining the whole world, whatever other thing it may lose."

A postscript, headed " General Situation," shows the fear of some arrangement reached between Germany and America.

" There is no doubt that the impression prevails that while the feeling in favour of the Allies is as strong as ever or even stronger, the animosity against Germany has diminished and the feeling against Great Britain has increased. This is natural, as our measures of restriction of trade tell against neutrals. There is a special reason here. A most active propaganda is going on and all the enemies of England have been marshalled against us. There are unfortunately a good many, and the Irish have lent their unequalled power of political organization [2] to Jews, Catholics and Germans. I believe there is a very strong feeling indeed in favour of Belgium and France and that this is growing intense. This is the sheet anchor of the situation. But everybody whom I consult warns me that the relations between the United States and England are growing tenser and that an incident at the present moment would have very serious results. Who would have foreseen the burst of feeling about the Sackville letter or the Venezuela message ? [3]

The safeguard is that this country doesn't want to go to war. If it did want to go to war, it would probably prefer Britain as the object. That is regarded as less dangerous and more

[1] The ' Persia ' was sunk in the Mediterranean on December 30, 1915, without warning. Germany declared that her submarines had orders against such action. It was not possible to prove whether the assailant was Austrian or Turkish.

[2] Elsewhere in this despatch: " The best politicians in the country are the Irish, and the professional Irish politician is against us."

[3] In 1888 and 1895 respectively.

profitable, and is in conformity with the tradition of native Americans and the wishes of a large number of imported Americans.

The President is on a tour. He is making speeches on behalf of defence and making an appeal to American patriotism. For this purpose he has to paint the devil on the wall. John Bull is the devil most in vogue here. To-day a sudden announcement is made that Germany must yield on the 'Lusitania' question within a week. Germany has already agreed to pay an indemnity and the only question at issue is the form of words. The President has been compared to a Byzantine theologian by some of his more prejudiced critics. In any case he may be trusted to find a formula by which all difficulties will be averted. For a diplomatic victory, Germany exacts her price. This price is said in the German press to be the prohibition of the carrying of guns on merchant ships and the use of the American flag for concealment, and also strong action against England or perhaps strong words. It is absolutely certain that strong words will be used, and some concessions exacted from us. We can hardly hope that the tension will not increase.

You were naturally rather surprised at the latest proposal of the Secretary of State.[1] I think the real reason was the desire to avoid any cause for complication in the future with Germany. If Germany gives a pledge not to sink without notice and keeps it, and if Americans are prohibited from travelling on belligerent ships, there will be good reason to believe that further incidents will be avoided. Of course the United States Government will not give any sort of guarantee of the German promise, and they are perfectly honest in refusing to give a guarantee which no American government could be certain to fulfil. I think our best plan is to give the matter long and careful consideration and to recognise the right of the United States to do what it likes on its own territory. By a change of the rules of war during the war it establishes a precedent of immense importance. It may cut both ways."

A month later, Spring Rice was chiefly concerned to impress on his Government the influence which was exercised on American policy by the imminence of a Presidential election. Since no definite action had been taken by the American Government, he was constrained

[1] In a circular letter to the European embassies, Mr. Lansing proposed that the right of carrying arms for defence should be withdrawn from merchantmen, as inconsistent with the claim that a submarine was bound to give warning before torpedoing non-combatant vessels: since if a submarine came to the surface, one shot might sink her. The inference was plainly, to recognise warfare by submarines on merchantmen as legal.

to give advice as to the courses which were least likely to have some unfavourable result: for he held now, as always, that direct attempts by England to influence American feeling would have an undesired result.

To GREY. Feb. 12, 1916.

"Shortly after the receipt of a message from Colonel House, who had just been in Berlin, the President in a speech at St. Louis, the headquarters of the German population here, announced that German submarine warfare was in the main conducted in accordance with accepted law; and he also proclaimed his adherence to the principle that Americans had an indefeasible right to trade in innocent goods with the civil populations of Europe. On his return it was announced that the agreement about the 'Lusitania,' which had been hanging fire, was on the point of settlement. The only obstacle appears to have been the too jubilant tone of the American press heralding a diplomatic victory, which was resented in Berlin in the form of public statements made by the Foreign Office and the Chancellor. Simultaneously it was announced that the United States Government was about to legalise submarine warfare, to treat armed merchant ships as cruisers, and to prohibit American citizens from travelling on board such vessels. The announcement from Berlin that the submarine warfare was to recommence with renewed severity on March 1 against all vessels carrying guns was hailed by the press here as a further proof that a good understanding prevailed between the United States and Germany, and that all their difficulties were successfully overcome. Immediately after this announcement followed the resignation of Mr. Garrison,[1] which was in consequence of the President's concessions to the opposition in Congress to the scheme for a continental army under national control. This every Congressman under German influence has violently opposed. It is also hinted that wide divergences have become manifest between the President and his Secretary on questions of foreign policy. Mr. Garrison has been known to hold strong views as to the steps which he considers necessary for the maintenance of American influence and honour in Mexico and elsewhere.

The explanation of these various phenomena which is made in certain circles here, I do not know with what truth, is as follows. The German-American vote is very largely Republican. There is a belief that Roosevelt is the President's most dangerous antagonist. There is also a belief that Mr. Bryan is in

[1] Secretary for War.

close touch with the German voter. If President Wilson could secure the mass of the German voters on his side, he would have a very great immediate advantage over both Mr. Bryan and Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. Roosevelt is considered to have lost the German vote irretrievably. Mr. Bryan, as a temperance advocate, is not likely to win the unanimous support of a party which lives and moves in beer. The German-Americans have united in virulent abuse of Mr. Wilson. The most violent personal attacks have been made upon him. But politics are above persons and the following solution appears to have been suggested in certain quarters. (I must say again that I cannot vouch for the truth of the rumour circulated.) If President Wilson adopts a policy satisfactory to Germany in certain specified points, the German Americans, although continuing to abuse him in public, may vote for him when the critical moment arrives. As the great mass of the foreign voters affiliated with the Allies are not organized as the Germans are, a pro-German policy is not so dangerous politically as a pro-Ally policy.

Another point is finance. The Democratic Administration has alienated the great financial interests. But it is necessary to find funds. For a consideration, certain financial interests would sacrifice general principles for particular interests. The Jewish bankers, the German brewers, and the Standard Oil are quoted as being quite susceptible to the charms of a satisfactory deal.

Supposing this supposition is true, the immediate result would be an apparent leaning towards Germany and an apparent compliance with her wishes. The consequence would be an outburst of feeling on the part of the Allies which would doubtless lead to some definite and hostile action. The result of this hostile action would be a severe reaction here, and it is no doubt on this that the German managers are now counting. It would therefore be our policy, while bringing the United States Government clearly to understand that we have marked and noted a change in the rules of law to Germany's advantage and our disadvantage, to abstain as far as possible from any overt act likely to turn American opinion seriously against us, unless the case in our favour is absolutely overwhelming. For there seems to be no doubt about the fact that, whether warm or lukewarm, the mass of American public opinion is in favour of the Allies and against the policy of subjection to Germany. We cannot count on this to prevent acts more or less injurious to ourselves, we certainly cannot count upon it to prevent injurious language; but I think we ought to be able to count

upon the fundamental good sense of the American people even among the German-born population, and the plain facts of the case which can leave no doubt in any reasoning mind as to what is the real nature of the European struggle, and its ultimate result upon America and American institutions.

But you must remember that as the election approaches, all political thought and action is in terms of an election. The one thought of the President's friends is to bring about his re-election and to dish his antagonists. For us the main thing to bear in mind is that the American people want to keep out of war and will avoid it at all hazards. They wish also to avoid open partizanship with one side or the other, and their personal sympathy will have no more effect upon their policy than the personal sympathies of an intelligent and capable business man. But it is an immemorial tradition in American politics that a Presidential election is a time when American public opinion is peculiarly sensitive to incidents. And every effort will be made by our enemies on this side to bring an incident about."

On the same date Spring Rice wrote a memorandum, which on second thoughts he did not send; but it describes vividly the difficulties which arose from President Wilson's method of conducting his Administration.

"I want you to understand the rather difficult position in which your representative here is placed. The direction of public affairs lies wholly in the hands of the President. He makes public utterances it is true, but their character is somewhat cryptic, and his language, while very elevated and convincing, does not immediately lead to any definite practical conclusions. In this respect he has been likened to Mr. Gladstone. For diplomatists, or at any rate for an English diplomatist, he is quite unapproachable. On the very rare occasions on which I have had the honour to be in his presence, he has addressed neither to me nor as far as I know to my colleagues any observation whatever of more than general interest. General politics are not, it is said, placed before the Cabinet. He is supposed to have adopted the plan followed by the Emperor of Russia in past years, who refused to deal with his Cabinet as a whole, but only transacted business with the individual Ministers on the subjects in which they were immediately concerned.[1] Mr. Lansing, who is very able and very

[1] House, I. 132, confirms this. "I told Page the President consulted with the individual members of his Cabinet about their departments, but he did not consult them on matters affecting their colleagues, and I thought he was right. If he did this, he would soon have every Cabinet minister meddling with the affairs of the others."

charming, is careful to avoid any expression of opinion whatever on matters of general politics, although he occasionally makes an observation which he is careful to point out comes from himself only, and is not to be considered as binding his government. Except in his written communications, which deal almost entirely with isolated questions as to which no previous consultation has taken place, he has not approached me on any subject of practical importance. His written communications generally come without any previous warning, and as a rule without a word of verbal explanation. It is, as you see, very much the system which prevailed in Russia, with the exception of the important fact that in the United States personal intercourse with the ruler and directing spirit is altogether excluded.

These are the circumstances which prevail as regards all my colleagues, at least among the representatives of the Allies. I have no information as to what takes place elsewhere and I have no reason to suppose that it is otherwise. But you will see how difficult it is to pierce the mystery in which the policy of this Administration is sedulously concealed, and I must ask you to excuse the consequence of these conditions and to be contented with merely hearsay information as to what may be passing in the mind of the Government."

As an example of such communications as went from the President to the Ambassador, may be given his reply to what Spring Rice had written on the occasion of Wilson's second marriage.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON,
Oct. 21, 1915.

"MY DEAR AMBASSADOR,

I am distressed that your letter of congratulation miscarried, but you may be sure that I did not doubt for a moment your feeling and I thank you most warmly for your letter of October 19 accompanying a copy of your letter of October 6.

It gives me peculiar gratification to have Lady Spring Rice and yourself think of me in such cordial terms at this time and I thank you both with all my heart. It is very delightful to feel that I have such friends.

Cordially and sincerely yours,
WOODROW WILSON."

It would be untrue to suggest that either the President's personality or his policy was sympathetic to Spring Rice. But the following letter is a vigorous and interesting defence of Wilson, when at last he had taken a decisive line.

Feb. 26, 1916.

"The last month has seen some very abrupt changes. Germany was ready to agree to a settlement of the 'Lusitania' case, which was a matter absolutely essential to the prestige of this Government. In negotiating the settlement, the Government discovered that Germany was contemplating a new and more severe form of submarine warfare which, the Government believed, would be extended across the Atlantic. It transpired also that Germany expected pledges to be given as to the action of the United States Government in order to facilitate and in a manner legalise this warfare. With a view to humanity, the Government seems to have thought that it would have been possible to obtain by mutual consent an arrangement by which submarine warfare could be brought within the lines of international law. As the negotiations developed, it became more and more apparent that the supposed concessions of Germany amounted to very little, and that what they had in view was a continuance of the old system with a certain outward appearance of legality, and with securities which were a mere sham. In the meantime feeling in the country was growing. The impression was certainly given to the press that an understanding was being arrived at with Germany which implied a surrender on the part of the United States on vital principles. Root's speech gave clear and distinct expression to the feeling which was growing. The strongest man [1] in the Cabinet suddenly resigned and a very dangerous discussion was announced in the Senate. The country began to be heard from. It grew daily plainer that the country did not approve of an agreement with any one of the belligerents, least of all with Germany, and the German Ambassador had certainly given the impression that an agreement existed, although he did this without the authority or the consent of the United States Government. This national feeling was rapidly becoming organized and was being taken hold of by the Republican party. On the other hand was Bryan, who stood fairly and squarely for peace at any price, and for an understanding with Germany both in Europe and America. There was also Champ Clark, a defeated rival, who was willing enough to join in any combination to defeat the President. It seems that under these circumstances the President determined on a course of action. He refused to enter into any form of compromise with the German Government which implied the appearance of a surrender or entailed a change of the rules of war to Germany's advantage. He determined, while seeking

[1] Mr. Garrison.

peace, to take the American standpoint and to reject the overtures which were undoubtedly made to him for German co-operation in the elections.

The decision came suddenly. Just as it was expected that the ' Lusitania ' agreement would be announced, the Secretary of State declared that he would not accept the offered terms unless he knew what Germany meant by her announcement of a renewed submarine warfare. There was indeed reason to suppose that a succession of atrocities would occur which would seem to be carried out under American auspices and with her consent. As soon as the decision of the President became known, the German Ambassador gave out that a crisis was imminent, that Germany would proceed to sink ships with or without Americans on board, that if the United States Government dismissed him in consequence, war would probably result. There was the same sort of panic in Congress which you may remember there was in the French Chamber at the time of Delcassé's downfall. This was no doubt organized by the Germans and was partly due to the fear of the German vote. But it was also due to the influence of Bryan and the pacifists, and to the ancient hostility between Clark and the President. Whatever be the cause, there was a panic. A demand was made for the instant passage of a resolution to prevent Americans from taking passage on belligerent ships. The President stood firm. The Republicans, although the mass of the German vote is Republican, assured the President of their support. He chose, of the two courses, to take the one which was opposed by German Americans, by Bryan and by the peace party. Every sort of pressure was put upon him, and he appeared for the moment to be in a minority in both houses, although the Senate from the first was inclined rather to support than oppose him. Telegrams and letters carefully prepared beforehand were pouring in in thousands to all members of Congress, urging them to yield and exclude Americans from belligerent ships. But later on a stream of communications came in calling for a firm stand. The President grew hourly stronger and at the present moment it is generally believed that he will be able to carry the day. He is said to have shown great heat in the discussion. He produced a letter which is extremely firm in its language and shows no symptoms of yielding.

Of course you will not misunderstand what has happened. The President did not take the German side and then abandon it for the side of the Allies. He attempted to make an arrangement with Germany, and found it was impossible without a sacrifice which he thought he could not honourably make. He wished to maintain his position as the champion of neutral

rights. He could not do this if he changed the rules of war to the advantage of one or other belligerent. He made up his mind that he would return to the old situation, refuse an arrangement with Germany until he had satisfactory guarantees that the principles which he had already laid down would be maintained, and he now is prepared to take energetic action against both sides alike if he conceives that the law has been violated.

We may thus expect some energetic remonstrance against ourselves, and no doubt these have taken place or will take place. Of course there are many things we cannot and must not yield. I have indicated one or two minor points in which we could usefully yield without giving up a principle.

It is interesting to note that Germany has put forth all her power in Congress according to a plan carefully laid down and very well worked out. The Republicans and Mr. Wilson seem both to have made up their mind that they will not accept German votes at the cost of patriotism. A large number of persons for various reasons are accused in the press, I don't know with what justice, of being very amenable to the influence of their German constituents. I think myself that the real reason for the strong feeling in Congress is the horror of war and the fear of becoming involved.

The firm attitude of the President of course has for its consequence that the Allies themselves will be the object of severe pressure in the form of diplomatic notes. On the other hand, it seems to have been proved that an appeal to honour and patriotism against the foreign vote has been singularly successful. It is, however, quite plain that during the summer the weight of this foreign vote will be felt very appreciably by both parties. It is, however, a maxim that religious or racial questions are fatal to the politicians who raise them. So that the German vote may take away more than it brings."

It was not easy to please both sides in this debate, and Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who had been Ambassador at Vienna and was (since his recall on the outbreak of war) at the Foreign Office, wrote to convey that he heard certain criticisms: Sir Eyre Crowe thought that the British Ambassador should follow Count Bernstorff's example, and use threats rather than persuasions. Spring Rice agreed in fundamentals with Sir Eyre Crowe (who was "Bird" to his friends, just as Spring Rice was "Springy"); and so there was no fear of his resenting a difference in detail. He replied:

To DE BUNSEN.

"I thought the Bird would raise an angry beak against my pro-American tendencies. I have nearly been turned out of the

State Department for my pronounced anti-American language. So perhaps I may assume that I steer the middle course, which however is not free from shoals. The present matter which excites most interest here of a kind disagreeable to ourselves is the interference with mails, and the supposed confiscation of American securities coming here from Holland. I had an interview to-day with an extremely exasperated official who hinted not obscurely that American patience was coming to an end.

I think everything is likely to be forgotten in Mexico if the present situation becomes much more complicated. Our own experience of small expeditions against unknown hostile countries is not encouraging. Congress has refused to make any sort of preparation because preparation would have looked like an intention to invade and would have been an insult to Mexican independence. There were not even water carts.

I am delighted to hear that you and other experts have not been consulted on any subject in which you were particularly well informed. This gives one the assurance that in this time of change and evolution the Foreign Office maintains untroubled a due regard to its noblest traditions. *Inlisa refunditur alga.*" [1]

Criticism of his inactivity had appeared also in the press, and had the effect of eliciting this letter from Sir E. Grey.

March 24, 1916.

" My Dear Springy,

It seems that Northcliffe has published some criticisms of you (and I believe of me also) on the ground that our methods of influencing public opinion are not like his, and in fact that we are not like him.

However, one result of his attack has been that most gratifying letters come from persons of knowledge and good repute in America, praising you exceedingly and contrasting you most favourably with Bernstorff. I delight in reading these. I think you have done most wisely and well. It is very difficult sometimes for us to make things easy for you, and you must allow for our difficulties here when you think we are being too stiff-necked.

If—it is still a big if—it only happens that Germans fail at Verdun, they may really begin to want peace and give up present hope of domination.

Yours sincerely,

E. Grey."

[1] Virgil, *Aen.* vii, 589. *Spumea circum saxa fremunt laterique inlisa refunditur alga.* He suggests that innovators beat upon the Foreign Office like wave-washed seaweed against the cliff.

The answer was :

April 14, 1916.

" My Dear Grey,

It has always been a pleasure to serve you and the pleasure increases the longer it lasts. Your letter in the middle of all your work is only another instance of your invariable kindness. There is a great deal to be said for the Northcliffe point of view namely, that we should be more vocal in the press. As a matter of fact the interviews given by Cecil [1] have been very beneficial and have been extremely well received here. But it would be very unwise if this Embassy were to undertake to influence the press immediately and directly. I see representatives of the press every day and learn a great deal more than I teach. But I do not make any attempt to suggest opinions, merely stating such facts as I think would be useful if known. I do not give information as to any negotiations going on at the State Department, unless the State Department gives formal leave to make verbal communication, or unless false and garbled statements have found their way into the press, generally through the newspaper agents of the German Embassy.

It is quite possible that it might be considered desirable that a press agent should be employed here for the purpose of correcting mis-statements, or making necessary communications as to matters of fact. The German Embassy put it about that this Embassy was on bad terms with the State Department. On the whole it is not a bad thing that this (which is quite untrue, to judge by the very friendly and cordial relations we have with the State Department) should be believed."

It is worth while to add this testimony from the very able man, more generally remembered as Lord Rhondda, who had been over on a mission concerning supplies :

Jan. 14, 1916.

" My Dear Sir Cecil,

" . . . I was exceedingly glad to get your note and very kind testimony to the way in which I had conducted the work of my Mission while in the United States.

I felt the less direct association I had with the Embassy the better under the circumstances, but I constantly had in mind our understanding that I would at once communicate with you when anything requiring your help occurred.

You will, I hope, not consider it presumption on my part if

[1] Lord Robert Cecil, the Under-Secretary of State, saw certain journalists at the Foreign Office and gave them a sort of synopsis periodically.

I say how much impressed I was with the way the British interests were being watched and safeguarded in the United States at this critical juncture, and how very favourably the methods of the British Embassy compared with those of the enemy. . . .

Believe me,
Yours very faithfully,
D. A. Thomas."

Spring Rice's ideas on the direction of British propaganda are set out in a letter to Lord Newton, who was then assisting Lord R. Cecil at the Foreign Office.

"When you desire to make yourself agreeable to some important newspaper, an interview of minor importance could be given or some exclusive news afforded to the correspondent in question. Many papers, such as the *New York Times* and the *Herald*, have certainly shown great courage in taking the part of Great Britain in a somewhat unfriendly world. The *New York Tribune* appears to have put Truth above Friendship. . . .

I hope you have not forgotten your own book.[1] Lord Lyons' letter on his arrival here before the Civil War is equally true now. We have no right to count on the good-will of Americans. They could count on ours, but we cannot count on theirs. The reason is that we wrongly suppose, because they talk our language, they are an Anglo-Saxon people. As a matter of fact they are a foreign nation, or rather several foreign nations. None of these nations is particularly friendly to us, and those of them who are of our race have very particular reasons for disliking us. It would be wiser to bear this in mind and to treat the American people not as cousins, still less as brothers, an attribution which they would greatly resent, but as English-speaking foreigners, some of whom make most agreeable companions and talk a most sympathetic language.

One effect of speaking the same language is that there is no difficulty whatever in an American paper obtaining news from the English newspapers. Such news is easy to get. On the other hand news from Germany is difficult to obtain and the German newspapers are not written in the style which appeals to Americans. Therefore they like their German news to be put in digestive form by a German-American correspondent. If it emanates from a Prince or a Chancellor in military garb with stern determination in his eye, so much the better. We cannot provide a similar picturesque setting, and the ordinary observations of a British statesman are not very good copy for the

[1] *The Life of Lord Lyons.*

American public. A speech in Parliament or a report in a Blue Book has no attraction from the news point of view. We have to meet these objections, and probably the best way of meeting them is to give now and then, at important moments, an interview with some prominent personality, which it would be worth while for a great press agency to distribute here. But it would never have the effect of the German interview, simply because it is English.

You may remind Lord Robert that there was a time when the Cecil family were regarded with some suspicion by the British democracy, which looked upon them as superior persons who had an inordinate share in the good things of government. They were also suspected of having a low opinion of their fellow-countrymen who so delighted to honour them. This is rather the feeling of many Americans towards England. It has not diminished. The criticism directed at us is, firstly that we are doing nothing, and secondly that we are doing everything. The German propaganda is directed against us as entirely responsible for the continuance of the war. It is also directed against us for taking no part in it whatever. I do not know how we can meet both forms of accusation. The fact is that the only propaganda which really pays is proved facts. First of all, devotion to the cause for which we are fighting and success in fighting it. I doubt whether any other propaganda would be successful in the end or that it would be worth while to devote very much pains, still less money, to carrying it on. You will bear in mind that most of the gentlemen who talk about it are interested themselves in carrying it on. I do not mean that you should not go on with the interviews in Europe or that we should not make some attempt to establish a general clearing-house of news here for the information of anybody who wants it. But we must not build too much on hopes based on this propaganda. It is an unfortunate fact that the mass of Americans do not love us and we cannot talk them into it, even though we use their own language. I do not mean by this that there is any special feeling of hostility, but what I do mean is that we must not be misled by a supposed community in race or ideals into believing that our relations with this country are essentially different from those which we have with any other neutral nation. The essential difference here is that there are many people here with whom one can be on precisely the same intimate terms as with one's own countrymen."

Another letter of later date to the same correspondent on the same subject may come here.

Oct. 20, 1916.

"DEAR NEWTON,

I saw Ian Hay, who seems a very pleasant man and who quite understands the situation. He will avoid any form of propagandism and will merely tell what he has seen without colouring.

I expect he will be very successful and you will hear from him direct. It is, of course, a good thing to have anyone over here who excites sympathy and interests and amuses people. Englishmen are not as a rule personally popular. I suppose they are too like Americans for the differences between them not to be apparent. The main difference at present is that we are making war and they are making money. The difficulty of finding a common basis for understanding, or even for conversation, is as great here as it was in the east. We live in different moral and intellectual worlds. This has nothing to do with sympathy or the reverse. A fish may sympathize with a bird and talk intelligently about flying; but there would be still some conversational gaps, occasionally.

A useful book to read now is Adams' Life of his father, the Minister to London, and Seward's despatches. One sees how very intensely we were hated by all good Americans—and yet, with one or two lapses, our attitude was quite correct. The fact is we think that because we speak the same language, we must think the same thoughts and when one finds that this isn't the case, one is inclined to be mad. But because a man asks you to dinner, you don't draw a cheque on him the next day.

The situation is getting very serious and what is greatly to be feared is the same feeling of exasperation after the war which the Americans had against us. After all, our case against them is not as strong as theirs against us (in the past), and the best thing for us to do is to recognize the obvious facts and say nothing about them. The obvious fact is that if we had the choice of making war or making money, as the U.S. have it, we should probably do the same. We should also say, as they do, that we do it in order to serve humanity with the proceeds. But as was said about Gladstone—one can forgive a man having an ace up his sleeve, but not for saying that God Almighty put it there.

If we want to borrow money here, it is no good saying that the Americans are money grubbers. If they weren't, they would not have sold us arms, or lent us money. You shouldn't buy sugar of a man and sneer at him for being a grocer."

Again and again he reiterated his belief that nothing was so convincing as the example of sacrifice.

This example had come from his own home. Gerald Spring Rice, the younger brother, was close on fifty when the war broke out, but contrived to get himself accepted in the army. In May 1916, he was killed by a shell in France. Cecil Spring Rice's feeling is best expressed by his answer to Bernard Holland who wrote to congratulate him on being promoted to the Grand Cross of St. Michael and St. George. "Gerald has earned a greater honour," he wrote. The detail is given in a letter to Senator Lodge.

(Undated, but of May 1916.)

"My Dear Cabot,

I am most grateful for your letter which is a real comfort. I feel something of the solemn pride which Lincoln talked of. My brother, too old to be received in the regular way, obtained leave from an old friend of mine and his, the Colonel of the Border Regiment, to serve as lieutenant in the transport service. He had just returned to the front, having been invalided home. He had spent most of his life farming in the Canadian North-West and had the health and strength and knowledge of men and animals which made army life with his friends and associates of Cumberland a real joy to him. He had written a long letter to Betty about flowers, birds, and above all, his mules, just before his last journey to France. Before leaving he had been made deputy lieutenant of Cumberland, which rank used to be given in peace time to the *landed* and rich. It was given to him because he was making himself so useful in recruiting and organizing. It had always been his great ambition to do something for the country's service and the chance came at last, in a humble way, and late. But when it came, it found him prepared and made him happy, and I can't think he could have wished any other end.

Yours most gratefully,

Cecil Spring Rice."

Two other letters on this subject are entirely characteristic of their writers. The first is from Roosevelt.—"Tom" was Spring Rice's cousin, and junior colleague in the Embassy—now Lord Monteagle.

Sagamore Hill,

July 16, 1916.

"Dear Cecil,

We have thoroughly enjoyed Tom's visit; yesterday I took him to row round Centre Island, and felt as if he were you and we were both of us young again.

I had not known of your brother's death. Tom has now told me about it. How finely and gallantly he acted! Your pride must outweigh your sorrow. *I* would like to finish in such manner.

Your country is passing through the flame and will come out cleansed and refined to lofty nobleness. *Mine* is passing through the thick yellow mud-streak of 'safety first,' and its high places are held—and not only in one party—by the men of little soul who desire only sordid ease ; and perhaps we shall have to be shot over, and eat the bitter bread of shame, before we find again the spirit of high desire.

Love to dear Lady Springy. How I wish we could see you both !

Ever yours,

T. R."

The second was from Woodrow Wilson.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 9, 1916.

"MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR,

Only the other day did I hear of the distressing loss you have suffered in the death of your brother. May I not convey to you my warmest sympathy ? The tragical circumstances of the time are a burden upon all our spirits, and I can imagine what the added burden must be of those who suffer irreparable losses like yours.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON."

So much is forgotten that it is well to reconstitute a little the atmosphere of these days. Mr. Luxmoore had written in 1913 about an Etonian on Spring Rice's staff, one of his old pupils, Mr. Ivor Campbell, for whose career he was anxious. When war broke out, this young attaché was still at the Embassy, but got leave to go home. On June 4, 1915, Lord Eustace Percy, another old Etonian and ex-colleague, wrote to Spring Rice :

"Ivor Campbell is at last at the front, having found some dishonest quack in a slum to pass him as fit, after he had been inspected by every doctor in England. He is totally transformed as a sub. in the Argyll and Sutherland."

On June 16, 1916, Spring Rice wrote to Percy, acknowledging a memento of this subaltern, who had by then gone the way of many other Campbells.

"Thanks very much for the photograph which I have put in my room. I have had a loss of my own."

Such things have to be remembered when the British Ambassador is blamed for impatience at this period.

CHAPTER XXV

FROM THE SPRING OF 1916 TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S RE-ELECTION

With the opening weeks of 1916 President Wilson's administration found grave complications facing them. First, Germany announced in February that submarine operations would be renewed with full intensity on March 1, and this threatened to force America into the war. The Presidential Election was imminent and there was no doubt that America desired to be kept out of the conflict. Just at this period, House was in Europe seeking to induce the Allies to consent to a Peace Conference on certain terms, with the promise that, unless the Central Powers accepted the proposal, America would join the Allies. Neither he nor Wilson wished to enter the war except on conditions which would appeal to the national pride of America—to enforce a peace whose terms America had dictated. But there was the danger that Germany's action at sea might force them into a position where they must either, to ensure the safety of their citizens, submit to the total disregard of America's rights, or else risk the unpopularity of going to war, with the electoral consequences. Personal aims apart, there was grave risk that a Presidential Election, if it were held after the nation had entered on a war which divided allegiance, might split the national forces still more gravely.

This danger became real on March 24 when the unarmed passenger steamer "Sussex" was torpedoed without warning in the English Channel, and eighty lives lost. After six weeks of diplomatic correspondence, Germany's renewed acceptance of the conditions which Wilson laid down, again averted war; and this was the more welcome because another possibility of war menaced from Mexico.—The chain of events must be reviewed.

In retaliation for the arrest of American bluejackets by Huertist troops, Vera Cruz had been occupied by an American contingent in April 1914. But the result on the Constitutionalist party, which Wilson's Government supported, had been to unite them, under their leader Carranza, with the Huertists against the violation of Mexican soil. Preparations for war were made, when Argentine, Brazil and Chile ("the A.B.C. powers") offered mediation, and a conference was held at Niagara. Meantime Carranza was winning as against Huerta; and in July 1914 Huerta was forced to resign his claim to the Pre-

sidency and leave the country. A Provisional President was named, but soon fled before the victorious Carranza, who entered Mexico City in August. But there followed a new split—Villa, backed by another brigand named Zapeta, setting up a new opposition. Wilson, in despair, withdrew the United States troops from Vera Cruz.

These events coincided with the first stages of the European War.

During the greater part of 1915, no leader of any party was recognised either by the United States or Great Britain as President of Mexico; but a step out of this anarchy was taken in the autumn when a Conference of the American Republics decided that recognition should be given to Carranza, who had partially established himself in power. The United States acted on this finding, and Wilson in his Address to Congress on December 7, 1915, took credit for the magnanimity which had "refused to take advantage of Mexico's distress and impose upon her an order and government of our own choosing."

"All the Governments of America should, so far as we are concerned, be upon a footing of genuine equality and unquestioned independence. We have been put to the test in the case of Mexico and we have stood the test. Whether we have benefited Mexico by the course we have pursued remains to be seen. Her fortunes are in her own hands. . . .We now hopefully await the rebirth of the troubled Republic."—So spoke President Wilson.

Trouble, however, increased instead of lessening. In March 1916 a party headed by Villa crossed into the United States, sacked the township of Columbus, murdered eleven American civilians, and killed nine of the troopers despatched to relieve the place. By the consent of General Carranza, an American force under General Pershing entered Mexico in pursuit of Villa, but became involved in hostilities with Carranza's supporters; and in face of further complications, Pershing's force was withdrawn.

It is unnecessary to follow Mexican affairs further. But it will be seen that from the beginning of 1914 there was constant prospect of a war between the United States and Mexico; and indeed it was only avoided because of the pacifist character of Wilson's administration.

Naturally, it was an object of Germany to bring about this war, on the chance of interrupting the supply of munitions to the Allies, and of distracting America's attention from the submarine campaign.

Spring Rice wrote:

March 17, 1916.

To GREY.

"There is considerable anxiety about the Mexican question. The attitude of the Mexican army is more than doubtful, and if the punitive force goes far into the interior its position may be very dangerous. A check might mean a general attack, and this, of course, would mean a serious war. The United States Government is wholly unprovided with men, transport or

ammunition for a very large force such as would be necessary for a serious war with Mexico. The Mexican army may be very inferior in quality but it is numerous and accustomed to the field. It is likely to unite against a foreign invader. The American army is inadequate. Congress has taken absolutely no steps to make proper preparations. Even on the frontier, transport, etc., cannot be organized because the money was never provided. The army has to be withdrawn from other parts of the United States. In the north on the Canadian frontier, the Germans have threatened aggressive movements against the Dominion. Opposite New York are the towns of New Jersey, Hoboken and Newark, through which all the southern railways debouch upon the Hudson. These towns are almost entirely occupied by Germans and it is believed that the Germans have many trained men among them and are under military orders. At Norfolk in Virginia, there is a naval station, and there are also a large number of Germans from the interned ships who have turned it into a German settlement. Scattered through the country are solid blocks of Germans who have been organized for the last thirty years and have now attained a very high pitch of organization. Congress daily receives a stream of communications from German constituents, which keeps it in a continual state of terror. The Administration receives offers or threats from four million German voters whose vote may be decisive in the Presidential elections. The prevailing feeling in the country is no doubt indifferent. Most people are making money and the foreign relations of the United States do not in any sensible degree affect the money-making of the majority. It is a long time since large questions of policy affected the great mass of the American people, with the single exception of the tariff. The people have got out of the habit of regarding politics as any more than a personal game, centring in the presidential election once in four years. But there is a strong, well-organized minority which is determined on following a certain line and pursuing a certain object. This is the German colony. Gradually the rest of the country is becoming aware of what is happening but they have not yet become aware of it."

The next letter was written after the sinking of the "Sussex" and Villa's raid on Columbus.

To GREY.

March 31, 1916.

"The situation here is a very difficult one for the Government. Congress had absolutely refused to give any credits

to enable the Government to make what appeared to be the necessary preparations on the Mexican frontier. The Administration, like our own in South Africa, had been most unwilling to make any preparation which would give the impression that it was intended to adopt an aggressive policy against Mexico. The high rate of wages had resulted in a great falling off of enlistments. The United States army was short of 20,000 men. The total available force is said to be about 25,000 men, and now, when for some unassigned reason Villa suddenly dashed across the frontier and made an unprovoked attack upon an American town, the country has demanded the punishment of this brigand and has insisted on the despatch of a force for his punishment. A small force is in the air in the interior of Mexico, and if Carranza's army makes common cause with Villa and accepts his very able leadership, the military position will be very alarming. It appears that the total force now remaining in the United States outside the Mexican frontier does not exceed 4000-5000 men. The force on the Mexican frontier is totally inadequate to defend it, still less to come to the rescue of the expeditionary force, if it is surrounded and cut off. The appeal sanctioned by Congress for the supplementary 20,000 men has resulted so far in the enlistment of less than 600, and there is no prospect of any acceleration of the rate of enlistment, as the attraction of the present high rate of wages in industry is overwhelming.

Under these circumstances, Germany, who had promised not to attack passenger ships, makes an organized attack which results in the injury and death of Americans travelling on the high seas in reliance on the protection of their Government. No explanation of any sort is vouchsafed by the German Government, and the German Embassy issues a contemptuous statement that they do not propose to make a communication to the United States Government about the sinking of British ships by British mines,[1] and that if relations are broken off Germany will declare war and proceed at once to destroy American ships. . . . It was just this situation that the President contemplated in his speech at St. Louis on February 3, when he said that the commanders of submarines have their instructions, but one reckless commander choosing to put his private interpretation upon those instructions might set the world on fire. It cannot be said that the United States has been set on fire, and it can be said with certainty that if there is any sign of a conflagration, every effort is being made to extinguish the flames. If Germany forces this country into war it will be an

[1] The suggestion was that the " Sussex " had struck a British mine.

extraordinary instance of what Germany can do in arousing hostility. . . .

Your experience at home will show you how long it takes to arouse the people accustomed to think only in terms of peace, against foreign aggression. This process is taking place here but very slowly. In the eastern and western states some progress has been made, but not in the central states which have always been considered to be the governing factor. It cannot be denied by any one who studies the existing state of affairs that Germany is deliberately taking action which would naturally lead to war, and is counting on the influence she possesses here to prevent the natural consequences. At the worst, if a breach comes, she seems prepared to face the worst that America can do. There is reason to believe that she counts on some breakdown in the naval defences and on the entire absence of any efficient military organization."

The next letter continues to discuss the lack of active patriotism in America, but, as always, with the reminder that England also had been very slow to accept the burden of preparedness.—The years of preaching when no one listened from 1908 onward had left a bitter memory.

April 14, 1916.

To GREY.

"The report of the Federal Reserve Board just issued shows the immense increase in the riches of the country. The prevailing feeling is a desire to maintain this prosperity and to enjoy it, and all the evidence goes to prove that there is no widespread feeling of insecurity, or of fear that such undefended riches are a great danger to the possessor. This fear, however, prevails very widely in thinking circles. There are complaints that the country has lost all national feeling and all patriotism, except what is contained in the phrase 'ubi bene est, ibi patria.' Both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Roosevelt have made most earnest endeavours to arouse the country to a sense of its obligations, but it does not appear as yet that these efforts have been attended with success, any more than the similar efforts which were made by Lord Roberts in England. Yet the situation is not without its dangers. Japan seems to be raising again the question of the immigration laws. The United States will certainly maintain its right to exclude anyone it chooses from its own dominions. The German attitude appears to be one of frank contempt, which is reflected in the attitude of the German Ambassador here. The South American countries do not appear as a whole to be willing to accept the

American proposals for a permanent arrangement, and openly dispute the right of the United States Government to give them advice, and their power to carry out their promises. The most striking case is Mexico. Practically the whole of the United States army is now engaged either in Mexico or on the border, and the United States Government has received a somewhat insulting invitation to withdraw its troops, which invitation was followed immediately by the announcement of an attack on American soldiers. The attempt to fill up the gaps in the established strength of the army by recruitment seems to have failed. Criticisms of the United States Navy are very frequent and very severe and come from high quarters. All these things taken together would seem to be a fair cause of apprehension, but Congress seems to be mainly occupied with local issues, and in fact to follow the lines with which you were so familiar in the British Parliament before the war.

Germany's desire, it is quite plain, is to force neutrals to break our blockade, under pain of having their ships destroyed if they do not break the blockade. Some people here seem to think that this demand should be given consideration and that the United States should force the Allies to modify their blockade measures in exchange for a pledge that Germany will modify her submarine policy. There is, however, a very natural incredulity as to the value of German pledges. It is the continual making and breaking of promises which has caused so much opposition to Germany here. At the present moment this irritation is rather yielding to the influence of the Mexican situation. It is absolutely imperative to withdraw the expedition before all the country rises. A disaster there would be a serious matter for the country and the administration. But it is still more difficult to withdraw now, because Carranza has demanded the withdrawal and is suspected of having caused an attack. If the Mexican situation becomes more strained, the effect on the relations with Germany will, of course, be marked. The United States Government is getting into a position of having trouble with all the world, but Congress still refuses, as our Parliament refused, to take the necessary measures of precaution."

He wrote with even more bitterness on April 28. Wilson's Note of protest about the submarine campaign had been published on April 18, and " except for its concluding paragraph had not succeeded in getting on to the first page " of newspapers—a proof that the American people were not interested. What did concern them was the interference with the mails, in the process of search for contraband of war.

To GREY.

"This question touches the convenience of so many people that I fear the excitement against us will prove a formidable factor. Whether we have the right or not to exercise control over the post, we are certainly invoking on our heads a great deal of indignation from many powerful people.

The attitude of public opinion as to the Irish rebellion [1] is on the whole satisfactory. The press seems to be agreed that the movement is suicidal and in the interests of Germany alone. The attitude of the majority of the Irish is uncertain, but if the movement spreads the effect here will be very serious indeed. All are agreed that it will be dangerous to make Casement [2] a martyr."

May 19, 1916.

To GREY.

"I have written about the Irish question officially. I fear that recent events have alienated from us almost the entire Irish party. They would prove very useful allies to the Germans. This is very convenient just before a Presidential election. A very large number of the delegates to both conventions are Irish and German. It is almost certain that Hughes will be nominated and he seems to have the support of the Germans, mainly because he is not Roosevelt. Wilson will probably be nominated by the Democrats. The Irish-German alliance will direct its energies to forcing both candidates to adopt an anti-British attitude during the term of the election. This will not be difficult if Germany can refrain from destroying American lives and property. Even if she does not so refrain (and it is believed that the submarine activity will begin again in July) it is hoped that the anti-British movement will be so strong that the anti-German movement will be neutralized.

It is quite plain from the President's language that he has no intention whatever of entering the European arena as a belligerent and that he has every intention of entering it as a mediator. The immense majority of the people wants peace, but as they are rather restive under the accusation of playing a rather ignoble part, they are anxious to gain the eternal glory

[1] On Easter Monday, April 16, rebellion broke out in Dublin and there was heavy fighting in the city for several days before the leaders and their small following surrendered.

[2] Sir Roger Casement, who had greatly distinguished himself in the British service by work on the Congo and on the Amazon in connection with the conditions of exploiting rubber, had sided definitely with the Irish extremists and sought to bring a German expedition into Ireland. He was captured on the coast of Kerry where a German submarine had landed him, on the eve of the rising.

of the peacemaker who inherits the earth. If the President can appear before the country as the great pacificator before the end of October, his re-election is almost certain. Consequently it is not surprising to see that his mind is turning that way. His standpoint seems to be that the world is mad and can only be saved by the few sane men who are left in it. As one of the madmen, you will form your own opinion, presumably a mad one, as to the claims of our sane Saviour. No one can doubt the President's perfect sincerity in his desire to help in the work of peace. The highest moral principles as well as enlightened interests point that way.

Germany is starting peace rumours every day. All the German influences, lay and clerical, are combining to bring on peace. The President would undoubtedly gain the support of the German Americans (which is now provisionally pledged to Hughes) if he could appear as a mediator. He would also gain the support of a large number of kind-hearted people who are horrified at the terrible news of the war. If the Allies refuse the peace offers which may be made to them, the whole odium of the continuance of the war will fall on them. The odium of having begun the war will cease to be remembered against Germany.

It will be wise therefore to count on a new phase in our relations with this country. Violent notes will no doubt be sent and violent threats will be used. At the same time we shall be told that the President is ready to help us to make peace. If we refuse, we shall be called bloodthirsty and we shall be made to feel the weight of American displeasure. We shall be told that it is more cruel to starve women and children than to drown them. We shall be told that to exclude Red Cross supplies is a refinement of barbarism before which the impulsive destruction of Louvain sinks into insignificance. Signs of this coming campaign are sufficiently plain. It is, of course, quite possible that some new German horror may efface even the impression caused by recent events and Germany again will come into the forefront. Should there be a burst of popular indignation against Germany, the Government would no doubt act in conformity with it. At present there are more signs of indignation against us. This country is a long way from war with anybody. It is extremely unlikely that America will go to war against the Allies. But it is not at all unlikely that there will be a violent diplomatic campaign against Britain. In the meanwhile feeling in England is also no doubt growing more bitter. We may conclude therefore that our relations are now entering into a difficult and dangerous stage. I hope that every

effort will be made to impress on our different departments interested the grave importance which may attach to incidents in which the United States are concerned. There is a great deal of delay which is very natural, and there are many questions which would seem to require careful treatment to prevent them becoming acute. I am sure that every effort is being taken to smooth the way. I am sure that every effort is necessary.

The movement for defence is growing, but it has not taken any definite shape beyond street processions. The country is entirely unprepared to meet a foreign crisis. It would take it long to make any adequate preparations even against a domestic uprising. The Dublin precedent [1] is an alarming one for a country of a hundred million persons and an available trained force of less than four thousand men."

On May 5 Wilson's protests and threats in regard to the submarine war produced a Note from Germany which renewed the pledge against the sinking of non-combatants. For the rest of 1916, the ruthless campaign was suspended.

House and Wilson thought the time had come to propose mediation. Germany made public protestation of a desire for peace, but it proved to be peace on the basis of her acquisitions in the war. The Allies on their part indicated that the time to talk of peace had not come. It was then decided that the President should make a gesture, and on May 27 at a meeting of The League to Enforce Peace he delivered an address in which he abandoned the idea of America's isolation.

" What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia," he said.

" At the same time," says Professor Seymour, " he advocated the creation of a League of Nations as the mainspring of a recognised international system."

Spring Rice in his comments on this proposal gives more detailed ground than before for his opinion that the Allies must not count on America to accept the practical consequence of such a proposal. He writes of course with a new touch of acidity, for he like the Allies at large had been indignant at a phrase in the speech : " With the war's causes and its objects, we are not concerned."

It is unfortunate that his warnings as to the impossibility of pledging Congress were not remembered after the Armistice. France more especially counted on President Wilson's assurance that America, the one unexhausted Great Power, would jointly with the other powers guarantee the peace of Europe. When it became evident that America refused to fulfil the anticipations for which Wilson and House had been responsible, there was a violent reaction and terms were imposed in a panic. It was one of the moments when Spring

[1] The insurgents with about 2000 men resisted for five days all attempts of troops several times their number to dislodge them.

Rice, who in this capital matter read America's psychology better than either House or Wilson, might have been of great service as a counsellor, had he survived.

In June, 1916, his argument probably weighed with the British Government, and was one of the many causes which led them to disregard the public proposal of a move towards peace contained in Wilson's speech. To this extent Colonel House was justified in regarding Spring Rice as an influence working against House and Wilson.

May 30, 1916.

To GREY.

"The President's speech is, of course, pure politics, although no doubt in part it represents the President's private opinion, which is probably that of the majority of Americans, and condemns the breach of treaties, of which Germany has been guilty. But in its main point, namely, immediate peace and subsequent negotiations, which are to include the freedom of the seas, it plays into the hands of Germany. The German Embassy here says openly that if the President is able to press effectively for peace, he will have the German vote. He will also have the pacifist vote which is very powerful. Fortunately he says expressly that he will not intervene unless both parties ask him to. We might take him at his word and let him know that we should be very happy to use him as postman if the other side desire to send a letter through his office. He has not said anything which would justify us in refusing an offer, because he has not made one. The danger is that the Allies should take the line that the proffered mediation of a man who is indifferent to the cause of the war is an absurdity. Anything which would give the Germans or the Pacifists good reason to say that Germany desired peace, but the Allies were opposed to it, would do us great harm. The answer of course is, that we do desire peace, but a permanent peace and not a truce; that Germany desires a peace in order the better to prepare for war. On the whole, public opinion here, which in the end will probably take a fair view, will understand the situation. But it is wiser to leave events to speak for themselves.

With regard to the main proposition as to a sanction for the articles of peace.—The President desires what we all desire, that is a general and effective sanction by the common consent of all the powers backed by their readiness to enforce that sanction. This is a pious wish in which we share. Germany would certainly refuse, on the ground that a permanent *status quo* sanctioned by treaty would debar the strong from using his strength. It is contrary to the principle of the survival of the

fittest, to which the whole German people seems to be pledged. From our point of view, as we desire nothing for ourselves, like the United States, the principle is a good one. But how can the President give us the desired pledge? He cannot pledge the action of Congress in advance, and the execution of the pledge must depend upon the action of Congress, which, as recent events have shown, cannot be depended on. If Congress had supported the President, Germany would long ago have been forced to give satisfaction on the question of the 'Lusitania.' Congress was not ready to take action. We have no security that Congress would act otherwise when the question at issue is not American but European. Therefore, in giving this promise the President gives a promise the fulfilment of which does not depend on him. But in return for this promise he asks for a fact, that is, the immediate surrender of our right to exercise pressure by sea power. The Central European powers have the military advantage of the interior line. They have the disadvantage that the encircling powers are able to cut off supplies. This disadvantage is to be removed and the advantage to remain as it is. And in return for this immense concession, we are to receive a promise which cannot be fulfilled.

This is quite obvious and no doubt will be seen to be true in time. What we can do is to give air for air, and a promise for a promise. We can say we share the pious wish and will do our best to fulfil it, and in the meanwhile we intend to use such means as are still in our power to secure the safety of the world and the proper observance of treaties.

As regards Ireland. It is most unfortunate that it has been found necessary to execute the rebels, especially Skeffington.[1] If this had been done in the first few days, it might have been condoned. The continued executions have greatly excited the Irish here and given our enemies a welcome handle against us. As to Casement. The Irish might regard his execution as a small matter in comparison with the others. They might ask why Skeffington was executed and Casement spared. But the great bulk of American public opinion, while it might excuse executions in hot blood, would very greatly regret an execution some time after the event. This is a view of impartial friends of ours here who have nothing to do with the Irish movement. It is far better to make Casement ridiculous than a martyr. The universal impression here seems to be that, when here, he acted almost like a madman. There is no doubt whatever that

[1] Mr. Sheehy Skeffington was shot during the rebellion by the order of an officer who was subsequently found to be insane. Skeffington had no part in the rising.

the Germans here look forward with great interest to his execution, of which they will take full advantage. It is quite true that if he is spared, the fact that he is not executed will be used against us. But if he is executed, his execution would be an even more formidable weapon."

Spring Rice was aware of the resentment occasioned by the reception accorded in Europe to Wilson's speech before the League of Peace, and to proposals which America had so warmly approved.

June 9

To GREY.

"A rumour is current that the President has given it to be understood that he intends shortly to take very severe action against the alleged illegalities committed by the Allies and especially by England.

The Secretary of State,[1] however, has pointed out with great courage two most important considerations. First, that the commercial complaints against the Allies can be settled by legal process, and ought not to be considered in the same light as the destruction of life, as to which there is no remedy. The other is that anyone who has the responsibility will think long and seriously before he takes any step which will lead to war. The conclusion from these remarks is that the United States will probably proceed by the ordinary diplomatic channels in order to obtain satisfaction in their complaints against the Allies. Further, that under present circumstances there is not sufficient justification to go to war with Germany, whatever there may be in the future if Germany persists in the destruction of American lives.

The Ship Purchase Bill may prove a very serious matter as ships may be acquired by the United States Government, and the flag transferred from a belligerent to the American flag and the ships operated in the interests of Germany. It is possible even that convoy may be resorted to. This, of course, would be tantamount to an act of war. It is very unlikely that any considerable support would be found in the country for a policy which would lead to joining in the war especially against the Allies and on behalf of Germany. It is in the interests of all countries that we should not suddenly find ourselves in a position which would confront us unexpectedly with a grave question as to which neither party is prepared to yield. It would be wise therefore if the Allies were to take the matter now into their serious consideration. In the Civil War a similar question was admirably handled by the United States Govern-

[1] Mr. Lansing.

ment. Without making any overt act, England and France were given to understand in an indirect way that the continuation of the blockade was vital to the existence of the United States Government, and that if any measures were taken by the maritime powers in order to break the blockade or with that effect, relations with the United States Government would automatically cease. I do not for a moment anticipate any such crisis here, but it is always wise to be prepared in advance."

The next was written after the selection of candidates for the Presidency.

June 16, 1916.

To GREY.

"The reason why Hughes was nominated was that he had excited no animosity during the split in the Republican party, because he had been on the Supreme Court and made no pronouncement. His previous record was very good and since he has been on the Bench he had made no enemies. Roosevelt was very much loved and very much hated, and the Republicans would have lost many votes if he had been candidate. Hughes is an unknown quantity so far as the present situation is concerned. It is absolutely untrue that he has any pronounced sympathies. The Germans have endorsed him because they hated Roosevelt. He is a very good campaign speaker and his chances are thought to be good. Wilson's supporters are also confident. In any case Wilson is President till March 4. I am glad to see the English papers are making no comments, and the less they make the better.

You will see in the Democratic programme that Wilson's suggestions in his recent speech have been followed. The Democratic Party think it is the duty of the President, if the opportunity offers, to interfere in order to bring about peace. The peace programme is exactly what the President has already outlined. You will have noticed that the freedom of the seas is part of it. Also the right to sovereignty of the smaller nations. Also the equality of all persons irrespective of religion, which means equal rights for Jews in Russia. The Allies would probably look with some suspicion upon the programme of mediation which would cripple our sea power, which would recognize the independence of Ireland and Poland, and which would include the abolition of restrictions on Jews in Russia. The Germans would be unwilling to accept a programme which condemned the principles of their recent policy. On the other hand, they are a practical nation and would not object to a

condemnation of principles if it was accompanied by specific measures of which they approved in practice. The German press has endorsed the President's programme of mediation and says that if he carries it out he will have German support.

I hope that no confidence will be placed in American intervention in our behalf. When the news first came here of a supposed decisive German victory at sea,[1] the German papers hailed it as the end of British sea power and as the domination of Germany in the Atlantic. The American press, instead of being alarmed or instead of showing sympathy with their British relations, took it from the point of view of an interesting event which gave them occasion to make rather derisive observations about British pretensions. And yet if the news had been true, the position of the United States was a very perilous one. Germany has made no concealment of her intentions over here or of the hatred and contempt in which she holds the United States. I think we may regard this as a test case. I do not think we can count on American help, perhaps not even on American sympathy. It is not practical politics. On the other hand, we can be almost certain that the United States will not intervene against the Allies.

The attitude towards England is changed for the worse by recent events in Ireland. I think we might adopt a benevolent attitude towards the distribution of funds for the sufferers by the revolt. If we are able in some measure to settle the Home Rule question at once,[2] the announcement will have a beneficial effect here, although I do not think that anything we could do would conciliate the Irish here. They have blood in their eyes when they look our way. All the same, the moderates, who have now joined the extremists, would leave them again if they could find a reasonable excuse for so doing. Many of our bitterest enemies do not wish to take sides with the destroyer of Belgium. At the same time we must remember that our cause for the present among the Irish here is a lost one."

July 14, 1916.

To GREY.

"The Mexican situation will have a great effect upon the elections. It was thought at first that if there was a war the country would be reluctant to change presidents during the crisis. The President was severely attacked because he would not fight. He was very near fighting and ordered the Militia to

[1] Jutland.

[2] There was a proposal at this moment to bring the Home Rule Act of 1914 into force at once. It broke down on the question of excluding Ulster.

the frontier. As soon as the Militia began to move, the country showed an evident desire for peace. A Southern friend told me that the North was anxious for war in peace time, and anxious for peace in war time. The North will certainly be very grateful to the President if he keeps them out of war, and so will be the central states and the South. Therefore if war is avoided until the elections begin, the President will have some important cards in his favour. It is quite evident that the country does not desire war, even when United States territory has been actually invaded and Americans killed in their own houses. We may draw the conclusion that this country is by no means ready to assume obligations in the future in Europe in connection with the Peace Treaty, however laudable be the objects. I am sure we would make a mistake if we counted on the active intervention of America as one of the guardians of a world peace. Every indication points in the opposite direction.

This country is not yet ripe for anything like compulsory service and its only desire at present seems to be to preserve the peace. Roosevelt has been definitely refused as Republican candidate because his policy was supposed to have entailed sacrifices of a personal character for the defence of the country. He said very truly that if the country was in a Roosevelt mood it would take him, but if it was not in a Roosevelt mood, it would not take him and he would not take it. He is at present opposing any sort of pledge or promise which cannot be carried out in fact, and he cites the peace league of the future as one of those ideas which are embodied in words without any intention of following out the words into action. He is a good judge of the country, and he is probably right in his estimate of the situation.

I should be inclined to believe that, if peace is preserved, the President would have a fair chance of election, although the other side are very confident. I do not believe the President's mediation in the European conflict would cut much ice, as they say here, in the Presidential Election. The country is too much preoccupied with its own affairs and is not inclined to worry about Europe."

July 31, 1916.

To GREY.

" With to-day the Presidential campaign may be supposed to begin, as Mr. Hughes is expected to make his first important speech. I need not repeat that we are not at all interested in the result of the election. In the election in itself we are very interested, as there are some very strong elements in the country opposed to us. Great importance is attached to words and a

politician gets a record by what he has said. There is a German and Irish vote, but there is no French or English vote. Consequently anybody who says a word against Germany suffers for it, while an attack on England or France would affect no votes at all. In fact the native American is always ready to hear an attack on England. Consequently Congress and the press will be full of diatribes against England because there is the most to be gained and the least to be lost by such language. Nor is England supposed to resent any attacks upon her ; in fact, one of the reasons of the dislike for us here is that we take so little notice of the abuse directed against us. The Administration and the State Department will be under constant pressure to do something awful to England. They will certainly say something awful. Whether they will be able to do anything awful depends entirely upon whether they are able to do it with impunity. As Lord Lyons long ago pointed out, the only effective deterrent is fear. This argument has been used with great success by Germany. This country is afraid of Germany because it does not in the least know what Germany may be able to do. But the impression prevails that Great Britain would never dare to resent any injury from the United States, and therefore any injury could be safely done to her. This is an unfortunate state of things because I presume there are certain things which we would not stand. Things, I say. As for words, we must be prepared for an immense amount of eloquence spoken and written, which if repeated in England would no doubt have a very disagreeable effect. I hope, however, we will be able to keep our tempers, because it will be very necessary. The talents of very many people will be concentrated on the task of provoking us.

There are, I presume, certain things which we propose to insist on. It would be as well if those things became gradually and imperceptibly known here. Not as a result of official communication or a diplomatic threat but as part of so to speak, a general atmosphere. . . .

The French have nothing to fear, partly because they are popular from the schoolbooks outwards, and partly because they do not come into contact with American business in the way we do. But there is no good trying to seek cover behind the French friend. It will make him unpopular and will add to our unpopularity by the suspicion that we are saying, It's the other boy, not me. We must bear our own burden and take the consequence of having about half the entire trade of the United States in our hands, as that proportion of the entire trade is with our empire ; and also of the command of the seas, by which

we come into contact with every nation in the world and especially with the United States. It is astonishing that there is not more friction than there is. The mere statement of what is being done in the way of restriction would astonish the world, and it is done without raising any special difficulties. I hope that we will not attempt to impose restrictions on paper, when they are not necessary. It is one thing to tell your servant not to admit a man if he calls, and another thing to put a notice on the street that Mr. Smith has ceased to receive Mr. Brown. I fear you will think that here we are getting in your way and diminishing the effect of your measures by our constant representations. But it is very essential at the present moment, during the elections and while Congress is sitting, with the Irish in a particularly pugnacious mood and both sides hungering for the German vote, to lie as quiet as possible and to occupy as little attention as we can. A measure here in a country where the trade is one and a half billion sterling is rather different from the same measure in Denmark or Bolivia. It is astonishing how far-reaching all our measures are, and what wide effect they have. . . .

You have been told that Hughes or Wilson is favourable or unfavourable to the Allies. They are, neither of them, unfavourable to the Allies by inclination, nor can they be favourable to them whether they have inclination or not. They are the product of circumstances and must obey them, whatever their force of character. The simple facts are that this country has in the course of past years protested on behalf of Greece, of Hungary, of Poland, of Italy and of the Jews in Rumania and Russia. It is a tradition here to pass a resolution on behalf of a suffering nationality. But no measure has been introduced in Congress on behalf of Belgium or of the French or of the Armenians. The reason of this is not a desire to abstain from interference, or a disbelief in the hideous stories most abundantly proved, but simply and solely a fear of alienating a certain number of German votes. The only occasions on which Congress has intervened or attempted to intervene in the present war, were to prevent a blockade of cotton and to prevent the execution of Irish rebels. There is no pretence at arguing that these particular matters are of more vital import than others, either to the United States or to humanity. The simple reason is that from the political point of view it pays. You must accept it at that value, but also bear in mind that the practical result is that it is not being wicked that matters, but being English. This is a crime of which, until we are conquered by Germany, we cannot rid ourselves, and it is constantly present in the American mind.

This does not mean that active measures of hostility will be taken against us, unless indeed it could be done without any danger, or that there is any personal hostility to Englishmen as a race. But the name represents an institution which from old times has been regarded with hatred, and which is now continually present in the most irritating form to the American mind.

The upshot of it all is that for the next three months we shall pass through a most critical time in which we shall have to make up our minds to fix on certain things which are—vital; and to insist on them and to let the other things go with as little comment as possible. One great advantage we have, that in the long run no American Government could count on the support of the American people in active military or naval measures, or indeed measures of any kind, on behalf of the destroyers of Belgium.

When this is the situation, as it is so clearly shown to be, would it not be a very dangerous thing to trust to this Government in any peace settlement? I venture to remind you of one or two notorious facts. Bryan was the apostle of peace. His peace treaties were concluded with all the great powers, excepting only Germany and Austria which refused them. Austria made war, although Serbia had offered submission to the Hague Tribunal. Germany made war, although the Tsar had done the same. And Germany's first act was to break every principle of international law and to violate every law of humanity. Bryan is famous for his indiscreet criticisms of foreign nations. But when war broke out under such circumstances, he was silent. During the war he remained silent. And he broke silence only when a German agent, known to be such, said that Germany wanted peace. Then, having maintained silence when the wrong was committed, he broke silence in order to prevent the punishment. Another peculiarity of Bryan was his open statement that he would have no dollar diplomacy. He would not intervene in Mexico for the menaced millions there, because he said he wasn't interested in commercial claims. But the first intervention he made in the European war was a plea on behalf of the Standard Oil Company and the copper trust, whose interests were menaced by the British blockade. You will see by this what is likely to be the attitude of the professional pacifist, and what value is to be attached to principles laid down at one moment and which have to be carried out at another. I must also remind you again that this country is radically and inalterably opposed to intervention in extra-American affairs, except by word, and then only when words cost nothing. The American people will not accept

liability which entails intervention abroad. And if they did so, it would be for the momentary pleasure of the contemplation of the beautiful vision, but with no fixed intention, and certainly no power, of carrying it out into action.

It is not so long ago that we boasted of our splendid isolation and only left it when we found it was impossible to maintain. It is not so very long ago since we left Denmark and France to their fate because we had not the means to prevent it, even if we had the will. We ought therefore to find it easy enough to put ourselves into the position of this country and I hope we shall try to do so.

What seems at present to cause most irritation is the black list, mainly because the ships are refusing to take goods of black-listed firms, or in some cases even of firms which trade with black-listed firms. This is leading to grave inconvenience. How grave it is really, is very difficult to say. I believe the great mass of traders are perfectly indifferent and are rather glad that their rivals are hit. There may be some cases when the inconvenience is severe and unmerited. I suppose these will be looked into. Congress is taking the matter up with its usual bitterness. It is becoming a profession now among a certain number of Congressmen to attack the British Government. It is quite like old times. The reason, of course, is that many of the Congressmen are Irish or with Irish connections and the irritation among the Irish here has reached a degree of intensity as great as in the 'eighties.

My duty is to represent to you what is the point of view here. Apart from the German-Irish hatred and the hereditary American dislike, there is a strong sense that our sea power is exercised in a way, not so much to injure American commerce and trade, as to hurt American pride and dignity. Commerce and trade have never been so prosperous. The share of Britain in American commerce has never been so overwhelmingly great. No one could argue for a moment that our war measures have ruined this country. Judged by figures alone, America has never been so rich. But the facts are that American trade is in a way under British control.

In order to avoid the Prize Courts, everything that passes across the Atlantic goes under a pass signed by a British officer. In order to prevent Germany receiving intelligence by the mails, every letter going from America to the continent is subject to inspection. In order to prevent allied subjects trading with the enemy, the operations of American commerce are subject to a general power of control, and American citizens may be ruined at any moment by being put on a black

list in Paris and London. There is good reason and good precedent for everything that we are doing. But it is wonderful how small is the irritation caused by this constant interference. Our sea power is as ' wide and general as the casing air.' It is objectionable, not so much because it is what it is, but because it is so all pervading. I know that in Parliament and in the departments it is considered that this Embassy is much too much inclined to bother you about concessions. I daresay we are too importunate. But if you were to look at it as Americans do, I think you would understand that from the American point of view there are many reasons why America should form common cause with the neutral countries, and come to the rescue of what they maintain is the threatened independence of the world, especially when by so doing they can save the Germans from privation and win the sympathies of the well-organized squads of German voters. We have been suggesting, not that there should be any concessions of a vital point, but that we should bear in mind that the present Government of the United States is under constant pressure from certain very prominent and powerful interests, and that it would be a great relief to them to be able from time to time to announce a small diplomatic victory.

The execution of Casement has been taken very quietly by the mass of Americans. The Government refused to take up the matter, which under the circumstances was an act of great courage. The Irish and German parties are now working the Casement case underground for all it is worth, and I fear the consequences may be grave. But on a review of the facts I cannot see that the Government could have done otherwise than what it did do, and let justice take its course, especially after less guilty people had suffered the extreme penalty."

August 13, 1916.

To Lord Robert Cecil,

" Your interviews[1] have had a very good effect and I hope they will continue.

As war goes on there must be a corresponding increase of the bitterness which is a necessary consequence of war. But in the neutral country there is an increase of indifference. People get satiated with horrors which they read about but do not experience themselves. What they do experience is the inconvenience ; and this they resent more and more. Thus you will understand that our difficulties are increasing here.

[1] Lord Robert Cecil was seeing representative journalists at the Foreign Office and giving them information for the press.

The sympathy with our cause is a lukewarm sort of thing which has not much vitality when confronted with any real loss or inconvenience. On your side you must be feeling every day the necessity of some new and more efficient measure of defence or offence. Here, this necessity is not felt or appreciated except by a few. In the face of this state of things we must be prepared for the possibility of some explosion. The way to resent Germany's proceedings is war. But war is out of the question. The people will not have it. The way to resent the Allies' proceedings is retaliation in the way of trade or finance. Whether retaliation is resorted to or not, depends on whether or not it injures America more than the Allies. It does not depend on the sympathy with their cause. Do not forget that the America you know and meet is not America which is represented in Congress. Vast masses which you never hear of, and which no Englishman there or here ever meets, make their influence felt in Congress, and carry the day, unless the President intervenes, as he has done more than once.

The reason why there has been no embargo on arms and ammunition is not sympathy with us, but the sense that the prosperity of the country on which the administration depends for its existence would be emperilled by such a measure. If there is a scarcity of material here, or any other reason why an embargo would pay, we should have an embargo. At present I don't see any chance of it, unless there is a change in the conditions. But lesser measures may be put into force. Restraints on shipping may be ordered. Transport may be impeded. A loan may be made more difficult. We are not secure against such measures. Therefore we must watch very carefully what is occurring here. Do not depend solely on official reports nor solely on unofficial reports. But obtain independent information from as many sides as possible. The object should be to ascertain when the breaking point is near and where. There may be a breaking point. Do not deceive yourself as to that. If it approaches you may have to concede a point or two. We will hope that the point to be conceded is not a vital one. You may have to give up on one point to save another. You are naturally between two fires. We in this Embassy are urging concessions. Parliament and the special departments are urging more efficient measures. Your Allies, who do not experience the weight of American animosity, are urging you to take more active measures because you—not they—bear the odium of them. The difficulties of the position must be very great, and I am afraid we here

are not lightening them. But I think it might be worth while to consider carefully the question as to which among the measures you must take is the essential one, and which may be abandoned, with loss it is true, but not essential loss. It might be worth while, for instance, to consider whether it is worth while to insist on the telegraph and news censorship on press messages and journals of German origin. I think the American people are rather apt to resent having their views ready made for them, and the German press campaign may do the Germans more harm than good. The cleverer Wiegand is, the more suspicion he excites. The more ingenious the German press bureau is, the more people are inclined to doubt the truth of its suggestions. Because the Germans want to do a thing, it does not follow that it is to their advantage that the thing should be done. It is sometimes more to their advantage that the thing should be prevented by us. We may be falling into a trap carefully prepared.

In all that we send you from here, you will remember that we write from this point of view only. You must judge what we write in the light of your own necessities, but you must not resent our reporting what we see and hear as we see and hear it.

Personally your services are very great in this respect. You take the American people into your confidence and say to them, 'This is what we are doing and why we have to do it. We do not mean to harm you. We want to harm our enemies. If we harm you, we will modify our measures so far as they can be modified without paralysing our war. We make war not money. *Non cauponantes bellum sed belligerentes.*'" [1]

September 4, 1916.

To GREY.

"I am sending the President's latest speech. You will see that your warning to Page took effect, and that he has explained his former statement as to his having no concern with the causes or objects of the war. He says that the United States were not immediately concerned and therefore could take no action. But he says that in future all neutral nations must be concerned in a war brought on by aggression, and that therefore some measure must be taken with a view to securing the submission of disputes to arbitration. Of course such measures in abundance have already been taken, and the Hague Tribunal exists, and the neutrals have the right and indeed the duty of calling the attention of would-be belligerents to the Tribunal. The reason why the President did not do this at the outbreak

[1] Not going to war like sutlers, but like soldiers.

of the war was his fear of provoking civil commotion in the United States. This argument would continue to apply in the future. It would be unwise to count on any action, or indeed any word, of the United States to which Germany could raise objection. The influence of the German vote here is, and will continue to be very strong. As everybody will tell you, the American tradition is against any sort of intervention in outside affairs and the present disposition of the country is absolutely opposed to the employment of force. I do not see how any international arrangement likely to be accepted by us as a guarantee of peace would be accepted by the Senate if it implied definite armed action on the part of the United States. The only possible measure which might perhaps be counted on is the interdiction of the use of American ports or markets or stock exchange to the aggressor in a world conflict. But then we have no guarantee whatever that, however innocent of aggression we might be, the blame would not be laid upon us by a Government acting under the influence of an organized foreign vote.

Mr. Page has done us very good service here by letting people understand what is the temper of England. He, of course passes as very pro-British, and is an object of suspicion to the State Department. I do not see however any allusion in the press to his supposed pro-British feelings. But to my knowledge he has spoken up bravely and well. Especially what he has said about you, has impressed people greatly.

I believe your friend [1] has returned to New York, and is supposed to be very busy. I have not heard from him. His prophecies have not proved to be true, and he appears to have misjudged the temper of the nation. The nation is anti-German, anti-British, and somewhat pro-ally. All these sentiments are those of the spectator who has no desire to leave the stall for the stage."

A last word, and a bitter one, concerning the President's proposal to assist the world, from his position of neutrality, by advocating a League to Enforce Peace, comes in a note to Grey's private secretary, Sir Eric Drummond.

"The Good Samaritan did not pass by on the other side, and then propose to the authorities at Jericho a bill for the better security of the highroads."

September 15, 1916.

To GREY.

"The elections are now entering the critical stage, and it is evident that things are working up for trouble with the Allies,

[1] Col. House.

or at any rate with England. I quite understand that we must maintain our belligerent rights, and that if we make war at all, we must make it effectively. I would not dare to interfere in any way even in a discussion of war measures. But I think it my duty to make it as clear as I can that from now on until the election the interest of both political parties, certainly of the political party now in power, is to have trouble with England. Germany seems to be counting on this and to have made all her plans on the supposition that relations between the United States and Great Britain will be strained, and that the President can be induced to make an offer of mediation on the basis of an armistice with a partial withdrawal of the German troops.

There certainly seems to be an impression among our friends here that many of our measures are taken as much with the object of promoting our own trade at the expense of the trade of neutrals as for injuring the enemy. Lloyd George's speech [1] is very much quoted as confirming this impression. There are also incidents which I have brought to your attention which give some support to the allegations of our enemies. It would be very dangerous for us if it appeared that our assurances with regard to our policy towards neutrals were not borne out in fact. I dare say many people are telling you, first, that the United States doesn't matter, because she has no army or navy; second, that it doesn't matter what you do to her, because she will in any case be your friend. With regard to the first, there is an immediate danger of the United States heading a league of neutrals. On the other aspect, who is to help us financially during and after the war, except the United States? As to the second, of course, you will hear from Americans in London and others that the United States is in your favour by an enormous majority. That may be so now, but this situation could be changed by a single incident. Until the date of the election every effort will be made to bring the incident about and to magnify it when made. Every effort will be made to damage our reputation and misconstrue our motives. We must be prepared for this and, although we were as chaste as snow and as pure as ice, we should not escape calumny. I think we should exercise the greatest care. We should also be prepared for the worst, because a serious crisis might possibly occur. It seems to me that as the President is empowered

[1] Dealing with the expansion of British industry during the war, and the interview in which he said, "the fight must be to a finish—to a knock-out."

to use the armed forces of the Republic against the Allies under certain circumstances, we should if the case arose, make an appeal to the Bryan treaty, and ask that the matter should be referred to a commission.

It is plain that we have the right to seize mails which contain contraband, money and information. The neutral, however, can claim that his mails should not be unfairly delayed. We contend that they are not unfairly delayed. These seem cases for impartial investigation, and certainly not for impassioned dispute, still less for war. On the other hand, measures adopted by a belligerent which are not really belligerent, but which are designed to obtain certain commercial advantages over neutrals, assume quite a different character. They are a form of war against neutrals with whom we profess to be at peace, and whom we are accused of injuring under cover of war measures. This accusation, which of course is a false one, would do us infinite injury among our friends, and there is every appearance that it will be urged to the full.

Gaunt[1] is rather impressed by the hostile disposition of people, generally very friendly, in New York. I happened to call upon a good friend of ours in the State Department. He burst out in a long and violent diatribe against all our proceedings, which he said were doing us more harm than the German had ever done. He surprised me by the extraordinary violence of his language, and by the number of cases of which I had never heard, which he mentioned against us. He was known as being rather violently pro-ally. As he was perfectly deaf and had a voice of thunder, I was in an embarrassing position, because I could not answer him, and about half the State Department must have overheard the indictment. The case is significant."

October 20, 1916.

To GREY.

"The situation here is not a very pleasant one, and it cannot be said to have improved. Events in Greece and in Ireland[2] will give a good deal of material for our enemies here, and besides this, there is the ever-growing irritation caused by our

[1] Now Vice-Admiral Sir Guy Gaunt, K.C.B., then naval attaché.

[2] The Allies had occupied Salonica in October 1915 by agreement with M. Venizelos. But Venizelos was dismissed, and in 1916 King Constantine took a line less friendly to the Allies. None the less they remained in Salonica, took over naval bases in Greek territory, and finally demanded the demobilization of the Greek army, because they suspected the intentions of King Constantine. These were, of course, violent acts of usurpation.—In Ireland after the rebellion, some thousands of persons had been imprisoned on suspicion and were still detained.

restrictive measures. I can quite understand that the irritation should also be increasing in England owing to recent events.

As a medicine, I have been reading the reports of the American Ministers during the American Civil War. I notice the same aversion for England and criticism of British materialism which I have no doubt is a fair model of what is being said about America in England and France. The results were, of course, deplorable. After the American civil war the relations between England and America were of the bitterest character. And yet it was England which prevented France from intervening on behalf of the South: it was the English working-classes which suffered most from the blockade and yet refused to have it broken: it was the English Government which prevented the sale of those ships to the South which would infallibly have broken the blockade. Looking back on it, except in one particular, the British Government seems to have acted very correctly, and yet the effect of what we said lasts longer than the effect of what we did.

I notice that Seward, the American Secretary of State, while he was absolutely resolved to break off relations with England and France in case they broke the blockade, was in constant and furious conflict with his colleagues in the Cabinet as to the necessity of making minor concessions to the British and French Governments. One of those concessions was the surrender of the mails, to which Welles objected most furiously. The sum of his policy was to insist on the vital points and to concede on less vital points. The reason was that he knew that the success of the North depended on the abstention from intervention of England and France. He would fight them if they intervened, but he would fight his colleagues rather than give foreign nations a pretext for intervening.

I think you have now the means of forming a definite and conclusive judgment as to how far we are dependent upon this country. If the facts are in your hands, you are able to form a judgment as to what should be the policy which we must adopt towards this country. There is of course the vital point of the blockade. There are questions less vital. Many people will say to you: Your cause is so just that the Americans must sympathize with it: they speak your language, they are of your race, you are fighting for their ideals. . . . I do not think we will be wise to count either on the sympathy or the common blood of this country. On the other hand, there are common interests of a very evident and tangible kind. We want to buy. They want to sell. We do not want to

interfere in this continent. Germany, if successful, would certainly interfere. Our trade with this country is immense, and the United States is now financially interested in the British Empire. There is thus a very clear and evident base for a common policy of a distinctively business character. It would be unwise for us if when we are making a business arrangement, we should complain of the American for being actuated by business motives. It would certainly be unwise if we offended in any way the business world with whom we have to deal. We must make allowances and we must make some sacrifices."

In November Wilson was re-elected, and thus a continuity of administration was ensured.

CHAPTER XXVI

FROM NOVEMBER 1916 TO AMERICA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

The election was won and President Wilson had been returned with a mandate, as he understood it, to keep the country out of the war. It is probable that Spring Rice would have welcomed a change of administration, if only for the reason that his friends were for the most part Republicans; but also because the Republican party as a whole was less pacifist than Wilson's following.

At all events, in the despatches which depict the situation to the close of this year, there is perceptible a less suppressed resentment. One of Wilson's speeches, which had compared America to a man looking on at a brawl in a public house, certainly stimulated his pen to irony. But throughout he is at pains to tone down the bitterness of English feeling and he deprecates attacks in the press on the President.

Meantime Wilson, having got his peace mandate, began to be aware that his chance of fulfilling it was slight. But he sought the chance. Ambassador Gerard came over to America, and Spring Rice, writing a year later,[1] says that he was " sent over by the German Government to make a bargain with the President. Germany was to comply with the President's demand in regard to the submarine campaign, and the President on his part was to issue a peace message and to reinforce it by stopping supplies to the allies."

It must be remembered that in the summer of 1916 the battle of the Somme had inflicted tremendous losses on Germany as well as on the Allies; that Rumania had followed Italy's example and, though more than a year after her, entered the war on the Allied side; and that Germany was on the point of making a strategic withdrawal over a considerable area in France. Enormous successes on the Russian and Balkan fronts more than offset these facts, yet the strain on German man power was felt, and the blockade began to tell.

Wilson went so far as to begin a pressure on the Allies by issuing public advice to the American people against subscribing to a new war loan which was being floated. This, according to Spring Rice in a letter of Jan. 19, 1917, dealt us " a very severe blow." The effect was however neutralised when the United States entered the war. Further, the President set to debating with House the form in which

[1] To Lord R. Cecil, November 17, 1917.

he should propose peace, but Germany anticipated him. On December 12 Prince Bülow publicly advocated a parley between the belligerents to settle terms for ending the war. Then—as it necessarily seemed, in support of Germany's proposal—Wilson issued a document on December 20, calling on both the Allies and the Central Powers to state their aims in the war and the conditions on which they would make peace. This manifesto contained an *obiter dictum* very unpleasing to the Allies. President Wilson observed that "the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind are virtually the same, as stated to their own people and to the world."

This, of course, seemed to Spring Rice, as to others, an exoneration of Germany from any moral guilt which did not attach to all belligerents. And indeed Colonel House's editor makes it clear that since the Allies had set aside what Colonel House and his editor call America's offer of assistance, Wilson was convinced that one side was no better than the other.

The President's proposal was not received anywhere with gratitude. The Germans replied that direct conference would be better than a statement of aims or terms in advance. The Allies replied that at the moment it was hopeless to expect the Central Powers would agree to the reparation, the restitution, and the guarantees, which were a necessary condition of any peace that would be permanent.

Then suddenly Germany forced the issue by announcing that after February 1, 1917, they would renew the intensive submarine campaign.

Spring Rice, a year later, described the situation in the letter to Lord R. Cecil already quoted, when the events were far behind him and had produced their consequences.

Nov. 17, 1917.

To Lord R. Cecil.

"Germany issued a peace message two days before the date fixed for the message of the President, which gave the world the impression that the President was following Germany's lead. The President issued his official advice to the American people to refrain from lending money to the Allies. The Allies were given the impression that the President had passed over into the German camp, and, having created this impression, Germany declared its intention to sink ships at sight, in the firm belief that the United States would take it lying down. Germany misunderstood the President's mind. He was bent on peace: he was determined to give Germany her chance; his great ambition was to be the mediator in a peace without victory which would give the world a permanent guarantee of international law and mutual confidence. But he did not propose to pay the price for peace which Germany thought he was willing to pay. She thought that his personal ambition

to play a part in Europe was so great that he would be willing to make every sacrifice for it. She also thought that the menace of the German voter and the German assassin would be sufficient to prevent the President and his people from resenting even the grossest insult. The fact that the insult was resented evidently created the deepest astonishment, and the most bitter disappointment in Berlin. But as we share in the upbringing of the race and people to whom the President belongs, we can understand without too much difficulty the present point of view of the man on whom such a trick was played, in the confidence that he would not see through it and was incapable of resenting it. You know the saying which is current in Ireland that the men of the north never leave go the hand of a friend or the throat of an enemy. Wilson's father's ancestors are buried near Londonderry, and his mother was born in Carlisle."

If Spring Rice's forecast and diagnosis went wrong at any time, it was in the critical weeks at the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917. His pessimistic nature forbade him to count on that which he most desired, even when the train was laid to the powder. To the very last he advised his Government not to count on America's coming in. It seemed to him, indeed, unbelievable that there should not be a limit to America's patience or that Americans should allow American ships to be sunk without retaliation ; but even on this he would not reckon absolutely. He realised to the uttermost that President Wilson was determined, if such a thing were possible, to keep America out of the war ; and Colonel House's diaries testify that he was right. Even after Germany's open avowal of policy, not a single act was done by the President to prepare for war, nor was war declared until a sufficiency of American lives had been lost at sea.

The first of these letters shall be given in full, though it repeats much that has been said before.

November 24, 1916.

To Sir Edward Grey.

"I hear from Boston that the feeling in New England is rather pro-ally than pro-British and that in general the feeling towards us is not very friendly. This is owing to the fact that our blockade measures touch the Americans nearly, and are a constant cause of irritation. They are not a wound, but a hair shirt. There is also a growing feeling that the longer the war continues the greater is the chance that the United States will be drawn in. There is a very great and constant fear of Germany, and a belief that some intolerable outrage is imminent. The United States does not want to go to war, and the elections have clearly shown that the great mass of the Ameri-

cans desire nothing so much as to keep out of the war. It is undoubtedly the cause of the President's re-election. Knowing this, the Germans can play upon the fears as well as the hopes of the American people. They are saying to them that they are willing to make peace, but that if peace is not made the war will daily become more terrible, and in the end the United States will be drawn in. You may think that no country would submit tamely to such a threat. But this country is not ruled by sentiment or pride or honour, because they are entirely indifferent to the opinion of the outside world, and they are perfectly satisfied with the present condition of affairs and their superabundant prosperity. It is difficult to conceive of circumstances which would drive them into war, and absolutely no arrangement whatever has been made in order to provide against war or to defend the country in the event of war. Whatever the President's private opinions may be, he would certainly be under the pressure of public opinion at the moment of making a decision, and public opinion demands strong words but shrinks from deeds. The President is said to have expressed his intention of writing no more notes. But if this is the case and he intends to answer deeds with deeds, he will have to confront the difficulty of an unwilling people and a very inadequate means of defence. The way out indicated by Germany is to mediate, or to break down the resistance of the Allies by refusing supplies to the belligerents. But here he will confront another difficulty, which is that the prosperity of the country depends upon being the base of supplies for Europe. The situation is one of very great complication, and I am credibly informed that he is waiting for Germany to take the next step. In the meanwhile he is silent as to Armenia and Belgium [1] and ready to accept excuses as to submarine atrocities. The situation is so complicated that he is unwilling to add to the complication by any overt steps of his own. It is true he has nothing to fear as to the election, which is over. But without the consent of Congress he can take no action of a definite or useful kind. The Lower House has passed from his control, as the majority will be Republican. The Speaker will probably be Mr. Mann, a most determined and inveterate enemy of England. The Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means is a very anti-British Irishman.[2] As far as we are concerned, Congress

[1] Germany had begun to deport Belgians to do forced labour in Germany. In Armenia during 1915 the Turks, who were allies of the Central Powers, had massacred or driven into captivity a number computed at over three-quarters of a million of Christians.

[2] Mr. Claude Kitchin.

will be hostile, because they believe that hostility to England entails no danger. They will be friendly to Germany, partly because of the German vote, and partly because they fear a conflict with Germany and know that German resentment will entail serious consequences. It would, therefore, be easier for the President to obtain from Congress action hostile to England than action hostile to Germany. For the President, the best and safest way out of the difficulty would be peace with himself as mediator. His friends are probably conscious of this fact, and are doing everything they can to promote it. What would be desired will be rather peace than any particular terms of peace. With regard to the future they think that a guarantee will be found in the League to Enforce Peace. As I have pointed out, this, as far as America is concerned, can be no more than a pious wish. It cannot possibly be backed by a satisfactory guarantee for the exercise of force. And experience has proved what is likely to be the attitude of the American Government in the case of aggression, as well as the attitude of the American people. It has hitherto been one of complete indifference, inculcated by the Government, and acquiesced in by the people. At Buffalo, almost within hearing of the Canadian frontier and of a town where almost every family has lost a son in the war, the President in one of his last speeches compared the war to a drunken brawl in a public house. This is the view which he is taking, and which the people of this country cordially shares. He has been re-elected by a large majority, because he has taken this view, and because he has not taken part in the war. In face of these facts, it is difficult to believe that Europe can accept an assurance that in the future the United States will forcibly interfere in the cause of humanity. Europe will remember Belgium, and will ask itself what the United States did in order to protest against aggression. At the present moment the President appears to have refused to make a formal protest to prevent the enslavement of Belgium, no doubt because he is unwilling to endanger the peace of the country by incurring the anger of Germany. And whatever his sentiments may be, the people of the United States would never support him should he enter into an engagement entailing the employment of force. They are ready to seek peace but not to ensue it.

I think, therefore, that our attitude should be one of friendly acquiescence in the philanthropic views of this great Government and of thankfulness for the pacific desires addressed to us. What importance should be attributed to them must depend upon our experience of facts. These are of such a nature

that the whole world can read them. We are not left in doubt. Had there been any doubt, the election should have dispelled it.

It is probably true that the President's chief preoccupation at the present moment is the high cost of living and the labour question. This latter question is very threatening, and it is hardly to be expected that a great strike can be avoided. Should a military crisis take place, a strike is almost inevitable, and a sudden peace might bring on such a crisis. It would probably be therefore better to leave things to go on as they are now, and until some striking development takes place the Government will probably take no new departure. Whatever happens, the decision lies with the President who seeks his inspiration from popular opinion as expressed in the mass, but takes no individual into his counsel."

When Mr. Gerard visited the United States, the German Government launched an elaborate peace propaganda in the American press, which met with considerable sympathy. "It is peace which is desired, the terms being a matter of indifference," Spring Rice wrote on December 1, describing the public attitude. An adequate guarantee for the future was held to have been found in the League to Enforce Peace. "Although," he adds "Senator Stone has rather unkindly warned the public that the Senate would not pass the desired Treaty," —which must commit America to armed intervention.

"It does not seem to be suspected," he adds, "that the sanction of the Monroe Doctrine has been more the fleets of Great Britain and France than the military force of the United States. A change of policy in Europe towards this doctrine might have serious consequences but it is taken for granted that so fundamental a change of policy would never be made."

—The Germans are feared, the Allies are not feared:—that is the burden of his song in these weeks; and there is no affection to count on—not even for France. He wrote again on December 5:

To GREY.

"A few days ago when Jusserand was at the illumination of the Statue of Liberty given by France to the United States, the President assured him before a large multitude of the intimate ties which bound France to America; yet the President's government had just officially informed the American people that they were not to invest in French securities without careful consideration. This is a curious country, and it seems to act in spots; the relation between words and deeds seems to be more remote than elsewhere.

The State Department says that it will be difficult to prevent Congress from insisting on retaliatory measures against the

Allies, or rather against England. It is not argued that our action with regard to the mails or the statutory list is illegal or in principle *ultra vires*. But it is felt to be inconvenient, and it is known to be British. The weight of the blockade falls upon certain interests which to some extent have suffered. Those who profit by the war say they have done so in order to serve our interests and that we ought to be grateful. Those who suffer by the war lay the whole burden on us. If we take measures in consequence of the scarcity of shipping due to submarine warfare, the blame is laid, not on the German submarines, but on British sea power and British arrogance. In many departments of the State Department I understand that the common talk is anti-British.

You will judge for yourself, from the tone of the despatches which we receive and of the Notes addressed to this Embassy, of the temper towards our country which prevails in this Department. I think we should conclude that at least in small matters the attitude of the State Department will be hostile and that their influence in Congress will not be friendly. Threats are ôpenly conveyed to us. We expect that some Consul or other official will be accused of some infraction of diplomatic propriety, especially in relation to the statutory list[1] and that he will be summarily dismissed. It is, of course, notorious that if I had done one-thousandth part of what Bernstorff has done I should have been given my passports long ago. The slightest slip would be visited with an immediate penalty. I have accordingly impressed upon all the Consuls the duty of keeping most strictly within the law and of saying nothing to imply that the statutory list can affect anyone but British subjects. That is, that we are merely exercising our right over our own subjects, without pretending to any authority over the subjects of other countries.

The question which presents itself in a serious form is this. It is much to the advantage of the President to play the rôle of peacemaker in Europe, because this would relieve him of the reproach that he has done nothing for humanity. The obvious way to be mediator is to force the Allies to accept mediation by cutting off supplies, and to conciliate Germany, by conniving within certain limits at Germany's submarine warfare. Would the President adopt this policy, which is being pressed upon him by many of his advisers and above all by his financial supporters? It is possible he might. On the one hand

[1] The "black list" of firms and persons with whom British subjects were forbidden to trade. It was issued by the Foreign Trade Department of the British Ministry of Blockade.

is the danger of war with Germany, which is always imminent if Germany chooses to sink an American passenger ship, because it is to be presumed there is some limit to American patience. A war with Germany may have unforeseen consequences of the most serious character, and it would be the breakdown of his peace policy. On the other hand, it is not thought that there is any danger of war with the Allies. They will not resent an injury, certainly not by force of arms; to insult or wrong them is safe. And they would be quarrelling with their victuals if they resented the manners of their grocer. Therefore great caution should be observed with Germany. None is necessary with the Allies. And what Germany insists on is that she should be given a free hand in destroying neutral shipping, which, after all, has the immediate effect of enhancing the value of the American mercantile marine, and putting America's principal competitor out of action. There is reason to believe that the President has addressed some very severe remonstrances to Germany as to a renewal of submarine activity in the neighbourhood of the American coast. But secrecy is observed as to what has been done. Again it is supposed that strong remonstrances have been made about Belgium, although here again there has been no publication. But so far as the allies are concerned, the United States Government seems to take pleasure in making its protests public to the world."

Then, having said this, he proceeds to point out what the United States might do if they wished to be actively unfriendly.

A most elaborate system of insurances and of agreement as to the supply of wool, rubber and so forth had been allowed to grow up, on the supposition that the British blockade and embargo were legal. Detail as to cargoes was first supplied by the shippers, then a British certificate was issued, which furnished a guarantee against seizure. But if objection to the legality were raised, the whole of this system, built up with the approval of the United States Government, might be overthrown, and every ship would be liable to be brought before a prize court " with all its delays and inevitable friction, which might have far-reaching results." Again, the officers of the Allies employed in America in connection with munitions might be hampered in their functions. Or finally, the United States might put itself at the head of a league of neutrals to break down the blockade in the name of neutral rights. The concluding sentence was:

" If we regard them as a foreign nation who happen to speak our language but who by history have been estranged from us, we can only be thankful that their attitude is more satisfactory to us than that, for instance, of Sweden."

The next letter is written after the German proposal for a Conference between the belligerents to consider means for ending the war.

December 15, 1916.

To GREY.

"People here are principally occupied with the German peace proposals, with the deportations from Belgium and with submarine warfare. War has gradually drawn nearer and nearer to the United States in spite of all their efforts. Now the German Ambassador presents himself with an alternative. The United States can present and recommend the acceptance of peace proposals. It can urge this acceptance by argument, and enforce it by certain simple measures which Congress is ready to pass. On the other hand, if war continues, the conflagration will not be confined to its present limits. The United States will itself be the object of an action which will force it into war or into a shameful surrender.

The credit of the Allies has been strained. There are signs that the war orders are drawing to their close. Scarcity of steel and foodstuffs is felt very deeply here, and it is due to war exports. Politics are confused and embittered by the recriminations of persons suffering from the blockade who demand protection and reparation. Relations with Germany are becoming daily more dangerous, and with England, daily more disagreeable. The President's great ambition is to play a high and moral part on a great stage. The stage is ready, and the part; he has only to assume it. The German programme appears to be to spread all through the country the idea that Germany, although victorious, is willing to offer reasonable terms and also to enter a league of peace and an arrangement for a limitation of armaments. The effect of this idea on the popular mind is naturally to provoke great sympathy with Germany, and that is at the present moment the prevailing sentiment in American minds, as far as we can judge here. It must not be thought that the sentiments which exist in the minds and hearts of the warring nations are shared in this country to any appreciable extent. It is most important to remember that while there is very real and sincere sympathy with the Allies as the virtuous characters in the present drama, the United States people do not propose to take any other part than that of sympathetic spectators. Germany will be the villain of the piece, but they will do no injury to the actor. On the other hand, while we can count on no very active sympathy, we may expect in Congress some measures of a coercive character, and, if not in Congress, the President can

always take action about our credit and about armed merchantmen. He is fully conscious of his power. And he is prepared to use it.

Simultaneously with these peace proposals, Germany has adopted an attitude in Belgium and in submarine warfare which one would think would make its professions of mercy and a love of peace no better than a horrible mockery. It is possible that the American mind may realize that a man who has killed his father and mother cannot fairly appeal for mercy as an orphan. Efforts are being made to bring this point of view to the knowledge of the American people, but it is doubtful whether these efforts are likely to be entirely successful, and the actions of Germany towards its Belgian slaves and its submarine victims seem to be entirely forgotten in its eloquent professions in the cause of peace."

President Wilson's manifesto followed unexpectedly on December 20. Spring Rice wrote after it had evoked a storm of angry protest in England.

His communication was for the first time addressed to Mr. Balfour instead of to Sir Edward Grey. The new Coalition Ministry having been constructed under Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Grey (as he became) followed Mr. Asquith into retirement.

Spring Rice had no more personal acquaintance with the new Prime Minister than with his predecessor. The change of Foreign Secretary could not be to his liking, as his regard and admiration for Grey were great. Mr. Balfour's personality and policy had never at any time inspired him with enthusiasm; and during the period of Mr. Balfour's Premiership, Spring Rice had coined many unflattering phrases about him. But he was a close friend of Mr. Gerald Balfour, and as will be seen, when early in this year he came into personal contact with the new Foreign Secretary, he was greatly impressed.

No letter remains which expresses any view of Spring Rice's on the Ministerial changes. But retirement gave Grey leisure to reply with characteristic friendliness to a note of leave-taking.

FALLODON, Dec. 24, 1916.

"DEAR SPRINGY,

Thank you very much for your letter of the 8th. I never had time in office to tell you how much I sympathize with the exceeding difficulty of your position at Washington. It has been the special field for malignant German propaganda, and it is a real triumph that the Germans have never once got their knife into you or the British Embassy. If the war ends well, this will be recognized even by the Press in time.

I think not only Balfour and Cecil but Lloyd George (when he has time to look that way) are aware of Crawford's immense merit. I am putting your recommendation of him in Balfour's hands, and if I am alive and kicking at the end of the war, and the powers that then be show any disinclination to recognize Crawford's services, I will demand it with all the energies of the importunate widow, the daughter of a horse leech or a suffragette and any other notorious examples of persistent and annoying importunity. Why are the most striking instances of this all female ?

Yours ever,

EDWARD GREY."

On the same day, as it chanced, Lady Novar from the other end of the world also sent characteristic greeting. She wrote from Government House, Adelaide.

" MY DEAR SPRINGY,

There is a chance, I fear, of your not knowing my handwriting, so strange and rare has it become to you. But tho' I have not corresponded, I have kept an eye on you and rejoiced at your importance and, at your having such a splendid chance of discomfiting your old enemies in one of their favourite fields of activity. It's not often that Cassandra survives to wear the halo of a true prophet. What a knocking off of haloes there has been in England. . . .

Your particular end of the tangle doesn't seem the least difficult to unravel, especially now that old W. W. is turning his thoughts towards peace. If anything has been proved by the war, it is that America is no nation, just a collection of peoples who neutralize one another like the bits of the Forth Bridge, which by pulling on one another keep the whole thing in place while the winds blow and trains rush over it—which is all very well for an iron bridge, but less so for The Great American People.

All those who have visited you from here have returned saying all the nice things about you which we have always thought—even about your clothes. I heard a particular account of the hat and slops in which you met an Australian visitor at your own door, and of your apologies for the same, all which the said Australian mightily enjoyed !"

About this time report circulated that the British Ambassador was about to be recalled. Some of Spring Rice's friends were sufficiently moved to write or telegraph in protest. Senator Lodge's letter is worth quoting.

"My Dear Mr. Balfour, Jan. 9, 1917.

. . . I have been much disturbed by the reports which I have seen in the newspapers of attacks in England upon your present Ambassador, accompanied with intimations that his recall was contemplated. I have known Spring Rice for some thirty years, from the time when he was here as Secretary of the Legation to the present day, and it so chances that I have known him very intimately and that we have become very close friends. Owing to this friendship and to my deep interest in the cause of the Allies, I have watched with great anxiety his course here under the trying conditions created by the war. I think that he has done extremely well. Naturally, owing to his long periods of residence here, he knows the United States and Americans almost as well as a native of the country. Nothing can exceed his industry and his utter devotion to his country and to the work imposed upon him. That work has been very heavy and charged with the gravest responsibility. The questions arising from the world-wide disturbance of trade and commerce have been almost infinite in number. Representing, as I do, a great industrial State, I have had almost innumerable cases of every sort and kind which I have been compelled to bring to the attention of the Embassy. I cannot praise too highly the attention, the thought and the tact with which the Ambassador has dealt with all such cases—anxious to carry out the policy of his own country in the most thorough manner, and yet in such a way as to cause as little trouble as possible to those affected by it. He has, I am certain, saved us from an immense amount of irritation which might have arisen if he had not dealt with all these complicated questions —aided, as he has been by the admirable work of Sir Richard Crawford—with the utmost skill and care. . . .

I cannot think of any one who could replace him with advantage in the midst of the war, because there is no one who has had the experience which has necessarily come to him. I honestly think that there could be no gain by making a change, and that the chances would be that such a change would be disadvantageous both to Great Britain, and to the United States.

Most sincerely yours,

H. C. Lodge."

On January 16 Sir Eric Drummond, sometime Grey's private secretary and now Mr. Balfour's, added a postscript to an official letter.

"I hope you entirely disregard all these rumours about your

withdrawal, etc.; they are based on absolutely nothing and I can't make out at present from what quarter they emanate (but I suspect Boche)."

Spring Rice's letter concerning the President's peace proposal was as usual explanatory and apologetic.

December 22, 1916.

To Mr. Balfour.

"However natural be the indignation which I see is being expressed in the British press on the subject of the President's proposal, I hope we shall not lose sight of the fact that it was not intended to be directed against us. The primary object of it was no doubt to state the fact that the position of neutrals is getting perilous in the extreme, mainly owing to the menace of German submarine warfare. The Germans have shown what their submarines can do here. We fully warned them at the time. Our warnings were unheeded, and now they are face to face with the fact that German submarines may be at the present moment in the near neighbourhood of American waters and that the commerce of America is threatened. Either the Americans must abandon all their former claims on behalf of humanity and of the most elementary American rights, or they must go to war, if Germany pleases to put before them this alternative. And the United States is neither morally nor physically prepared to fight. The West is not interested in the sea, and is very greatly interested in the preservation of peace. The election was quite positive in its decision on this subject. The plea that the Allies have also interfered with American rights is probably advanced in the desire to hold an equal balance. The American Government cannot seriously claim that the injuries are at all commensurate. But the injuries that we do inflict by the nature of our position are felt by a larger circle than the injuries inflicted by Germany. And in a country of over a hundred million inhabitants, in which the proportion of murders per population is as a hundred to thirteen in comparison with England, the interest in human life is not very keen. The numbers of Americans murdered and tortured in Mexico is greater than the number killed on the high seas, and the United States has raised no serious protests. We may therefore expect that our astonishment and indignation at the President's attitude will not be understood here. It may very likely meet with a very angry response. For some time I have warned people here that sooner or later an explosion of public feeling in both France and England, and probably Russia is inevitable. I have pointed out that

in past years the democracies of Western Europe have looked upon the democracies of America as their natural friend and ally. I have pointed out how the governments of England and France, even if they had wished to intervene in the American civil war, would have met the most furious opposition from the non-voting labouring population, and that probably it was this fact which saved the United States, at any rate from French intervention. I have reminded people that it was the same interest which made it impossible for the British Government to persist in the joint blockade with Germany of Venezuela, and which enabled President Roosevelt to order the German fleet to leave American waters within 24 hours. I have also said that this same feeling prevented England from joining in the joint action proposed by the German Emperor at the time of the war with Spain in the enforcement of a Monroe doctrine for Europe, and the common defence of an European monarchy against the American republic. I have added that this feeling is one in its nature transitory and dependent upon events; that no event could be more striking than the betrayal of the democracies of the world in their great struggle with autocracy. I have said that if the labouring classes of Europe are once convinced that, now that the American democracy has become rich and prosperous, it is entirely indifferent to its sisters suffering as they do in the rest of the world, there will be a new alignment in the policies of England and France, and that the Monroe doctrine will no longer receive the sanction which it at present enjoys in the existence of friendly governments interposed between Germany and America. I have not received much response, and the usual impression which appears to be conveyed by these remarks is that all these things are a long way off, and that what is present is the black list or the censorship.

It is possible that this outburst of feeling in the European press may give the Americans pause. They may think that when the terms of peace come to be discussed, not much attention will be paid to the desires or the interests of the United States; that Europe will be as indifferent to their fate as they have been to ours; that the terms of peace may contain clauses giving non-American powers the same latitude which Bismarck gave to France in Tunis. The present and immediate effect of the British comments will be to cause the President great personal irritation and will play Germany's game in originating another furious controversy between the British and the Americans.

Of course, as you know, the Irish question here assumes a most

dangerous form. The Irish leaders are in the pay of Germany, and the rank and file of the Irish are no longer indifferent but hostile. It is interesting to remark that one of the chief parts of the joint German-Irish programme is the establishment of a naval base in South-West Ireland under German auspices, to be an outpost of the Central Powers on the Atlantic and the curb of British tyranny at sea. It does not seem to be perceived that such a base would be a German base against the United States as much as against England. But it is significant that this is part of the programme, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the ferocity of the language held at the German-Irish meetings. I understand that the attitude of the lower clergy is fully as violent, although the official heads of the Church try to maintain an attitude of neutrality. But this recrudescence of the Irish question has a very unfortunate effect on public opinion, on Congress and on the press. However favourable to France public opinion here is, it cannot be said to be favourable to England.

. . . It is difficult to explain exactly the way in which business is conducted here. The President rarely sees anybody. He practically never sees Ambassadors, and when he does, exchanges no ideas with them. Mr. Lansing is treated as a clerk who receives orders which he has to obey at once and without question. His communications to the press have been several times contradicted from the White House. He practically never expresses an opinion to a foreign representative. He never discusses any serious step in consideration by his government. The State Department is full of very pleasant gentlemen whose kindness and courtesy make it very easy to transact business. Mr. Lansing himself is most sympathetic and agreeable. But the real business of foreign politics is transacted by the President alone. He has a pronounced taste for the employment of secret foreign agents, a long succession of whom have passed through the White House. He has also a succession of advisers, who one after the other are discarded. Sometimes he sends a message to a foreigner through one of these, but he rarely, if ever, appears to discuss matters face to face with any foreign representative, and with his own Cabinet he is supposed to have maintained the strictest reserve. It is actually doubted whether Mr. Lansing knew of the President's intention to send his peace note. Both the President and Mr. Lansing denied that there was any such intention, and Mr. Lansing's denial in the most positive form was given the day after the despatch of the note, which was sent over his signature. You will see that under these circumstances it is rather difficult to do diplomatic

business, or to obtain authentic information of what is going on in the mind of the administration, except through communications through the press. The German Embassy is extremely well informed by some mysterious source which also inspires the German press here. How far the Germans knew that the President was going to take the step that he has taken, I do not know; what is quite evident is that the step which the President has taken is the very one which Germany wished him to take."

January 5th, 1917.

To MR. BALFOUR.

"It looks as if the President was determined not to give up his efforts towards peace. The reasons are the danger which the United States is in of being drawn into the war, if it continues, and if the Germans execute their threat of destroying every neutral ship bound for allied waters. Another compelling reason is the natural ambition of the President and the United States people to play a part in this crisis, and their feeling that the part they have played hitherto has not been distinguished. Many influences combine to make this movement popular. The fear of peace and the discontinuance of war orders seems not to be so great as the fear of war. And there is a feeling that if peace is concluded without the interposition or co-operation of the United States, the result may be unpleasant. There is a fear that the Monroe doctrine may cease to have the active support of the British and French democracies and that Japan and Germany may be given a free hand in this continent. If the Allies give any reason for the hope that peace negotiations of some sort may be opened, the President will no doubt take full advantage of it. If the Allies close the door, it is quite possible that the President may try to force it open. It is almost inconceivable that this country should take sides with Germany against the Allies. But it is possible that they may put some pressure on the Allies in order to force them to negotiate.

A good many people think we should undertake more active propaganda. The safest course would seem to be some sort of clearing house of information, with an American adviser and a competent specialist with a library of reference. But it is doubtful whether we can change the weather by rigging the barometer. The course of the war has its natural reaction here. People are weary of it. They have no true comprehension of what it means. And now that they know that they may become involved they have a sudden realization of what this may

mean, and they have an intense desire to free themselves from the danger.

I doubt whether it can fairly be said that the President has misrepresented the sentiment of the people here when he said he did not know what the war was about and that with the causes of the war he had no concern. In saying this, he was probably not expressing his personal opinion, but was trying to express in words what his audience was thinking. But we have arrived now at a new stage, that is, we have come to the time when many people here think that they can no longer be mere spectators. They wish to avoid an imminent danger, and also to grasp at a proffered distinction. Germany is using the menace and is also holding out the honour. The President is indifferent to neither. . . . He lives enveloped in mystery, and there are strange stories of the difficulty which is encountered by anyone even in the highest position who desires to have access to him. On the other hand, there appear to be numerous unofficial counsellors who have long and intimate conversations and convey mysterious but authentic messages. None of the allied Embassies have had any access to him at all except the French, and to Jusserand he has said nothing of any importance. He sedulously avoided committing himself on any important question. There are rumours that Bernstorff has a readier means of access, but these rumours, though often repeated, are unconfirmed. The result is that New York seems to be better informed than Washington as to the movements of his mind. Here we regard the White House rather as Vesuvius is regarded in Naples, that is, as a mysterious source of unexpected explosions."

In the next letter dated January 12, Spring Rice again reviews American opinion and the President's action. There is now, he says, " no pressing demand " for measures against blockade, censorship, black list or restrictions on trade. " The United States precedents in the past are too strong and the interests of the United States are too plain." Agitation against the Allies has died down " under the influence of the conciliatory measures you have adopted."

On the other hand the President's peace move, and the fact that replies to it were received, had mitigated the submarine campaign.

To Mr. Balfour.

" No flagrant case has been recorded in the last three weeks. From this point of view, Gerard has no doubt expressed the feelings of this Government in expressing his satisfaction at the continued exclusion of Tirpitz from Office. But the menace

still hangs over this Government. For this, if for no other reason, it is to be expected that the President will make further overtures. All his interest and all his ambition are concentrated on the peace movement and the attention of the American people is fixed on this subject. The debates in the Senate have shown that though the Senate may have had doubts as to the time and mode of sending his note, the principle of it was approved. But it was quite apparent that the Senate would have nothing to do with the proposal of the League of Peace. They will not abandon the Monroe doctrine. They do not approve of entangling alliances nor of unconditional peace treaties nor of an unconditional engagement for the employment of force. Therefore some other method for securing peace on a permanent basis must be arrived at, and that part of the President's message falls to the ground.

If the issue of peace messages continues, there may be no appreciable change in the present situation. It is felt that now that the Allies have answered while Germany has not, the next note will be addressed to Germany. The answer of Germany may be a renewal of submarine warfare on an extended scale. It is rather hoped that it will be a communication of more moderate terms. Great expectations are raised by the despatch of a new Austrian Ambassador, and the appointment of the new Turkish Ambassador. It is hoped that influence will be brought to bear upon them in the direction of moderation. I must again insist that the American people as a whole are not interested in the sea, are not very sensitive on the point of national honour, and are absolutely bent on keeping out of the war. There is no strong feeling at the back of the President, should he desire to break relations on a mere question of law or honour or humanity. You have not forgotten that to the great mass of the American people the cry of suffering Europe is a tale of little meaning though the words are strong. As some one said to me the other day, the statue of Liberty is an image of gilded bronze, hollow inside, with its back turned to Europe. The meaning of this is that the liberty the Americans care for is their own liberty and not the world's, their own happiness and not ours. There is nothing perhaps inhuman in this. It is what Denmark said to us. It is what Thiers said to Lord Granville. It is what the Cabinet said to Mr. Gladstone. The danger is that we should hope too much and we should be angry because we are disappointed, from too much hoping."

January 19th, 1917.

To Mr. Balfour.

"So far as diplomacy is concerned, things are going well for the Allies here. It was expected that we would refuse to reply to the President's enquiry as to our terms in the same way as Germany had refused. Now that we have accepted, and Germany has refused, we hold the first place in the popular respect. In spite of a strong temptation to return an abrupt answer, we have given a full and courteous one. The effect on the President's mind, if reflected in the *New York World*, is highly satisfactory. Then came your note. It is impossible to describe the effect on the minds of those whom you would regard as of your make. There seems to be a universal feeling in a certain class that here at last is found the true and full expression of what made the war and of what alone can end it. I make reservations. How large the class is which is susceptible to such an appeal, I do not know. How many of this very busy people will pay any attention to what we say, however said, it is impossible to foretell. They live in a different world, on a different plane. 'Hear ye indeed, but understand not, and see ye indeed, but perceive not.'

I have no idea what the effect on the President's mind is except from the articles in the *World*, and various vague conversations which are repeated to me second-hand. The President made no acknowledgment of your courteous delay in the publication and expressed no opinion as to what you said. This is in entire conformity with his policy of silence which he preserves towards diplomatists as well as towards his Cabinet. But the indications are favourable. He seems to sympathize in the main in the objects as expressed by us. With regard to what I suppose is the main point, namely the conditions of securing a permanent peace, he has received rather a severe setback from Congress.[1] But he believes that the party is pledged to join some sort of peace league, and he intends to win over public opinion to the necessary sacrifices. For this purpose he will strain every nerve. It is a difficult task, as you yourself remember, who lived through the days of splendid isolation. You said once that Great Britain would not lie on the waters as a helpless hulk, but could defend herself against all comers. Many people here have the same opinion and think that America can defend herself alone, if ever attacked. Certain thinkers do not believe that the United States can live alone and

[1] Which had refused to consider any unconditional engagement to employ force as a sanction of peace.

the President is among these. But from the conviction in the mind of the President to a doctrine accepted by the American people and from accepted doctrines to actual performance is a very long way. I do not see how anyone who knows this country could hold out to you any sure and certain hope of practical help in the realization of this idea. But you will remember that this, of all countries, is the home of the phrase. It was said of the Chicago meat packers that they had machinery which could utilize every part of the pig except the squeak. The American politician has achieved a further conquest. He has utilized the squeak. This is a recognized part of politics and a word is regarded as a contribution to the fulfilment of a statesman's duty just as much as a deed. But the word is not expected to imply a deed. When it has served its purpose at the polls, it obtains a decent burial and is succeeded by other words. The President's assurances as to the desire to take part in the permanent settlement are undoubtedly genuine. They have been repeated again and again and are incorporated in the party platform and the President's acceptance. But between this and the performance there is a gulf. This people will have [1] to abandon the Monroe doctrine and the Washingtonian tradition against entangling alliances. They will also have to have an army and a fleet ready on an instant and distant call for foreign service. The people who could not spare one word to Belgium are now to engage to send their armies and navies to the defence of threatened right. This is a big change. An alternative is, of course, that the aggressor country should be automatically denied the right to use neutral countries as a base of supplies, and that neutral ports should be closed to it. But this would require the action of Congress, and who knows what pressure would be brought to bear by racial or economical interests? Then, what could be more certain than what brought on the war? Will ever war be clearer as to its origin? But the President has told us that it is by no means clear. And what this President has failed to see, his successor may also fail to see, and suspend action until he has seen.

On the other hand, it is becoming clear to many people that with the terms of peace the United States will enter into a critical stage of their history. What will guarantee them against a peace in which one or other of the powers is given a free hand in this continent? Why should Europe care for them when they have cared so little for Europe? What has become of that sympathy of the democracies of western Europe for the

[1] In a League to Enforce Peace.

democracy of the United States which saved the union in the Civil War, and which saved United States from an European coalition when they made war with Spain ? Does it still exist, and if not where is the guarantee of the Monroe doctrine ? This is the question which presents itself and must present itself, and when presented must be answered. From this point of view many people think that the United States and not the Allies are in need of propaganda. Americans must educate their rulers. Serious thoughts are rife on this subject, amongst serious people. I have been asked about it. I have said that I do not see how we can be asked to teach Americans where their own interests lie. Only Americans can do that. We have our own opinions, which Americans may not share. If Americans do not share our views, we shall shape our policy accordingly, but we do not propose to persuade them when they can only be persuaded effectively by themselves. I have also said that I would have nothing to do with any propaganda directed against the President to whom I am accredited. We are often used as a stick to beat the President with. The President is rather apt to resent the stick as much as, or more than the beater, and we suffer accordingly.

I have been in Russia, Berlin, Constantinople and Persia, which are all popularly supposed to be autocratic governments. But I have never known any government so autocratic as this. This does not mean that the President acts without consulting the popular will. On the contrary his belief and practice is that he must not lead the people until he knows which way they want to go. But his interpretation of the oracle is his own secret, he consults it alone, he makes his own interpretation, and he acts according to his own judgment of what the people desire should be done. To curse him as many people do would be as wise as to curse the weather, or rather as to curse the weather cock. But the mysterious way in which he moves makes everything a matter of divination rather than diplomacy. The F. O. used sometimes to say the same of Lord Salisbury. It is impossible even for his closest associates to foretell what he will do, for even his most intimate advisers do not know what other advisers had access to him and his left hand knoweth not what his right hand doeth.

To turn to the practical side of politics. The Federal Reserve Board by its appeal, dictated by the President and McAdoo, addressed to the American investor against our credit, has dealt us a very severe blow. The State Department and the Treasury appear to be contemplating action

which will interdict our armed merchant ships [1] to American waters. Nothing has been done to obtain satisfaction either as to Belgium, or as to the breach of the submarine pledges, and nothing is being done to prepare this country for war if Germany forces war upon it. Germany is not anxious to force war, and apparently believes that some formula will be found which will expose all allied ships to attack without involving American honour or imperilling relations with America. This is the hope of Germans, of Congress, and of a large part of the American people. It is possible at any moment that further pressure will be brought to bear to end the war. The mysterious relations between the White House and Germany and especially between the Administration and certain Jewish German financiers are the subject of very common comment. The explanation probably is that, as there is a feud between the President and the Christian bankers of Wall Street, the Government is obliged to have recourse to the Israelitish enemies of the New York Philistines. But it is undoubtedly true that the sources of information enjoyed by Germany are very good. The German Embassy, I am assured by a press man, was informed of the arrival of your note before any one else had news of it and immediately after it had been privately communicated to the President. You will no doubt count upon this in any communication which you may have occasion to make. As you know, the latest German proposal appears to be a democratic reform in Germany. The Kaiser will appear in his new part of Hodge, but I do not know with what success."

On January 22 Wilson opened his mind to the world, in a speech delivered to the Senate. The Central Powers, he said, had gone no further in reply to his proposal than to say that they were willing to meet their opponents in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Allies had been more amenable and had " stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to supply details as to the arrangements, guarantees and acts of reparation which they deem to be indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement." Wilson now proposed to set out America's view. The war must first be ended and ended upon terms which would make peace durable. " It must be a peace without victory. . . . Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice. No such peace could last. But even when a reasonable peace was concluded, it would be absolutely necessary that a force be created as guarantor of the settlement, so much greater than

[1] That is, they would forbid the vessels armed against submarines to use American harbours.

the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it." America must be a partner in this guarantee.

This was what Wilson led the world to expect from America; and the expectation proved a disastrous will of the wisp. Spring Rice continued to warn his Government not to count on realization of it. But for the moment, the opinion of Europe fastened on the phrase, "a peace without victory," and both sides resented it. Spring Rice's attitude is shown in his letter of January 26, 1917.

January 26, 1917.

To Mr. Balfour.

"It is hardly to be expected that the President's efforts in the cause of peace will cease. A new step is expected. Each step has been distinctly an advance. First there was the German peace note with a recommendation to reply. Then the President's own peace note, which is interpreted not as a peace but a war note. Mediation was, we were told, not in question, but we were asked to state our terms. Now the President has stated his own terms, and has offered, if the terms are satisfactory, to guarantee them by the use of the armed forces of the United States. Presumably as the German Government has not stated its terms but has demanded a conference, the next step taken by the President will be to suggest a conference under his auspices. This at least is what is expected here.

It is rather important to bear in mind the particular conditions here. The President is a transitory being. His glory is effulgent but brief. The temptation to play a great part before the brief authority is over is overpowering. The Democratic party for many years has not had consecutive terms of office. It is a one-man party. It is President Wilson. Peace under the President's auspices must mean the permanent glory of the Democratic party in the person of its head. A man who was quite recently rejected by a local university, and who becomes the arbiter of the destinies of the world, a partner with Pope and Kaiser, is certainly an object of admiration. The awestruck comments of the press on his epoch-making speech are only an earnest of what may come. The President's great talents and imposing character fit him to play a great part. He feels it and he knows it. He is already a mysterious, a rather Olympian personage, and shrouded in darkness from which issue occasional thunderbolts. He sees nobody who could be remotely suspected of being his equal, should any such exist in point of intellect or character. You will see, therefore, that if he is human and if the Demo-

cratic party is human, the temptation to mediate is overwhelming. The German advisers have long felt this and have been sedulously holding out this golden hope. There are also the great army of philosophers and pacifists, the good and clever men whose goodness and cleverness have not been appreciated in their own country, and who are sending out here urgent cries for help, appreciation and sympathy. These no doubt are quite an important element in the situation.

I do not think you should attach too much importance to those considerations which are present in Mr. Bonar Law's mind when he speaks of our debt to those who had gone away from us never to return. I doubt whether the President is very susceptible to this order of idea. He is very different from Lincoln who, as someone said, was brought up splitting rails and not hairs. Lincoln had no doubt whatever as to what was right and what was wrong. But Lincoln was at war. Our own attitude then was the attitude which we now complain of in Mr. Wilson. If we remember this, we will find it easier to understand.

The President is now engaged in preparing his second inaugural which he will deliver on the 4th of March. Before that date it is expected that some event will occur of a striking character which will render that date even more epoch-making than the 22nd of January. But what it is no one seems to know for certain. As I have often said, no one appears to have access to him, and to no one does he seem to confide his intentions. But at the present moment, the peace talk has for him the great advantage of throwing the question of the submarines and the Belgian deportations into the background."

But if the Allies resented Wilson's vague peace talk, Germany frankly disdained it; and on January 31 Zimmermann presented to Gerard at Berlin a note which began by referring to Wilson's speech of January 22. It declared that, "the guiding lines of this important declaration agree to a wide extent with the principles and the works which Germany professes." It went on to complain that Germany's proposals for a conference had "failed owing to the lust for conquest by their opponents"; and therefore, that Germany was driven to make new decisions. The pledge as to limitation of submarine warfare was formally withdrawn. It was hoped that the United States Government would "appreciate the new state of affairs from the high standpoint of impartiality," and would "warn American ships against entering the banned zones and its subjects against entrusting passengers or goods to vessels trading with harbours in these zones."

The reply of the United States came when it was announced on

February 3 that relations had been severed and that Bernstorff had been given his passports. But there was still no declaration of war. Spring Rice wrote a day before the official rupture was announced.

February 2, 1917.

"I think there is more indignation about the German note than there was about the *Lusitania*. There is at any rate one important difference in the present situation, apart from the studied insult of the language. The effect of the declaration of the submarine blockade has been to cause a very severe loss in values, especially in cotton and wheat. This is a very serious matter. If the Germans are able to make good their menace to any extent, a practical blockade of American ports is carried out, as three-fifths of the trade is with the Allies. The South is entirely dependent on our market for cotton, and on cotton everything depends. In the West, values will also be greatly affected, although not so far as California. There is a quite remarkable unanimity in the press comments, except from California and the German organs.

What the President's feelings are may be imagined. The United States Ambassador in Berlin would appear to have warned the President that Germany proposed to begin indiscriminate submarine warfare at once unless the President should take some serious measure in order to bring about peace. This he did at the imminent risk of breaking with the Allies, or at any rate of giving them the impression that he was on Germany's side, and hostile to them. In spite of his carrying out the German programme, Germany apparently has done exactly what he wished to prevent by complying with German wishes. There does not appear to have been any notice whatever of Germany's intentions, beyond the spreading of a report that the Allies were arming merchant ships and that, therefore, attacks without notice were justified. The United States Government had no reason to suppose that neutral ships also would be attacked without notice, whether armed or unarmed. The blow is a heavy one, and no doubt the President must suffer extremely. He has done everything possible to put a stop to the war, in order to prevent the war reaching this country; and in spite of all his sacrifices he has now to choose between the alternative of an ignominious surrender or a rupture of relations with Germany. It is curious to observe how greatly sentiment has changed within a few weeks. A short time ago there can be no doubt the feeling in favour of Germany was growing up. There appeared to be also common action in favour of peace between Germany and the United States.

The Allies appeared to be opposed to the course advocated by the President. But you have complied with the President's request for a frank statement of terms. Germany has refused such a statement. You have written a note which has made a profound impression, expressing in clear and unmistakeable terms what the war was about and what you hope to secure. Germany has replied in an even more unmistakeable manner by her deeds. The situation is now quite a different one.

From some one near the President I have been told that his desire has been and is to gain sympathy for the ideas of a league of peace. This is an immense revolution in American polity, and he has to obtain the assent of the people. In order to do so he has to convince them that the peace which they are to secure is a just one. He has also to avoid giving any offence at all to any of the various sections of the American population. Germany by her present action has shown in an absolutely unmistakeable manner what she means by war, and how she means to conduct it. It can no longer be argued that the United States can be kept out of the war, when war is carried on in such a way. The lesson of the American people is therefore half-learned already. The President proposes to continue his campaign, and he hopes for success. But it is very evident that there is a great deal to be done before the assent of the Congress and the people is secured. It would be very rash to assume that any real progress has yet been made. The main point is to see whether and how far the United States Government is at the present moment willing and able to maintain and defend its rights. Many people here think that it may be willing (although that is doubtful), but that it is not able. They add that the only way to bring the American people to a consciousness of their real situation is to bring them face to face with facts. It seems likely that the facts will take a very disagreeable form. Measures however have been taken to look after the possible malcontents whose opposition is expected should there be trouble with Germany. These measures in New York are on a very large scale. The army is being withdrawn from Mexico, and will soon be available. The Navy is concentrated in the neighbourhood of Cuba. There is a shortage of men, and convoying, if necessary, will be a difficult matter. I do not however hear that any serious measures for defence are being taken by land or sea by the government itself, which evidently hopes for a peaceful solution. A rupture of relations does not mean war and the German Embassy will be carried on by a secretary or by the Austrian Ambassador. Many excuses could be made for an apparent

violation of American rights at sea. The general feeling in Congress is certainly that war may be avoided, and probably will be avoided. There is an intense desire that another step should be made for peace. Some people seem to think that Germany wishes that the United States should put itself at the head of a league of neutrals in order to force peace on the world, and thus to relieve the German Government of a responsibility of making peace itself. The stories which reach here from Germany point to the absolute necessity for peace in that country. And this last measure is thought to be the last desperate resort. At the same time there is such faith in German efficiency that there is a very serious alarm as to the effect of the German submarine measures. There can be little doubt of the very friendly feeling which now prevails here towards the Allies. This is due to your word and Germany's acts, and we can only hope that the opinion will continue."

A fortnight later, he depicts the situation, while America's action was still deferred.

February 16, 1917.

To Mr. Balfour.

"The situation here appears to be that feeling in the country is gradually increasing in intensity owing to the effect of the German declaration of ruthless warfare and other lawless acts, including the detention of the United States Ambassador.[1] Traffic on the railways and in the ports is in a dangerously congested condition, and the mere threat of ruthless action has sufficed to blockade the entire American coast, or would do so, had not the ships of the Allies the courage to put to sea. While the exasperation is great and is becoming greater, the President and the Cabinet think it their duty to take no action which in the remotest degree would appear to justify the German Government in throwing the blame for hostilities upon the United States. They are also determined to take no action until the country insists with practical unanimity that action must be taken. This is far from being the case at present. There is no doubt that the temper of Congress is pacific. Until Congress changes it is hardly to be expected that the Government will change. But it is understood that the pressure of the country on Congress is beginning to be felt, and that an incident or overt act may make war inevitable. The German Government has withdrawn its supplies of gold

[1] Mr. Gerard was temporarily detained at Berlin.

and its credits and has closed its news agencies. It disabled its ships here and appears to have made every preparation for war.[1] It may, therefore, be said that peace or war depends upon the action of the German Government. That is, upon whether or not they are prepared to execute their menace.

There is, of course, another solution. The United States Government may acquiesce in an embargo on their entire trade with the Allies, and may prohibit their ships from navigating the forbidden zone, or refuse to encourage them to sail in such waters or to give them the means of defence. Or American skippers may accept the German threat, and do their business in quieter regions. For a people of a hundred million which has always with justice boasted of its independent policy and courageous indifference to Europe, such a policy is an interesting and novel departure. Most people with whom I have spoken think it an impossible one. Many members of Congress think it possible and desirable. It remains to be seen which view will prevail. It may be that you may know before this letter reaches you.

The Austrian Ambassador, or rather the gentleman designated as such, is still here but has not presented his letters. The Austrian Government has declared that it fully adheres to the policy of its sister empire. But it has been asked to explain exactly its point of view, and there is every desire here that the Austrian Ambassador should remain as a possible if unofficial channel between Washington and Berlin for those peace negotiations as to which all hope has not yet been laid aside. Peace is still in the air, if still further removed from earth than hitherto. A frantic effort was made by Bernstorff before he left to renew the peace negotiations.[2] It is evident that Zimmermann in Berlin tried the same experiment on Gerard. But it is difficult to see how Germany could avoid a conflict with the United States if a *sine qua non* of negotiations

[1] He writes later on March 1 that the order for the destruction of the machinery was fixed for January 31—of course, in anticipation that ruthless submarine war would be resumed on February 1; and that the order must have been given at least a month earlier, as the machinery was destroyed on the same date at Guam, an island of the Ladrone group in the Pacific, where there was a U.S. naval station. There was no telegraph at Guam and the wireless was controlled by the U.S. Government.

[2] Bernstorff and his staff sailed on February 15. House (ii. p. 449) notes that on February 10 the Dutch Minister called on him to propose a Conference of Neutrals at Washington, with the Ministers acting as representatives to formulate "a plan of action, directed against violation of sea rights." (This would cover English action as well as German.) "I have a notion," House says, "that this plan was suggested by Bernstorff, than whom he has no closer friend among the diplomatic corps."

is that all trade between the United States and the Allies should be inhibited. For this trade is valued at 5 billion dollars annually. And the meat exports of the middle west and the cotton exports of the south depend on England for their market. You will remember how the President, by ordering the Federal Reserve Board to discourage investments in British Treasury Bills, attempted to exercise pressure in order to accelerate peace. We hope that such a measure will not again be resorted to, but it must be evident that Germany is building on the possibility that such a pressure may be exerted.

Measures of defence and preparedness, including the co-ordination of supplies, are under consideration or are being resolutely pushed forward. But the Fleet is still in Cuban waters, and it is to be noted that though Congress a year ago allowed an appropriation for the construction of small calibre guns for arming merchantmen, no step whatever has been taken with this object. I have heard it quoted that if you wish war you must be prepared for peace, and if this is true, the outlook is decidedly warlike.

An insurrection has broken out in Cuba in which the hand of Germany is suspected, and indeed, has been traced. German reservists have been gradually moved in the direction of Cuba and Mexico, especially to the latter country. Carranza is now under German influence, and the Mexican Minister in Berlin has returned to his native country, evidently armed with arguments of a weighty character. German officers are said to have been seen in considerable numbers both with the Villa and Carranza forces."

House's papers confirm Spring Rice's picture of the general unwillingness of America to go to war. He noted on Feb. 13, 1917:

"Durant of the General Motors Company . . . has just returned from the Far West and writes that he met only one man between New York and California who wanted war." (II. 451.) Again on March 31:

"Edward G. Lowry said that in Missouri they do not seem to know what it is all about."

It is also plain that Wilson himself hoped against hope. Only on February 26 did he ask for powers to arm merchantmen, and in the Senate a Bill to give this power was blocked by the organized obstruction of a small group. Wilson, however, took the step by his own executive authority.

The result was that Spring Rice in his forecast greatly underrated the military effort which America would make, if and when she did go to war.

Feb. 23, 1917.

To MR. BALFOUR.

"The situation is much that of a soda water bottle with the wires cut but the cork unexploded. The President appears to be watching. Germany has declared that she will destroy United States ships if found in the war zone. The United States has declared that Germany will do so at her peril. But so far, no United States ship has been destroyed. Is this because no United States ship has been sent into the war zone or because no United States ship has been found there? American ships have certainly passed these waters. Others are on their way. But the great majority have remained in port and the German threat appears to have been entirely effective. She has not committed murder, but the threat of murder has kept America off the seas. The result is a stoppage of trade, a congestion in the ports, widespread discomfort and even misery on the coast and inland, even bread riots and a coal famine. These seem to be overt acts. They are at any rate overt facts. But they are not it seems of a sufficiently spectacular character. What is required to arouse the American people is the destruction of an American ship with American passengers. Mr. Franklin, a very energetic man, who is in control of the American line, wanted to send his ships in the danger zone with passengers on board if he was allowed to arm them. The Secretary of the Navy told him that to provide guns to a private ship would be an unneutral act, although if he could get them from private sources he was welcome to use them. Mr. Franklin said that he knew of no store in New York where 6-inch guns were on sale. He then went back and ordered his crews to be disbanded and the ships unloaded. It was said in the press that they were to be used for war purposes, but this the Navy Department emphatically denied. The fact is that the United States Government is firmly resolved to give Germany no excuse whatever of saying that America took the first step to bring on war. Bernstorff when he left announced his firm conviction that the German Government would take no aggressive action and would leave the initiative to the United States. This may mean that the initiative is sending a ship into the forbidden zone. It may also mean sending an armed ship.

There seems to be little doubt that, although the pacifist party in Congress is very strong, Congress will follow the initiative of the President and give him any powers he may desire to have. The country generally is convinced that the President will

avoid war if it is possible to avoid it and that any steps which he takes will be purely defensive. The spirit of the country is rising. This does not mean that the desire for peace is less, but that the sense that something must be done to unify the nation and to prepare for war is growing. The celebrations on Washington Day, yesterday, were characterized by a great deal of enthusiasm.

Before you get this letter you will know what action has been taken, if any. Unless an incident has occurred in the interval, there will certainly not be war. The preparations here are being actively pushed forward, mainly in the form of very large money votes and of the constant meeting of committees. I hear that a state of disorganization has been discovered which might have been expected after a long peace in a democratic country. Congress, however, seems ready to go any length in the way of naval credits. The difficulty is in proceeding with the actual work of construction and with enlistment. With regard to the army, many people like Colonel Roosevelt have offered to raise large volunteer forces. It would be unpopular to send a large force abroad in case of war, and I think this would be wholly out of the question. The utmost the United States would do would be to encourage enlistment. With regard to ourselves, the courts have refused to give any decision as to the interpretation of the neutrality act,[1] and all our operations are hung up in spite of our protests. The general feeling is first of all that the United States should take no action except of a purely defensive character ; secondly, that if this action leads to war the war should be an American war in defence of American interests, and thirdly, that no general compact should be made with any European power. The competent authorities are perfectly aware of the vital necessity of not interfering with our supplies and as a matter of fact, should war take place a close understanding will naturally ensue. It will be closer with France than with the other belligerents. Most people would be glad to have paid the debt owed by the United States to France both in money and in men, but an understanding with England or Russia would certainly not be liked. There appears to be an immense amount of indifference in the country at large, and in California the only country which excites the fear or dislike of the population is Japan. In the west they have no pecuniary or other interests in the war, and the west has much influence in Washington. The middle west seems to be waking up and the

[1] The American Courts had refused to allow British consular authorities to enlist British citizens in America for the war. See above p. 280 and below p. 396.

east is undoubtedly in a considerable state of excitement. But on the whole the President will do all he can to maintain peace and it will be extremely unwise to count with any certainty on the United States entering into the war."

March 1, 1917.

To Mr. Balfour.

"The President evidently expected that ruthless submarine warfare would result in an overt act which would render the rupture with Germany complete. But the effect of the German threat was to keep American ships from starting. They asked for convoys and for guns, but to provide convoys or guns would have been to give the Germans at least some appearance of justification. It would have been construed as an act of war and the responsibility for war would have been thrown on the President. This he was determined to avoid. So he waited. For a space of three weeks no overt act occurred. But during this time American ports were blockaded, the railways were tied up and the congestion extended far inland. Congress was drawing to a close. It was absolutely necessary to ask for the powers which the President believed he possessed without any further action by Congress, but which he desired to receive with the official endorsement of Congress. So he went down to the House and made a calm and dispassionate review of the situation. He showed that the action that had been taken already was a necessary consequence of what Germany had done. He pointed out that it was certain that something would shortly occur which would render action imperative. He declared (what was evident to the whole world) that he had desired to keep the peace and had done everything possible to maintain it. But he showed that it was impossible to avoid the impending crisis and that preparation was a duty. He therefore asked powers to carry out the minimum of preparation and to arm merchant ships. While he was making his speech, news arrived of the sinking of the 'Laconia.'[1] Even so it seemed as if Congress was unwilling to grant the powers he asked for. A strong peace movement developed itself and several Senators combined to form a strong opposition in the hope of postponing action until Congress adjourned. But it was plain that feeling in the country was growing stronger and stronger and that the President could safely appeal to the country against their representatives. To-day news has been published which shows that on the 19th of January the German Foreign Office was making all preparations for war, had determined on commencing

[1] A Cunard liner, sunk without warning on February 25; six lives lost.

ruthless warfare on the 1st of February, and was inviting the Mexicans to form an alliance with Germany and Japan. The State Department is convinced of the authenticity of the document in question.[1] They have received news which shows that German reservists in considerable numbers are being concentrated in Mexico, and that Germans enjoy access to the inner councils of all the Mexican leaders without discrimination, and that the advice given by them is intensely hostile to the United States. The feeling of exasperation against Germany is naturally growing greater every day. The sudden death of General Funston on the Mexican border, the ablest of the American soldiers and the man most qualified to cope with the difficult situation there, has excited some apprehension. The General died suddenly of an acute stomach trouble under rather mysterious circumstances. This event, like other events of a strange character which are reported from different parts of the country, excites considerable alarm and anxiety. It is not believed that an armed rising on a large scale will take place. But it is feared that there will be outrages without number. The water supply of New York and Washington is being heavily guarded, and at all the ports of the United States defensive measures are being taken. There is a general feeling that no adequate measures of preparedness have yet been taken or are even possible. But there is also a feeling that the country is steadily drifting towards war. The nearer it gets, the less inviting seem the prospects. The country is bent on peace, although there is a vague and increasing sense that it will be difficult to maintain peace. It is certain that the President will not take any action whatever unless he is absolutely convinced that the country is behind him. He will not lead the country into danger. He will follow as a guide to direct them in the hour of need. The impression is that what he hopes for is that even at the latest hour he will be able to avert hostilities, or, if hostilities begin, to bring them to an end by some sort of world arrangement. I believe that an article in this sense which is being circulated in the press reflects his opinions.

He is doing everything possible to prevent the necessity of calling an extra session of Congress. If he is left alone, he will be able to draw his inspiration from the people without the disturbing influence of the people's elected representatives. There is a very widespread feeling among the warlike and the pacifist elements alike that it would not be safe to leave him to act alone and without the control of Congress. He is an un-

[1] It was secured by the British naval intelligence department and its authenticity was later admitted.

known force, and the movements of his mind are so mysterious that no one seems to be able to prophecy with certainty what decision he will arrive at. We may, however, be pretty certain that no action will be taken which is not felt by the people at large to be absolutely and imperatively necessary. This is his strength. The result is that numbers of people in the east criticise him for being backward and unwilling to face the issue. The result of this criticism is that when he does move forward he has an almost irresistible weight of public opinion which moves with him."

March 9, 1917.

To MR. BALFOUR.

"Feeling in Congress was already to a considerable extent exasperated against Germany when the Mexican revelation took place. The first effect was greatly to increase the irritation. This was made evident in the very large majority which the President obtained in the House. The next effect was to raise a strong feeling of suspicion against the British Government which, according to German sources of information, had forged the document and communicated it to the United States in order to bring on war. This view of the matter was obtaining credence when the German Government announced that the revelation was genuine, and no fabrication. Even so, with the open and public justification of a proposed alliance with Japan and Mexico against the United States, there was a determined minority in the Senate headed by the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations who prevented all legislation in defence of American rights.[1] Senator Stone is still likely to remain Chairman and none of the twelve Iscariots, as they are called here, except three whose term comes to an end, are likely to be forced from the Senate. Their action however has excited and alarmed public opinion. It is an evident proof of the direct authority exercised by Germany in Congress. Similar direct authority is believed to be exercised in all the public departments. Rumours of plots and discoveries of plots by German-Americans are rife and some of them authenticated. A regular system of the purchase and preparation of sites for attacking important military centres has been discovered and frustrated. The Indian plot which is now in course of investigation throws an unpleasant light on what German organization can do in the way of destructive agencies. Bombs have been frequently discovered and precautions have been taken on an extended scale. The impression prevails that these plots were intended

[1] They prevented the passage of the Bill giving power to arm American merchantmen before Congress rose on March 4.

for execution in the event of a breach between the United States and Germany. The anxiety as to an armed rising seems to have died down. It does not seem to be believed that there is much to be feared on this score. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence that German reservists in this country have been ordered to proceed to Mexico. It is not known exactly what are their numbers, but as to the fact there is no doubt. The question suggests itself, what are those other reservists doing whose services have not been called upon. News arrives from South America that German reservists are gradually being moved north and are being concentrated in Central America. The breakdown of the American treaty with Colombia, under which the United States Government had to pay compensation for the loss of Panama, has irritated the Colombians and thrown them into the arms of Germany. It is suspected that Germany is making arrangements for submarine bases and wireless stations in Colombia and Venezuela. A wireless plant in Mexico is said to be operated in connection with plants in South America and Germany. No credence is attached to the rumour that Japan is likely to make an agreement with Mexico. The United States Government appears to have made a full confession to the Japanese Government and to have declared that Japanese motives are not suspected. The Japanese Ambassador has been received in audience by the President, has congratulated him on his inauguration, and has no doubt made the same assurances which have been made in the press, namely, that they propose to be absolutely faithful to their engagements and not to contemplate any change of policy. China appears to excite some anxiety. The United States Government does not wish China to be engaged in the war, as this would throw China under the direct control of the Japanese.

The essence of the President's inaugural address is that the United States Government cannot remain much longer indifferent to Europe. Apart from becoming involved in the struggle in defence of their rights, the Americans must take part in the settlement. The President's point of view appears to be that the Americans would wish to remain entirely detached from the struggle but that this is no longer possible. It is only by accident that they are becoming involved against Germany and not against ourselves. A violent propaganda is being conducted from Germany by wireless with the object of inducing the Americans to take action against British restrictions on commerce and shipping. The President of the new Shipping Board,[1] which has very extended powers, is conducting an

[1] Mr. Denman. See below, p. 388.

energetic press propaganda against us. It is unfortunate that he should be taking so active and public a part. The Secretary of the Treasury has, however, at last consented to the publication of the notice by the Federal Reserve Board which recalls its warning against allied loans. . . . You owe a great deal to Crawford and, of course, Lever. They have both served you very well.

The country is becoming more and more suspicious of Germany. It is not becoming more in love with England. It is pro-ally but anti-British, and it is pro-ally because it is anti-German. At the same time it seems to be generally considered that the country will drift into war, mainly because Germany wishes it. If Germany, however, does not wish it, it is still possible that war may be averted, and if the submarine warfare fails, it seems quite possible that Germany will abandon this weapon. At the moment of writing it seems generally believed here that war is inevitable. All I can record for certain is that the vast majority of the country desire peace and would do a great deal to secure peace."

March 23, 1917.

To MR. BALFOUR.

" Opinion was considerably shocked by the sinking of the ' Algonquin,' and the public were prepared to consider it as the ' overt act.' It required however, the sinking of three more American ships, the news of which came the same day, really to arouse the public and the Administration. Even then the President showed some hesitation as to the line of conduct he should follow. Some of his closest advisers, with their ' ear close to the ground ' dared not give him advice, not being sure of the attitude of the new Congress. Should he or should he not advance the date of the meeting of Congress fixed for April 16 ? If he did not, there was the danger that public feeling would calm down and that he would be confronted by a divided Congress. At the Cabinet meeting on the 20th the President, strange as it may seem, is represented as having been influenced by the firm attitude of the members, and the next morning he issued his proclamation summoning Congress for April 2 ' to receive a communication concerning grave matters of national policy.' That Mr. Wilson wished it to be known that the responsibility for such a step was shared by his official advisers is evident.

Enough has been said and hinted in official circles and in the press to justify the assertion that the die has been cast and that this country has drifted into war. It is not that the United States wanted it but their hand has been forced by Germany.

The President, according to all indications, will not declare war on Germany on April 2 but merely assert that a state of war has existed between the United States and Germany since March 17, or even perhaps March 14, the date of the sinking of the 'Algonquin.' Great hopes are entertained that Germany will herself in the interval declare war, consequent upon a probable encounter between the submarines and an armed American ship, two of which should, by now, be entering the area prescribed by Germany.

Meanwhile active preparations are proceeding and the necessary legislation is being drafted for submission to Congress, to meet the exigencies of the various departments concerned. There will probably be a fight in Congress over questions of detail and perhaps even over questions of principle, but it is confidently expected that the Administration will have its way in the end. Among the more important measures now said to be under consideration are the following. The mobilization of the entire naval forces, the passage by Congress of a universal military training and service bill designed to provide an army of 500,000 men within six months, the granting of permission to Allied warships to use American ports, the unlimited supply of war equipment to the Allies and the requisitioning of German vessels now in American ports, the mobilization of the merchant marine, of the railways and of the industrial and financial resources of the country.

All the above projects seem quite promising, but much will depend on their mode of execution. The spirit may be willing but the mechanism is wanting.

Although there is no longer apprehension of any armed rising, there is considerable fear of incendiarism and bomb and other outrages in the near future. The state of affairs in Mexico and the continued exodus of Germans from this country thither continues to be a source of much concern.

Crawford is handling the financial situation with Lever and so far everything seems to be going smoothly. Denman, the President of the Shipping Board, has been spoken to by those in authority, so that he is less likely to pursue his activities against us, but he will still bear close watching.

The Russian revolution was hailed with enthusiasm here, especially by the Poles and Jews, and prominent men like Schiff have publicly proclaimed their sympathy. There is no doubt that the effect here will be to cut away the ground from under the feet of the German propagandists and so strengthen the cause of the Allies. Considerable interest is manifested in the prospect of a renewal of the commercial treaty with Russia and

the consequent development of the United States in that direction."

On April 2nd, 1917, there came an end to all hesitation and doubts. The United States of America entered the war in association with the Allied Powers against Germany. The British Ambassador was present when, as he told some of his friends, President Wilson spoke as though he had put on the black cap to deliver judgment, and a criminal stood before him. No despatch relates the tremendous episode; but he gave his memory of it in the last public speech which he delivered a fortnight before he died, when after his retirement from Washington he was waiting in Canada for a ship to take him home.

"I shall never forget a rainy evening in April when I drove down to the Capitol. The Capitol was illuminated from below—white against a black sky. United States troops were collected round it, not for parade, but for defence—and necessary too—and the President came down. I sat on the floor of Congress. The President came in, and in a perfectly calm, deliberate voice he recited word by word, deed by deed, what Germany had said and done. At the end he said: 'I have told you the facts. We have several courses to take. One course we will not take, the course of submission.' I shall never forget the cheer I heard at those words. The die was cast; it was that there was but one course to be taken with honour, and that course was taken."

When Spring Rice heard that cheer, he must have said to himself that, come what might, his mission was accomplished. His difficult task had been to watch and wait, to guide England away from dangers, above all, to refrain from counting with certainty and prematurely on American help. These letters will have shown how long and anxious was the watching, and how slow the evolution of events. That the United States would enter the war against the Allies he had never believed possible; but again and again he had been afraid lest England by insisting upon a course necessary for the Allied interests in the war should so curtail the freedom of neutrals that America would resent it by denying access to America's resources. Now, since America was no longer a neutral but engaged in the same war, that danger was over. He certainly never dreamed that he had brought America into the war. In his view, first and foremost, only America could do that—or more strictly, only Germany. Nothing but direct and savage injury inflicted on the United States could determine such a step. The injury had been inflicted, the step had been taken; for his own part, he could thank God that nothing had been done, as so many things might have been done, to determine America not to make common cause with England.

CHAPTER XXVII

FROM APRIL 1917 TO JANUARY 1918.

After America had come into the war, Mr. Laurence Godkin, one of the best-known publicists in New York, sent Spring Rice a cutting from his paper. The article began :

" Sir Cecil Spring Rice and M. Jusserand may look about them at the fruits of their work and pronounce it good."

Many Americans, the writer went on to say, had at times criticised the " extreme caution and self-restraint which characterized the attitude of the British and French Embassies." They would (like Colonel House) have admired something more in the manner of Count Bernstorff. But the path, especially of the British Ambassador, had been beset with danger. " It would be idle," the article admitted, " even now that we are allies, to deny the very strong anti-British sentiment that exists amongst Americans." M. Jusserand's diplomatic course was less complicated ; though the French Navy carried out virtually British plans, interference with American commerce was never laid at M. Jusserand's door ; and his repute as a writer upon American institutions gave him a prestige like that of Lord Bryce. But the result of his studies had led him to endorse the judgment and action of his British colleague. " Neither of these diplomats," said Mr. Godkin, " has ever thought it desirable to go outside of legitimate diplomatic channels and attempt to intrigue among sections of the people. That is a fundamental principle of successful diplomacy in the United States."

Many other Americans, then and later, said the same in other words. Meanwhile from England Mr. Luxmoore—who, however, cannot be accused of the least impartiality—wrote :

> " I think now that the entry of America justifies a letter of congratulation ; it really must be the crowning success of your mission and I am clear that the main credit of it is yours, and it is all done so quietly that your name has hardly been mentioned once in the matter. To most men it would be a mortification ; not to you. I think it stamps the whole business as of the highest quality, and your patriotism as well as your skill of the most genuine."

Spring Rice's friends may be content to leave testimony at that. His work was done. There was large room now, and he knew it, for other men and other methods. It was announced immediately that Mr. Balfour would come to the United States on behalf of the British Government, to concert policy and action. Spring Rice, on receiving this news, wrote a letter of rejoicing and of guidance:

April 13, 1917.

(*Probably to* Lord Robert Cecil.)

"The announcement of Mr. Balfour's visit has given the greatest satisfaction here, especially in Government circles. There are, however, certain considerations which it would be wise to bear in mind.

1. There is no intention to establish a coalition government, or to accept the advice and assistance of the Republican Party, although in political, naval and military affairs the Republican Party owing to its long continuance in office undoubtedly possesses the most distinguished personalities. In finance the great leaders belong to the Republican Party and are on the very worst terms with the Democratic administration. On the whole what is generally known as society is on the side of the Republicans, and opposed to the Democrats. The speakers and writers who have from the first taken the side of the Allies have violently attacked the President, and are almost all to be ranked among his political enemies. It will therefore be essential that our mission should bear these facts in mind. The persons with whom they would naturally come in contact, and with whom they would be naturally inclined to associate, are precisely those with whom the President is on bad terms. Any intimacy with these persons would be regarded with suspicion. On the other hand it would of course be dangerous to show any ingratitude to those who have borne the labour and heat of the day on our behalf. It is thought very fortunate that the British Government has selected a man who is known to be most competent to deal with this very delicate situation.

2. The President in entering into the war has probably taken the action which he has done at the earliest possible moment. If it had been taken before, it is extremely doubtful whether the country would have followed him. His political method is to ascertain from various sources of information what is the predominant sense of the country. He has never taken any action in which he was not moderately sure of at least the acquiescence of the majority. His tendency has been to follow very exactly the dictates of popular opinion. There is no doubt that this country desires peace and enters on the war

with the greatest reluctance. Their reason for coming into it is not the desire to help the Allies but the conviction that neutrality is no longer possible; that they must fight Germany, and it is better to fight her in Europe with allies than in America without. Congress is already showing very plainly the effect of the manifest reluctance of the people of the United States to take an active and physical part in the struggle.

3. One of the favourite lines of attack on the President by the pacifists and pro-Germans is that Great Britain for her own purposes has inveigled the United States into the war and is going to make use of this country for her selfish objects. It will be said, especially in the Hearst papers, that, in order to carry out this object, the British mission is sent here to induce the United States to take action best fitted to promote British purposes, and is sending specialists to teach the United States how to raise an army and conduct the war. The best answer to this accusation is to point out that the conditions in the United States are very similar to those which prevailed in Great Britain, and that the United States has every reason to take advantage of the mistakes made by Great Britain and profit by our experience. We are sending a mission, not to offer advice unasked for, but to answer any questions which the United States Government may be inclined to ask us, in order to promote the common cause and to enable this Government to avoid the errors into which we have fallen.

4. The reason which no doubt is at the bottom of the antagonism of Americans to Great Britain is the fear of being thought to be relapsing into the condition of a colony. There would be the very greatest reluctance to taking part in the war under British control or as a part of a British campaign. The United States army and navy and the United States Government would be very sensitive to the accusation, which will undoubtedly be made, that they are submitting to the control or dictation of any British officer. This is the danger which will have always to be borne in mind. The fact that Great Britain has taken the part she has done in the war, and that the United States has come in at a later date, will tend to promote the impression that the United States is following Great Britain's lead. For this purpose it is most important that every possible care should be taken to impress on the minds of Americans that Great Britain has no secret designs of this nature. Of course it is also highly important that true recognition should be given of the very great services which this country has rendered and is now rendering to the Allied cause.

5. There can be no doubt that the President will speak of the

Irish question. The Irish party are of very great political importance at the present moment. The question is one which is at the root of most of our troubles with the United States. The fact that the Irish question is still unsettled is continually quoted against us, as a proof that it is not wholly true that the fight is one for the sanctity of engagements or the independence of small nations. The President is by descent an Orangeman and by education a Presbyterian. But he is the leader of the Democratic Party in which the Irish play a prominent part, and he is bound in every way to give consideration to their demands."

Another despatch of the same date testified to the excellent effect produced by the visit of the British and French Admirals who came to concert action at sea.

For his own part Spring Rice adhered to his former line. Mr. Cunliffe Owen, an English resident in America, who had been one of his constant informants, wrote that the London Pilgrims Society were giving a banquet to Ambassador Page with Mr. Balfour in the chair in celebration of the new alliance. It was proposed that the same should be done by the Pilgrims of America in honour of the British Ambassador. But the reply was : " I still think silence is best."

Yet he could not always remain obdurate. Professor W. R. Thayer, Roosevelt's biographer, wrote to him in the summer, begging him to be present at the Harvard Commencement and to receive a degree.

" I doubt if you realise how deeply some of us New Englanders, and especially Harvard men, desire to express something of what we feel for the mother country, and for you who have represented her with such extraordinary good judgment and tact—and may I not say to you ? charity, during these last three years."

Spring Rice accepted the invitation and, having been introduced by President Eliot, spoke to the assembly.

" I am particularly grateful to have this opportunity of thanking you on behalf of my Government, face to face, for what you did to us when you were neutral. And I do not speak for myself alone ; I have the great honour and privilege of speaking for Dr. Jusserand of Harvard College, Ambassador of France. When you were neutral, we, the French and the English, wanted doctors, nurses, ambulances, drivers. We asked you without hesitation, because it was useful and because it was dangerous ; and those were the reasons for which you gave the help that was asked without stinting.

All my life, like many Frenchmen, and like most Englishmen, I have known the name of Harvard—the Harvard that plays,

the Harvard that rows, that teaches, that writes. Now we know Harvard that helped in the time of trouble and in the other dangers.

I do not praise you. Harvard wants no praise. What you have done, what you are doing, and what you will do, will not be done for the hope of praise or for the fear of blame. Still stands the old rule—and where can it stand except that way in the State of Massachusetts?—"According to conscience." Not for praise, not for blame: according to conscience.

Two years ago I had the great honour and privilege of attending the opening of your famous library, and on that occasion I heard the great speech made by Senator Lodge whose reputation, I believe, is not entirely national. Senator Lodge quoted Milton—and it was a good time and a good place to quote Milton, among the books that Milton loved, and in the State which lived in his spirit. Senator Lodge quoted the words of Milton which ring in my ears now. Pointing to the books he said, 'There are certain books which being sown up and down may chance to spring up armed men.' I heard the words, and to-day I have seen the men."

It was not only in this fashion that "the silent Ambassador" found utterance. He who had so long eased his impatience with idle doggerel, and sometimes with lampoons, while America stood out of the struggle, now found a song to make in honour of the America that fought.

TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

Sons of honour, nobly fathered, scions of the sturdy brood,
Who from age to age have gathered strength and duty in the blood,
Strength to bear the distressed burden, duty which has cost them dear—
Wounds for wage and death for guerdon—lo! the final hour is here.

Tell again your father's story—how the victory was won—
Not the praise and not the glory—not the triumph led them on—
But the faith that stood unaltered, bore the brunt and paid the toll—
And the heart that never faltered, the unconquerable soul.

From the grave beside the river—peace-encompassed, far removed,
Where the maples gleam and quiver in the garden which he loved—

When the quiet eve is falling, golden on the leafy dell
From the grave the voice is calling, to the land he loved so well.

Here above the noise and riot—brothers, let us lift our eyes,
Where aloft, in marble quiet, bright against the cloudy skies,
Where it points the warning finger—woe to them who watch
and wait—
Woe to them who lounge and linger in the final hour of fate—
Woe to them who lounge and linger when the foe is at the gate.

The oldest of Spring Rice's American friends was, it need hardly be said, as forward as the youngest men. Spring Rice wrote on April 13 to his Government:

"Roosevelt is urging on the President to consent to his raising a considerable force and taking them to France to be trained there. I think it is out of the question, or at least very unlikely, that the President will consent. I told Roosevelt that it was no business of ours how the United States should send her troops if she was going to send them, and that I could offer no opinion whatever. All I knew was that the moral effect of the appearance of the American flag in France would be enormous, and also that men were imperatively needed. These facts, however, would not justify us in making any suggestions, unless we were officially asked as to what course should be followed by the United States as to sending troops to France."

On April 16 Roosevelt had written concerning one of his sons (Quentin) who had tried to join a Canadian regiment as the quickest way, but who, failing this, was gone to the American Military School. He added as to himself:

"The Secretary of War has informed me that he will not grant my request to raise a division to be sent at once to the front, and that he does not intend to send troops speedily to the front, nor to employ me. I shall write him at some length in return and will send copies of my letter to you and Jusserand. I shall probably suggest that he ask your two Governments whether they would not like to have such a division, with me in it as a brigade commander, if they don't wish me to have the command of the division itself. I understand perfectly that your Governments are not willing to do anything in opposition to the Administration's wishes; but perhaps if it asks your Government whether they would like such a division sent over at once, the Governments will answer him, as they have answered me privately (yours through Captain Thwaites), namely, that

they believed to have such a division sent over at the earliest moment would be a very good thing."

Spring Rice replied :

April 19, 1917.

"I have just had a talk with Jusserand. You will have heard what he said to the high ones here. He has had several opportunities. I have not seen anyone, except incidentally to our attempts to get permission to enlist our own subjects in this country. Under a ruling of the Justice department the neutrality laws were held applicable, even though the U.S. was *not* a neutral, and consequently all recruiting operations are suspended till Congress has amended the law. So you see the situation was not favourable for suggesting the employment of U.S. forces when our own subjects, resident here, could not be recruited. I have always said that there were two things (after ships) which we most desired : (1) the American flag over a detachment, however small ; (2) men, to any extent. Of course your presence would be immensely popular, but I have carefully avoided making any suggestion as to any particular force or any particular man, as I was given to understand that the authorities didn't ask for suggestions, and I don't think that my observations would be of much service to anyone. I rather think that it would be the other way on.

My experience is that things are developing fast and that the military question is assuming quite a different character here since Congress has heard from the constituencies, but I keep very rigidly to the rule not to express any opinion whatever unless I am asked for it. No one has asked me.

As you know, Jusserand's position is very different from mine and you will no doubt have heard from him, or of him.

Love to Mrs. Roosevelt. When, oh when, shall I see you all ? "

On June 19 came another communication from the head of this martial family. Roosevelt wrote :

"I am enclosing copies of letters I have just sent in a letter to Arthur Lee. You will see that they are important, and to provide against accident I ask you to forward these duplicates to him through your Embassy bag, if that is proper. I would like you to read them. You will notice that I am asking that Kermit be given a commission as second lieutenant, and be sent to Mesopotamia. It is, of course, asking a favour, but the favour is that the boy shall have the chance to serve and if necessary, be killed in serving. It is the kind of favour I have

secured from my own military authorities, and if necessary would have for my son-in-law Dick, all of whom are going to the front. I am trying to get Kermit the same chance. Whether their mother and their wives and I will ever see any of them again, or not, of course none of us can tell; but I am very genuinely proud that they are all eager to prove their truth by their endeavour."

Kermit Roosevelt secured admission to the British Air Force, and before the year was out was flying in Mesopotamia.

A month later Spring Rice (writing on other matters) ended his letter:

"I need not tell you and Mrs. Roosevelt how completely our hearts are with you and your sons. Make the sacrifice of righteousness, and trust in the Lord."

His religion was first and foremost a cult of self-sacrifice; the literature that had fed his youth taught him to count no sacrifice finer than that of the man who takes his life in his hand to fight in a good cause.

This was the service that Spring Rice had the chance to do for one old friend. In these months he repaid two others of the band in quite other coin. Henry Adams, as all Americans know, had commissioned the sculptor St. Gaudens to create a monument which should be set up in Rock Creek Cemetery, and had thereby bestowed on his nation at its capital a thing of imperishable beauty, linked with the memory of his dead wife. Spring Rice had always been a votary of this work, and it would appear that Adams asked of him that he should interpret his feeling about it in verse. This was done in two linked sonnets. He explained to his friend in talk the Eastern legend which lay behind these poems. A letter from Adams, who always cloaked his sensibility behind a laughing mask, carries on the story:

BEVERLEY FARM, MASS.,
July 10, 1917.

"MY DEAR SPRINGY,

I enclose to you a copy of the two sonnets, prepared for the press. I wish you would look over them and see if they suit you. I have not yet taken any further steps about them or read them to anyone else, but I wish that in case it comports with your high dignity you would return them to me at your earliest convenience; and further that, if Your Excellency pleases, there might be added a few lines of Your Excellency's own, giving the legend which you recited to me, and which I apprehend, entered into your conceptions of the sonnets, which, if you do not object, I will insert between the two sonnets, in such a manner as to connect the two, but without heading. Do

you think it would comport with Your Excellency's high dignity to return me the document this time, with your high approval?

Ever yours,

HENRY ADAMS."

Sonnets and legend were published in the *Atlantic Monthly* that autumn, and republished in Spring Rice's poems, but they shall be given again here, with a Note by the Author, and a verse of Scripture, which were prefixed.

"It is told of the founder of one of the Sufi sects in Western Asia, that, hearing of the great beauty of a certain lady, he sought her in marriage and promised her parents to build a beautiful house for her. The request was granted and the house built. The bride was brought into it veiled, according to custom. When the veil was removed, the bridegroom saw before him, not a bride, but the angel Azrael. He fell at the angel's feet, crying, 'Have mercy!' And the angel answered, 'I am Mercy.'"

"Son of man, behold, I take from thee the desire of thine eyes at a stroke—yet shall thou neither mourn nor weep—neither shall thy tears run down. So spake I unto the people in the morning; and in the evening my wife died."—Ezekiel xxiv. 16.

I

I built my love a temple and a shrine,
And every stone of it a loving thought:
And far and wide and high and low, I sought
For sweetest fancies on the walls to twine,
And deeds of gold and words that purest shine
And strength of marble faithfulness, enwrought
With love's enchantments.—Lady, dearly bought
Nor lightly fashioned was that house of thine.
Who came to dwell within it? Not the face
I dreamed of—not the dear familiar eyes,
The kind, the soft, the intimately sweet.
Dread presence—great and merciful and wise—
All humbly I draw near thy dwelling place
And lay the vacant crown before thy feet.

II

O steadfast, deep, inexorable eyes,
Set look inscrutable, nor smile nor frown!
O tranquil eyes that look so calmly down
Upon a world of passion and of lies!

For not with our poor wisdom are you wise,
Nor are you moved with passion such as ours,
Who, face to face with those immortal powers
That move and reign above the stainless skies,
As friend with friend, have held communion—
Yet have you known the stress of human years,
O calm, unchanging eyes! And once have shone
With these our fitful fires, that burn and cease,
With light of human passion, human tears,
And know that, after all, the end is peace.

It is possible that this episode inspired Spring Rice with the thought of another tribute; at all events, in the end of September he brought to Senator Lodge the poems which at one time or another he had written for Mrs. Lodge. There is a note from Lodge saying that he feared to have seemed unresponsive. "I was dumb and voiceless, because I was so deeply moved. Close on the second anniversary of her death, your feeling for her, so lighted with love and imagination, helps me and lifts me up." In November of that year these poems were printed and brought out as a little memorial volume. All will be found in the *Collected Poems*.

His friends of American birth were at hand; them, he could see and hear. Those divided from him by the Atlantic were not only out of sight but driven out of memory by the stress of events—with one exception. Mr. Luxmoore never let himself be forgotten, for he never forgot; and every few months there came a word from what was in many ways to Cecil Spring Rice the heart of England.

The last of them was written about the middle of August 1917.

"My Dear Cecil,

In one of your letters you hazarded that you liked a letter from Eton. It is my excuse for writing now. But no excuse for not having written before. When America became our ally, I said 'This is Cecil's work and I will write my felicitations on what must be a glorious resolution of some of his worst anxieties.' But I have been pretty busy—the business of an idler on the scrapheap—and it has been delayed and delayed, but warm in my heart all the time, for this has been a great world-epochy work. You have put your hand on our spinning globe and given it a telling push, and that without figuring in newspapers or flaunting in public addresses and advertisements, bless you. Your last letter to me said, America was like a soda water bottle without the wire loosed, and you said Wilson had loosed it. At that time all the English newspapers were blaming his coldness, timidity and indifference; now they find his sagacity was only waiting to ensure the country at his back. My family have gone up to the Castle this morning to

see American troops, and yesterday their march through London created warm enthusiasm. My word! The concentration of English-speaking countries is an amazing fact. I say again, bless you."

Meanwhile the war mission with Mr. Balfour at its head was effectively in possession of the field, and to a great measure superseded the Ambassador. His duty was largely to report progress and to give guidance. But in the organization of supply Mr. Balfour needed chiefly the Commercial Adviser, Sir Richard Crawford, whose abilities had been so often and so warmly praised by Spring Rice.

There had not been any previous personal contact between Mr. Balfour and the Ambassador; but when Spring Rice recorded the impression which the Foreign Secretary's personality had produced, it is manifest that he himself felt the effect which he records.

May 18, 1917.

Probably to Lord Robert Cecil.

"Mr. Balfour's personal influence has been an asset of immense importance. Wherever he has gone he has left the impression of a sincere friend of America and of a wise, noble, and beneficent presence. It is quite impossible to exaggerate the importance of the work done here, and an enumeration of the details would give a very poor impression of what has actually been done. It is more in the nature of a new light and a new atmosphere. It is rather rain and sunshine than seed, although good seed has been sown.

But we ought not to exaggerate the progress that has been made. The war atmosphere only exists at present in isolated patches. There is still a strong undercurrent of disinclination to face the facts. The old political influences and some of the old political antagonisms are still strong. The realities of war have not yet reached this country and it will take them some time to realise the true significance of the struggle as it affects America.

It is impossible to exaggerate the good effect of Mr. Balfour's mission here which has been a most unqualified success, a success which I think is likely to be lasting as it has created what is in my experience an entirely new atmosphere in Anglo-American relations. The impression made on Congress, on the press, and I believe on the President has been very favourable and very deep. As I have often explained the President's policy is to keep entirely aloof especially from foreigners. It was therefore extremely fortunate that Mr. Balfour should have been able to discuss matters quite freely and fully with him

personally. I have no doubt that Mr. Balfour's visit has resulted in clearing up many doubts which no doubt were held here as to British policy in many very influential circles, not excluding the President himself."

But by this time Mr. Balfour had gone home and another potentate was in the field. The same despatch of June 14 notes Lord Northcliffe's arrival. His position was, as Spring Rice defined it to a correspondent, "Head of the British War Mission and organization of all the various missions from different British Government Departments, which is quite independent of the British Embassy—though, of course," he added, "I am in constant touch with Lord Northcliffe and the members of his mission on questions of policy."

It would be useless to suggest that these contacts were without friction. At that time it was much the fashion to decry the services of professional diplomacy, and Spring Rice naturally did not admire this attitude, which Lord Northcliffe and his organs had adopted with great emphasis. In addition, the Northcliffe press had personally singled out the British Ambassador in Washington as an extreme example of the profession's incompetence. On July 13 Spring Rice wrote to the Foreign Secretary, setting out frankly the personal difficulties, as well as the technical embarrassments, caused by the presence in America of an authority which was not accredited according to diplomatic precedents. In stating the difficulties, he made plain his resolution to surmount them; but he put on record his fear lest the same tendencies might deprive France and the Allied cause of a powerful support in the person of the French Ambassador.

July 13, 1917.

To Mr. Balfour.

"After receiving my degree at Harvard I went to see Colonel House and I pointed out to him that as Lord Northcliffe had not received any diplomatic commission, it was not, strictly speaking, necessary to ask for the President's consent to his mission. The mission had regard principally to the organization of the various British agencies in the United States. This was a matter which primarily concerned the British War Council. Had the matter been less urgent, I had no doubt that the President's opinion would have been taken. As it was, it was imperatively necessary to take immediate steps. I added that Lord Northcliffe's great influence with the press in England and on public opinion made him a very valuable element in Anglo-American relations. It would be very convenient to have anybody with such a dominant influence as his in England well posted on the true inwardness of American sentiment and the internal situation here.

Lord Northcliffe got on very well with the United States

authorities and was much struck with the friendliness of his reception. I also arranged a private interview with M. Jusserand who was very pleased to have the opportunity of a heart to heart talk. Lord N. has been careful to keep out of the press, although at the urgent request of the Press Club here he gave them an address full of valuable information as to the German spy system in England and the working of the censorship. I hear he made an extremely favourable impression. He asked me how it was that the opinion seemed to prevail that there was hostility between himself and the Embassy. I told him that as far as I knew no one in the Embassy was responsible for this impression, which certainly prevailed in the press. The cause of it was no doubt the attacks made in his papers on several occasions against the Embassy. Before the war [1] he had made in the *Times* an anonymous and libellous attack on myself which, being an official, I was unable to resent in the manner which my solicitors had informed me was open to me if I desired. During the war his paper, in conjunction with the *Tribune*, had attacked the Embassy for not having imitated Count Bernstorff's policy as regards the press. This also we had not resented and had made no reply; but, of course, the impression prevailed that his attitude towards the Embassy was as hostile now as it had been before. I said that under present circumstances it would be childish and wicked to allow personal antagonisms to prevail over the public advantage. He entirely agreed and our relations have been very pleasant and friendly.

I notice that in your instructions, and in the debate in the House of Lords, it is distinctly stated that Lord Northcliffe has no diplomatic functions, which strictly interpreted would mean that all negotiations with United States officials should pass through the diplomatic channel. There is a practical difficulty in carrying out these instructions which your residence here will enable you to appreciate. Mr. McAdoo is the most active and enterprising member of the Cabinet. It was he who carried out the campaign which resulted in the successful flotation of the Liberty Loan. It is he who distributes proceeds in the forms of loans to the Allies. He naturally wishes to keep financial administration in his hands. But financial administration covers practically all the more important matters in discussion between our Governments. He does not wish these negotiations to be carried on through the State Department. It would be impolitic to take a different point of view. At the request of the Secretary of State I went to see

[1] In July 1913.

the President to communicate to him the statement of the financial position sent to me by Mr. Balfour. The President said that financial matters were in the hands of Mr. McAdoo, and that I was to apply to him in all matters of this nature. This express command of the President who, of course, is the absolute head of the administration, the members of his Cabinet being merely his secretaries in the same way as under the Tudor monarchy in England, entitled me to apply direct to Mr. McAdoo. I accordingly called upon him and discussed the whole situation. I pointed out to him that Sir Hardman Lever is a financial secretary of the Treasury, and that Lord Northcliffe is charged by H.M.G. with the supreme control of their financial matters in this country. It would therefore be advantageous for all matters of finance to be considered direct in consultation with these two gentlemen. Mr. McAdoo is unfortunately resentful of what he believes to be a regrettable misunderstanding arising out of some conversations with Sir Hardman Lever. He also seemed to think that Lord Northcliffe's experience had lain chiefly in the sphere of journalism and not of finance. He evidently would prefer the presence here of a high independent official of the British Government. This question, however, is not of very great urgency, as there seems every prospect of a cordial understanding between him and Lord Northcliffe who had a long and confidential interview with him the day before yesterday. Lord Northcliffe brought with him Mr. Gordon, who has had large financial experience in this continent. Sir Richard Crawford did not attend although he was fully consulted. Lord Northcliffe like every one else has a very high opinion of Sir Richard Crawford, whose diplomatic talents apart from his special knowledge are, as you are aware, of the greatest value. . . .

It would be very unfortunate if M. Jusserand's position were weakened in Paris. The reason why there is a movement against him is that he has been consistently opposed to propagandism here in connection with the Embassy. On the other hand he has taken every opportunity which presented itself of keeping alive the warm feeling of sympathy which exists between France and the United States. He is a good speaker and his speeches are not only eloquent but models of discretion. He has lost no opportunity of bringing home to Americans that the cause of France is also the cause of England. His services in this respect towards the formation of public sentiment in this country have been very great. He has taken the view in diplomacy that it would serve the common cause if the sympathy for France should be conserved as much as possible and

this has resulted in our having to bear a large part of the odium of the blockade measures. But as we should have had to bear this odium in any case, it may be just as well that France should maintain the attitude of the intimate friend and well-wisher of the United States. In all essentials Jusserand has supported our measures and has insisted on their vital necessity. I do not think it would be possible to replace him. His long residence here, his many acquaintances, his knowledge of the English language and literature, of American history and the great prestige which he enjoys throughout the country, almost equal to that of Mr. Bryce, owing to his many tours and public appearances, all these give him a position which is rare among diplomatists. He is certainly a public asset of the French Government. At the Fourth of July celebrations under the Washington monument the whole crowd passed before him, insisted on shaking hands, and many kissed his hands. The demonstration was unprepared and entirely spontaneous. But he never allows himself in his speeches to be carried away by sentiment and his remarks are always characterised by great reserve. He carefully avoids any appearance of interference in domestic politics or the remotest semblance of advice as to policy."

Since Lord Northcliffe operated with New York for a centre, there was little personal intercourse between him and the Ambassador. But opposition arose. Spring Rice's deep-seated belief was that it paid to let Americans do their own thinking and their own propaganda. Lord Northcliffe was not likely to adopt such a policy of hiding his own light under a bushel. He gave America the full benefit of it and did not wholly abstain from criticism even of the President. Yet Spring Rice, still of his own opinion, wrote to Lord Robert Cecil (on October 4, 1917) :

" It is quite true that there is a great feeling of real sympathy and solidarity ; that is, Americans like and dislike the same things as we do. But we both dislike exceedingly the idea that anyone, not a native, should boss us ; we may feel we belong to the same concern, but neither wants the other to be perpetual president. And the feeling is growing that the U.S. is becoming the largest shareholder."

Six weeks later, after Lord Northcliffe had gone back to England, Spring Rice wrote to the Foreign Secretary :

Nov. 23, 1917.

" The newspapers announce that when Lord Northcliffe has put some of the President's punch and pep into the British Government and removed the dead wood, he will return here again. There is some anxiety lest he should perform a similar

function for the U.S. Government, which prefers to do its own forestry, but I don't believe Northcliffe's return would be as fatal as some people say. There would be some comments, derisive or fulminatory, but the American public would settle down to paying him little or no attention, and he would no doubt do the British part of his job with his wonted efficiency."

Again, in reference to the interviews describing America's war effort, blazoned with all the publicity which their author commanded, Spring Rice wrote on November 30 :

"Lord Northcliffe's recent utterances have not given unqualified satisfaction here. Many people do not like the sort of enthusiastic praise in American newspaper language which is now being meted out to them at the expense of European governments. I think the Americans dislike certain sorts of praise from a certain sort of Englishman even more than they dislike dispraise. But as I said before, the ordinary rules are not applied to Lord Northcliffe who is judged from the American newspaper point of view, and the American newspaper world has a standard all its own. But I think it would be wiser to be rather more moderate in these paeans of praise."

Apart from these personal issues were the material difficulties that arose, and the first of them concerned finance. The following letter indicates the considerations which led to the further mission, that of Lord Reading.

July 5, 1917.

To Mr. Balfour.

"The situation here is much as it was in London in Canning's time when the Russian Ambassador used to call at the Foreign Office, being ignorant of French, and slap his pockets and say 'aurum, aurum.' As England was the sole financial resource of the Allies in the war against Napoleon, so the United States are our sole resource from the financial point of view at the present moment. Mr. McAdoo, the Secretary of the Treasury, has had several conversations with Crawford, Northcliffe and myself recently. He says that Congress authorised the loan of three billions immediately after the declaration of war. The country did not realise the necessity of this vast expenditure but accepted the President's recommendation. The idea was to help the Allies in buying supplies for the continuation of the war. The country did not realise the situation in which the Allies actually were, and that financial help was needed not only for future expenditure but for the obligations incurred in the past. The time was rapidly approaching when the sum

authorised would be expended. The Secretary thought that it would be a very difficult matter to get a new appropriation from Congress. It would be absolutely impossible unless he were able to explain exactly how the money already voted had been expended. This he was totally unable to do at present, as full explanations had not been afforded to him. Furthermore he felt that loans should be utilised like battalions in a battle, where they were most needed and where they would have the greatest effect. This was impossible unless he knew accurately what was the actual state of affairs from the military, naval, political and financial points of view. I said that I believed a request had already been made to the United States Government to send someone of high authority to take part in the deliberations of the Allies. He said that besides this it would be desirable for the British Government to send someone of authority over here. As I have reported to you by telegraph, Crawford and I were received in audience by the President who treated us with great kindness. He impressed on us the importance of making absolutely full and frank explanations to Mr. McAdoo in whose hands lay the administration of finance. He used the same arguments as have been used by Mr. McAdoo to show the necessity of having full knowledge of the situation. I told him how conscious we were of the immense importance of the rôle which would now have to be played by the President of the United States. He admitted the fact, which he regretted. He said he had not wished it. I imagine that what he said represents very much the feeling of thinking men here. The United States entirely against its own will has been driven into the war, partly by the peril in which the cause of democracy was placed, and partly by the individual wrongs perpetrated by Germany against the United States. Suddenly after going into war the United States realised the immense importance and the great gravity of the situation. A very strong element in the public is urging the Government that it is hopeless to fight against the predominance of Germany in Europe, that the United States should keep all their resources for their own defence and assume in the new world the same predominance assumed by Germany in the Old. Voices came from some of the Allies claiming that they had borne the burden and heat of the day for the sake of the United States, and that the United States Government was under the sacred obligation of repaying the debt. To this it is urged in reply, that it would have been perfectly easy for the United States to admit the legality of submarine warfare as a new form of warfare for which there was no precedent, and to hold aloof from the European contest. . . .

The President so far has been able to induce Congress to accept his measures in the main because public opinion is on his side. But he cannot go further than public opinion wants him to. The situation may change when the casualty lists arrive. They may serve as an incentive or as a deterrent. You will have seen the situation as it existed when you were here, and the Government seems to have implicit confidence in your thorough sympathy and understanding."

In successive letters the Ambassador emphasises the difficulties under which President Wilson and his Administration laboured, arising essentially from the fact that the war was not as yet popular. The old suspicion of Great Britain made America hostile to certain measures, notably to steps for supporting the British exchange. It was not easy to convince uninstructed persons that "a break in sterling exchange would be regarded in Germany as an immense success, greater even than a victory of German arms." Over and above this reluctance were certain active hostilities, that of the German element and of the Irish.

July 13.

"All the Irish organizations including the majority of the priests are now in the hands of the Sinn Feiners, who are organized and paid by the German funds, probably derived from the breweries.[1] Apart from these funds the sympathies of the Irish would probably be in any case with the extreme party. They believe the hour has come when England is to fall and Ireland is to have her revenge. That such a consequence would hurt Ireland and Irishmen and the United States of America, is as nothing in comparison with the pleasure of revenge. An alliance appears to have been formed with the I.W.W., and Irish agitators are going through the country stirring up troubles wherever labour troubles can do most harm to the cause of the Allies. The obvious consequence is that the Irish are rapidly getting into the position in which, having been given a refuge in this country, they are turning against her in her hour of need in order to cripple her power of resistance, to provide Germany with a naval station on the Atlantic opposite to the United States, to spread hatred and disaffection against the Allies in the United States; and all not for the vital interests of the country of their origin but in order to gratify a secular hate. In order to effect this object they are receiving money from the declared enemies of the country in which they live, and are actively engaged in attacking its interests abroad and its industries at home. As soon as this position is made clear, I am

[1] The brewing industry in America was mainly in German-American hands.

convinced that the very large number of Irishmen here who are anxious to be accepted on the footing of loyal American citizens will leave the Irish organizations. But no influence of ours can have any effect. What will affect them is not an English but an American argument. When they are faced with the question of whether they wish to be branded as openly disloyal, they will, I think, refuse to accept the consequences. It is of course impossible now to separate the interests of England and the United States so far as regards the Atlantic. An independent Ireland controlled by Germany would be as severe a menace to the United States as to England and France, and this is the aim and object of the Sinn Feiners. I do not think in the end it will be achieved."

Pending the advent of American troops, the two main points on which help could be expected were ship construction and food; and on both the administration found itself hampered. On the Shipping Board, which was the scene of violent quarrels, a step in advance was achieved when President Wilson dexterously persuaded General Goethals, an ardent supporter of the Allies, to resign his position, and then called upon Mr. Denman, the member chiefly responsible for delay, to imitate the patriotic action of the man with whom he had been in dispute, and make the way clear for a complete change of membership and the introduction of men who would get the work done.—On the Food question, Congress had held up a Food Bill; but Mr. Hoover was appointed Food Administrator and powers were secured to him. Meanwhile Mr. McAdoo, to whose ability and energy there are frequent testimonies, pushed on with finance.

Spring Rice wrote:

Aug. 9, 1917.

To Mr. Balfour.

"One of the arguments used is that America in keeping up sterling exchange will have to meet British debts to other countries in gold. Another argument is that exchange on other countries suffers to the detriment of the United States. The Secretary told me to-day that the whole matter has been very carefully considered, and that for the present in order to meet the immediate difficulty, he had made an additional advance. His attitude was very friendly and a speech which he has just made, as to the necessity of carrying on the war, leaves no doubt as to the policy on which he and the President are determined. He is a man of action, but he is also a politician, and he is keenly alive to the great difficulty which he will have to face in Congress. Under the surface there are certain elements which are always ready to show themselves should the occasion arise, and should they be able to do so, with

any hope of popular support. It is satisfactory to notice that those Senators who are most under suspicion are obliged from time to time to make patriotic speeches, sometimes evidently against the grain.

The Secretary told me, as I telegraphed you to-day, that it is essential to his success in Congress that he should be able to communicate to the Committee some form of argument with the Allies which would be regarded by Congress as an adequate security against unwise or unfair expenditure.

It is most important that we should understand and appreciate the President's point of view. His main difficulty is that the American people do not yet fully realize the fact that this is an American, and not a European, war, so far as America is concerned. The line of attack taken by his enemies is either that he has entered on the war on purely philanthropic and abstract principles or out of personal sympathy to one or other of the allied nations. In order to get the full support of the American people, it is essential that they should understand that the war is carried on for a vital American interest, and not for philanthropy or for Belgium. All his actions must be guided by the imperative necessity of the situation of popular sentiment here, as to which he is the supreme judge."

Sept. 7, 1917.

To Mr. Balfour.

" The indications are that the President is absolutely determined to carry on the war but he is also absolutely determined to maintain his full and complete independence. He retains his original idea when he thought of being mediator, even now that he is a belligerent. He is not a belligerent among other belligerents, but something apart. It does not mean that he will not give every possible help and make every possible sacrifice ; but he will not be bound by any sort of agreement nor will he incur even the possibility of being supposed to have an agreement. He has clearly before him the ideal of a reformed Germany over whom there will be more joy than over ninety-nine just nations. With this Germany no measures of reprisal or repression or even of defence will be necessary. With no other Germany will he treat. . . .

One of the reasons why the President objects to have responsible agents abroad to keep him informed of military and naval and other matters is that he has a rooted distrust of military and naval advisers, and that he has had an extremely disagreeable experience with various special commissioners. House turns out to be the only one that he can really trust to, and I

suspect that he gets all his information of an unofficial character through House as General Intelligence Officer and editor of news. House is absolutely unselfish and quite devoted to the President. He has no political aim of his own, he is endlessly patient as a listener and very clear as an informant. The President trusts him to give him what he hears without any colour of personal interest. But the strain on House, who is almost without assistance, is becoming intolerable, and I don't know how long the present system will be able to last."

On September 14 Spring Rice welcomed the news that an envoy even more important than Northcliffe was being sent. "There is every reason to anticipate that Lord Reading's visit will be a great success," he wrote. In addition to the reasons for such a mission which he had conveyed in his despatch of July 5, he noted that Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, insisted on holding communication direct with the Embassy, though the Embassy, acting through the Foreign Office, was in no direct relation with the British Treasury. Lord Reading, as a member of the War Cabinet, was a better link.

It was essential to comply with Mr. McAdoo's wishes; he was in Spring Rice's view, all important; the first loan had only gone off through his personal exertions, and now that a second was being launched he must undertake a new and oratorical campaign.

Two months later (November 23) Spring Rice was able to testify to the success of both the British and the American statesmen.

"Several bankers told me that Reading's mission was most useful and that he was exceedingly adroit. His reputation for cleverness was very high indeed—so high that there was a good deal of anxiety expressed lest 'he should put one over on Mr. McAdoo.' The latter has made good, as they say here; he has floated his loan and considerably increased his prestige. He is now the strongest man in the Cabinet. He is certainly most strongly for the war and has expressed himself with unmistakeable plainness."

This was after the event. Spring Rice had written on September 13, examining the difficulties in the way of a loan:

To Mr. Balfour.

"With regard to the action of the Holy See. I am unable as a layman to attempt to fathom the secrets of infallibility. There are certainly two branches of action among the Catholic clergy here. One, represented by Cardinal Gibbons, is that the Church should keep out of politics and that Churchmen should be advised to be loyal to whatever government they belong to. The other, led by Cardinal O'Connell, is that the power of the Church over the faithful should be used for the political advance-

ment of the Universal Catholic Church, and for the promotion of such ends as may seem good to the directors of Vatican policy. I know not for what reason, but it seems taken for granted here, as in Mexico, as in Quebec, as in Australia, that the interests of the Vatican entail the destruction of heretical England and atheistical France. I understand that some among the Catholics here are rather alarmed at the divergence that appears to exist between the policy of the official directors of the Vatican and the Government of the United States. They fear that popular opinion in the United States might represent that Catholics as a whole are devoted not to the cause of the United States but to the cause of a foreign though spiritual sovereign. They are afraid that the high intentions and the pure lives of the clergy as a whole would not reconcile the American people to an alliance with a foreign enemy even on the holiest grounds. Cardinal Gibbons, who is one of the most influential men in America, is anxious to represent this danger to the Vatican whose ear appears to be possessed by persons holding very divergent views. Whether it will be possible for him and his friends to obtain a hearing is a matter as to which I am entirely unable to form a judgement; but I think it well that you should be informed of what is passing in the mind of some prominent Catholics here. One rather curious aspect of the division which exists in the Catholic Church is the persecution and oppression of Italian and Belgian priests. I am told that some of the Polish priests have also suffered for espousing a cause which is not that of Austria. What makes the matter more surprising is that it is believed here that the German Emperor has offered a public affront to a high Austrian ecclesiastic for daring to express some sympathy with Cardinal Mercier. The fact remains that the German clergy and their Irish allies here are far more Prussian than they are Austrian, and this fact seems to occasion some misgivings among certain sections of the clergy."

Kindred questions are handled in a letter to Lord Robert Cecil, who was still Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. It suggests speculations as to the difficulties which might have arisen in August 1914 if the Unionists had been in power and had declared war.

Oct. 17.

"There is no doubt whatever as to the attitude of the President and the administration. It was fortunate for us that the Republicans were defeated, for had Mr. Hughes been elected and declared war as he would have been forced to do, it is probable that the great mass of the Democratic Party would

have opposed the war bitterly and that there would have been a strongly divided nation. As it is, the President was elected on a peace programme which he did his best to carry out. . . . His entry into the war, which was necessitated by the German action, was seconded, though much against their will, by the great mass of the Republican Party. The election showed that his own party in part resented his breach of his peace promises and this feeling is strong in many parts of the country.

His hold over Congress is still strong, but it is partly due to Republican support. He is unfortunate in the rather inferior calibre, not in the way of intelligence but of Parliamentary experience, of his principal supporters in the House and Senate. Democrats of the greatest experience are personally opposed to him. His position is an embarrassing one and he is driven more and more into himself and his own resources. He is also very anxious to preserve his clarity of vision and his bodily health, in view of the immense strain which is thrown upon him. He is thus forced to avoid personal contact as much as possible. He regards most interviews, especially argumentative interviews, as a waste of time and mental resources. The emotions of his mind are thus wrapt in mystery, but there are no indications whatever of any change in his point of view with regard to the war. When it was rumoured that he had accepted the request of the Allies for American representation on the War Council, he caused it to be known that the Council on which he was to be represented was really a war council and not covertly a peace council. When representations were made to him that some arrangement should be made to facilitate communications with the Vatican, he insisted that nothing should be done that could be interpreted as a common move towards peace. There is no sign of a weakening of his resolution. The signs are the other way. On the other hand it is abundantly apparent that this country, while intensely anxious to finish the war in a manner likely to secure a permanent peace, will never consent to embark in European politics or even to take much interest in a policy of territorial give and take. The conception in the general mind is a peace with a territorial *status quo* but a constitutional revolution. The Germans are perfectly conscious of this, and if they could do so without danger to the situation of the governing classes they would certainly effect an apparent constitutional revolution which would be sufficient to deceive the American people. . . .

It is perhaps as well to have in our minds what is the President's conception of his position and duties so far as we can guess at it. He has entered into the war by necessity and

compulsion while doing his best to preserve peace. No more preparations had been made, and the United States enters into the war at a great disadvantage. But it has its immense resources due to its peace policy, and it proposes to use them, not for any selfish object but for the vital question of its own self-preservation, which is a necessary part and consequence of the preservation of the world and the world principles on which America is founded. A defeat practically means the destruction of the American idea and of America itself. He will therefore continue to the end. But the end has nothing in common with that state of things which existed before the war, and which made war possible."

The interest of these letters is that they enable us to follow the slow but formidable spread of warlike spirit in America.

Oct. 23, 1917.

To MR. BALFOUR.

". . . The loan went badly at first but it is going better now. There are various reasons why a very large section of the people thought that its failure would result in increased taxation of those who are perfectly able to bear taxation. There are many signs that the antagonism of South to North and West to East is still in full vigour. But there is a gradually growing feeling that if the loan fails after the German loan has succeeded, it will be counted as a great German victory, and there is a growing determination that there shall not be a German victory. One of the Justices of the Supreme Court who has just been down to see his son at a camp in Virginia has described to me in very moving terms the wonderful feeling which prevails in the camp among all classes. The same account in slightly different language comes to me from all parts of the country and the Secretary of the Interior who has just been all through the West describes the same state of feeling as prevailing there. I am sending a despatch from Chicago describing what occurred in that very cosmopolitan city at a patriotic meeting attended by all classes and sections of the population. When these accounts which come with little difference from all parts of the country are compared with the prophecies made a little over six months ago, it is hard to believe that the accounts are real. The change is almost fantastic. But while this is true, you will see from the military reports sent home by your military attaché and in some degree also from the naval attaché that there is a great want of co-ordination between the civil and the naval and military authorities. The old jealousy of military domination inherent in the race is very visible in Washington.

The naval authorities do not even control the anchorages in the naval ports. The military authorities have got no power to requisition without elaborate recourse to a complicated civil procedure. What is most serious is that there is no co-ordinating power which can determine with authority how the resources of the country can be best used for a single purpose. There is no co-ordinating authority here nor has this country any certain means of becoming informed, not only of their own war needs but of the war needs of the Allies as a whole. The war is still conducted by pigeonholes in departments. There is no central direction except the President, and he is a single man.

German propaganda here takes the form of pointing out that, if Germany is beaten, the hegemony of the world will pass to the hated British. I see that in Europe it takes the form of pointing out that if Germany is beaten the hegemony of the world passes to the hated American. This is being realised as a fact here, and it certainly adds to the vigour with which the war is being conducted. There is, of course, an undercurrent of feeling that by the end of the war America will have all the ships and all the gold in the world, and that the hegemony probably of the world and certainly of the Anglo-Saxon race will pass across the Atlantic. Whether this is the case or not, it is certainly true that there can be no comparison whatever between German and the American hegemony. There can be no doubt that the great mass of the people here are sound in their instincts and feelings and that what they all desire is a fair show for all the world."

On November 17 he mentions the emergence of a demand which has since been met; and his attitude to it shows his anticipation of Imperial reorganisation on the lines of greater status for the Dominions. Canada had appeared to desire special representation by a High Commissioner at Washington. The American State Department would be very glad, Spring Rice said, to have a department thoroughly cognisant of Canadian affairs to deal with, and would welcome a special officer attached to the British Embassy; but it did not like "such complication as would be caused by the separate representation of Great Britain and Canada." Also, there were fishery negotiations in progress, and a change would be undesirable at the moment.

"The question of the more direct representation of Canada will thus be held over for a time, and I presume it will be raised at a later date in connexion with the whole imperial question. Australia and New Zealand will, of course, demand separate organisations also, and if it is granted to Canada, it could not be refused to them, as they have very direct interests here, which equally require direct representation. The question is one

mainly of convenience. If the present system is inconvenient to any sensible extent, the self-governing colonies are sure to object. If arrangements can be made better than those prevailing at present for the transaction of business, it would be perfectly possible to combine this with unity of diplomatic representation on all imperial questions. The lines on which an arrangement could be drawn up would be business lines, that is, it would be necessary to define precisely the nature of the local interests affected and the best manner of dealing with questions arising in connection with them. These would not be entirely of a commercial nature. Some of a political character would also be local, as for instance internal waterways and internal fisheries. But most fishery questions would affect other nations, like Japan, or independent colonies, like Newfoundland. It ought not to be impossible to draw up a formula which would be workable, and which would ensure the separate and independent treatment of local questions without affecting the general unity of representation."

The Russian Revolution in March, 1917, naturally attracted much sympathy in America. But by the end of November Russia was in Bolshevik control, Kerensky had fled, and the Soviet rule had begun. Germany was free of apprehension from the East, and could throw her full power against the Allies in the West. Spring Rice records a notable conversation.

Nov. 30, 1917.

To Mr. Balfour.

"Root came to see me yesterday. He talked about the Russian situation as if Russia was an unknown quantity about which no prophecies could be safely made. But while acknowledging the serious nature of the situation, he was by no means pessimistic. He said the vital point was that the American people as a people should realise what the situation really was. There could be no further room for doubt, and he told me that there was a distinct change for the better and that the metal was growing harder as more pressure was applied. He said the New York election[1] had shown the interesting fact that over 100,000 voters were acting on the instigation of Germany. Many of the prominent Russian revolutionists were well known in New York, where they had doubtless acted as German agents until their presence was required in Russia. The I.W.W. for the first time in their history were receiving large supplies of money

[1] In November, 1917, for the Mayoralty. Mr. Hylan, the Tammany candidate, a Democrat, defeated by two to one Mayor J. P. Mitchel standing as an Independent, but supported by Hughes, Roosevelt, Root and other leading men.

and nobody had any doubt as to its source. Stories of German origin and fake letters written by German agents were being circulated wholesale. Everybody knew their nature and had no doubt as to their origin. Government Departments were permeated by persons of German origin and sympathy or by non-German hirelings working in German interest. All this was known and was having its effect on the popular mind. There was one answer to it and that was instant and severe punishment. I asked him if this was being applied. He said the Americans had made a specialty of quick justice by private enterprise, and this method he had no doubt was being resorted to and would be effective. The danger now visible to all had long existed and for long had been a growing one. It was inevitable that the danger should be ultimately discovered and it had now come to light in a form about which there could be no mistake. His general attitude was that peace was quite impossible until this danger was put an end to once and for all. It was in two forms, external and internal, and he thought that the internal form was the more dangerous of the two. . . . But on the whole he seemed to think that it was absolutely necessary for the salvation of this country and of the world that the people of the United States should have no doubt whatever as to what it was their duty, and indeed their necessity, to do. As you know, Root has a reputation of being the wisest statesman in this country and the calm expression of his opinion was striking.

Congress has met again. It is a different Congress from the last although the persons are mostly the same. Mann, the Republican House leader, who was strongly pro-German and who appears to have received complimentary messages from Dumba, seems to have disappeared, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health. Fitzgerald, the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, a friend of ex-Senator O'Gorman's, is also leaving on the ground of financial necessity. Senator Stone, the Democratic leader, who is a person of cold intelligence and who distinguished himself in the last Session by his strongly pro-German attitude, has now come round and is said to be wholly in sympathy with the Government. In the House and the Senate the influence of the constituencies is making itself felt. The impression seems to prevail that the spirit of the country has changed. At Cincinnati, the great German centre, the German Americans subscribed far more than their quota to the Liberty loan, and in Milwaukee the leading citizens vied with each other in expressions of patriotism. O'Connell in Boston has been severely defeated in an attempt to force parochial

education on the State of Massachusetts and this Irish Cardinal has received a severe setback. On the whole there is a change for the better in the temper of the Irish, who when they have to choose between their love for the United States and their hatred for England do not invariably prefer the latter.

The President was very warmly received. Contrary to the rule absolute secrecy had been maintained as to the contents of his speech. The reason for this was that within three days of making it, he had not made up his mind as to declaring war with Austria. There were various reasons for this. One was that he hoped to detach Austria by a separate agreement. But the principal reason was that he was not certain what would be the attitude of Congress. Mr. Flood, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, told me that the feeling in Congress on this subject was very strong, but that he had not known until the last moment what the President was going to do. Senator Stone had found out by enquiry what the feeling was in the Senate. Reports that had reached the President showed quite clearly that a war proposal would be passed by a large majority. But absolute secrecy was observed and the President's own Cabinet were not informed. Even the Secretary of State did not know what was the decision of the President till between two and three days of the speech. As you will see by reading the speech, part of it was evidently written with the intention of declaring the resolution not to break relations. The speech was listened to with intense interest. There was a tense silence during the passage in which he declared his reasons for wishing Austria to maintain an outlet to the sea. When he declared his intention of recommending a breach with Austria, there was a sudden burst of loud applause which left little doubt as to what were the sentiments of each member. Senator Lafollette was the only one who maintained an obstinate silence. The sentiment of the Senate was shown by the fact that while it is the custom for the Senators to walk into the House two and two and arm in arm, this Senator had to walk in alone and sat with two empty chairs on each side of him.

The speech was read in very clear but unimpassioned tones. The President showed the deepest earnestness but his manner and voice were resolutely calm. The tone of the audience in general was one of deep attention with occasional bursts of applause.

The black list is now published and is far more extensive than our own. The *New York Times*, which raged over ours, publishes the American list almost without comment. The fact is that the Americans have come to realise in their own persons that

Germany has been receiving the means of conducting propaganda abroad through non-German banks which have been used as instruments. The method adopted has been to have good and capable agents on the spot who are ready with local knowledge to assist foreign capitalists, for instance, in South American countries. If the foreign banks desire to do business, the only convenient agents were the Germans, and they naturally received the middleman's profit and turned this to the advantage of the Fatherland. Gradually the U.S.G. has realised this and their attitude has changed accordingly. They know how wet water is now that they have fallen into the pond. We have not given advice but we have merely shown our wet clothes. What we have now to refrain from doing is to say ' we told you so.'

You will see the general tone of thought in the President's speech. The war must be won and must be continued until it is won, but when it is won it must be utilised as a means not of making new wars but of ending war altogether. He would like to see established a state of things which would make peace secure because all the just requirements of the nations were satisfied. Lord Lansdowne's letter [1] was regarded here by the public as a very serious and unfortunate fact. This was not because his conclusions were in the least opposed to those which are the conclusions of the United States. It was merely because it gave the impression, with or without the intention, of a desire to end the war without any provision against its resumption. It was regarded as an appeal for peace and as a sign of weakening. And if the recommendations had been verbally the same as those in the President's message, the opinion here as to the effect of Lord Lansdowne's letter would not have been different. On the other hand there is undoubtedly a feeling in high circles that the effect of the letter both in Germany and Russia may be good, and although nothing is said publicly there is undoubtedly a feeling that the incident is not altogether to be regretted. Although little has been made of it, the effect of the publication made in Petrograd has been to create the impression that the Allies have combined to draw up a programme of an aggressive nature which would form the material of new claims and new disputes. This is the very thing the President wants to avoid, but he certainly feels, and feels most strongly, that until the German Government is radically changed Germany can never be satisfied. As long as there remains the will to conquer and destroy, the present rulers of Germany will continue with their present policy. And this great continent is a prize worth waiting for and may and probably will be the object of the

[1] It advocated a peace by negotiation.

policy of which the domination of Europe is only a part. That is, the present business, now in hand, is to win the war; but one of the methods of winning the war is to persuade the combatants that, when the war is won, the peace secured will be a real one, and not a peace of mutual destruction. If this scheme fails and if the peace arrived at is incomplete and lacking finality, then there remains a programme of permanent defence, of which North America is the centre ; England, France, Italy and Japan the outposts.

This is the explanation of the new attitude of this Government towards Japan. It is felt that the collapse of Russia and its possible domination by Germany is such a danger to Japan that she will naturally look for help to the United States, which can do her a great deal of good and can do her no harm. An alliance based upon the freedom of the Pacific and keeping Germany out from the domination over a possible outpost for attack, would be to the good of both countries. American money and enterprise would help Japan to organise and develop China and enable Japan to resist Russian-German aggression. There is certainly an increase of good feeling between the countries, and the tendency in Japan to turn the stream of immigration to Brazil instead of North America is probably a sign of what is going on in the Japanese mind. The withdrawal of Japanese from this continent which seems to be going on may be part of the same policy. You will see that Japan's relations with ourselves would become less intimate, and America would to some extent take our place. You would probably prefer this to the place, if it has to be ceded at all, being taken by Germany.

Not very much attention has been paid in the general press to the supposed agreement, published in Petrograd and now denied in London, as to the Pope's participation in the peace conference. It has, however, been published in the Catholic press and has done the Allies a good deal of harm. The Pope's participation would not be popular here. Other international religions would feel aggrieved at the supremacy accorded to the Pope. On the other hand those Americans who believe that the salvation of this continent depends on each American citizen owning but one allegiance would view with regret a public acknowledgment of political and terrestrial rights accorded to a spiritual sovereign who claims so many adherents in this country. Either, they argue, the Pope is purely a spiritual authority, or else he is a temporal sovereign like others. In the former case he could not claim participation in a political conference. In the latter case he would have the right of claiming participation

but he would have to show who and where were his temporal subjects. If all Catholics are to be counted as such, then American Catholics owe a double allegiance, and the question for the American Government to decide is, which of the two masters he loves and cleaves to and which he hates and despises. There will be no public demand here for the Pope's participation in an international conference. But there will be the strongest possible desire on the part of everyone here whose opinion is worth anything that the subject should not be mooted officially, and left entirely to the consideration of the sectarian journals which nobody reads but doctrinal experts, and professors of religion."

Dec. 21, 1917.

To MR. BALFOUR.

" It was not the general impression here that Jews and Catholics were to be counted on as our best friends. The result of the capture of Jerusalem has been to reveal the fact that throughout the war they have been panting for our success and are now eagerly and confidently expecting their reward. Shane Leslie,[1] on behalf of the Cardinal of New York, makes strong representations that the Holy City should be placed in the hands of the Franciscans and that the British Government should proclaim its intention of keeping Jerusalem a Christian City.

At the same time I have received many communications from distinguished Israelites who desire my participation in various meetings connected with the capture of Jerusalem and the future of the Zionist party. After consultation with the State Department, we agreed on the following course of action. American Jews, being American citizens, should not have direct relations as such with the foreign representative on a question affecting American foreign policy. The U.S.G. had not declared war on Turkey, and could not participate in any scheme for the partition of Turkey. Overt acts of sympathy from the State Department, and consequently from a foreign representative, would not be correct and could not be asked for. The leaders of the movement would, however, keep the State Department and the British Embassy informed of any decision arrived at, and direct communication would be made to the usual independent Zionist leaders on the other side of the water. I also pointed out that the French and Italian flags had been represented at the capture of Jerusalem and that these flags would also be shown on the occasion of any festivities to

[1] Mr. Shane Leslie, who was then living in America, had throughout the war kept Spring Rice informed on the movements of Irish Catholic opinion.

celebrate the capture of Jerusalem. This step seems necessary to preserve good relations among the allied representatives here.

How far you can build on re-establishing really good and cordial relations with the large Jewish population in this country by a friendly attitude to the Zionist movement is not very certain. You would not conciliate all the Irish by making Carson a Viscount, and the situation is rather similar. The great mass of the Jews appear to be bitterly opposed to the Zionist leaders, and the rich Jews are divided among themselves. What is perfectly evident is that any favour to Jews will be resented by Catholics, and any favour to the Jews or Catholics by the Protestant Churches. What our French friends will think about it is not yet apparent; but the Jews seem to have great anxiety lest the French Government should come forward as a violent and uncompromising advocate of the claims of Syrian Catholics. Altogether you must feel rather like the bear who stole a hornet's nest."

Jan. 4, 1918.

To the Same.

"Justice Brandeis of the Supreme Court called on me yesterday. He is the accepted leader of the Zionists and was the nominee of many prominent Jews for the Supreme Bench. He is said to have much influence with the President.

He explained the situation among the Jewish community. He regarded the Zionist problem from the point of view not of the territorial question but of idealism. He thought that it served as a rallying point to the Jewish race, especially on its idealistic side. I asked him how much influence the Zionists possessed with the Jewish community. He said they were violently opposed by the great capitalists and by the Socialists for different reasons. But on a poll it appeared that the Zionists were in the large majority or at any rate controlled a majority of votes. It could not be said that they were supreme, and of course in Europe there were very strong elements, as there were in America, which opposed the Zionist policy. The chief of these was represented in the Neue Freie Presse. Many Jews were in favour of merging their nationality in the nation in the territory of which they resided. Such were the great capitalists, and also idealists like Claude Montefiore, who thought religion and politics had nothing to do with one another. For himself and for his friends, he could say that the hope of the Jewish race for their elevation and for their conservation depended on the prosecution of the Zionist idea. His friends knew by experience that under German control the idea could

never be realised and that under English control their idea could be realised. It was for this reason that the Jews everywhere, he believed, would be deaf to German blandishment. I reminded him of the attitude of the Jews and crypto-Jews in Turkey at the time of the Young Turk Revolution and of a similar attitude of the Jews now in control of the Russian revolution. He said that the alliance between England and imperialistic Russia had caused a breach between the Jewish race and England which was rapidly being healed."

When Spring Rice left America, representatives of the Jewish community were warm in expressions of gratitude to him. He had succeeded in convincing them of his intelligent goodwill.

For reasons which will be discussed in the concluding chapter it had been decided in the last days of December to send out Lord Reading to replace Spring Rice as Ambassador. After some exchange of telegrams President Wilson was informed of the fact by Spring Rice who wrote his account of the interview :

Jan. 4, 1918.

To Mr. Balfour.

"The President gave me an audience yesterday. I communicated to him your telegram announcing Lord Reading's appointment here. He read it and said he fully understood the circumstances. I pointed out to him how necessary it was to have some one who had been in close touch with the British Government to be present here and that he must have full control. He expressed himself in the kindest language to me personally and in fact nothing could exceed his cordiality. We passed at once from the personal question to wider topics.

He said that when he had first seen me after the war began, he had told me that his chief preoccupation was not external but internal. There was imminent danger of civil discord, the country was divided into groups which did not understand one another, which were of different origin and which at any moment might fly at each other's throats. There was evidence of a long planned agitation which might at any time lead to most serious results. The nation was only nominally united. That at least was the substance of the reports which had reached him. That was his main preoccupation during the first year of the war. Now, he said, the country had not been so thoroughly united for years. Except for a small and no doubt dangerous minority, the whole country was united in defence of the flag. Disloyalty was not an element to be feared any longer.—I told him that Bishop Hamilton of the Methodist Episcopal Church, which Church with its affiliations

numbers about one-third of the whole American population, had only the day before used almost precisely the same language to me. Speaking of the Catholic clergy, the Bishop had recognised the fact that some of them, especially those of German and Irish origin, were probably inclined to be disloyal, but that the great majority were ready to follow Cardinal Gibbons who insisted on sole allegiance to the flag.—The President said that he had received similar information from representatives of all the Churches and all sections of society. He went on to say that the problem which an American President had to face was in the main a psychological one. He had to gauge public opinion. He had to take the course which commended itself to the great majority of the American people whose interpreter he was bound to be. No action could be taken or at least usefully taken unless it received the support of the great majority. It was not so much a question of what was the right thing to do from the abstract view point as what was the possible thing to do, from the point of view of the popular condition of mind. It was his duty to divine the moment when the country required action and to take that action which the great majority demanded. It was from this point of view that certain considerations had lately presented themselves to him with great force. He himself with the full consent of the American people and with their express approval had made an appeal to the German people behind the back of the German Government. The Bolsheviki in Russia were now adopting the same policy. They had issued an appeal to all the nations of the world, to the peoples and not to the governments. He was without information at present, or at least without certain information, as to what reception had been given to this appeal. But there was evidence at hand that certainly in Italy and probably also in England and France, the appeal had not been without its effect. In the United States active agitation was proceeding. It was too early yet to say with positive certainty how successful this agitation had been. But it was evident that if the appeal of the Bolsheviki was allowed to remain unanswered, if nothing were done to counteract it, the effect would be great and would increase. The main point of the appeal was this. War should not be waged for purposes of aggression. The war should be brought to an end but not on a basis of conquest. The proper basis was satisfaction of legitimate desires of the separate peoples who had a right to satisfy those desires. They should be allowed to live their own lives according to their own will and under their own laws. In point of logic, of pure logic, this principle which was good in itself would lead to the complete

independence of various small nationalities now forming part of various Empires. Pushed to its extreme, the principle would mean the disruption of existing governments, to an undefinable extent. Logic was a good and powerful thing, but apart from the consideration of existing circumstances might well lead to very dangerous results. These were only general considerations. He would not enter into details. But he could express the following general conclusions which I must not take to be enunciated by him as President but merely as the interpreter of certain phases of opinion which had recently come before him.

The American people were engaged in this war with all their heart. They were convinced that no course was open to them with honour except to engage in the war. But they would not engage in a war in which America was involved except on American principles. They would not fight this war for private ends, either for themselves or for anyone else. Their object was a stable peace and they did not believe that a stable peace could be based upon aggression. The German people had been worked upon by their Government, which had persuaded them that they were fighting not for conquest but for defence and that the object of the Allies was to crush and disrupt the German Empire and place German peoples under foreign rule. A formidable weapon was in the hands of the German Government as long as the German people could be brought to believe that such was the object of the alliance which they had to face. It was also very widely felt here that the Allies now fighting in Europe would find it extremely difficult to agree on any definite programme which did not look on the face of it as if its object, and its main object, was aggression and conquest. In any case it was felt in this country that an agreement among the Allies would be a very difficult thing to bring about, and in the process very serious differences of opinion would develop themselves. There was considerable fear here that, should the Allies agree upon a common statement of claims, the effect in Germany and Russia of the claims agreed upon would be such as to create the impression that the Allies were prosecuting the war for conquest.

Thus, speaking in general terms, it seemed to him that the American people were inclined to receive with favour a statement of a moderate and unaggressive character and would welcome such a statement. He had already in general terms indicated the general lines on which he thought American policy should be based. These statements had met with general approval. Each one had been more detailed than the last, and it might become necessary, as the war continued, to define even

more clearly those objects for which America was waging war. In drawing up this statement, it would be necessary not only to follow the rules of logic and to draw reasoned conclusions from accepted principles, but also, so far as was possible, to give due consideration to the circumstances and the facts which actually existed.

I made at once a telegraphic and more detailed report, but I put the above on record as an indication of what he said was passing in his mind. He begged me to remember that our conversation was wholly unofficial and that he was not speaking as President. I said that as soon as Lord Reading arrived he would have the advantage of speaking freely with one who could interpret the policy of the British Government. Speaking only for myself, I said that I knew quite well what your personal wishes were and what was your personal conviction. I knew that you believed the hope and salvation of the world lay in a close and cordial understanding between the free nations, more especially between those who were of the household of our language. I said that we could almost endure with equanimity all the horrors of this terrible struggle if they led in the end to a close, sure and permanent understanding between the English-speaking peoples. If we stood together we were safe. If we did not stand together nothing was safe.

The conversation ended with renewed and most cordial assurances from the President."

Thus in the close of his last despatch Cecil Spring Rice records how he had set before President Wilson, not only as his own conviction but that of the Foreign Secretary, what had been with increasing clearness the guiding belief of his diplomatic career: that the English-speaking peoples must stand together, for the safety of the free nations of the world.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE END OF SERVICE

The circumstances of Spring Rice's recall are set out by himself in a letter to Sir Valentine Chirol. It was written on January 26, 1918, from Government House at Ottawa where he and his had gone to stay with the Duke of Devonshire, Lady Spring Rice's kinsman.

"My Dear Chirol,

It has been such a pleasure to see your writing again. I am now at the end of my diplomatic career. Of course, you know the circumstances. When Balfour was here, I told him that, of course, as circumstances were changed, I would await his orders as to remaining. Northcliffe's appointment [1] came as a surprise, and unfortunately he was supposed in the American press to have come as an opponent of the policy hitherto followed in the Embassy; under these circumstances A. J. B. asked me not to resign as this would have implied an internal crisis and disagreement. . . . Northcliffe was quite conciliatory as far as regarded the Embassy, and we agreed that there was no disagreement. But it was evident that some form of central control was required, and naturally the War Cabinet decided on sending someone to take sole control including the Embassy. The decision was taken suddenly and without previous warning, as was to be expected under war conditions. The U.S.G. were acquainted with the circumstances and quite understood them, although they made very kind and friendly assurances to myself personally. I cleared out as quickly as possible, and poor Florence had to stay to arrange for packing up, etc., at very short notice. I went up here with the children and then found I had a very bad state of affairs in my mouth and have been under the dentist since I came here. I shall go home as soon as I am fit and have arranged affairs at Washington. To facilitate arrangements at the Embassy, I have suggested that I should have leave till April 18 when my five years appointment expires, and then get a pension. I shall be 60 in a year.

[1] As head of the War Mission, when Mr. Balfour returned.

Balfour has agreed to this, so that I am now a free man. I must say the feeling of freedom is a very pleasant one, if I could be quite sure about the family and financial arrangements. If I get the pension, this is secure. Florence and the children remain here, as it would not be possible for me, who have continually refused passports to women and children, to send my own home, and children are not a war asset. So this is my *nunc dimittis*; and although I should have been very glad to stay on till the end of the war, it is obviously right and proper that the Ambassador at Washington should be the direct representative of the War Council and in touch with actual war conditions. When Reading returns, I presume some prominent and well-known British statesman will be appointed as permanent Ambassador."

He had in point of fact written, on September 21, 1917, to Lord Robert Cecil, suggesting that when the special delegates, Lord Northcliffe and Lord Reading, had returned to England, some statesman of outstanding repute should be sent out as Ambassador; and that Lord Robert himself would be the best choice. In November, writing to the same correspondent, he was still of the same opinion.

But there is no use in concealing that the message of recall came as a painful shock to him. Mr. Balfour's telegram was most courteously worded and apologised for the necessary "telegraphic bluntness." In theory, Spring Rice was ordered home on leave for purposes of consultation; but he was given plainly to understand that the Government desired Lord Reading to stay at Washington as long as his other duties permitted, and therefore that Spring Rice must regard his ultimate return to the United States as doubtful.

As has been said already, the man was abnormally and even unduly sensitive. Yet it is not usual to recall an Ambassador by telegram, and Spring Rice's friends in general felt, as Senator Lodge wrote to Lord Novar a few weeks later, that "he was hurried away from Washington in a manner which seemed harsh, and certainly proved to be needless, as Lord Reading did not come for some weeks."

Further, such a recall, unless accompanied by the announcement of other employment or of some reward, inevitably looked like a censure. The Foreign Secretary declared emphatically in his telegram that it was not so intended; but no step was taken to prevent the public inference. A letter was indeed written later, to be handed to Spring Rice on his return, expressing high appreciation of his services; but this, as it fell out, never reached his hands. Further, it was left to himself to raise the question as to the financial consequence of his retirement—a matter of more interest to Civil Servants who live by their profession than is always remembered by chiefs exempt from such cares. Spring Rice cannot be blamed if he left his post feeling that his services had not been adequately recognised.

There may doubtless be two opinions as to his value as an Ambassador at Washington, and in general as a diplomat. Washington was, of course, his testing time; but it should never be forgotten that he preached for nearly twenty years before the war the danger from Germany, and justified his fear by sound political and military reasons. He preached also the gospel of preparedness, and few will dispute now that if England had chosen not merely to spend money but to give voluntary service of manhood, the European war would never have begun, or, if begun, would have been much more swiftly ended. His reward for these warnings was the sneer of persons of importance. "I have never forgotten that Asquith said to me in 1911 that your despatches were hysterical," Ferguson wrote in 1915. "Nor have I forgiven it. Well, I suppose he is in a white sheet now, inscribed 'Wait and see.'"

For his Washington period, it must be borne in mind that his old friendship and sympathy with the chief Republican leaders—above all with Roosevelt—were so strong and well known that they made him an object of suspicion to the Democrats. Without these friendships he would not have attained the internal knowledge of America which was his main qualification for the post; but in the circumstances, personal relations, which under another administration would have advantaged him greatly, were a serious handicap.

Again, it has been frankly admitted that he showed faults of temper in dealing with the persons of the Administration. But it must be remembered that the United States habitually entrusts its diplomacy to amateurs, whose fashions of handling affairs must often be trying to a trained diplomatist. Mr. Bryan was a man for whom Spring Rice had a personal regard with a quality of affection in it. But in Mr. Bryan there was a mixture of the saint and the politician which would have exasperated an unmitigated saint; and he certainly inspired exasperation in Spring Rice no less often than affection. Besides it is clear from Col. House's papers that neither Wilson nor House himself regarded Mr. Bryan seriously as a diplomatist. Mr. Lansing, who succeeded him as Secretary of State, was a man of much more normal type, and by no means touched with the sense of being too proud to fight. But Professor Seymour, in his commentary on affairs, admits the "sharpness" of Mr. Lansing's communications to Great Britain; and House himself quotes the American Ambassador Page as saying that "Lansing insults everybody with his Notes." Those who play at bowls must expect rubbers: sharpness begets sharpness in reply.

But Spring Rice's position was made specially difficult by the fact that President Wilson entrusted very little to his Secretary of State, and that the President himself was inaccessible. Colonel House was the only available channel, and, apart from the natural distaste for such indirect intercourse, Spring Rice had strongly the ingrained and perhaps Whiggish dislike for unconstitutional agents. He was accustomed to deal with men who had power because they had responsibility with a legal and official title to power: Colonel House's

position was that of a prince's favourite, comparable to that of Buckingham in the days of Charles the First or, more strictly, to that of Olivier le Daim under Louis the Eleventh. Moreover, House's papers make it plain that the Colonel regarded President Wilson and (in a less august degree) himself as morally and intellectually on a higher plane than the persons who were in charge of Europe's destinies. He also desired explicitly to see President Wilson become the arbiter of Europe's destinies, and to attain this pitch without sacrifice, by a mere right of fitness. Spring Rice, who had singular quickness in reading the thoughts of others, was the last man from whom such a state of mind could be concealed ; and his perception of it was attended by some human resentment. It is not that he resented the pretension because Wilson was an American : he himself had gone very far in admiring comparison of Roosevelt to the best European minds. But while he was sensible of Wilson's eloquence, and no way irresponsive to the splendour of some of Wilson's conceptions, he thought the man at bottom an opportunist ; and the opportunist speaking *ex cathedra* as major prophet was not to Cecil Spring Rice's taste.

The trouble, however, lay deeper than any temperamental antipathy to Wilson's personality. Wilson aspired and sincerely attempted to be less his own agent than the interpreter and transmitter of America's mind. He forced therefore upon Great Britain's representative an image of the United States made in his own likeness ; and however Spring Rice might question the faithfulness of this representation, the America with which he had to deal, the America whose actions he must study and forecast for his own Government, was the America that spoke through Wilson's lips and was coloured by Wilson's mind.

Setting aside the question of manner, whether Spring Rice might have been usefully more conciliatory, and whether this could have been reasonably expected in the circumstances—there remains the question of substance. Was the line of argument which the Ambassador felt bound to follow in his long controversies with the Administration other than justifiable and necessary ? Speaking with all desire for courtesy as well as candour, it does not seem that America's demands during the period of neutrality could be maintained in justice, if judged by the standard of previous American action. The action of the British naval power was incomparably wider in range than that of the navy of the North when blockading the South during the Civil War, but it was conducted on the same principles. Mr. Lansing asked, not for simple justice, but as an influential constituent requests a favour, with the suggestion that unless the favour is granted as a right, he will be disobliging. Intercourse of this kind added a grave strain to the internal difficulties of the situation with which Spring Rice was constantly confronted.

On the other hand, when it is said, as was said by some, that Spring Rice brought the United States into the war, one can only answer that this is an exaggeration which he would never have countenanced. What can be said with truth is that he kept the way clear of un-

appeasable quarrels, on which the enemy reckoned to bring about a decisive break between the English-speaking powers ; so that when a sense of America's own interest urged America to enter, there was no envenomed feeling against Great Britain to check that impulse, nor any diplomatic complication to hold America back.

There can be no serious doubt that his diplomatic instinct was right in rejecting the campaign of appeals by publicity which Lord Northcliffe advocated. This was a question of method, and he was supported by the wisdom of M. Jusserand. But the promptness and the persistency of his warnings in regard to the projected League of Nations require to be once more emphasised. Spring Rice never doubted the desirability of such a League. What he saw was that America would not join it, because of the conditions of American life and the traditions of American policy. He saw clearer in this matter than America's accredited spokesmen. Yet not unnaturally the statesmen of Europe trusted to President Wilson and Colonel House as interpreters of America's policy rather than to what the British Ambassador had told his Government in a series of despatches.

The consequence was not chiefly felt by England, but by the two protagonists and main sufferers, France and Germany. When the Armistice was concluded, every Frenchman wanted to get back to his farm or his office, his fireside and his slippers ; for France was assured that America, the great unexhausted power, would join to guarantee the world against a recurrence of these tragedies. Then suddenly America disavowed President Wilson, England refused to be a guarantor alone, and France leapt up in a panic. Every Frenchman over sixty had twice within his life seen France overrun by Germany ; three or four times between 1870 and 1914 the threat of invasion had overhung France. Now, since France had only herself to depend on, Germany should be bound hand and foot. The suddenness and the violence of that revulsion is not always recognised in English-speaking countries ; but it caused the worst troubles since the war ; and it would have been avoided if English and American statesmen had borne in mind what Spring Rice had foreseen and foretold from the first moment when the idea of a League to guarantee peace was tentatively put forward.

That was the extreme instance of his sagacity. As to his value in negotiation, it cannot be overlooked that during the period while America was neutral, all the issues in dispute between England and America were decided as England wished. It proved possible for the Allies, and chiefly for Great Britain, to use America as their main source of supply, and at the same time to prevent America from supplying the Central Powers. Loans were raised successfully in America, even while angry controversies were in progress concerning the black list, the blockade and the interference with mails. Even the sale of German shipping to the American Government never went through. " I believe it to be the case," Lord Reading wrote after Spring Rice's death, " that the Allied Governments were never forced to recede from their position in any important question owing to American

opposition, and the result is in itself a sufficient proof of the sagacity with which the negotiations were conducted during the period of American neutrality."

The sense of slight which Spring Rice felt owing to the manner of his dismissal, certainly did not carry with it any conviction of failure. There is a characteristic letter from him to Mr. Frank Noyes of the *Washington Evening Star*, one of the many American journalists who wrote lamenting his departure.

> " I can only thank you again with all my heart for all you have been to me—it was not all seed sown in vain, as I think you know. I think we made a very excellent pair of allies who worked for the common good, on a footing of complete confidence and this is rare. You are a master of covert and anonymous wisdom and I think we have always understood each other. Curious that the men like you, who know and judge, should have all the more power that nobody knows of it.
>
> C. S. R."

Such men as Mr. Noyes were fully aware that the excellence of Spring Rice's work lay less in what he did than in what he did not do. No word or act of his hampered Mr. Noyes and a thousand others in the task of bringing America to that resolution which the British Ambassador desired.

Yet, though he was not discontented with the work he had done, no man with that intensity of the desire to serve can retire without pain. Senator Lodge saw this and wrote to Ferguson :

> " He felt giving up his work here very much, for his whole soul was in it, and nobody could have been more admirable than he was during those years of war ; especially during the period of neutrality. His tact was perfect. The situation was an extremely delicate one and I could not see that he made a single mistake."

Among the letters which came pouring in when his recall was announced was one from Mr. Bryan, many of whose opinions the British Ambassador vehemently condemned ; but as happened to nearly all brought into contact with this Westerner, he could not but like Mr. Bryan, and recognise the warmth of his sincerity. Also, he could not forget that they two had put their signatures jointly to a pact designed for peace ; and in a sense, it would seem as if Bryan, standing outside the circle of his own intimates, had come to embody for him America at large—perhaps even more because the range of their agreement was limited. At all events, to this genial acquaintance, and not to any of his life-long friends, he addressed the letter which set out his thought about their two countries.

WASHINGTON,
Jan. 12, 1918.

"MY DEAR MR. BRYAN,

Looking back on my many years spent in Washington—since 1887 I have been here frequently— the memory is one of a bright vista of friends. Whatever may be said of the relations, politically speaking, of England and America, one thing is absolutely certain—in no other country can an Englishman make such friendships.

And so, my dear Mr. Bryan, you can readily understand with what delight I received your most kind and warm-hearted letter. It is a real and enduring possession, and it is doubly blessed because I hope and believe Mrs. Bryan shares the feelings of affection and respect which my wife and I feel for you and her.

I have been reading your *Heart to Heart Appeals* with great profit and satisfaction, and they have inspired me with some lines which I venture to enclose—as a sort of spontaneous outpouring.

It will be a source of some natural pride to you, and is a source of pleasurable wonder to me—that the great objects which you have so long advocated at such costs, and with such a sacrifice, are now on the eve of fulfilment, or are already fulfilled. National temperance—suffrage—national ownership—here they are! Is it not wonderful? The greatest object of all—at the most terrific cost and the most tremendous sacrifice—will, I hope, at last be permanently established, Peace. But as you have so nobly said—the shortest way to it is the way straight through.

With the warmest good wishes,

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

C. S. R."

These are the lines:

I vow to thee, my country—all earthly things above—
Entire and whole and perfect, the service of my love,
The love that asks no question: the love that stands the test,
That lays upon the altar the dearest and the best:
The love that never falters, the love that pays the price,
The love that makes undaunted the final sacrifice.

And there's another country, I've heard of long ago—
Most dear to them that love her, most great to them that know—
We may not count her armies; we may not see her King,
Her fortress is a faithful heart, her pride is suffering—

And soul by soul and silently her shining bounds increase,
And her ways are ways of gentleness and all her paths are Peace.

In a book of manuscript verses, some trivial, some serious, which were written down by him in Sweden, there occur two stanzas headed "Urbs Dei," of which this is the first.

I heard my country calling, away across the sea,
Across the waste of waters she calls and calls to me.
Her sword is girded at her side, her helmet on her head,
And round her feet are lying the dying and the dead.
I hear the noise of battle, the thunder of her guns,
I haste to thee my mother, a son among thy sons.

The second verse is, with a few slight verbal changes, the same as in the poem sent to Mr. Bryan.—In 1911 and 1912, Spring Rice's imagination was ceaselessly at work on the thought of a war in which England must fight for her very life; and he wrote of her helmeted and sword-wielding. But in 1918, after he had seen three years of war, he struck out all the panoply and noise of battle to glorify the single aspect of patriotism that seemed worth celebrating—the passion of self-sacrifice. What he kept, in 1918 as in 1911, was the vision of man's other country, a vision of gentleness and peace.

There were not many pacifists to whom Spring Rice would have written in praise of peace; but he recognised in Mr. Bryan, and in Mr. Bryan as representing America, a genuine will to peace which sprang from motives as honourable as ever sent a man to war.

These lines are the extreme quintessential expression of Sir Cecil Spring Rice's spirit; but they have received a wider acceptance. They have been spoken broadcast on the day in November when England remembers her dead; yet it would mean more to their writer that they were chosen to be inscribed as the last words of the Golden Book of Eton, at the end of the long list of those whom the school that he loved sent forth during the Great War to make the "final sacrifice."

If this last poem gives the concentration of his inner brooding mind, his last public utterance matches it for a summing up of his active thought.

On January, 1918, he addressed the Canadian Club in Ottawa, where he was the guest of the Governor-General. It was, as he told them, the last time he would speak as British Ambassador; it was necessary to have in Washington a "direct and responsible representative of the War Cabinet, somebody who is well versed in the latest developments in the field of war and the European situation."

"The result is that I have to go. It is for me an immense and irreparable loss. I cannot tell you how deeply I feel it;

but, speaking before you, with your record, I don't think that I need have any doubt or hesitation in saying that we all understand that we have one only duty to perform, and that is to the cause. We must play the game. We must each play our part. But, I tell you, it is most difficult of all to cease to play a part at all, and my time has come."

He went on to review the causes which had brought it to pass that "the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race were hand in hand fighting for the cause of liberty." America has had its internal difficulties; now America was unanimous. What had done it? "One thing alone—Germany." Then he sketched the Germany that he had known thirty-five years earlier—"gentle, kind, sympathetic." His German colleagues had been his best and most trusted colleagues. How did it change? The men of blood and iron "put the soul of the German people in chains." He quoted instances of horror, from Armenia, from Poland, from Serbia, from Belgium—deeds of which Germany could not disapprove even if it would.

"The militarist party, as long as the war lasts, have complete control. They have no longer any fear of Socialists, Reichstag, anything. They have complete, absolute control; and that lasts as long as the war lasts, and not one minute longer.

How they have exercised that control is a matter which is pretty well known to most of us. They have been cruel to us, but they have been very very cruel, almost as cruel, to their own people, and after the war the reckoning will come."

Here again his vision was completely justified by the event, and even sooner than he foresaw. It was not after the war that the reckoning came, but in the very fact that Germany was defeated almost as much through internal revolt against the savage exigencies of militarism as by the final exhaustion of her armies in the field.

But there was an element in Spring Rice that lay deeper than the range of any mere student of political happenings, however gifted to forecast; and at the close of the discourse, the voice of this deeper mind is heard.

"The world has had many ideals. Two of the most prominent are present in the minds of all. We have seen the relics of Egypt, or Assyria. We have seen the emblem of the ancient religions, the ancient monarchies—the king on his throne, the badge of sovereignty in his hand, the scourge. We have read of the ruins of a palace once decorated with pictures of burning cities, troops of captives, victims being tortured to death. That was the banquet hall of the King of Assyria. That is one type of civilisation. There is another, the sign of which is the Cross. I need not tell you what that means, but I must say

this: the Cross is a sign of patience under suffering, but not patience under wrong. The Cross, gentlemen, is on the banner under which we fight—the Cross of St. George, the Cross of St. Andrew, the Cross of St. Patrick; different in form, in colour, in history, yes, but the same in spirit, the spirit of sacrifice.

We are all subjects of the Prince of Peace, the Prince of Peace who fought the greatest fight ever fought upon this earth, who won the greatest victory, and won it by His blood. That is the Cross; that is the sign under which we fight against this hideous enemy. That is the sign under which we fight, and by which we shall conquer."

Three weeks later, Cecil Spring Rice, who on the whole seemed fairly well, went out on skis with the Duke of Devonshire and two children, but did not over-exert himself. That evening, an interesting man came to dinner and Spring Rice "talked freely, just like himself." At eleven o'clock he was in the smoking room with a pipe and "full of jokes." By midnight he had gone to bed. An hour later Lady Spring Rice from the next room heard a moaning, and came in to find him unconscious. He died painlessly in a few moments, on February 14th, 1918. Senator Lodge wrote to Ferguson that the doctor in Washington regarded the death as wholly inexplicable, for he had examined Spring Rice with the utmost care before he left; his heart, which had been temporarily affected some years before with a threatening of Graves' disease, had entirely recovered its tone; his arteries were soft, and in short, it appeared that he was in excellent condition.

"My own belief," Lodge said, "is that the sudden cessation of his work and responsibilities in which his heart was bound up, caused a reaction and a loss of will to live, as they term it now, which in the old days used to be termed a broken heart.—To me," Lodge added, "he is an unspeakable loss. He was an intimate friend for more than thirty years—and a friendship which was never affected by the necessary separations. And during the last years we were constantly together. Very few days passed that he was not at my house late in the afternoon to talk things over and I think he found it a comfort to be with someone to whom he could open his heart without reserve. I miss him more than words can say."

The old friends have a right to be heard—Ferguson himself, who had written in the end of January to Spring Rice, "I hope they give you Paris," wrote, after the death, to Lady Spring Rice. There were fierce sentences about the manner of his friend's recall, but this is the pith of the letter:

"You have this for a consolation, that all that was worth having in friendship at home and in America, and elsewhere

too, was Springy's by right. Half the world seems dead with him—at least to me."

Roosevelt wrote also, and with rare insight, of the man and his work:

"We dearly loved Cecil; he was our close friend for over thirty years; I write about him from the heart, and I share your sorrow. On the whole I think that no English ambassador had as difficult and important a task to perform as Cecil's during the last five years. . . . Under the peculiar and exceedingly delicate conditions, his usefulness to his country was almost directly proportioned to the manner in which he effaced himself, and only a man of rare unselfishness, a man completely lacking in the vulgar ambition to keep in the public eye, could in this crisis have rendered the literally invaluable service that his country—and my country, too—needed, and that Cecil rendered."

The official commendations which were never delivered, have been printed in Sir Valentine Chirol's little *Memoir*, and can be consulted there. Here it suffices to quote what Lord Robert Cecil said in the House of Commons:

"No Ambassador has ever had to discharge duties of greater delicacy or of more far-reaching importance than fell to his lot. Nor has any Ambassador ever fulfilled his task with more unwearied vigilance, conspicuous ability and ultimate success."

These were good words. But unluckily, under the Foreign Office regulations, which provide no pension for the widow of any of its servants, they could have no bearing on the point which, as his letter to Sir Valentine Chirol shows, had preoccupied Spring Rice from the moment of his retirement. The many needs of a man with a wife and children would have been moderately met, had he lived to enjoy the pension to which long service had entitled him. But his pension ceased on his death, and though the small private means which Lady Spring Rice possessed, together with what he left, would have sufficed her very simple manner of life, there were two children to be educated, if possible, on the lines which he had always desired. It was just this that was recognised at once by his many friends in America, some of whom knew him intimately enough to feel that they could best express their affection and admiration by making the path easy for those of his care, and at the same time creating a fund which would eventually associate his name in perpetuity with the life of his old Oxford College. They promptly raised the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars (fifteen thousand pounds), to be a "Cecil Spring Rice Memorial Fund." The income was to be payable to Lady Spring Rice for her life, and after her death to the two

children till they should reach the age of thirty-five; eventually it would be transferred to Balliol to endow travelling scholarships for young men entering the diplomatic service. It is doubtful whether history shows another example of provision so made for the family of the successful Ambassador of a great power. However else the fact may be commented, it admirably symbolises that sense of fellowship in the English-speaking race which Cecil Spring Rice always strove to forward.

The announcement of this bounty was made on October 1918, by Mr. Gerald Balfour (who read a letter from Mr. Jack Morgan) at Eton where a stall-plate in honour of Sir Cecil Spring Rice was dedicated in the chapel—a rare honour, since the stalls are reserved for those holding office in the College.

The stall over which the plate was set is fifth from the North door. The plate of copper bears the family arms emblazoned, and the following inscription:

CECIL ARTHUR SPRING RICE, P.C., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,

Legatus Britannorum plurimas Europae Asiaeque gentes expertus cum denique Americanos nobis contra Germanos sociasset felix obiit

MCMXVIII., Aet. LIX.

Vir animae cum poeticae tum Christianae, patriae, ruris, suorum amantissimus.

The school which—as he would have most ardently desired—keeps his memorial shall speak the farewell to him, through the lips of the old man who survived his pupil, though forty-five years had gone by since they first met, mature man and childish boy, in the pupil-room. Mr. Luxmoore did not sign what was written in the *Eton College Chronicle* of February 21, 1918; but there is no doubt whose words those were. They said that the death of Sir Cecil Spring Rice at Ottawa had robbed Eton of the joy of doing honour to the return of one of her most illustrious sons. No truer Etonian, no better public servant, no more lovable character had been bred in that generation. To him was allotted the supreme task of conciliating and maturing the alliance of the United States, which must probably decide the world war. His name was hardly ever seen in the newspapers, but the alliance was made and his achievement stood complete. —Then a memory from Plato's language prompted the pen.

"Death is not unhappy which comes without decrepitude, ἅμα ἀκμῇ, not so much of glory as of the service accomplished, for which his country had chosen him."

Other sentences spoke of the dead man's more intimate qualities, his love of literature, love of his Cumberland home, love of Eton playing fields, and all sights and sounds of the countryside, his delight in his children and his family life, the grace of his talk, the

interest of his letters from abroad, " often read to boys after evening prayers in an Eton House." But for the last word of all spoken over one who had been so much a Platonist, the scholar turned to Plato's language. Yet the words which he quoted did not come from Athens, but were written, in the book most familiar of all to Cecil Spring Rice, in that Syrian Greek which transmitted to Westerners a teaching where East and West blended to make a mysticism in which the individual counted for less, and the final cause for more, than ever in Plato's *Republic*.

Ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία ἀπὸ τῶν τέκνων αὐτῆς

Wisdom is justified of her children.

That saying has more than one meaning. Those who knew and worked with Cecil Spring Rice never ceased to wonder at the swiftness of his divination, his power to interpret and to forecast. But his intimates loved and praised rather that inner compulsion which rendered it impossible for him to consider solely his country's material advantage or the private interest of his fellow-citizens. For them, wisdom was justified in all that Spring Rice thought and taught unceasingly concerning the high and austere obligations which lay not only upon England and its people but upon all who shared in the traditions of the English-speaking race.

INDEX

Abbas Hilmi, Khedive of Egypt, i. 124 n^2
Abyssinia and Italy, i. 202 ; ii. 52
Adams, Brooks (brother of Henry A.), i. 90, 90 *n*, 97, 214, 233 ; ii. 169, 169 *n*
Adams, Henry, i. 51, 52, 53, 55, 59, 59 n^1, 68, 77-8, 77 *n*, 80-1, 86, 94, 102, 109, 380, 381 *n*, 382, 233 *n*, 300, 367, 368, 450, 450 n^{2-3}, 464 ; ii. 167, 178, 185, 197, 322, 397 : letters from C. S. R., i. 209-10, 235-9, 296-8, 342-4, 381-2 ; ii. 168-71, 180-2, 183-4, : letters to C. S. R., i. 316-17, 337 ; ii. 143, 168, 171-2, 182-3, 184, 397-8
Adams, Mrs. Henry, i. 68, 78, 81
Adcock, Dr., at Teheran, i. 302
Adowa, *see* Abyssinia
Afghanistan, i. 205-6, 205 n^2, 313, 362, 396, 404, 415, 419 ; ii. 70, 82, 102, 103
Agadir, Morocco, ii. 163, 164-5
Akaba, Gulf of, ii. 75
" Alabama," the, i. 62
Aladin, member of the Duma, ii. 42, 42 n^1
Aland Islands, the, ii. 134, 134 *n*, 144
Alaska, seal fisheries of, i. 102-3, 103, 112, 112-13 : boundary question, the, i. 292-3, 367, 370 ; ii. 9, 10-11
Albania and the Albanians, i. 266, 267, 275, 277 ; ii. 176, 179-80, 183 *n*
Alexander, Czar, ii. 7, 30
Alexander Michaelovitch, the Grand Duke, i. 425, 431, 463
Alexandra, Queen, i. 460
Alexandria, U.S.A., i. 172
Alexeieff, Admiral, i. 389, 392, 400, 463, 501
Algeciras Conference, the, ii. 25, 26, 32, 53, 58-9, 58 *n*, 62, 63, 64-5, 66, 69, 75
" Algonquin," sinking of, ii. 387, 388
All Souls College, i. 26
Alsace-Lorraine, i. 225
America, *see* United States of America
American Civil War, the, i. 62, 63, 80, 87, 159-60 : neutrals and the blockade in the, ii. 236, 242, 257, 306, 307, 336-7, 350, 365
American Labour Union, ii. 273, 280
American Protective Association (" the A.P.A."), i. 161
American troops in London, ii. 399-400
Americans, not an Anglo-Saxon people, ii. 320
Ampthill, Lord, i. 190
Anderson, Chandler, ii. 235
Anglo-French entente, the, i. 414 ; ii. 52-3, 69, 95, 100
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the, i. 353, 388-9, 453, 460, 475, 486, 496, 501, 501 n^3, 502, 503 ; ii. 7, 8, 11, 64
Anglo-Jewish Association, the, ii. 26, 27 n^1
Anglo-Russian entente, the, ii. 52-76, 82, 85, 95, 99, 100, 101 : the Convention of 1907, ii. 102-5, 107, 110
Anti-Poverty Society, i. 64
Antoni (Russian priest), ii. 39
Aoki, Viscount, i. 196
" Arabic," sinking of the, i. 281 ; ii. 281 *n*, 298
Ardilaun, Lady, i. 42
Argentine, the, ii. 246
Aristachi Bey, i. 80 *n*
Armageddon, prophesied by Lord Wolseley for 1889, i. 43
Armenia and the Armenians, i. 185, 196-7, 198, 219, 233, 234, 235, 260, 262, 265, 266, 270, 276, 315 ; ii. 1, 2, 13, 341, 355, 355 n^1
Armistice, terms of the, ii. 333-4, 430
Armstrong, Li-Hung-Chang's portrait of, i. 138
Art collections, American (1891), i. 119
Asquith, H. H., i. 369, 410 ; ii. 73, 113, 115, 211, 361, 428

Assiut, i. 352-3, 355
Assouan, i. 352, 355, 358
Astors, the, i. 70, 166
Atlantic Monthly, the, ii. 398
Austin Lee, Sir Henry, ii. 66-7
Austria, the Emperor Francis Joseph of, i. 221, 415, 415 *n*; ii. 177
Austria (1903), i. 364, 365, 366: (1905-6), ii. 53, 65, 68, 73: (1908), ii. 117: (1909), ii. 135: i. 219, 221; ii. 140, 145, 158, 181; annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, ii. 126-7, 130, 135: and Great Britain, ii. 133: and Serbia (1912), ii. 176-7, 179-80: U.S.A. declaration of war on, ii. 417
Avlen, Admiral, i. 403

Babis, the, i. 298
Baden, Grand Duke of, i. 240, 241
Bagdad Railway, the, i. 362; ii. 71, 72, 73, 75-6
Bakhmetieff, M. (Russian Ambassador to the U.S.A.), ii. 289, 305
Baker Pasha (Colonel Valentine Baker), i. 34
Baku, i. 279, 314, 338, 500, 500 n^1; ii. 1, 2
Balfour, A. J., i. 55, 125, 192, 192 *n*, 194, 253, 328, 332, 353, 362, 363, 365, 365 n^2, 370, 390, 410, 479, 483, 485, 490, 503; ii. 17, 61, 113, 114, 136, 143, 148, 159, 210, 211, 361, 362, 391, 393, 400-1, 426-7, 426 *n*: letters from C. S. R., i. 401-4, 404-5, 405-7, 407-8, 408-11, 413-14, 414-15, 415-22, 422-5: letter from Senator Lodge, ii. 363
Balfour, Gerald, i. 10, 368, 448; ii. 361, 437, 485: letters from C. S. R., 481-3, 449; ii. 145-8: letters to C. S. R., i. 449, 503-4
Balkan war, ii. 176-7, 179-80, 194, 196
Ballin, ii. 243
Balliol, i. 5, 6, 15-17, 18-26, 436; ii. 7
Balmaceda (President of Chile, 1891), i. 117
Baltic coast, a holiday on the, ii. 161-2
Baltic provinces of Russia, ii. 2, 20, 57
Baltimore, Lord, his country house, i. 157-8
Bangkok, i. 148-50
Barclay, Sir Colville, ii. 221, 221 n^1
Baring, Sir Evelyn, *see* Lord Cromer
Baring, Maurice, ii. 43
Barrington, Eric, 181 n^2
"Bast" (sanctuary) at the British Legation, Teheran, ii. 78, 83, 106
Batoum, i. 339
Battenberg, Prince Louis of, i. 425
Bavaria, King of, i. 46
Bayard, Secretary, i. 52, 55, 57, 58, 59, 64, 68 *n*, 69, 78, 81, 94; ii. 198
Beaconsfield, Lord, C. S. R. on, ii. 143-4, 160
Beale, Miss Emily, i. 80 n^2
Beale, Mrs. Harriet Blaine, letter to C. S. R., i. 120
Bebel, i. 199, 204
Bechuanaland expedition (1884), i. 190 n^2
Beeching, H. C. (Dean of Norwich), i. 19, 24, 25
Behring Sea fisheries, i. 102-3, 105, 112, 112-13, 118, 153-5, 159
Belgian special mission to the U.S.A. (Sept. 1914), ii. 228, 228 n^2
Belgians, King of the, i. 32, 223
Belgium, in the Great War; Germany's attack foreshadowed (1909), ii. 145: C. S. R. on attitude to her of the U.S.A., ii. 216, 218, 224, 226 n^1, 229, 240-1 241 n^1, 242, 250, 252, 254, 260, 261, 265, 306, 309, 341, 342, 355, 355 *n*, 356, 359, 360-1, 371, 373, 375, 409
Bell, Miss Gertrude, ii. 48 *n*: letters to C. S. R., i. 380; ii. 149-50, 174
Bell, Sir Hugh, ii. 48, 116, 118, 149
Beluchistan, ii. 70
Benckendorff, Count, Russian Ambassador, i. 390; ii. 34, 53, 61, 63, 72
Benckendorff, Countess, i. 400
Benson, A. C., i. 8-9, 8 *n*, 13-15
Benson, F. R., i. 25-6
Benton, Mr., British subject killed by order of Villa, ii. 203-4, 205
Benton, Thomas Hart, Theodore Roosevelt's, i. 49
Berchtold, Austrian Chancellor, ii. 177, 177 *n*
Beresford, Lord Charles, i. 472
Berlin, Conference of, on the Niger and the Congo, i. 389, 182 *n*
Berlin, Treaty of, ii. 126, 127, 128 *n*, 134 *n*
Bernstorff, Count, German Ambassador at Washington, i. 1; ii. 201, 201 *n*, 209, 215, 217, 222, 225*n*, 226, 227, 228, 244, 248, 261-2, 271, 286, 308, 317, 318, 329, 358, 376, 379, 379 n^2, 381, 390, 402
Bethune, Sir H. (Earl of Lindsay), his grave in Persia, ii. 92
Birkenhead, Lord, ii. 253

Bismarck, Prince, i. 31, 79, 180, 182, 182 n^1, 188, 190, 193, 195, 205, 239, 258, 259, 259 n^3, 316, 468, 471 ; ii. 22, 60, 116-17, 218, 229, 365
Bjornsen, i. 126
Blackburn, Senator, i. 87
Blackett, Sir Basil, ii. 243, 243 n^1
Black Sea mutiny, the, ii. 2, 4
Blackwood, Lady Helen, *see* Ferguson, Lady Helen
Blaine, James G., i. 49, 61, 65, 68, 71, 72, 81, 100-1, 102-3, 114, 118, 119-20, 119 n^{1-3}
Blaine, Mrs., i. 120
Bleichroeder, i. 194
Blunt, Wilfred, i. 346
Bobrikoff (Governor of Finland, 1904), i. 390, 412, 412 *n*, 430
Boer War, *see* South African War
Bokhara, Russia in, i. 460
Bolsheviks, the, ii. 415, 423
Bompard, M., French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, ii. 26, 31, 32, 55, 58, 62-3
Boris, the Grand Duke, i. 431, 463
Bosnia, ii. 126, 135, 135 n^2, 177
Boulyguin, Russian Minister of the Interior, ii. 1
Boy-Ed, Captain, ii. 276, 277, 277 *n*, 280, 296, 298, 298 n^3, 300, 302
Boyes, British midshipman at Shimoneseki, i. 141
Braddock, i. 172
Brandeis, Justice, ii. 421
Brazil, i. 248 ; ii. 246, 419
Brenan, i. 138
Brett, Reggie, i. 325
Bright, John, i. 36, 39-40 ; ii. 236, 242
Broderick, ii. 265
Brodrick, St. John (Lord Midleton), i. 20 ; ii. 51
Brooks, Sidney, ii. 300 *n*
Broughton, Miss Rhoda, i. 19, 23
Brown, John (of Harper's Ferry), i. 92, 92 *n*
Browne, Professor Edward, letter to C. S. R., ii. 106
Browning, Oscar, i. 8-10, 10 *n*
Brussels, agitation for extension of franchise in (1891), i. 110-11
Bryan, Mrs. W. J., letter from C. S. R., ii. 273-4
Bryan, W. J., i. 209, 469 ; ii. 184, 184 n^2, 191, 194, 197, 197-8, 201, 202, 203-4, 206, 220, 221, 222, 228, 228 n^3, 233, 236, 238, 240, 245, 256, 265 *n*, 270, 271-2, 272 *n*, 273-4, 274 n^1, 281, 298, 311-12, 315, 316, 342, 428, 431, 432, 433 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 206-7
Bryce, James (Lord Bryce), i. 40, 109 ; ii. 84, 166, 167, 174, 178, 182, 189, 191, 390, 404 : letter to C. S. R. (Dec. 1914), ii. 250-1
Bryce, Mrs., i. 109 ; ii. 182
Buckingham Palace Conference on Home Rule, the, ii. 209-10
Budberg, ii. 5
Buffalo Bill, i. 72, 79
Bulgaria, i. 197, 198, 266, 275, 277, 364, 365 ; ii. 125, 126, 127, 130, 176, 179-80, 181, 295
Bunsen, *see* de Bunsen
Burns, John, i. 98-9, 164-5
Busch, i. 261
Bushire, i. 280
Butcher, Augusta (Mrs. Charles Crawley), i. 290-1, 290 *n*
Butcher, Elizabeth, i. 4
Butcher, Dr. (Bishop of Meath), i. 4
Butcher, Henry, i. 15-16, 19
Butcher, Mrs. Henry, i. 19, 23
Butcher, J. G. (Lord Danesfort), i. 4
Butcher, Professor Henry, i. 4
Butlers, of Ormond, i. 3
Buxton, Edward North, i. 375

Cairo, i. 335-61 : C. S. R. on life in, i. 151, 336, 341-2, 354 : *see also* Egypt
Caisse de la Dette (Egypt), i. 323, 335 ; ii. 79
Cambon, M., i. 265, 265 n^1 ; ii. 71, 71 *n*, 127
Cameron, Miss Martha, i. 381, 381 *n* ; ii. 50, 171 : *see also* Lindsay, Lady
Cameron, Mrs., i. 19, 51-2, 53, 54, 98, 115, 273, 294, 343, 354, 381 *n* ; ii. 50, 169, 171, 180 *n*, 185, 186
Cameron, Senator, i. 51, 52, 53, 105, 168-72, 252, 253 ; ii. 171
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, i. 276, 276 *n* ; ii. 18, 76, 114
Campbell, Ivor, ii. 190, 190 *n*, 324
Canada, and the U.S.A., i. 56, 112, 113, 117, 119, 119 n^{1-2}, 154-5, 292-3 ; ii. 91, 414-5 : visited by C. S. R. (1886), i. 43, 46 : (1887), i. 73, 76 : (1918), ii. 426, 433-5 : in the Great War, ii. 306
Canadians, French, ii. 279, 306
Caprivi, Count, i. 180, 182, 182 n^1, 205, 237, 238
Carden, Sir Lionel, British Minister in Mexico, ii. 179, 205, 207
Carow, Miss Edith Kermit (Mrs Theodore Roosevelt), i. 48

Carranza, General, ii. 179, 199, 208, 325-6, 328, 330, 380
Carroll, American yachtsman and traveller, i. 158
Carroll of Carrolltown, i. 292
Carson, Sir Edward, ii. 273 *n*², 421
Carter, Jack, i. 464
Casa Blanca, Morocco, ii. 63
Casement, Sir Roger, ii. 248, 331, 331 *n*², 335-6, 344
Caspian Sea, i. 285, 285 *n*
Cassel, i. 357, 358
Cassini, Count, i. 410, 410 *n*
Catholics, in Germany, i. 238-9 : in America, ii. 260-1, 263, 309, 419-20, 423
Cecil, Lady Edward (Lady Milner), i. 350, 350 *n*
Cecil, Lord Robert, ii. 319, 319 *n*, 320, 321, 344 *n*, 352 *n*, 362, 427, 436 : Letters from C. S. R. to, ii. 344-6, 353-4, 391-3, 400-1, 404, 411-13
Century Club, New York, i. 61
Challemel-Latour (French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1883), i. 30
Chamberlain, Austen, i. 353 ; ii. 211
Chamberlain, Joseph, i. 36, 39, 39 *n*¹ 43, 50, 88, 88 *n*, 91, 98, 109, 109 *n*, 180, 186, 193, 197, 235, 253, 254, 259, 350-1, 353, 363, 365-6, 375, 390, 410, 453, 462, 479 ; ii. 19, 91, 111, 114 : caricatured by C. S. R., i. 47 : in the U. S. A. (1887), i. 76-7, 78-9, 84-6, 87 : on King George V., ii. 151
Chamberlain, Mrs. Joseph (Miss Endicott), i. 53, 88, 98
Chanler, Winthrop, i. 53, 165 *n*, 450, 450 *n*¹ : his letter to C. S. R., ii. 186-7 : the Misses, i. 165-7 : Miss Laura, i. 343
Charles (the Knight of Kerry's butler), i. 83, 83 *n*¹
Charleston, U.S.A., i. 172
Chile, U.S.A. threatens war with (1891), i. 117-18
China (1892), i. 139-40 : (1894), i. 164 : (1896), i. 208 : (1897-8), i. 242-5 : (1900), i. 312, 322 : (1906), ii. 44-5, 72, 72 *n*¹ : (1914), ii. 219, 219 *n*¹
Chirol, Sir Valentine, i. 1-2, 184, 185, 191, 191 *n*, 192-3, 240-1, 253, 350, 259 *n*¹, 263, 436-7 : letters from C. S. R., from Constantinople, i. 258-9, 261, 264-5, 267-8, 274-6 : from Persia (1), i. 286-7, 288-9, 303-4, 310, 315-6, 322-4 : from Russia, i. 437 ; ii. 46-7, 75-6 : from Persia (2), ii. 78-9, 81-2, 85-9, 98-101, 101-2, 103 : from America, ii. 241-4, 247-50, 426-7 : his *Memoir* of C. S. R., ii. 436
Cholera, in Egypt, i. 352-5, 356
Churchill, Lord Randolph, i. 41, 42-3, 46, 99
Churchill, Winston, ii. 226-7
Clark, Champ, ii. 315, 316
Clayton-Bulwer Convention, i. 377 : *see* Panama Canal
Cleveland, President, i. 48, 53, 55, 71, 72-3, 77, 80, 81-2, 87, 88, 91, 97, 103, 105, 116 : second term of office of, i. 153-77, 153, 154, 160, 167, 176, 180, 185, 247, 270 *n* ; ii. 173, 186, 233
Cleveland, Mrs. Grover, i. 72-3, 82, 88, 91
Cochran, Burke, i. 291-2
Coghlan, Captain, i. 292
Cologne, i. 18
Colombia and Germany, ii. 386
Combes, M., i. 427
Congo, the, ii. 165, 331
Constantinople, i. 249, 251, 256-277, 337, 340 : C. S. R. on history and surroundings of, i. 263, 271-2, 274
Connaught, the Duchess of, 189 *n*²
Connaught, Prince Arthur of, i. 460
Constantine of Russia, the Grand Duke, i. 181-2
Continuous voyage, doctrine of, ii. 231-2, 235
Cooper, Mr., ex-Mayor of New York, i. 89
Copper Trust, the, ii. 242, 342
Copyright, American, for British authors, i. 86, 86 *n*¹, 115
Corea, i. 196, 219-20, 415, 420, 421, 486, 488 : embassy to U. S. A. from, i. 86 : C. S. R.'s journey with Curzon in, i. 126-36
Cornish, i. 10
Cory, William Johnson (first Eton tutor of C. S. R.), i. 5, 7, 8, 31-2, 296, 296 *n*
Cossacks in Persia, i. 281, 283, 289, 297, 314, 319 ; ii. 87, 93, 106
Cowdray, Lord, ii. 179, 192-3
Cowles, Mrs. (sister of Theodore Roosevelt), i. 48, 51, 52 ; ii. 187
Cranbourne, Lord, i. 353
Cranley, Lady, ii. 76
Cranley, Lord (Lord Onslow), ii. 3, 4, 76 : letters from C. S. R., ii. 95-6, 113-4, 138-9
Crawford, Sir Richard, ii. 265, 265*n*² 362, 363, 387, 388, 400, 403, 405-6
Crawley, Charles, i. 290 *n*

Crete, i. 219, 241, 256, 257-8, 260, 260 *n*, 261, 262, 265, 265 n^2
Croatia, ii. 177
Cromer, Lord, i. 201, 324, 335, 336, 337, 341-2, 347, 358, 361
Cross of Furness, Lord, i. 46, 138
Crowe, Sir Eyre, ii. 317
Cuba, i. 232-3, 248-9, 291, 299 ; ii. 377, 380
Cuninghame (Roosevelt's hunter in B. E. A.), ii. 141
Currie, Sir Donald, i. 99
Currie, Sir Philip H. W. (Lord Currie), i. 43, 43 n^2, 46
Curzon, Lady, i. 53, 364 ; ii. 49 : letter to C. S. R., i. 367 : *see also* Leiter, Miss Mary
Curzon, G. N. (Lord Curzon), i. 174, 185, 185 *n*, 256, 288, 362, 400, 409 ; ii. 47, 74, 102, 153 : at Eton, i. 6, 6 *n*, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 : at Balliol, i. 19, 24-5 : in Japan, i. 125-6 : in Corea, i. 126-36 : visit to Li-Hung-Chang, i. 136, 138-9 : in French India and Siam, i. 140 : on C. S. R. as travelling companion, i. 140, 140 *n* : as Chancellor of the University of Oxford, ii. 119, 119 *n* : C. S. R. on, i. 61-2, 257-8, 258-9, 320 ; ii. 49 : letters to C. S. R. on his St. Petersburg appointment, i. 363 : on his Washington appointment (1912), ii. 174
Cyril, the Grand Duke, i. 431, 463
Czar, the, *see* Nicholas II.
Czarevitch, the, i. 390, 424, 424 *n*, 431
Czarina, the, i. 483, 493, 496 ; ii. 21, 34

D'Aehrenthal, ii. 126, 127, 130, 188
Daily Mail, the, ii. 136
Daily Telegraph, the, ii. 131, 133 n^2
Daisy, *see* Spring Rice, Margaret
Dalai Lama, the, his visit to the Czar, ii. 74-5
Dalhousie, Lady, i. 40
Dalmatia, ii. 177
Dalny, i. 489
Danesfort, Lord (J. G. Butcher), i. 4
Dardanelles, the, ii. 61, 61 *n*, 126, 128, 295
Davies, Mr., of Corea, i. 126, 128, 131, 131 *n*
Dawkins, Clinton, i. 20
de Bunsen, Sir Maurice, i. 122, 122 *n*, 124, 164, 264 ; ii. 79-80 : letter from C. S. R., ii. 317-8 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 275
de Gray, Lady, i. 74
Delahunty, Captain, i. 292
Delcassé, M., i. 459, 502, 502 *n* ; ii. 10, 53, 58, 67, 69, 104, 104 n^2, 185
Demavend (mountain), i. 283, 287-8, 294, 327-8
Democracy, novel by Henry Adams, i. 59 *n*, 68, 80, 80 n^2
Denman, Mr. (President of American Shipping Board), ii. 386-7, 388, 408
Denmark, i. 192, 396, 404 ; ii. 138, 139, 145
de Noailles, Marquis, i. 217, 217 n^3
Derby, Lord, i. 188, 188 *n*
Derings, the, i. 253
Dernburg, chief director of German propaganda in the U.S.A., ii. 241, 241 n^2, 242, 246, 247, 271
de Trolle, Swedish Foreign Minister, ii. 127
de Vere, Aubrey, i. 4, 68, 81, 211-2, 309
de Vere, Sir Stephen, i. 4
Devonshire, Duke of, i. 36, 42, 363, 390 ; ii. 210-11, 426, 433, 435,
Dewey, Admiral, i. 247
de Wiart, M., ii. 228, 228 n^2
Diamond Jubilee, the, i. 61 *n*, 216, 222, 225, 278
Diaz, Porfirio, ii. 179, 189
Digna, Osman, i. 34
Dilke, Sir Charles, i. 31, 43, 114
Dillon, Dr. E. J., i. 481, 485, 495, 503 ; ii. 12, 22, 26, 44, 54-5, 57, 61-2, 68 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 80
Dock strike (1889), i. 98-100
Dogger Bank incident, the, i. 390, 432, 433-4, 433 n^1, 435-6, 439, 442
Dolgorouky, ii. 34
Dongola, i. 190 n^3, 202, 219
Dorjieff (Darjieff), his operations in Tibet, i. 362, 364
Dresden, i. 26, 27
Dru, ii. 43
Drummond, Sir Eric, ii. 347 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 363-4
Duckworth, Mr. (publisher), i. 379
Duff, Grant, i. 174
Dufferin, Lord, i. 98, 151, 320, 320 n^1, 357 ; ii. 152, 157 : his *Letters*, ii, 159
Dugdale, Mrs., i. 79-80
Duma, the, i. 391, 456, 456 *n*, 500 ; ii. 1, 2, 12, 15, 22, 24, 25, 30, 31, 32-3, 33, 35, 35-7, 41, 42, 43-4, 46-7, 66, 76, 79, 82, 98, 102 : the opening ceremony, ii. 39-40
Dumba, Count (Dr.), ii. 193, 209, 248-9, 271, 277 *n*, 278, 278 *n*, 280 : letters to C. S. R., ii. 176-7, 248-9 *n*

Dumba, Mme., ii. 249 *n*
Dunne, Mrs. (Miss Daphne Rendel), i. 255
Dunraven, Lord, i. 99, 200
Durand, Lady, i. 280, 282, 317
Durand, Sir Mortimer, i. 280, 280 *n*, 282, 284-5, 290, 307, 307 *n*, 317, 320, 322, 330, 368, 374, 435, 447, 448, 449, 485 ; ii. 8, 84, 91, 173 : despatch to Lord Lansdowne (March 1905), i. 453-5
Durant, Mr. (of General Motors Company), ii. 380
Dürer prints, i. 18
Durnovo, Russian Minister of the Interior, ii. 30, 31, 32, 34-5

Eclipses, Japanese controversy as to cause of, i. 123
Eddy, Spencer, i. 431, 435
Edhem Pasha, i. 256
Education of Henry Adams, the, i. 51
Edward VII., King, i. 409, 460, 462, 483, 485 : and the Kaiser, i. 497, 502 *n* ; ii. 132, 133 : and Russia, ii. 17, 19, 21, 26, 33, 47, 57, 62, 67-8, 68, 70, 71-2, 76 : interview with C. S. R. (1908), ii. 122-3 : his admiration for President Roosevelt, i. 451-4, 455, 469, ; ii. 150
Egan, Martin (U. S. Minister to Chile, 1891), i. 117-8
Egan, Patrick, ii. 279
Egypt, i. 201, 102-3, 323, 333, 335-61, 405 ; ii. 75, 124, 125
Egyptian politics, C. S. R. on, i. 151
Eliot, President of Harvard, ii. 393
Endicott, Mr. (President Cleveland's Secretary for War), i. 53, 72, 81, 88, 106, 107
Endicott, W., i. 160
England in Egypt, Lord Milner's, i. 151
Enlistment of British subjects in the U. S. A., ii. 396
Enver Bey, ii. 124
Errington, Lord (the second Lord Cromer), ii. 3, 4, 80
Esmonde, Sir Thomas Grattan, i. 83, 83 n^3, 84
Eton, C. S. R. at, i. 5-18 : his memorial in the chapel, ii. 437
Eton College Chronicle, the, ii. 116 ; on C. S. R., ii. 437-8
Etonian (school journal), i. 11-12
Eugénie, the Empress, 181-2
Evans, Admiral, i. 472
Ewen, Mr. (King's Messenger), ii. 44
Ewing, Sir A. Orr, i. 41
Expansion of England, Seeley's, i. 58
Extradition Treaty between U. S. A. and England (1888, shelved), i. 89, 89 n^2

Fairchild, Mrs., i. 91
Fairfax, Lord, and George Washington, i. 93
Fairholme, G. F., i. 28, 28 n^1
Fane, Sir S. C. B. Ponsonby, i. 223, 223 n^2
Farmers' Alliance, i. 104
Farrer, Lady, ii. 121
Farrer, Lord (father of Thomas Farrer), i. 290-1, 290 *n*
Farrer, Thomas (Lord Farrer), i. 20, 310, 342, 343 ; ii. 108 : letters from C. S. R., i. 26-7, 29-30, 254-5, 329
Fashoda, i. 245, 256, 264, 264 *n*, 276
Federal Reserve Board, the American, ii. 329, 372, 380, 387
Ferdinand of Bulgaria, ii. 126, 127, 130
Ferguson, Miss, i. 71, 79-80
Ferguson, Lady Helen (Lady Novar), i. 98, 106, 115, 185, 329, 449, 449 *n* ; ii. 50, 116, 130, 152-3, 173 : letters from C. S. R., from Germany, i. 213-4 : from Egypt, i. 349-50, 353-4 ; from Persia, ii. 97-8 : from London, ii. 121-2 : from Sweden, ii. 132-3 : 134-5, 136, 137-8, 159-60 : from Washington, ii. 187, 196 : letters to C. S. R., ii. 84, 174, 362
Ferguson, Robert (Bob), i. 209, 209 *n*, 252, 252 *n*, 301, 301 n^2
Ferguson, Ronald Munro (Lord Novar), i. 36, 45, 52, 65 n^1, 76, 79, 88, 95 *n*, 209 *n*, 370, 483 ; ii. 40 *n*, 97 *n*, 98, 427, 428, 431, 435 : letters from C. S. R., i. 38-40, 41, 41-3, 44, 46, 47 : from America (1), i. 50, 56-8, 60-1, 61-3, 64-7, 68-9, 70-2, 73, 81, 87, 89, 95-6, 98, 100-1, 103-4, 106, 109, 112, 112-5, 116, 117, 118, 119-20 : from Japan, i. 122-3, 124-6, 136-40, 141, 145-7 : from America (2), i. 154-5, 156-7, 161-2 : from Germany, i. 185, 223-4, 252-3, 259 : from Constantinople, i. 262, 276-7 : from Persia (1), i. 300-2, 314-5, 319-20, 328-9 : from Egypt, i. 347-8, 357, 360-1 : from Russia, i. 363, 365-6, 375-6, 392-3, 402-6, 409, 411, 423-4, 432-3 ; ii. 18-9, 50-1 : from Persia (2), ii. 84, 90-2, 102, 107 :

from England, ii. 112, 114-6, 118 : from Sweden, ii. 130-2, 135-7, 143, 149, 152-4, 157-8, 159, 164-5, 165-6, 173 : letters to C. S. R., i. 447, 448-9 ; ii. 112, 149, 163-4 : letter to Lady Spring Rice on C. S. R., ii. 435-6
Field, Mr. (a rival of Jay Gould), i. 70
Finland, i. 371, 390, 422, 426, 429-30, 461, 500 ; ii. 1, 2, 3, 13, 134, 138 : described by C. S. R., i. 401, 412-3
Fisher, Lord, ii. 113, 113 *n*[2]
Fisheries, International Commission on (1887), i. 76-9, 83, 84 : draft treaty on, i. 85, 86, 87, 90, 93, 93 *n*
Fitzalan, Lord, *see* Talbot, Lord Edmund
Fitzgerald, Brinsley, i. 107, 322, 324
Fitzgerald, Julie, i. 38, 82, 83, *see also* Spring Rice, Mrs. Stephen
Fitzgerald, Mary, i. 3
Fitzgerald, Mr., Chairman of the (American) Ways and Means Committee, ii. 416
Fitzgeralds, of Kerry, i. 3, 38, 82
Flood, Mr., Chairman of the (American) Foreign Affairs Committee, ii. 417
Ford, John (attaché at Teheran), i. 287
Ford, Pat, i. 65
Formosa, i. 219
Foster, Arnold, i. 402
Fourth of June celebrations at Gulhek, ii. 94
Fox-hunting in Cumberland, C. S. R. on, i. 212-3
France, her relations with Germany (1896), i. 192 : (1897), i. 220, 225 : (1904), i. 438 : (1905), i. 483-4, 502-3 : (1908), ii. 52-3, 58-60, 64-5 131 : with Great Britain (1883), i. 30-1 : (1893), i. 146 : (1896), i. 179, 187-8, 190, 201-2 : (1897), i. 225 : (1904), i. 408-9 : (1905), i. 502-3 : (1906), ii. 63, 75 : with Russia (1893), i. 146 : (1896), i. 192, 205, 263, 265 : (1904), i. 409, 415, 428, 438, 438 *n* : (1905), i. 475, 493, 497, 501-2 : (1906), ii. 33 : with Turkey, i. 219 ; ii. 75 : with the U.S.A., i. 196-7, 497 ; ii. 218, 257, 260, 309, 340, 341, 366, 382 : and the projected continental coalition, i. 489-90, 493 ; ii. 7, 11
France and Morocco, i. 459-60, 468, 469, 471, 499 ; ii. 162-3, 164-5 : and Persia, i. 289 : the religious orders in, i. 427, 427 *n*
Franklin, Mr. (American shipowner), ii. 381
Franz Ferdinand, the Archduke, ii. 158, 158 *n*, 209
Fraser, Mr. and Mrs. Hugh, i. 124
Frederic Leopold of Prussia, Prince, i. 189, 189 *n*[2], 462 : Princess, i. 189
Frederichs, Russian Minister of the Court, ii. 34
French Canadians, ii. 279, 306
Frere, Sir Bartle, on General Gordon, i. 33-4
Fujiyama, i. 142
Funston, General, ii. 384

Gapon, Father, i. 391, 458, 458 *n*[1], ii. 1, 43, 44
Gardner, Captain (son-in-law of Senator Lodge), i. 250
Gardner, Mr. (of Mass.), ii. 308
Gardner, Mrs. Augustus, ii. 167
Garrett, Mr. (rival of Jay Gould), i. 70
Garrison, Mr. (American Secretary for War), ii. 311, 311 *n*, 315, 315 *n*
Garvin, J. L., ii. 144
Gaunt, Sir Guy, ii. 349, 349 *n*[1]
Genoa, C. S. R. at, i. 30
Gensan, i. 126, 127
George, Henry, i. 48, 49, 60, 64, 65
George V., King, ii. 150-1, 159, 166, 188, 209
Gerard, Ambassador, ii. 222, 222 *n*, 256-7 *n*, 352, 357, 368, 375, 378, 378 *n*, 379
German Catholic Association of the Holy Land, i. 256
German colonial policy, i. 201, 202-3, 204, 227-8, 229-30 : emigration to non-German countries, i. 227-8, 230 : General Staff, i. 314-5 ; ii. 146 : land *versus* money in, i. 235-9 : landlords in Russia, ii. 2, 20 : navy (1897), i. 224, 226, 228, 241-2, (1904) 422 ; (1908) ii. 108, 133, (1909) 135-6, 136-7, 146 : press, i. 192, 193, 261 : social life, i. 181, 206, 209, 216-7 : soldiers and recruits, i. 183, 207-8 : views on English educational system, i. 375
German Diplomatic Documents, Dugdale's, i. 191
German Empress, the, i. 189, 267 ; ii. 225

German South-West Africa, i. 190 *n*[2] 227
Germans and the German vote in the U.S.A. (1902), i. 351-2 : (March 1914), ii. 205 : (during the War), ii. 212, 218, 221, 238 242-3, 244, 248, 254, 270, 275-6, 277, 285, 287, 297, 298-9, 301-4, 308, 309, 311-3, 317, 327, 331, 332, 334, 337, 338, 340, 341, 343, 344, 347 : (after America's entry), ii. 354, 356, 366, 373, 385, 416
Germany, the Crown Prince of, i. 460, 497
Germany, the Crown Princess of, i. 431, 431 *n*
Germany (1895-6), i. 178-218, (1897-8) 219-255 : in the Great War (Aug. 1914—Apl. 1917), ii. 213-351, (Apl. 1917—Jan. 1918) 352-425 : her attitude in the Balkan War (1912), ii. 180 : pre-war relations with France (1896), i. 192, 194, (1897) 220, 225, (1904) 438, (1905) 483-4, 493-4, 502-3 ; (1908), ii. 52-3, 58-60, 64-5, 131 : with Great Britain (1895-6), i. 182-3, 186-7, 191-2, (1898) 248, (1901) 345, (1905) 497 : with Holland, i. 396, 396 *n* : with Persia, ii. 71, 72, 88, 96, 101-2, 105 : with Russia (1896-7), i. 186, 188, 190, 192, 194, 199, 225, 228-9, 230, 234, 242, (1898) 259, (1904) 422-3, (1905) 471, 489, 493-4, 500 ; (1909-10), ii. 146, 158 : with the U.S.A., i. 228, 230-2, 248 : projected Continental coalition, i. 192, 197, 197 *n*, 395-6, 398, 404-6, 414-6, 438-40, 471, 493-4, 502, 503 ; ii. 7, 64 : *see also* Austria ; Morocco ; Spring Rice, Cecil ; Turkey ; William II., Emperor of Germany
Germany and the Germans, Roosevelt on (1897), i. 230-2, (1900) 331, (1905) 469-71 ; ii. 10, (Aug. 1914) 218-9
Gibbons, Cardinal, ii. 410-1, 423
Gladstone, W. E. (1884-6), i. 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 46 : (1887-8), i. 62, 79, 85, 99 : (1892-4), i. 123, 138, 145, 146, 156 *n* : (1896), i. 205 *n*[2] : C. S. R. on his death, i. 254 : his character and policy, i. 410 ; ii. 64, 109, 241, 241 *n*[1], 263, 271, 322, 369 : President Wilson compared to him, ii. 313 : caricatured by C. S. R., 37
Gleichen, Count (Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen), ii. 23, 23 *n*, 24, 25, 113
Gloucester, Mass., fishermen of, i. 108-9
Godkin, Laurence, ii. 390
Godley, Under-Secretary, India Office, ii. 78
Goethals, General, ii. 408
Golden Book of Eton, the, ii. 433
Gompers, Mr., ii. 273, 280
Gordon, General, i. 31, 32-5, 203
Gordon, Mr., ii. 403, *see also* Northcliffe, Lord
Goreimeikin, ii. 5
Gorgas, General, ii. 266
Gorst, Eldon, i. 336, 337
Gosselin, Sir Martin, i. 184, 184 *n*
Gould, Jay, i. 64, 70, 90
Gould, Miss, i. 174
Graham, General, i. 34
Granger party (Farmers' Alliance), i. 104
Grant Duff, Sir Evelyn, ii. 42, 42 *n*[3], 78, 78 *n*
Granville, Lord, i. 31, 35, 202, 433 ; ii. 263, 266, 271
Greco-Turkish War, the, i. 219, 220, 233-4, 246-7, 248
Greece, i. 241, 241 *n* ; ii. 179, 349, 349 *n*[2] ; *see also* Greco-Turkish War, the
Greece, Prince George of, i. 256, 259, 260
Greene, C., ii. 157
Grey, Lady (Edward), ii. 19
Grey, Sir Edward (Lord Grey), i. 15, 20, (1892) 124, 124 *n*[1], (1898-9) 252-3, 253 *n*, 276, 286, (1900) 325, 325 *n*, 329, (1904-6) 432, 449, 453 ; ii. 18, 19, 23, 50, (1906-7) 77, 81, 84, 91, 97, 102, 107, (1907-8) 112, 113, 116, (1908-10) 128, 128 *n*[1], 130, 133, 135, 136, 143, 145, 149, (1910-1) 163, 164, (1912-3) 180, 191, 193, 194, (Jan.-May 1914), 196, 197, 202, 208, (Sept. 1914-Apl. 1915) 229, 234, 235, 236, 237, 241, 249, 249 *n*, 253, 259, (Oct. 1915-Oct. 1916) 288, 289, 307, (Dec. 1916-Jan. 1917) 361, 363 : letters from C. S. R., from Russia (1906), ii. 25, 29-30, 31, 33-4, 35-7, 54-61, 63-4, 66, 67-8, 69-71, 72-3, 74, 75, 76 : from Persia (1906-7), ii. 103-5 : from America (Jan.-May 1914), ii. 195-6, 201-2, 203-4, 205-6, 207-8, (Aug. 1914-Apl. 1915) 218-223, 224-7, 233-4, 237-9, 244-7, 254-8, 258, 259-67, (May-

Oct. 1915) 268-71, 274, 275-9, 280-3, 283-4, (Oct. 1915-Oct. 1916) 293, 297-8, 298-306, 308-14, 319, 326-33, 334-44, 346-7, 347-51, (Nov.-Dec. 1916) 354-61 : letters to C. S. R. (1905-6), ii. 18, 47, 53-4, 64-5, 71-2, (1906-7) 78, 83-4, 96-7, (1907-8) 118-9, (1911) 166, 167, (Mar. 1916) 318, (Dec. 1916) 361-2 : telegrams to C. S. R. (Sept. 1914), ii. 224, 234-5, (Apl. 1915) 287 : letter to Colonel House, ii. 298 : letter to T. Roosevelt, ii. 290
Grierson, Colonel, i. 207-8
Grove, Consul, ii. 45
Guggenheim, Mr., ii. 250
Gulhek, C. S. R. on life at, i. 279-80, 282-3, 283-4, 286-8, 320-1, 320 n^2 ; *see also* Teheran
Gunsburg, ii. 28
Gutschkon, ii. 20, 32

Hadijeh, *see Story of Valeh and Hadijeh, the*
Haester (of the " texas "), i. 292
Hague Convention, the, ii. 240, 242, 244
Haldane, R. B. (Lord Haldane), i. 349, 453 ; ii. 51, 51 *n*, 73, 108, 113, 114 : his mission to Germany (1911), ii. 165
Hale (of Maine), Senator, i. 60
Hallsteads, house on Ullswater, i. 4-5
Hamburg-Amerika Shipping Company, ii. 219-20, 221, 246, 253
Hamilton, Bishop (of Methodist Episcopal Church), ii. 422-3
Hampden miniature, King Edward's gift to President Roosevelt, i. 451-4, 455 ; ii. 150
Hancock, General, i. 87
Hanotaux, M., ii. 289
Harcourt, Sir William, i. 42
Hardinge, Lady, ii. 40 *n*
Hardinge of Penshurst, Lord, *see* Hardinge, Sir Charles
Hardinge, Lady (Charles) i. 400, 412
Hardinge, Sir Arthur H., i. 6, 6 *n*, 27-8, 27 n^2, 38, 49, 50, 110, 151, 323-4, 330, 336, 337-8
Hardinge, Sir Charles (Lord Hardinge of Penshurst), i. 247, 363, 367, 367 n^1, 374, 391-2, 399-400, 408, 410, 412, 423, 424, 432, 433, 440 ; ii. 1, 7, 19, 23, 25, 31, 55, 55 n^1, 57, 82, 123, 153, 153 *n* : letters from C. S. R., ii. 32-3, 68-9, 74 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 17
Harper's Ferry, i. 92, 92 *n*
Harper's Magazine, i. 235
Harrison, Frederic, ii. 144, 144 *n*
Harrison, Mrs. i. 104
Harrison, President, i. 68, 100, 101, 103, 104, 104-5, 111, 112, 113, 118, 143, 143 *n*, 153, 209
Hart, Sir Robert, i. 127, 140
Hartington, Lord, i. 34, 42
Hartwig, Russian Minister to Persia, ii. 42, 73, 74, 83, 85, 86, 88, 103
Harvard University, ii. 290, 393-4, 401
Harvey, Sir Paul, ii. 308
Hatzfeldt, i. 200, 200 n^3
Hawaii, i. 73, 153, 155, 246-7, 249, 250
" Hay, Ian," ii. 322
Hay, Colonel John (secretary), i. 52, 53, 55, 68-9, 71, 81, 86, 94, 97, 109-10, 209, 229, 249, 253, 332, 344, 344 *n*, 367, 371, 407, 430, 433, 435, 448, 454, 465, 479, 480, 483 ; ii. 178, 252 : letters from C. S. R., from Germany, i. 246-7, 248, 251-2 : from Russia, 414-6, 424-9, 460-4 : letters to C. S. R., i. 247, 464-5
Hay, Mrs. John, i. 52, 97, 209, 296, 464 : letter from C. S. R. from Russia, i. 429-31
Hay, Sir John Drummond, i. 43, 43 n^3
Hayashi, Baron, i. 496, 498-9
Hayti, ii. 255
Hearst, W. R., ii. 272, 392
Hedin, Sven, ii. 139
Heligoland, i. 125
Helyar, Mrs., i. 110
Henderson, Mr. (of the British Embassy, St. Petersburg), ii. 37-8, 38-9, 44
Herbert, Lady (Miss Wilson), i. 367, 367 n^2, 451
Herbert, Sir Michael (" Mungo "), i. 74, 74 *n*, 86, 97, 177, 358, 360, 367, 434, 451
Herbette, M. (French Ambassador to Berlin), i. 199, 199 *n*, 220, 225
Herschell, i. 77
Herzegovina, ii. 126
Hewitt, Mr. (Roosevelt's opponent for mayoralty of New York), i. 49
Hicks-Beach, Sir Michael, i. 353
Hillier, British Consul at Seoul (1892), i. 131
History of Modern Europe, Gooch's, i. 190 n^3
History of Naval War of 1812, Theodore Roosevelt's, i. 49

Hoar, Senator, i. 162
Hohenlöhe, ii. 69-70
Hohenlöhe, Prince, i. 180, 181, 181 *n*[1], 188, 205, 220, 223, 240, 241
Hohler (First Secretary, British Legation, Mexico), ii. 193, 203
Holland and Germany, i. 396, 396 *n* ; ii. 145
Holleben, German Ambassador at Washington, i. 351, 351 *n*, 352
Holland, Bernard, i. 35, 37, 309, 356 ; ii. 323 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 17
Holstein, permanent chief of German Foreign Office, i. 188-9, 189 *n*[1], 204, 302 ; ii. 69, 69 *n*[2]
Holy Land, *see* Palestine
Home Rule, i. 36-8, 44-5, 55-6, 62, 63, 64, 65-6, 67, 123, 124, 163, 254 ; ii. 157, 208, 209-10 ; *see also* Irish Rebellion
Hong Kong Bank, i. 103
Hong-Kong, i. 148
Hoover, H. C., ii. 408
Hornby, Dr. (headmaster of Eton), i. 10
House, Colonel, ii. 194-5, 194 *n*, 214-7, 224-6, 233, 233 *n*, 245, 245 *n*, 251-2, 258-9, 268, 274 *n*[2], 295-7, 298, 299, 299 *n*, 304-5, 307-8, 311, 325, 347, 347 *n*, 352-3, 401, 409-10, 428-9, 430 : his *Papers*, ii. 194, 196, 214-7, 217 *n*, 224, 226 *n*[2], 227, 233-4, 256-7 *n*, 258, 259 *n*, 296, 298, 298 *n*[1], 300 *n*, 313 *n*, 353, 354, 379 *n*, 380, 428 : letter from Sir Edward Grey to, ii. 298
Houston, Mr., ii. 215
Howard, Sir Esmé, ii. 175-6
Huerta, General, ii. 179, 191-3, 194, 196, 199, 203, 204, 205, 208, 325-6
Hughes, Mr. (Republican candidate for the Presidency, 1916), ii. 331, 332, 337, 339, 341, 411, 415
Hylan, Mr. (Mayor of New York, 1917), ii. 415

Iddesleigh, Lord (Sir Stafford Northcote), i. 40, 45
Ignatier, Count, ii. 5-6, 44
Independent Workers of the World, the, ii. 407, 415-6
India and Russia, i. 43, 395-6, 405, 415, 482, 498 ; ii. 53, 70, 72, 82, 91-2, 101, 102 : and Japan, i. 492 : and the Moslem Liberal Movement, ii. 124, 125 : in a constitutional crisis, ii. 148
India Office, C. S. R.'s impressions of, ii. 78-9
Ingalls, Senator, i. 66, 87
Inglis (of Balliol), ii. 154
Inland Sea, the, i. 141, 143, 147
International Marine Conference (Washington, 1889), i. 100-1
Irish and the Irish vote in the U. S. A., i. 62, 65-6, 77, 84, 85, 109, 112, 113-4, 161-2, 163, 166, 168 ; ii. 201, 205, 218, 239-40, 242, 245, 254, 260-1, 263, 273, 278-9, 309, 309 *n*[2], 331, 338, 340, 341, 343, 344, 365-6, 392-3, 407-8, 417
Irish question, the, *see* Home Rule *and* Ulster
Irish rebellion (1916), the, ii. 331, 331 *n*[1], 333, 333 *n*, 335-6, 338, 338 *n*[2], 341, 349, 349 *n*[2]
Ispahan, i. 281
Isvolsky, Count, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, ii. 41, 41 *n*[2], 55 *n*[2], 72-3, 83, 85, 122, 128, 128 *n*[1], 130
Italians in New Orleans, i. 111
Italy, i. 201, 202-3 ; ii. 52, 126, 133, 145-6, 176
Ito, Count, Japanese Prime Minister, i. 125-6, 393, 442, 492
Ivan the terrible, C. S. R. on, i. 408
"I vow to thee, my country," ii. 432-3

Jaffir, Songs from the Book of, C. S. R.'s, i. 310-11
Jameson, Dr., i. 186, 335, 347
Jameson Raid, the, i. 185-6, 193, 194-5, 196, 200, 200 *n*[2], 235
Japan, 19th century history of, i. 121 : C. S. R. and language of, 121-2 : globe-trotters in, i. 122 : national anthem of, 123 : politics of, i. 122-3, 123, 123-4 : Emperor of (1891), i. 123, 123 *n* (1905), i. 492 : relations with missionaries, i. 124 : war with China, i. 180, 196, 219-20, 234, 246-7, 248 : C. S. R.'s affection for, i. 262, 270, 272 : relations with the U. S. A., ii. 200, 200 *n*[2], 219, 219 *n*[1], 329, 282, 419 *See also* Anglo-Japanese Alliance *and* Russo-Japanese War
Japan and Japanese character, Roosevelt on, i. 382, 397-8, 417-9, 444-5, 472-3
Japan and Mexico, Germany invites alliance with, ii. 384, 385, 386
Jebb, i. 10

Jerusalem, capture of, and American Jews, ii. 420-1
Jewish (ancient) foreign politics, C. S. R. on, ii. 129
Jews, in Germany, i. 233, 234, 239 : in Russia, ii. 4, 12-3, 15, 26, 31 : in the U. S. A., ii. 200, 201, 242-3, 244, 245, 285, 309, 312, 373, 420-1, 422
Johnson, W. M., *see* Cory, William Johnson
Johnstone, Sir A. V., ii. 72, 72 n^2, 73
Jowett, Benjamin, i. 16, 20-1, 22, 22-3, 24, 288 ; ii. 119, 154-5
Jubilee, the first, i. 40, 67
Julie, *see* Mrs. Stephen Spring Rice
Jusserand, M., French Ambassador at Washington, ii. 8, 190, 206, 209, 211, 222, 228, 253, 262, 289, 293, 305, 357, 368, 390, 393, 395, 396, 402, 403-4, 430 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 196
Jusserand, Mme., ii. 211-2, 228
Jutland, ii. 338, 338 n^1

Kaiser, the, *see* William II
Kaneko, Baron, i. 417 : Roosevelt's letters to, i. 487-9, 498
Kasim Khan, Abu'l, i. 288
Kassala, i. 202
Katsura, Japanese Prime Minister, ii. 8
Kautz, Admiral, i. 292
Keats, disturbance of grave of, i. 58
Keller, Count, i. 456
Ker, W. P., i. 19
Kerensky, ii. 415
Kerry, Knights of, *see* Fitzgeralds of Kerry
Kerry, Rice family settles in, i. 3
Kiao-Chow, i. 242-3, 248
Kiderlin, i. 241
Kiel, i. 222-3 : the Canal, i. 180
Kimberley, Lord, i. 138
Kipling, Rudyard, at the Washington Zoo, i. 173 : at the Congress, i. 173-4
Kitchener, Sir Herbert (Lord Kitchener), i. 35, 124 n^2, 202, 219, 245, 256, 347, 409, 414, 460, 431-2, 485 n^2 ; ii. 153 : letters to C. S. R., i. 101, 432
Kitchin, Claude, ii. 355, 355 n^2
Klondyke, the, i. 367
Knatchbull-Hugessen, ii. 136
Knights of Labour, i. 69, 71
Knollys, Lord, i. 451 ; ii. 123 : letters from C. S. R. to, ii. 19-21, 21-3, 25-6, 30, 62-3, 65-6
Knorring, private secretary to Count Izvolsky, ii. 73
Knox, Mr. (President Taft's Secretary of State), ii. 172, 172 *n*
Kobe, C. S. R. on, i. 143, 147
Komura, Baron, i. 481
Kondratenko, General, i. 501, 501 n^1
Korea, *see* Corea, i. 219-20
Kotze duel, the, i. 203, 204
Krüger, President, i. 186 : in Berlin and Portugal, i. 190, 190 n^1 ; telegrams from German Emperor, i. 191, 195
Krupp, ii. 235, 237, 263 : Li-Hung-Chang's portrait of, i. 138
Kruse, i. 292
Kuhn and Loeb, of New York, ii. 219, 243
Kurino, M. (Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, 1904), i. 162-3, 162 *n*, 164, 167, 393, 393 n^1
Kuropatkin, i. 389, 404, 405, 407, 430, 431, 496
Kuttler, ii. 44

Labour, in the U.S.A., i. 69 ; ii. 272, 357
"Laconia," sinking of the, ii. 383, 383 *n*
La Farge, Grant, i. 209
Laffan (of the *New York Sun*), i. 292
Lafollette, Senator, ii. 417
Lamar, Secretary, i. 67-8
Lamsdorff, Count, i. 403, 424-5, 435, 482, 483, 495, 501, 502 ; ii. 32, 55, 55 n^2, 57, 58-9, 62, 63, 67, 68, 70-1, 72, 73, 74
Lang, Andrew, i. 4
Lansdowne, Lord, i. 65, 345, 353, 362, 363, 366 *n*, 370-1, 374, 408, 448, 453, 462, 462 n^2, 474, 475, 479, 480, 483, 485-6, 490, 498, 501, 503 ; ii. 13, 17, 28, 64, 77, 128, 209, 210-11, 227, 418, 418 *n* : letters to C. S. R., i. 486 ; ii. 16-17 209 : despatch to him from Sir M. Durand, i. 453-5
Lansing, Mr., Secretary of State, ii. 234 *n*, 235, 236, 238, 273, 281, 283, 296, 304-5, 310, 310 *n*, 313-4, 316, 336, 336 *n*, 366, 402, 417, 428, 429
Lascelles, Miss Florence, i. 180, 345, 360, 375, 376, 377, 378, 399, 399 *n*, 400, 406, 411 : letters from C. S. R., i. 350, 351-2, 355, 361, 379-80 : *see also* Spring Rice, Mrs. Cecil *and* Spring Rice, Lady
Lascelles, Mary, ii. 40 *n*
Lascelles, Miss, ii. 210
Lascelles, Sir Frank, i. 180, 180 *n*, 185, 186, 194, 200, 202, 214, 216,

218, 265, 345, 346, 360, 375, 437, 446, 447, 453; ii. 4, 17-8, 21, 63, 76, 123, 126-7, 129: letter from C. S. R., ii. 33
Laurier, Sir Wilfred, ii. 292, 292 *n*
Lavenham, original home of the Springs, ii. 120-1
Law, Bonar, ii. 211, 375
Law of Civilisation and Decay, Brooks Adams', i. 90 *n*
Lawrence, Mrs., i. 80 *n*, 81
Lawrence, Walter, ii. 153
League of Nations, project for a, ii. 215-6, 258, 268, 307, 333, 430
League to Enforce Peace, the (American), ii. 333, 336, 347, 356, 369, 371 *n*
Lee, Arthur, ii. 396
Lee, Colonel (Viscount Lee of Fareham), i. 294, 294 n^1
Lee, General, i. 80, 92 *n*, 93
Lee, Henry Austin, i. 41, 41 *n*
Lee's preparatory school, Brighton, i. 6
Leigh, W., i. 379
Leipzig, i. 18
Leiter, Miss Mary, i. 53, 174, 174 *n*, 175: *see also* Curzon, Lady
Lendinara hangings, the, i. 111, 500, 500 n^2
Leopold, Prince, *see* Frederic Leopold of Prussia
Leslie, Shane, ii. 420, 420 *n*
Lessar (Russian Minister at Pekin, 1904), i. 392
Lever, Sir Hardman, ii. 387, 388, 403
Lhassa, the Treaty of, ii. 72 n^1, 73: *see also* Tibet
Liakhoff, commander of Persian Cossacks, ii. 106
Liberia, ii. 148
Liberty Loan, the, ii. 402
Liddell, H. G., Dean of C. C. C., i. 25
Liddon, Canon, i. 21, 23
Lightfoot, Bishop, i. 90
Li-Hung-Chang, i. 340: C. S. R.'s visit to him with Curzon, i. 136, 138-9
Lind, John, ii. 208, 208 *n*
Lindsay, Lady (Miss Martha Cameron), ii. 180, 180 *n*
Lindsay, Sir Ronald, i. 485, 485 n^3; ii. 25, 180 *n*
Lithuania, German landlords in, i. 466, 466 *n*
Lloyd George, D., ii. 145, 159, 160, 163, 211, 348, 348 *n*, 361, 362
Lobanoff, i. 404
Local Government Bill, Mr. Ritchie's, i. 89, 89 n^1
Lodge, Bay, i. 250, 250 *n*, 273, 282, 342, 343; ii. 141-3, 162
Lodge, Miss, i. 115
Lodge, Mrs. Cabot, i. 15, 51-2, 53-4, 74, 76, 115, 300, 350, 406; ii. 184, 187, 187 *n*, 399: letters from C. S. R., from Constantinople, 272-4: from Persia, i. 281-2, 295-6, 326-7: from Egypt, i. 341, 341-2, 352, 358-9: from Russia, i. 370, 394, 450-1: from England, ii. 48-50: from Sweden, ii. 141-2, 160-2: from Washington, ii. 275, 292-4: letter to C. S. R. (1896), ii. 197-8
Lodge, Senator Cabot, i. 49, 52, 53, 54-5, 61, 76, 94, 115, 155, 157, 161, 185, 207, 209, 229, 268, 295, 350, 352, 359, 367, 368, 370-1, 372, 450, 483; ii. 160, 162, 167, 184, 186, 187, 214, 215 *n*, 253, 275, 290-1, 292, 293, 308, 394, 399, 427, 431, 435: letters from C. S. R., i. 112: from Germany, i. 249-50: from Persia, i. 327: from Russia, i. 383, 406-7: from London, ii. 188: from Washington, ii. 191-2, 193-4, 291, 323: letters to C. S. R., i. 250-1, 378, ii. 188-9, 192-3: letter to A. J. Balfour, ii. 363
Lodge, Professor, ii. 149
London Convention, ii. 202
London, Declaration of, ii. 231, 233, 234, 235, 248-9
Lonsdale, Lord, in Germany (1896), i. 204-5
Lowell (President of Harvard), ii. 270
Lowndes, James, i. 80 n^2
Lowry, Edward G., ii. 380
"Lusitania," the, ii. 258, 259, 267, 268-94, 309, 310, 311, 315-7, 335, 376
Luxmoore, Mr. (Eton tutor of C. S. R.), i. 6, 8, 15, 16, 17-18; ii. 139, 324, 437-8: letters from C. S. R., i. 22-3, 31-4: from America (1), i. 176-7, 206: from Constantinople, i. 257-8: from Persia, i. 287-8, 304-5, 307-9, 312, 331: from Russia, i. 413: from London, ii. 150-1: from Sweden, ii. 154-6, 157: from Amercia (2), ii. 211-2: letters to C. S. R., i. 333, 379; ii. 47-8, 121, 156, 174-5, 190, 390, 399-400
"Lynch, Judge," i. 111
Lynch, Mrs. (of New York), i. 111
Lyttelton, Alfred, i. 9

McAdoo, Mr., Secretary to the U.S. Treasury, ii. 219 n^2, 269 *n*, 305, 372, 387, 402-3, 405-6, 408-9, 410
McClellan, General, i. 87
McCormick, Mr. (American Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 1904), i. 376, 376 n^2, 410, 458 n^2
McCormick, Mrs., i. 409-10, 409 *n*
MacDonald, General, i. 409
Macedonia, i. 267-8, 273, 275-7, 364, 427
McGlynn, Father, i. 64, 65
Machell, P. W., i. 346 : letter to C. S. R.
Mackail, J. W., i. 19, 24, 25, 344
McKinley, President, i. 104, 116, 247, 332, 346, 367, ; ii. 178, 197
Macleod, Rev. — (of St. Petersburg) ii. 46
Madagascar, diplomatic incident (1883), i. 30-1
Madero, Mexican President, ii. 179
Mafia, the, suspected of operations in New Orleans, i. 111
Mahan, Admiral, i. 235
Mahomed, Mirza, i. 380, 383-7 : *see also* Hadijeh, the Story of
"Malacca," seizure by Russia of the, i. 389, 423, 424, 436, 439
Malet, Sir Edward, i. 180, 180 *n*, 181, 182, 200
Malet, Lady, i. 181
Mallet, Sir Bernard, i. 28, 28 n^2
Mallet, Sir Louis, i. 366, 366 *n*, 371, 374 n^1, 414, 432, 448 ; ii. 23, 56, 143 : letters from C. S. R. from Russia, ii. 3-4, 61-2 : letters to C. S. R., i. 374, 432 ; ii. 17, 18
Manchester (Mass.), i. 53, 106
Manchester Guardian, i. 234-5
Manchuria, i. 420, 426, 486, 488-9, 491
Manila, i. 246, 247, 248, 251-2
Mann, Mr. (Republican leader of the House of Representatives), ii. 355, 416
Manning, Cardinal, i. 39, 99
Marchand, Colonel, i. 256
Margaret, *see* Spring Rice, Margaret, *and* Reynardson, Mrs. Aubrey
Marlborough, Duchess of, i. 42-3
Marling, Sir Charles Murray, ii. 104, 104 n^1
Marschall von Bieberstein, Baron, i. 180, 189, 189 n^1, 191, 194, 205, 223 n^1, 224, 238, 243
Marshall, Arthur (uncle of C. S. R.), i. 181, 181 n^1
Marshall, Miss Elizabeth, *see* Spring Rice, Mrs. Charles
Marshall, William, M. P. (grandfather of C. S. R.), i. 4-5, 211
Mary Queen of Scots, her missal at St. Petersburg, i. 370
Mason, Colonel, i. 359, 360
Masque of Balliol, the (broadsheet), i. 24
Maxse, Admiral, i. 350 *n*, 388
Maxse, Leo, i. 350 *n* ; ii. 132, 144
Meade, R., i. 190
Meath, Bishop of (Dr. Butcher), i. 4
Mecklenburg, the Regent of, i. 431
Mejlis, the (Persian Assembly), ii. 81-2, 84, 87, 88-9, 95, 98, 102, 106
Memories and Friends, A. C. Benson's, i. 8-9, 8 *n*, 13-5
Mendelssohn, ii. 32 n^2, 59
Menpes, Mortimer, i. 401
Menzel, pictures by, i. 183-4
Merchant Shipping (American) Bill, i. 86, 86 n^1
Mercier, Cardinal, ii. 411
Meredith, George, i. 350 ; ii. 144, 144 *n*
Meshed, i. 286, 289
Metropolitan, Roosevelt's article in the (1915), ii. 288
Metternich, i. 251, 252, 352, 433 n^2 ; ii. 147
Mexico and the U.S.A., ii. 81, 175, 179, 188-9, 191-3, 194, 195, 196, 198-9, 199-200, 202, 203, 203-4, 205, 207-8, 208 *n*, 250, 255, 257, 261, 263, 272, 273, 311, 318, 325-8, 330, 338-9, 342, 364, 377, 380 : German relations with, ii. 384, 385, 386, 388, 411
Meyer, George (American Ambassador to St. Petersburg), i. 442, 458, 458 n^2, 462, 463, 487, 487 *n*, 490, 491, 492, 493, 495, 496, 501, ii. 9, 24, 56-7, 65
Meyer, Mrs. George, i. 458
Meyer, Kuno, ii. 247-8, 247 *n*
Midleton, Lord, i. 20
Miliukoff, ii. 33, 34
Milner, Sir Alfred (Lord Milner), i. 347, 400 ; ii. 50
Minto, Lord, ii. 153
Mirski, Prince Sviatopolk, i. 390 ; ii. 1, 30
Missionaries, in Corea, i. 131, 137, 152 : in Japan, i. 124 : in Siam, i. 151
Mitchel, Mayor J.P., ii. 415
Mito, Prince of, i. 142
Modern Egypt, Lord Cromer's, i. 335
Modern Europe, Gooch's, i. 490 n^1
Mogador, ii. 67

Mohammed Ali, Shah of Persia, ii. 87 *n*[2], 92-3, 95, 98, 102, 103-4, 106, 107, 122
Monroe Doctrine, the, ii. 179, 357, 365, 367, 369, 371, 372 : Roosevelt on, i. 480 ; ii. 10
Monteagle of Brandon, the first Lord (grandfather of C. S. R.), i. 4, 158
Monteagle of Brandon, the second Lord (cousin of C. S. R.), i. 4, 37 ; ii. 323
Montefiore, Claude, ii. 27, 27 *n*[1], 29, 421
Montenegro, ii. 180
Morgan, J. P., ii. 270-1, 270 *n*, 274-5, 176, 276 *n*[2], 437
Morgan, Mrs., J. P., ii. 275
Morley, John (Lord Morley), i. 39 ; ii. 79, 79 *n*, 153 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 89
Morocco (1886), i. 43 : (1904-6), i. 459-60, 465, 468-9, 471, 477, 499 ; ii. 10, 52-3, 58-60, 58 *n*, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65-6, 66-7, 69, 133, 133 *n*[1] : (1908), ii. 125 : (1911), ii. 162-3, 164-5 : Conference on (1906), ii. 25, 26, 32, 53
Moscow, ii. 12, 21, 45 : described by C. S. R., i. 408
Mouravieff, i. 490, 490 *n*[3]
Muenter, Erich (Holt), ii. 275, 276, 276 *n*[1]
Mukden, i. 164 : battle of, i. 391, 455, 456-7, 459, 460, 469, 471 ; ii. 52, 67, 75
Munro Ferguson, *see* Ferguson R. M., *and* Novar, Lord
Münster, Prince, in the U.S.A., ii. 244
Murphy, Senator, i. 292
Mutsu, Mr., Japanese Secretary for Foreign Affairs, i. 125-6
Muzaffir ed Din, Shah of Persia (1899-1901), i. 283, 288, 289, 290, 296-7, 302-3, 312, 313, 314, 315, 320, 322, 329 ; ii. 77-8, 81, 84, 85, 87, 90

Nagasaki, C. S. R. on, i. 141
Nahant (U.S.A.), i. 53, 76
Napier, Colonel, ii. 38, 39
Napier, Mrs., ii. 37-8, 38-9
" Natchez," the, ii. 283-4
National Review, the, ii. 144
Negro songs and dances, i. 170-1 : church, i. 171
Nettleship, R. L., i. 20, 26
New London, i. 159
New Orleans, i. 111
New York Harbour Board, the, i. 102
New York Herald, the, ii. 320
New York police force, the, i. 157, 163, 231
New York Times, the, ii. 242-3, 320, 417
New York Tribune, the, i. 61, 89, 90, 119 ; ii. 320, 402
New York World, the, i. 91, 185 ; ii. 279, 370
Newfoundland Banks, fisheries of, i. 103, 108, 112
Newport (U.S.A.), C. S. R. on, i. 74, 107-8, 115-6
Newton, Lord, ii. 119-20 : letters from C. S. R. from America, ii. 209, 239-40, 320-2, 322 : his *Life of Lord Lyons*, ii. 209, 320, 320*n*
Nicholas II., Czar of Russia (1897), i. 228 : (1903), i. 368, 372-4 : (1904), i. 376, 377 : during the Russo-Japanese War, i. 391, 392, 393, 394, 400, 402, 404, 407, 410, 411, 415, 420, 425, 426, 429, 436 : (1905), i. 457, 458, 463-4, 466, 467, 478, 480, 482-3, 482 *n*, 484-5, 487, 489, 489-90, 490, 491, 492, 493, 495-6, 497, 497 *n*, 499, 501, 504 : during the revolutionary movement and the meeting of the first Duma, i. 456, 456 *n* ; ii. 1, 4, 5-6, 7, 9, 12, 13-4, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25-6, 30, 31, 33-4, 35, 36, 37, 39-40, 44, 47 : and the Anglo-Russian *entente*, ii. 52-3, 56-7, 57-8, 62-3, 63, 64, 65, 67-8, 71, 74-5, 76 : (1906), ii. 85 : (1907), ii. 96, 99, 154, 313-4 : *see also* William II., Emperor of Germany
Nicolson, Sir Arthur, ii. 25, 26, 26 *n*[2], 41, 42, 45, 82, 95, 95 *n*, 103, letter from C. S. R., ii. 240-1
Nicolson, General M. H., i. 43, 43 *n*[1]
Nicholas Nicholaievitch, the Grand Duke, ii. 5
Noel, Admiral, i. 256, 257-8
Norman, Herman, ii. 3, 4, 37-8, 44, 84
North German Lloyd ships, ii. 221, 253
Northcliffe, Lord, ii. 318, 319 : his mission to the U.S.A., ii. 401-3, 404-5, 410, 426, 426 *n*, 427, 430
Northcote, Sir Stafford (Lord Iddesleigh), i. 40, 45
Norway, i. 460 ; ii. 122, 135, 135 *n*, 137, 144, 145
Novar, Lady, *see* Ferguson, Lady Helen

Novar, Lord, *see* Ferguson R. M.
Novibazar, the Sanjak of, ii. 126
Noyes, Frank, ii. 431
Nurses, hospital, C. S. R. on, ii. 160

O'Beirne, H. J., i. 485, 485 n^2 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 79
O'Brien, Edward, i. 37
O'Brien, William (M.P.), i. 65, 65 n^2
O'Briens, of Thomond, i. 3
O'Connell, Cardinal, ii. 410, 416-7
O'Connor, T. P., i. 83 n^2, 84
Odling, Dr., at Teheran, i. 313
O'Gorman, Senator, ii. 195, 416
O'Laughlin, J. C., i. 434-5 : letter to C. S. R.,
Old Believers, Russian sect of, ii. 2
Old Etonians, i. 17 *n*
Oliver, F. S., ii. 157, 157 *n*, 285, 285 *n*
Olssen (of Corea), i. 127
Omdurman, i. 245, 256
Onge air torpedo, the (1909), ii. 148
Onslow, Lord, ii. 3 : letters from C. S. R., ii. 76, 306-7 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 76 : *see also* Cramley, Lord
Orange Free State, i. 186
Ordeal by Battle, F. S. Oliver's, ii. 285, 285 *n*
O'Shea divorce case, the, i. 111, 114
Osten Sacken, Count, i. 216-7, 217 n^1
Ostrakow, ii. 44
Ottawa, the Canadian club of, C. S. R.'s last speech at, ii. 433
" Our Lord " (Foreign Office nickname of Lord Rosebery), i. 38, 40, 42, 50, 56, 58, 64
Out of School at Eton, C. S. R.'s contributions to, i. 12-3
Owen, Cunliffe, ii. 393
Oxford, revisited by C. S. R., ii. 119-20

Page, Walter H., American Ambassador in London, ii. 191, 191 n^1, 202, 206, 226, 234, 235, 283, 298, 313 *n*, 346, 347, 393, 428
Paish, Sir George, ii. 243, 243 n^1, 246
Palestine, the German Emperor in, i. 256
Panama Canal, the, i. 377, 377 n^1 ; ii. 166, 168, 175, 176, 178, 180, 184, 185-6, 188-9, 194-5, 199-200, 205-6, 206-7, 220, 220 n^2, 386
Pansa, Count, Italian Ambassador at Berlin, 1908, ii. 127
Papen, *see* von Papen
Paris, C. S. R. in, i. 26
Parker, Lieut. (U.S.A.), i. 293
Parker, Mr. (candidate for U.S. Presidency, 1904), i. 429, 429 *n*
Parnell, C. S., i. 38, 41, 83 n^2, 111, 114 ; ii. 242
Paterson, Commandant Cairo City Police (1901), i. 346
Patterdale hounds, the, i. 212-3
Pauncefote, Sir Julian (Lord Pauncefote), i. 100, 101, 107, 110, 113, 117, 160, 177, 207 ; ii. 178
Pavie, M. (French Minister at Bangkok), i. 149
Pechili, Gulf of, i. 196, 220
Pekin, C. S. R. on, i. 139 : reported massacre at (1900), i. 322
Penjdeh incident, the, i. 205-6, 205 n^2
Pense, N.W. Territory, Canada, i. 46
Percy, Lord Eustace, ii. 190, 190 *n*, 211 : letter from C. S. R., ii. 324 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 324
Perry, Commodore, i. 121
Persia (1899-1901), i. 262, 263, 278-334 : (1905-6), ii. 16-17, 53, 54-5, 65, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75-6 : (1906-7), ii. 77-107 : British influence in, i. 284-5, 314, 315, 319-20 ; ii. 77, 86, 88 : British Legation in, its organisation criticised by C. S. R., i. 318 : Customs, i. 289, 318 : diplomatic work in, i. 324-6, 327, 329-30, 336-7 : finances of, 284-5, 288-9, 290, 297, 318 : Foreign Minister and Office of, i. 284-5, 302, 314, 320-2 : and Germany, i. 289 ; ii. 71, 72, 88, 96, 105 : government of, C. S. R. on, i. 313, 323 : national bank of, projected, ii. 88, 105 : Prime Minister (Sadrazam) of, i. 281, 281 n^2, 284, 288-9, 297, 298, 302, 303, 315, 318 : reform movement in, ii. 124-5 : and Russia, 278, 281, 281 n^1, 283, 285-6, 289, 297, 312, 313, 314, 318, 319, 338-9, 345, 362, 415 ; ii. 53, 54-5, 65, 71, 75, 77, 82-3, 85, 86, 88, 95-6, 96-7, 101, 102-3, 104-6, 107 : Shah of, *see* Mohammed Ali *and* Muzaffir ed Din : and Turkey, i. 288 ; ii. 96, 99, 105, 105 *n* : *see also* Gulhek *and* Teheran.
" Persia," sinking of the, ii. 308-9, 309 n^1
Persian Assembly, *see* Mejlis, the
Persian Gulf, the, i. 264, 285, 286, 313, 318, 362 ; ii. 148
Persian language and literature, i. 122, 278, 283-4, 285, 299, 307, 310-12

Persian servants, i. 287, 294, 295
Phelps, Mr. (American Minister in London, 1887), i. 59, 59 *n*[2]
Philae, i. 352
Philip II. of Spain, C. S. R. on, i. 214-5
Philippines, the, i. 270, 305-7 : *see also* Manila
Phillips, Mr. (of the Secretary of State's office), ii. 215
Phillips, Willie, i. 209
Picot, i. 325
Pierre, Admiral, i. 30
Plataean tripod, base of the, at Constantinople, i. 257, 263, 271, 340
Plehve, Count (Russian Minister of the Interior), i. 372, 390, 405, 427, 430, 466 ; ii. 30, 33, 36
Plessen (brother-in-law of Bismarck) i. 206
Pobiedonostseff, ii. 2, 7
Pohlevsky, ii. 122
Poison gas, German use of, ii. 259
Poland, ii. 14, 57
Polk, Frank, ii. 215, 300 *n*
Pooles, the (a Southern family), i. 92
Pope, the, and American Catholics, ii. 410-1, 419-20
Port Arthur, i. 242, 388, 389, 391, 393, 393 *n*[2], 400, 402, 408, 408 *n*, 418, 419, 446, 447, 451, 486, 489, 501 *n*[1] ; ii. 61
Port Hamilton, i. 146-7, 146 *n*[2]
Port Lazareff, i. 127, 137
Portsmouth, Treaty of, (1905), i. 501, 501 *n*[2]
Pototzka, Helen, ii. 42
Potsdam, C. S. R. on, i. 226
Pribylov Islands, i. 153
Pringle, Miss, of Charleston, i. 172
Problems of Europe, Dilke's, i. 114*n*[3]
Problems of the Far East, Lord Curzon's, i. 125
Propaganda in the U.S.A., British, ii. 239, 249, 278-9, 311, 319, 320-1, 322, 367-8, 372, 430 : German, ii. 239, 241, 241 *n*[2], 241 *n*, 247-9, 255, 261, 263, 272, 320-1, 346, 357, 361, 414
Protestant clergy in the U.S.A., sympathies of, ii. 261
Prothero, George, ii. 144
Prothero, Lady, i. 19
Prussia, as the maker of Germany, i. 236
Prussia, Prince Augustus William of, ii. 123 *n*
Prussia, Prince Henry of, i. 242, 351
Punch, ii. 282
Quarterly Review, the, ii. 144
Quay, Senator, i. 105
Queen's Gate, 113 A (Spring Rice family home), i. 27, 27 *n*[1], 29, 97
Radolin, German Ambassador in Paris, ii. 67, 67 *n*
Radzivill, Princess, i. 184-5
Radzivill, Prince, i. 184-5
Rattvik (Sweden), visited by C. S. R., ii. 161
Reading, Lord, i. 281-2 : his mission to the U.S.A., ii. 405, 410 : his appointment as Ambassador, ii. 422, 425, 427 : on C. S. R. and the American Government, ii. 430-1
Redistribution Bill (1884), i. 36
Redmond, W., ii. 273 *n*[2]
Reed (of Maine), Mr., i. 104
Reid, Whitelaw, i. 61, 61 *n*, 81, 90, 474 ; ii. 150
Remington, Mr. (painter), i. 326
Reminiscences of Oxford, Tuckwell's, i. 25
Rendel, Miss Daphne (Mrs. Dunne), i. 255
Rennie, E. H., i. 485, 485 *n*[4] ; ii. 25
Renington, Lieut.-Col. C. A'Court, ii. 113, 113 *n*[1]
Revelstoke, Lord, ii. 55
Reynardson, Aubrey Birch, i. 158 *n*, 399
Reynardson, Mrs. Aubrey Birch (Margaret), i. 21 *n*, 158, 158 *n* : letters from C. S. R., from Germany, i. 183 : from Persia (1), i. 283-4, 290-1, 310, 311 : from Egypt, i. 356, 357 : from Russia, i. 368-70, 399-402, 408, 411-3, 434, 446-7 : from Persia (2), 89-90 ; ii. 92-4 : *see also* Spring Rice, Margaret
Reynardson, Evelyn (niece of C. S. R.), i. 369
Rhodes, Cecil, i. 186, 190, 335, 347, 357
Rhodes scholars, German, ii. 119
Rhondda, Lord, letter to C. S. R., ii. 319-20
Rhys, original form of name Rice, i. 3
Rice, Allan (cousin of C. S. R.), i. 60, 89
Rice, Sir Stephen, i. 3
Rice, Stephen Edward, i. 4
Richmond, U.S.A., i. 169
Richthofen, German Foreign Minister, ii. 69, 69 *n*[1]
Riga, ii. 2, 20

Rivaulx Abbey, C. S. R. on, ii. 49
Rives, Amelie, i. 93-4
Roberts, Lord, his campaign for national service, ii. 108, 112-3, 329
Robertson, Sir Malcolm, on C. S. R., ii. 213-4
Robinson, Douglas, i. 159, 159 *n*
Robinson, Mrs. (of Henderson House), i. 159
Robinson, Sir H., on General Gordon, i. 33
Rodichev of Tver, member of first Duma, ii. 42
Roman Empire, C. S. R. on the fall of the, i. 214, 215-6
Roosevelt, Miss Alice (Mrs. Douglas Robinson), i. 159, 159 *n*, 326, 494, 494 *n*
Roosevelt, Elliot (brother of Theodore R.), i. 60
Roosevelt, Mrs. Elliot, i. 60
Roosevelt, Kermit, i. 161 ; ii. 396, 397
Roosevelt, Quentin, ii. 395
Roosevelt, Teddy, ii. 229, 326, 359, 376
Roosevelt, Theodore, i. 3, 15 : meets C. S. R., i. 46, 48 : C. S. R. his best man, i. 48 : (1886-8), i. 49-50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 60-1, 61, 65, 67, 73, 76, 89, 94, 95 : (1889-91), i. 100, 101, 104, 113, 115 : (1894), i. 160, 160 *n*, 161, 162 : (1895-6), i. 186, 196 : (1898), i. 246, 248-9, 250, 251, 252, 272 : (1899-1901), i. 282, 291, 294, 299, 300, 326, 346 : (1902), i. 350 : (1903), i. 367, 368, 371, 374, 376, 378 : (1904), i. 391, 393, 414, 426, 429, 433, 434, 435, 448 : (1905), i. 449, 451, 452, 454-5, 455 *n*, 460, 465, 472, 483, 486, 490, 490 n^2, 491, 491 *n*, 493, 494, 495, 496, 498-9, 503-4 ; ii. 7, 11 : (1906), ii. 24, 25, 65-6, 70, 70 *n*, 84 : (1907-8), ii. 198, 111-2, 121, 123, 124, 125 : (1909-10), ii. 132, 139, 151 : (1911) ii. 161 *n*, 167, 167 *n* : (1912), ii. 168, 170, 172, 174, 175 : (1913), ii. 178, 180, 185, 186, 187, 194 : (1914-5), ii. 214, 215, 217, 218-9, 245, 253, 255, 268, 287, 288, 302 : (1916), ii. 311, 329, 337, 365 : (1917), ii. 382, 393, 395, 415, 428, 429 : his African shooting trip, ii. 123-4 140-1 : letters from C. S. R. to, from Germany (1896-7), i. 207-8, 210-3, 214, 215-6, 227-9, 232-5 : from Constantinople (1898), i. 268-70 : from Russia (1904), i. 394-7, 419-23, 435-6, 436-7, 438-40 : from Sweden (1909), ii. 140 : from Washington (1913), ii. 191-1 : (1914), ii. 227-30 : (1915), ii. 252-3, 289-90, 293 ; letter from Sir Edward Grey to (Dec. 1915), ii. 290 : letters to C. S. R. (1886), i. 48 : (1887), i. 72 : (1896), i. 209 : (1897), i. 229-32 : (1898), i. 271 : (1899), i. 291-4, 305-7 : (1900), i. 317, 331-2 : (1901), i. 344-5, 347 : (1903), i. 370, 375, 377-8, 382-3 : (1904), i. 397-9, 407, 416-9, 434, 441-6 : (1905), i. 469-72, 478-80, 486-9 ; ii. 8-11 : (1907-8), ii. 109-11, 118, 123-4 : (1909), ii. 140, 141 : (1910), ii. 150 : (1912), ii. 173-4 : (1913), ii. 185, 187 : (1915), ii. 251-2, 287-8, 288, 289 : (1916), ii. 323-4 : (1917), ii. 395-6: letters to Lady Spring Rice after C. S. R.'s death, i. 76 ; ii. 436 : letters to Baron Kaneko on Russo-Japanese peace terms, i. 487-9
Roosevelt, Mrs. Theodore, i. 48, 52, 60, 209, 213, 229, 269, 306, 347, 359 n^2, 382 ; ii. 8, 123-4, 141, 150, 185, 229, 396, 397 : letters from C. S. R. to, from Washington (1894), i. 160 : from Germany 1896-7), i. 196, 214-5, 217-8 : from England (1898), i. 249 : from Constantinople (1898), i. 271-2 : from Persia (1899-1900), i. 294-5, 299-300, 327-8 : from Egypt (1903), i. 359-60 : from Russia (1903-5), i. 368, 372-4, 376-7, 383, 393-4, 409, 437, 451, 483-5, 490-503 : (1905-6), ii. 4-7, 11-6, 23-5, 34-5 : from England (1907-8), ii. 108-9, 111-2, 121, 124-5 : letters to C. S. R. (1894), i. 161 : (1899), i. 326 : (1902), i. 350
Root, Senator Elihu, i. 367, 469, 480 ; ii. 8, 253, 256-7, 298-9, 315, 415-6 : letter from C. S. R., i. 474-8
Rosebery, Lady, i. 58, 109, 114
Rosebery, Lord, i. 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 50, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, 113, 113 *n*, 114, 124, 124 n^2, 136, 138, 145, 154, 155, 156, 156 *n*, 180, 185, 242, 325, 347-9, 366, 369, 453 ; ii. 188 : his *Life of Peel*, i. 301, 301 n^1
Rosen, *see* von Rosen, Baron
Rothschilds, the, i. 194, 239 : in Persia, i. 338

Rough Riders, Roosevelt's book, i. 299, 299 *n*, 301
Roumania, ii. 180 : the King of (1898), i. 264
Rouvier, M., i. 483
Rowing, at Eton, i. 10, 17 : at Oxford, i. 17, 19, 21-2
Rozhdestvensky, Admiral, i. 390, 451, 460, 469, 469 *n*, 472
Runciman, ii. 263
Russell (at the British Embassy, Vienna, 1912), ii. 176
Russell, Lord John, ii. 184, 184 n^1
Russia (1903), i. 362-78 : the Russo-Japanese War, i. 388-440 : contraband of war in, i. 426, 430-1, 432-3, 439 ; ii. 128, 128 n^2 : peculations in, i. 457 : Roosevelt on peace terms, ii. 9-10 : President Roosevelt's intervention in the R.-J. war, i. 441-504 : the revolutionary movement and the first Duma, ii. 1-51 : the Anglo-Russian entente, ii. 52-76 : and Bulgaria, 1761, i. 198, 364-5 ; ii. 9 : and the Dardanelles, ii. 126, 128 : finances of, ii. 22-3, 26, 31-2, 32 n^2, 33, 55-6, 59, 66, 75 : government of (1903), i. 372 : peasants of, i. 369-70 : prestige before and after the R.-J. War, i. 179, 465-6, 469 : raids on Embassies, 437 : reform movement in, i. 456, 461, 462, 464 : in Asia, i. 196, 323, 362, 373, 377, 394-5, 402, 420, ii. 53-4, 65, 82 : in China, i. 146-7, 198, 208, 242, 406-7, 415-6, 420-1, 426 : in Persia, i. 278, 281, 281 n^1, 283, 285-6, 289, 297, 312, 313, 314, 318, 319, 338-9, 345, 362, 415 ; ii. 53, 54-5, 65, 71, 72, 75, 77, 82-3, 85, 86, 88, 95-6, 96-7, 101, 102-3, 104-6, 107 : in Turkestan, i. 389, 409 : relations with France (1893), i. 146 : (1896), i. 192, 205, 263, 265 : (1904), i. 409, 415, 428, 438, 438 *n* : (1905), i. 475, 493, 497, 501-2 : (1906), ii. 33 : with Germany (1896-7), i. 186, 188, 190, 192, 199, 225, 228-9, 230, 234, 242 : (1898), i. 259 : (1904), i. 395-6, 398-9, 404-6, 414-6, 422-3, 427-8 : (1905), i. 489, 493, 500 : (1909-10), ii. 146, 158 : with Great Britain, i. 376, 395, 399, 400, 403-6, 410, 435, 498, 501-2 ; ii. 75 : with Japan before the R.-J. War, i. 141, 242, 373, 376-7, and after, i. 467 : with Serbia, ii. 135 : with Turkey, i. 198-9, 259, 264 ; ii. 9, 75 : with the U.S.A., i. 229, 231, 376, 377-8, 395, 399, 406, 409-10, 415 ; ii. 200, 201 : in the Great War, ii. 295 : *see also* Afghanistan, India
Russian character, C. S. R. on, i. 228-9, 374, 419, 425-6, 435 ; ii. 56 : Roosevelt on, i. 231-2, 397, 416-7, 470

St. Ives, C. S. R. on, i. 246
St. Petersburg, life in, i. 370, 371 : in the Russo-Japanese War, i. 393-4, 409-10, 446-7, 457 : in the revolutionary movement of 1905, ii. 4-7, 12, 21 : British colony in, ii. 3-4, 21
St. Sofia at Constantinople, C. S. R. on, i. 257, 263, 271-2, 273, 340
Sackville-West, Sir Lionel (Lord Sackville), i. 49, 55, 56-8, 68 *n*, 69, 90, 94, 100, 410 ; ii. 261-2, 429, 309, 309 n^3
Sackville, Lord, *see* Sackville-West, Sir Lionel
Sackville-West, Miss, i. 58
Sadrazam, the (Persian Grand Vizier), ii. 81, 87
Saghalin, i. 486, 487, 489, 491, 492, 496, 499, 499 *n* ; ii. 9
Salem, Mass., i. 106-7
Salisbury, Lord (1884-7), i. 35, 36, 38, 40, 43, 44, 46, 55, 77 : (1892-6) i. 125, 138, 146, 154, 155, 176, 180, 186, 190 *n*, 196, 201, 203 : (1897-8), i. 217, 220, 242, 260, 263 : (1900-2), i. 318, 338, 345, 351 : his retirement, i. 353 366 ; ii. 77, 144, 208, 372 : caricatured by C. S. R. (1885), i. 37
Salisbury Plain, ii. 132, 132 *n*
Salonica, ii. 179, 349, 349 n^2
Samoa, i. 137, 201, 203, 203 *n*, 247
Samoan Conference (1887), i. 68, 68 *n*, 69
Samson, Admiral, i. 292
Sanderson, Sir Thomas (Lord Sanderson), i. 40, 40 n^2, 345 ; ii. 1, 3
Satow, Sir Ernest, i. 392
Schiemann, Professor, ii. 127
Schiff, ii. 201, 243, 388
Schleswig-Holstein, the Duke of, i. 189 n^2
Schleswig-Holstein, Prince Albert of i. 205, 205 n^1
Schleswig-Holstein, Princess Alexandra Victoria of, ii. 123 *n*
Schnadhorst, i. 47
Schneider (German Minister at Teheran), i. 314

Schoen, Count, ii. 56, 73, 127
Schroder, *see* Kotze
Schwanebach, ii. 43, 44
Scott, Sir Charles, i. 362, 374 *n*[2], 408
Scott, Sir Walter, i. 5, 95-6
Scott, Charles (son of Sir Walter), his grave in Persia, ii. 92
Seal fisheries, *see* Alaska
Seddon, J. A., ii. 239, 245
Seistan, Russia in, i. 460
Selborne, Lord, i. 20
Selwyn, E. C., i. 19
Seoul, visited by C. S. R. and Curzon, i. 130-1, 138
Serbia, i. 266, 275, 277 : (1908), ii. 126, 135 : (1912), ii. 176-7, 179-80, 183 *n* : in the Great War, ii. 266, 295
" Serge B.," ii. 43
Serge, the Grand Duke, ii. 1
Seymour, Professor, ii. 217, 333, 428 : *see also* House, Colonel
Shanghai, i. 140-1, 147, 148
Shaw, G. B., ii. 248
Sheridan, General, i. 63, 79, 87, 91-3
Sheridan, Mrs., i. 79
Sherman (of Ohio), Senator John, i. 51
Shiah religion, the, ii. 98
Shimoneseki (Shimoneshi), i. 141, 147
Ship Purchase Bill, the (American), ii. 336
Shipping Board, the American, i. 386-7, 385, 408
Shoguns, the, i. 121, 126, 142-3, 144-5
Siam, C. S. R. in, i. 148-51
Siberia, i. 229, 486, 488
Siberian Railway, the, i. 137, 242, 264, 362
Sidgwick, H., i. 10
Siemens, of the Deutsche Bank, Constantinople, i. 264
Silver question, the, in the U.S.A., i. 103, 103 *n*, 104, 105, 111, 116, 156-7, 209
Simon, Oswald, ii. 26-9
Simon, Sir John, ii. 26
Sinai Peninsula, Turkey in the, ii. 41, 41 *n*[3]
Sinn Feiners in the U.S.A., ii. 407-8
Skeffington, Sheehy, ii. 335, 335 *n*
Skipow, ii. 44
Smith, Arthur L., letter to C. S. R., ii. 189-90
Smart, W. L., ii. 94-5
Smyrna, i. 257
Socialists, in Germany, i. 238-9
Solomon Islands, i. 203 *n*
Songs from the Book of Jaffir, C. S. R.'s, i. 310-1
Soudan, the, i. 201, 202 : C. S. R.'s visit to, i. 360-1
" Souls," the, i. 169
South Africa, i. 225 : German emigration to, i. 227, 230
South African War, the, i. 300-2, 303-4, 304-5, 314, 315-6, 345, 351, 443, 455, 502 : Roosevelt on, i. 305-6, 317, 332
South America and Germany, i. 227, 228, 230 ; ii. 10 : effect of U.S. tariff on British trade with, i. 116
Southern States, their history since, 1870, i. 62 : visited by C. S. R. (1888), i. 91-3, 93-4 : (1895), i. 168-72 : " the Nigger question " in the Senate (1890), i. 101
Spain and Cuba, i. 232-3 : and Morocco, ii. 52, 65, 163
Spanish-American War, the, i. 54-5, 219-255, 246, 436, 443
Spectator, the, i. 20 ; ii. 144, 149, 262 *n*, 266, 298
Spencer, Lady, i. 42
Spender, J. A., i. 20 ; ii. 129
Speyer, ii. 201, 222, 225
Spring, Alice, i. 4
Spring Rice, Agnes (sister of C. S. R.), i. 80, 80 *n*[1] : letters from C. S. R., i. 21-2, 23-4 : from Japan, i. 140-1 : from America, i. 158-9, 165-8, 168-72, 173-5
Spring Rice, Antony Theodore (son of C. S. R.), ii. 121, 129, 140, 150, 155, 182
Spring Rice, Bernard (brother of C. S. R.), i. 80, 80 *n*[1]
Spring Rice, Cecil, his ancestry, i. 3-4 : his American women friends i. 53-4 : his clothes, i. 50, 54 : his Corean journal, i. 126-136 : his fastidiousness, i. 11, 53, 54, 56 *n* : his handwriting, i. 45 : his horses, i. 331 ; ii. 89, 90 : his literary tastes, i. 94-5 : his poems, at Eton, i. 12-3 : (1898), 254-5 : (1900), i. 307-11 : (1910), ii. 156-7: (1915), ii. 292-4 : (1917), ii. 394-5, 398-9 : (1918), ii. 432-3 : as Ambassador, ii. 214-7, 428-31 : as athlete, i. 10-11, 17, 19, 21 : as linguist, i. 94-5, 121-2, 286, 299, 311-2 ; ii. 1 *n*[1], 131 : as mountaineer, i. 5, 213, 287, 294 : in London on the eve of the Great War, ii. 210-1 : on American politics, i. 71, 88, 89, 102, 104 :

Anglo-American personal friendships, i. 51 : on aviation (1909), ii. 132, 137, 138, 148 : on the British political parties, i. 169, 411; ii. 111 : on Imperialism, i. 325 : on Japanese politics, i. 142, 144 : on national service, i. 325 ; ii. 112, 116-8, 119-20, 133 : on patriotism, i. 467-8 ; ii. 432-3 : on protection, i. 363, 375 ; ii. 111, 135 : on prospect of war with Germany (1904), i. 395-6, 405-6 : (1905), i. 494, 498 : (1908), ii. 108, 113-4, 115, 116-8, 125 : (1909) ii. 135, 146-8 : (1910), ii. 158 : (1912), ii. 181-2, 181 *n*

Spring Rice, Mrs. Cecil (Lady Spring Rice), i. 412, 413, 446, 447, 453, 489 ; ii. 17, 21, 24, 34, 46, 48, 49, 50, 81, 90, 92-4, 97-8, 110, 111, 121, 122, 134, 140, 141, 143, 150, 154, 156, 158, 160, 171, 174, 182, 210, 288, 314, 324, 426-7, 435, 436-7 : letters from C. S. R. to, from Russia, ii. 37-46 : from Oxford, ii. 119-21 : from Berlin, ii. 126-7 : from Stockholm, ii. 127-30 : *see also* Lascelles, Miss Florence

Spring Rice, Charles (father of C. S. R.), i. 4, 6

Spring Rice, Dominick (nephew of C. S. R.), i. 356 ; ii. 156, 156 *n*, 284 : letter from C. S. R. from America, ii. 285-7

Spring Rice, Mrs. Elizabeth (mother of C. S. R.), i. 4, 7, 10, 16, 27, 29 ; ii. 40 *n* : letters from C. S. R., i. 11, 19

Spring Rice, Evelyn (Lady Farrer), sister of C. S. R., i. 10, 20, 29, 290 *n*, 369 : letters from C. S. R. to, i. 11 : from America, i. 79-80, 165-8, 173-5

Spring Rice, Georgina, ii. 40 *n*

Spring Rice, Gerald (brother of C. S. R.), i. 43, 46, 369 ; ii. 121, 217, 323-4

Spring Rice, Lady, *see* Spring Rice, Mrs. Cecil

Spring Rice, Margaret (Mrs. Reynardson), sister of C. S. R., i. 10, 158, 158 *n* : letters from C. S. R. to, i. 10, 21 : from America, i. 63, 74-6, 80, 107-8, 159-60, 162-3, 165-8, 173-5 : *see also* Reynardson, Mrs. Aubrey Bird

Spring Rice, Mary Elizabeth (Betty, daughter of C. S. R.), ii. 37, 39, 40, 40 *n*, 46, 48, 49, 76, 81, 92, 97, 119, 122, 129, 134, 143, 154, 155-6, 182, 323

Spring Rice, Stephen (elder brother of C. S. R.), i. 6, 9-10, 16, 27, 27 *n*, 29, 38, 82, 356-7, 358, 369, 399 ; ii. 156 *n* : letters from C. S. R. to, i. 5, 11, 20, 20-1, 30 35 : from America (1), i. 55-6, 59-60, 67-8, 70, 72-3, 77-9, 81-2, 83, 84-7, 87-90, 98, 101, 103, 104-6, 106-7, 111, 115-6, 119 : from Japan, i. 123-4 : from Corea, 126-36 : from Siam, 148-51 : from Egypt (1), i. 151 : from America (2), i. 155-6, 157-8, 164 : from Germany, i. 180-3, 183-5, 186-8, 202-3, 204, 216-7, 218, 221-3, 226, 240, 244-6 : from Constantinople, i. 262-3 : from Persia, i. 279-80, 282-3, 286, 290, 300, 311-2, 318, 319, 320-2, 324-6 : from Egypt (2), i. 336, 346, 347, 354-5

Spring Rice, Mrs. Stephen (Julie) i. 150, 152, 322 ; ii. 39 : letters from C. S. R. to, from America (1), i. 110-1 : from Japan, i. 147-8 : from America (2), i. 163-4 : from Persia, i. 330-1, 331 : from Egypt, i. 353, 356

Spring Rice, Thomas (first Lord Monteagle of Brandon), i. 4

Springs, the, ancestors of C. S. R., ii. 120

Stanciow, Bulgarian Minister at St. Petersburg, ii. 41, 41 n^1

Standard Oil Company, the, ii. 242, 312, 342

Stead, W. T., i. 84, 265 ; ii. 3

Stephen, Sir Herbert, letter to C. S. R., ii. 175

Stephen, J. K., i. 9, 11, 12, 15, 20, 26, 27, 30 ; ii. 175

Stewart, Colonel, on General Gordon, i. 32-3

Stockholm, C. S. R. on surroundings of, ii. 130, 138, 155 : C. S. R. on life in, ii. 153, 155-6, 162 : archæological congress at, ii. 169-70

Stoessel, i. 501

Stolypin, ii. 79

Stone, Senator, ii. 273, 273 n^1, 357, 385, 416

Story of Valeh and Hadijeh, the, C. S. R.'s, i. 311-2, 336, 353, 368, 368 *n*, 379-87, 399

Strachey, St. Loe, i. 19-20 ; ii. 262, 262 *n*, 287 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 47

Straus, Oscar, ii. 221-2, 228, 262

Strike, general, in Sweden (1910), ii. 153-4

Suarez, Mexican Vice-President, ii. 179
Submarine warfare, German, ii. 232-3, 253-4, 255, 256-7, 258-9, 259-60, 279, 295, 300-1, 308-9, 310, 311, 315-7, 325, 328, 330, 331, 333, 352, 353, 358-9, 360-1, 364, 367, 368-9, 373, 375, 376, 378-9, 381, 383, 387-8
Sugar industry, German, i. 232
Sullivan, W. L. (prize fighter), i. 79
Surrey, C. S. R. on the beauty of, i. 342-3
"Sussex," sinking of the, ii. 325, 327-8, 328
Sutton, Manners, ii. 210
Sweden, and Germany, ii. 137, 139, 145, 173: and Norway, i. 460; ii. 122, 135, 135 *n*, 137, 144: and Russia, ii. 128, 134, 134 *n*, 137, 139, 144, 145: the Crown Prince of (1909), i. 134: the King of (1908-9), ii. 122, 145: the Queen of, ii. 122-3
Swedish character, C. S. R. on, ii. 131, 134, 139, 153-4, 170, 173
Switzerland, C. S. R.'s visit to, ii. 112
Szögyenyi (Szogeny), Count, i. 217, 217 n^2; ii. 127, 127 n^1

Tabreez, i. 286, 289, 296
Taft, President, i. 469; ii. 8, 161 *n*, 167, 168, 170, 172, 178, 180, 183, 183 *n*
Takahira, M., i. 481; ii. 8, 10
Taku forts, i. 136
Talbot, Lord Edmund (Lord Fitzalan), ii. 210-1, 210 *n*
"Talbot," H.M.S., i. 388, 403
Tamatave, bombardment of, i. 30-1
Tammany, i. 163; ii. 195, 245, 273
Tangier, i. 459-60: *see also* Morocco
Tartars and Armenians, ii. 1, 2
Tashi Lama, the, ii. 74
Tatham, M. T., i. 12, 20
Taylor, Lady (Henry), aunt of C. S. R., i. 4, 58
Taylor, Sir Henry, i. 4, 58, 69, 81, 98
Teheran, i. 257, 262, 263: the Governor of, i. 320-1: C. S. R. on life in, i. 280-1, 281-2, 294, 327-8, 329-30; ii. 89-90, 92-4, 97
Tennyson, Lord, i. 4: C. S. R.'s visit to him at Haslemere, i. 98
Territorial Army, the, ii. 108, 114
Tewfik, Khedive of Egypt, i. 124 n^2
Thayer, Professor W. R., i. 253: letter to C. S. R., ii. 393
Thomas, D. A., *see* Rhondda, Lord
Thwaites, Captain, ii. 395
Tibet, i. 139, 362-3, 364, 389, 392, 409, 415; ii. 72, 72 n^1, 73, 76, 82, 102
Tientsin, i. 136, 138
Tiflis, i. 338; ii. 1
Tilden, Mr., i. 174
Tillett, Ben, i. 99
Times, the, and America, i. 118, 119, 436-7; ii. 161: C. S. R. on, i. 182, ii. 102 and Chirol, i. 184, 185, 191 *n*, 240, 253: the Emperor William on, i. 200: Lord Curzon's Eastern letters to, i. 135, 140: and Lord Curzon, 258: on German newspapers (1898), i. 261; on the Siberian Railway, i. 264: its wrath threatened by W. T. Stead, ii. 3: and Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace, ii. 99: on Germany (1908), ii. 130: on British naval programme (1909), ii. 133: and B. Williams, ii. 144: on Ireland (1910), ii. 157: Lord Northcliffe's attack on C. S. R. in, ii. 402
Togo, Admiral, i. 472, 479, 486
Togugawa (Tokugau), Prince (last of the Shoguns), i. 126, 142-3
Tokio, the British Legation at, 122
Tolstoi and Russian reform movement, i. 461
Tonquin, French war in, i. 139-40, 139 *n*
"Too proud to fight" speech, President Wilson's, ii. 259, 268
Tower, Mr. (American Ambassador in Berlin, 1905), i. 462, 462 n^1
Townsend, Mrs., i. 341
Tranby Croft case, American interest in, i. 114, 114 n^1
Trans-Caspian railway, the, i. 278
Transcaucasia, i. 279
Trans-Siberian Railway, *see* Siberian Railway
Transvaal, the, i. 180, 183, 185-6, 187, 188, 190, 192 *n*, 193-6, 201, 219, 222: *see also* South Africa *and* South African War
Trebizond, i. 196, 279
Trench, Archbishop, i. 19
Trepow, Governor-General of St. Petersburg, i. 391; ii. 1, 4-6, 13, 30, 34
Trevelyan, George, i. 375; ii. 236, 242, 263, 263 *n*, 265
Trilby, C. S. R. on, i. 162, 163
Troubetskoi, Prince Serge, ii. 2, 7
"Trusts," the American (first appearance of word), i. 87, 103, 157; ii. 109, 110, 111-2, 167

Tschirsky, German Foreign Minister, ii. 69
Tsushima, i. 137 : battle of, i. 391, 460, 472, 479 ; ii. 2
Tupper, Sir Thomas, i. 84
Turkey, (1898-9) i. 248, 256-77, (1903) 364-5, 365 *n*[1], 366, (1904-5) 427, 479, 498; ii. 41, 41 *n*[3], 53, (1910) 158, (1912) 176, 179-80, 181 : and Bulgaria, ii. 126-7, 130 : government of, C. S. R. on, i. 267-8, 272-3, 275, 277 : and Persia, i. 288 ; ii. 96, 99, 105, 105 *n* : reform movement in, ii. 124-5 : and the U.S.A., ii. 420
Turkey, the Sultan of (1895), i. 185, (1898) 259, 264, 265, 267-8, 272-3, (1899) 275-6, 277 ; (1906) ii. 59, 75, (1908) 115 : and the Emperor William, i. 256, 261, 261 *n*[3], 266-7, 340 ; ii. 60
Turks, C. S. R. on the, i. 270 : Roosevelt on the, i. 419
Turner, Senator, i. 367
Turners, the (a Southern family), i. 92
Tweedmouth, Lord, ii. 113, 113 *n*[3]
Tycoon, the (the "Temporal Emperor" of Japan), his palace at Kioto, i. 144-5
Tyrrell, Sir William (Lord Tyrrell), ii. 18, 128, 194, 197, 215 *n* : letters from C. S. R., from Sweden, ii. 143-4 : from America, ii. 194-5, 198-201, 202, 205 : letter to C. S. R., ii. 145, 194, 208, 239

Ullswater, i. 4-5, 17, 226
Ulster, i. 123 ; ii. 166, 198, 208, 338 *n*[2] : *see also* Home Rule *and* Carson, Sir Edward
United States of America, the (1887-92), i. 51-120, (1894-7) 153-77, (1913—Aug. 1914) ii. 178-212 : relations with Canada, i. 56, 112, 113, 117, 119, 119 *n*[1-2] 154-5, 292-3 ; ii. 91, 414-5 : with France, i. 196-7, 497 ; ii. 218, 257, 260, 309, 340, 341, 366, 382 : with Germany (pre-war), i. 228, 230-2, 248 : with Great Britain (1887-92) i. 114-5, 119-20, (1894-7) 175, (1895-9) 178, 179, 269-70, 274, 291-3, 304, (1900) 332 : with Mexico, *see* Mexico : with Russia (1897), i. 229, 231, (1904) 376, 377-8, 395, 398, 406, 409-10, 415, (Jan. 1914), ii. 200, 201 : tariffs (1887), i. 81-2, (1890) 104, 105-6, (1891) 114, 116, (1894) 155-6, 157, 165
United States of America during the Great War (Aug. 1914—May 1915), ii. 213-67, (May—Oct. 1915) 268-94, (Oct. 1915—Mar. 1916) 295-324, (Mar.—Nov. 1916) 325-51, (Nov. 1916—Apl. 1917) 352-89, (Apl. 1917—Jan. 1918) 390-425 : relations with Austria, ii. 278, 417 : attitude to the combatants, ii. 218-9, 225, 239-40, 244-5, 247-9, 251-2, 263, 266, 269-70, 287, 297, 298-9, 301, 338, 347, 349, 354, 360, 366, 387 : to the British blockade and contraband of war, ii. 230-8, 241-2, 243, 246-7, 249-50, 253-4, 257, 259, 260, 262, 269, 278, 305, 318, 330, 340-2, 343-4, 349, 352, 354, 358-9, 368, 372-3, 373 *n*, 376, 380, 417-8 : loans to Great Britain (1915), ii. 280-1, 282, 286, 299, (1917) 413 : *see also* C. S. R. on future problems of contraband (1891), i. 112-3 : money and personal aid for the Allies before April 1917, ii. 266-7 : munitions for the Allies ii. 250, 254, 263, 272, 278, 279, 295, 345 : *see also* Irish in the U.S.A. ; Germans in the U.S.A. ; Roosevelt, Theodore ; Wilson, President

Valiahd, the, ii. 84, 84 *n*, 87, 87 *n*[3], 88 : *see also* Mohammed Ali, Shah of Persia
Vanderbilts, the, i. 70, 75-6, 119
Vanderpeereboom (Belgian Minister of Justice), i. 110
Vandervelde, M., ii. 228, 228 *n*[2]
Vansittart, Robert Gilbert, ii. 94, 94 *n*
Vaux of Harrowden, Lord, i. 36
Venezuela (1895), i. 175-6, 185, 192 *n*, 194, 194 *n*[1-2], 195, 270 *n*, ii. 233, 309 *n*[3], 365 : as proposed German base, ii. 386
Venice, C. S. R. at, i. 30
Victoria, Queen, i. 40, 114, 453 : memorial service at Teheran for, i. 330 : Persian belief concerning her, i. 331
Vienna, Congress of, ii. 128
Villa, General, ii. 179, 199, 202, 203-4, 205, 207-8, 326, 327-8, 380
Villiers, Francis, i. 45, 50, 93, 136, 262, 349, 374 *n*[1] ; ii. 143 : letters from C. S. R., from America, i. 172, 175 : from Germany, i. 188-96, 196-202, 203-4, 204-5, 220-1, 224, 236 *n*, 239-40, 240-1,

242-4 : from Constantinople, i. 258, 260, 266-7 : from Persia, i. 280-1, 284-6, 288, 302-3, 313-4, 329 : from Germany, i. 345-6 : from Egypt, i. 336-7, 358 : from Russia, i. 364-5, 371-2 : letters to C. S. R., i. 370-1, 447
Vinaver, ii. 44
Vladimir, the Grand Duke, i. 458 ; ii. 20
Vladivostock, i. 137
von Bieberstein, Baron Marschall, *see* Marschall von Bieberstein
von Bülow, Count (Prince), i. 223, 223 *n*[1], 241 ,245, 351, 427, 494 ; ii. 53, 69, 127-8, 127 *n*[4], 128, 129, 131, 134, 160, 353
von Diederich, Admiral, i. 292
von Papen, Captain (German military attaché), ii. 277, 277 *n*, 280, 296, 298, 298 *n*[2], 302
von Rosen, Baron, i. 481, 495 ; ii. 60
von Stemrich, ii. 127, 127 *n*[2], 128, 130
von Sternburg (" Specky "), i. 294, 294 *n*[2], 359, 367, 435, 435 *n*, 443 *n*[2]
von Tirpitz, Admiral, ii. 134, 368

Wadsworth, Austin, i. 350
Waifs and Strays (collection of Balliol verse), i. 25
Wales, the Prince of (Edward VII.), i. 74, 114, 114 *n*[1], 199 : *see also* Edward VII., King
Wallace, Sir Donald Mackenzie, ii. 99 *n*
Walpole, Sir H., ii. 78-9
Warburg, Mr., of the Federal Reserve Board, ii. 219, 219 *n*[2], 243, 245
Warren, Sir Charles, i. 190 *n*[2]
Washington, George, i. 93, 172
Washington Evening Star, the, ii. 431
Waters (military attaché at Berlin), i. 345
Wayte, W., i. 17
Webster, Daniel, i. 63
Wei-hai-wei, i. 242, 245
Weimar, i. 218
West, *see* Sackville-West
West Africa, British and French in (1897), i. 225, 225 *n*
West Indies, effect of U.S.A. tariff on British trade with, i. 116 : suggested annexation of, by U.S.A., i. 116
Wharton, Mr., i. 112
White, Harry (Counsellor at the American Embassy, London), i. 368, 370, 372, 447, 447 *n*, 451, 454 ; ii. 195-6
White, Mr. and Mrs., i. 169
Whitney, Mr. (Secretary of U.S. Navy, 1887), i. 63, 63 *n*, 70-1, 72, 86 *n*[3], 86-7, 91
Wilde, Oscar, C. S. R. on, i. 215
Williams, Basil, ii. 144
William II., Emperor of Germany, and British volunteers, i. 115 : his Kruger telegram, i. 178-218 : takes oaths of recruits, i. 183 : quarrel with Prince Frederick Leopold of Prussia, i. 189 : his appearance, i. 196, 202 : and the German navy, i. 197, 224 : as yachtsman, i. 199, 200, 204-5, 208, 222-3, 214 : and the Kotze duel, i. 203 : at a review, i. 208 : in Vienna, i. 221 : his relations with his Ministers, i. 224, 226, 239, 252 : and the Diamond Jubilee, i. 225 : and German landowners, i. 236-8 : in Russia and Hungary, i. 240 : as absolute monarch, i. 241 : his " German Michael " and " mailed fist " speech, i. 242 : in Palestine, i. 256 : invites Great Britain to join coalition against the U.S.A. (1898), i. 253 ; ii. 365 : on the South African War, i. 315, 345 : at Tangier, i. 459-60 ; ii. 52, 69 : and Brodrick, ii. 51 : and Mr. Haldane, ii. 51, 51 *n*, 165 : and Japan, ii. 64 : and Russian finance, ii. 75 : (1908) ii. 113, 125, 131-2, (1909) 132-3, 133 *n*[2], (1914) 219, 225, 228, 244, (1917) 373, 411 : his relations with the Czar, i. 436, 439-40, 465, 465 *n*, 478, 480, 481-2, 482 *n*, 485 *n*[1], 489-90, 492, 493, 503-4 ; ii. 24, 53, 56-7, 58, 62, 63, 65, 68-9, 96, 99 : with King Edward, i. 497, 502 *n* : with President Roosevelt, i. 454-5, 469-71, 473, 489 ; ii. 10, 70 : with the Sultan of Turkey, i. 220-1, 256, 261, 266-7, 265 ; ii. 60 : C. S. R. on his character and policy, i. 226, 227, 228, 229-30, 467, 468 ; ii. 73, 132
Willing, Miss, i. 166
Wilson, Miss (Lady Herbert), i. 74, 74 *n*
Wilson, General (of the U.S.A.), i. 250
Wilson, Sir Henry, ii. 211
Wilson, President Woodrow (1911), ii. 161 *n*, (1912) 168, 172, 173, 178,

(1913) 179, 183, 184, 184 *n*², 187, 188-9, 194-5, (Jan.—May 1914) 196, 197, 198-9, 199-201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 208, (Aug. 1914—Apl. 1915) 214-7, 219-21, 223, 225, 226, 233-4, 238, 238-9, 241, 242, 243, 245, 247, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 258-9, 261, 262-3, 264, 266, (May —Sept. 1915) 268, 271-2, 273, 274 *n*², 276, 279, 281, 282, 284, 286, (Oct. 1915—Mar. 1916) 295-6, 297-8, 299, 300-1, 301-3, 302 *n*, 304-5, 307-8, 310, 311-3, 313-4, (Mar.—Nov. 1916) 325-6, 329, 331-2, 333-4, 336, 337-8, 339, 341, 345, 346-7, 348-9, 351, (Nov. 1916 —Apl. 1917) 352-3, 353-4, 355, 356-7, 358, 360-1, 364-7, 367-8, 372-3, 378, 380, 381-3, 383-5, 387-9, (Apl. 1917—Jan. 1918) 391-3, 395, 402-3, 404, 406-7, 408, 408-9, 409-10, 411-13, 414, 417-8, 422-5, 428-9, 430 : C. S. R. on his character, ii. 186 : defence of his attitude by C. S. R. (Feb. 1916), ii. 315-7 : his Irish ancestry, ii. 354, 393 : his efforts for peace, ii. 255-6, 258-9, 270, 331-2, 333, 334, 339, 348, 352-3, 358, 361, 364-5, 367-8, 369, 370-2, 373-5, 376-7 : letters from C. S. R. (Sept. 1914) ii. 223, 234, (Oct. 1914) 235-6, 236-7 : letters to C. S. R. (1913) ii. 197, (Oct. 1915) 314, (June 1916) 324

Wister, Owen, letter to C. S. R., ii. 271

Witte, Count, i. 225, 372, 405, 427, 428, 457, 463, 466, 481, 490, 495, 496-7, 497 *n*, 498, 499, 500, 503 ; ii. 2, 4-7, 8-9, 12, 13-4, 15-6, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34-5, 36, 37, 44, 46, 54-5, 57-8, 60-1, 62, 67, 67 *n*, 68-9, 70

Wolff, Sir Drummond, i. 35-6

Wolseley, Lord, i. 34, 35, 43

Women suffrage in U.S.A., i. 163

Woodrow Wilson and His Work, Dodd's, ii. 243 *n*²

Wordsworth (the poet), i. 4, 5, 57, 94, 206, 212, 235, 309 ; ii. 149, 212, 223

Wyndham, George, i. 9

Yalu, battle of the (1894), i. 393, 393 *n*¹

Yalu River, battle of the (1904), i. 388

Yildiz Kiosk, *see* Turkey, Sultan of

Younghusband, Colonel, i. 362, 364, 409 : letter to C. S. R., i. 364

Young Turk movement, the, ii. 124-5, 126

Zapeta (of Mexico), ii. 326

Zemstvos, the, ii. 1-2, 14-5, 26

Zimmermann, ii. 375, 379

Zionists, in the U.S.A., ii. 420-2

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